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Abstract 
Poems to Open Palms: Praise Performance and the State in the Sultanate of Oman 
by 
Bradford J. Garvey 
 
Advisor: Jane C. Sugarman 
This dissertation traces the musical constitution of moral, economic, material, and social 
relations between rural communities and the state in the Sultanate of Oman. I argue that 
communities embedded within the authoritarian state hegemony of the Sultanate form and affirm 
social relations with the state through its embodied proxy, Sultan Qābūs bin Ṣa‘īd Āl Bū Ṣa‘īd, 
via the reciprocal exchange of state-directed giving and praise poetry responses. The circuit of 
exchange catalyzes the social production of political legitimacy and ensures continued generous 
distribution by mythopoetically presenting such cyclicity as resulting from elite and non-elite 
mutuality. This praise poetry is rendered within two song and dance complexes: al-razḥa, a 
collective war dance with drumming and antiphonal choral singing, and al-‘āzī, a choral ode with 
a solo singer, tight poetic structure, and a chorus of responders. Through a close analysis of the 
content and context of praise poems sung by Arab men’s performance troupes experienced over 
a year of participant observation fieldwork, I argue that praise poetry is an overlooked site for the 
construction and negotiation of state political legitimacy. Drawing on heterodox and Gramscian 
political economy, I show how musical performance operates within broader circuits of 
exchange by functioning as a site wherein non-market economic logics are fused with moral, 
performative, and political norms. Instead of simply tracing a circuit of utilitarian exchange 
(praise for gifts for praise), I focus on the how gifts and their responses reciprocally negotiate 
social relations between state elites and non-elites. By focusing on the words and actions of non-
elites as they integrate the various proffered benefits of a distributive state into their own 
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communities, I attempt to complicate standard explanations of Arabian Gulf politics and 
statecraft. I posit two social mechanisms—one which relates generosity and political legitimacy 
and one that relates performance with the construction of a moral political community—and then 
follow them through their operation in social space. By singing praise poetry at celebrations of 
state distribution, praisers rhetorically render such state gifting as “generosity,” which is deeply 
tied to good leadership in the Omani context. In addition, praisers simultaneously 
mythopoetically generate a political community of generous givers and grateful receivers who 
are linked by relations of history, homeland, religion, and kinship. In this way, praise “opens 
palms” and induces continued elite distributions. However, unequal gifting is fraught with social 
hazard and threatens to trap communities in dependency relations with the state. By attending to 
the pragmatics of performance, however, I argue that razḥa and ‘āzī tacitly address this threat of 
dependency by performing strength and dignity while simultaneously seeking to redraw the 
relations of unequal gifting from ones of dependency to ones of mutual obligation—a “moral 
economy.” This ethnomusicological study is an attempt to show how musical and linguistic 
performers draw on a wide variety of tacit and explicit economic, moral, political, and communal 
factors in order to take social action in a context of authoritarian state hegemony. 
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A Note on Translation and Transliteration. 
Translating and transliterating Omani Arabic is a complex task. I have chosen to use the standard 
of transliteration adopted by the International Journal of Middle East Studies due to its 
simplicity.  
 
 
 ء = ’  
 ى ،ا  = ā  
ب = b 
ت = t 
ث = th 
ج = j 
ح = ḥ 
خ = kh 
د = d 
ذ = dh 
ر = r 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ز = z 
س = s 
ش = sh 
ص = ṣ 
ض = ḍ 
ط = ṭ 
ظ = ẓ 
ع = ‘ 
غ = gh 
ف = f 
ق = q 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ك = k 
ل = l 
م = m 
ن = n 
ه = h 
و = w, ū, aw, -uww 
ي = y, ī, ay, -iyy 
ة = a 
لا = al, -l-  
  ِ  ٍ  = i, in 
   ِ  ِ  = a, an 
ٌ  ٍ  = u, u 
 
xviii 
 
I have attempted to render the sounds of Interior Omani dialectical speech with some spellings 
but not with new orthographic characters. This is only for parsimony: words such as:  ! دوه
دوه  “knock knock!” are perhaps better rendered with a dipthong like “hōd” instead of “hawd” 
but readers familiar with such phonic differences will be able to identify issues like these with 
relative ease.  
Translation issues were constant with this project because no standard dictionary of Omani 
dialectical Arabic is available. Dialects differ in substantial ways from neighborhood to 
neighborhood, let alone over the large province my research was located within. While I learned 
as much as I could and checked translations as often as possible, some words and phrases eluded 
even my most poetically inclined colleagues and interlocutors. When there were questions or 
issues, I chose what I took to be the best rendering of the word or phrase. Errors are mine alone.  
Some features of Interior Omani Arabic as I learned it that may confuse speakers of other Arabic 
dialects are (1) the use of infixes (-inn-) between pronomial suffixes and verbal nouns (e.g., هن فياش
shāyifinnuh, “I saw him”); (2) the use of  موي yawm for “when” as in امدنع ‘andimā; (3) the 
alternation between the “hard” Egyptian jīm (g) and the “soft” Emirati jīm (y); (4) the use of shay 
for the Shami “fī” in “there are…” constructions; (5) wāgid as a general amplifier/intensifier 
(more, lots, many, very, etc.) (6) frequent use of anaptyxis: masqaṭ rendered as musqāṭuh, etc.; 
(7) ultimate emphasis when using pronomial suffixes: e.g., ’a-KHĪ “my brother,” ’ab-WĪ “my 
father”; (8) use of -ish for the 2p f.s., e.g., kitābish “your (f.) book.”  
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Introductions: Approaching the state by way of poetry: Praise, performance, and political 
economy 
Āh, yiwāb, yallah yiwāb!—Ah, answer, O God, answer! 
So began a poem sung before Qābūs bin Sa‘īd bin Ṭaymūr Āl Bū Sa‘īdī, the Sultan of 
Oman, as similar poems have begun before similar Omani rulers for more than a century. This 
time, the poem was given on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Sultan’s taking the 
throne. On that day in November 2010, thousands of heavily armed Omani men were gathered in 
Muscat to sing praise poetry, arranged in neat squares under the Sultan’s stoic gaze.  The poetry, 
composed specifically for the event, was an Omani ‘āzī, or choral ode, presented after a 
collective sword dance, razḥa. Both performances, addressed to the Sultan, praised his leadership 
and the Omani renaissance he brought about. Such performances have marked nearly every 
National Day (yawm al-waṭanī) since 1970, though perhaps never with such spectacular 
character. The singer of the poetry, the famous Muḥammad al-Marzūqī, stood tall in his white 
dishdāsha and clutched the straight Omani sayf sword in one hand and its sheath and turs buckler 
in the other. A maṣar, a large, embroidered square of thin wool, was wrapped painstakingly 
around the crown of his head, while a matching belt wrapped and framed the deeply bent khanjar 
dagger that he wore at the front of his waist. Al-Marzūqī marched the group straight towards an 
open gap in a huge arrangement of other Omani men, arranged in tight, uniform squares: 
shirtless wrestlers, phalanxes of police and soldiers, and thousands of other similarly dressed 
performers. The performers were all members of one or another of the hundreds of 
governmentally registered performance troupes from all over northern Oman. Two-headed, 
slightly hourglass-shaped drums, a larger and a smaller historically twinned, hung from the 
shoulders of drummers, thundering out responses in the open space between poetic and human 
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performing lines.. As Al-Marzūqī sang out the lines, he held up his arms and turned his head and 
trunk back and forth, addressing audiences actual, televisual, and virtual to the conclusion:  
،دلابلا ناطلس سوباق سوباق سوباق 
  نيعمجأ كلدعل دهشن    
Qābūs, Qābūs, Qābūs, sulṭān al-bilād,  
Nashhad li-‘adalak ’ajma‘īn. 
 
Qābūs, Sultan of the land,  
We all bear witness to your justice! 
 
Al-Marzūqī was at the head of a large group of similarly dressed and armed men who roared 
responses to each hemistich of the ode, beating the drums in affirmation. 
  Yā slimt! They cried, “Truly!” 
Al-Marzuqi continued: 
،داتولا تيلعت نماي 
        دنس كمساب تفرشتو   
Yā man ta‘alayt al-witād,  
Wa tashsharaft bi-’ismak sanad! 
 
O, you who raised up the wall-pegs, 
You are honored as your name is treasure and pillar and bond.  
 
Music Example 1 contains a sketch of two selections from this performance, one drawn from the 
very first line, and one from the last. Measure 1 represents the first half of the first couplet. Measure 
2 is the final half of the couplet, including the unchanging final addition, ṣubyān yā kibār al-
shiyyim (youths of the greatest moral character). Measure 3 skips to the the first hemistich of the 
final couplet, the intensive climax of the piece. The event, broadcast live on national television 
and radio channels, recorded on video and CD, was sold in stores and posted on dozens of internet 
forums and on Youtube. The 2010 performance is often referenced by Omanis as emblematic of 
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‘āzī, a perfect performance of what it is and does, and indeed, it has served as the basis for 
imitations both in Oman and abroad.  
 
Music example  1. A sketch of the first couplet of the 40th National Day ‘āzī vocal line, 
which is the basis for all others except the final couplet.  
The 2010 performance raises a number of questions about the role of sung poetry and 
performance in the mediation of the state. According to the Omani Centre for Traditional Music, 
the people of the Sultanate perform some 180+ distinct musical practices. Why did the Omani 
state, known for its stability and prosperity, choose to celebrate its 40th anniversary in this way, 
with historical genres of sung poetry and a war dance? What is the history of these practices of 
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praise? What does such musical praise do? Who sings, to whom is it directed, and why? What do 
performances of these collective praise practices tell us about the ways in which political authority 
in Oman is imagined, enacted, transmitted, communicated, and reproduced? If these genres were 
selected for this highly politicized context, what role, if any, has collective performance had in the 
development and legitimation of Omani political structures and shaping of political space?  
This dissertation is a study of the relationships between men’s public performance and 
political authority amongst Arabs in the Sultanate of Oman, based on field research conducted 
over thirteen months between 2015-2017. In it, I propose to study the social legitimation of 
contemporary political authority in the Sultanate of Oman by closely studying Omani Arab 
performance practices, called al-funūn al-sha‘abiyya (lit., “popular arts”). I especially foreground 
performances like the one recounted above, that are framed as praise responses to the Sultan, the 
state’s embodied duplicate. As we shall see, such praise is often rendered as a response to state-
directed giving, rhetorically producing it as generosity—a trait that is tightly linked with good 
leadership in Oman. Rather than studying these practices as reflecting or commenting on other, 
more concretely political behavior (as we might imagine protest music does), I frame them as 
political behavior. They are an irreducible part of a political economic order predicated on 
generous giving.  
Poetry and dance may seem a strange way to enter the study of politics. This is perhaps 
doubly true of praise. However, the specific configuration of ideals of political authority, 
especially links between generosity and good leadership, historical patterns of material inequality, 
governance in authoritarian oil-states, and cultural associations among poetry, giving, and 
authority make such an entry appropriate. Performance has not just functioned as praise for Omani 
Arab elites, however, it has also accompanied their armies and colonial ventures. This relationship 
5 
 
 
 
has further cemented the role of public performance as central to state hegemony. I will argue that 
poets, especially praise poets, have historically occupied an important role in Omani political 
economy by shaping the interactions between rulers and the ruled through facilitating 
communication and material and musical exchange between them, and that this historical 
relationship has been seized upon by contemporary capitalist state agents to solidify contemporary 
state hegemony. 
The main way that Omani state elites have sought to legitimate the contemporary state-
form is by providing state-directed development and other distributions of state largesse, which, 
as an aspect of good leadership, demonstrate right authority, leadership capacity, and responsible 
rulership. Leaders give. Understood as a kind of gift that necessitates response amongst recipients, 
state generosity prompts certain lower-status groups to offer praise as a form of recognition of that 
legitimate leadership, in order to incorporate that generosity into deserving communities. Since 
gifts between unequal groups have the potential to draw individuals and communities into 
dependency relations with the giver, praise is also taken as a site for lower-status praisers to 
represent themselves and make claims on the higher-status gifter. Whether or not all these aspects 
are successfully implemented or always function adequately is highly contextually dependent, but 
this basic function is an understanding that is implicitly shared amongst many performers and non-
performers alike. Generosity, as a value that is widely shared across class lines, can function as an 
avenue of communication across those lines as well as a source of temporary cross-class alliances: 
hegemony. 
However, this study does not simply track generosity and giving as a hegemony-producing 
strategy of state elites. Rather, I focus on non-elite responses to generosity. As Antonio Gramsci 
wrote, “hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the 
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groups over which hegemony is to be exercised” so “that a certain compromise equilibrium should 
be formed” (1971:161). Hegemony is a tensely negotiated and only fitfully realized 
rapprochement, drawing unsystematically on some values and practices that are shared across 
classes and some that are not. Taking this reversed approach highlights how state-directed giving 
is not simply a unidirectional process, but a conflictual, semi-voluntary, and constantly reevaluated 
cross-class compromise: in Katherine Bowie’s terms, a détente. Generosity, as a mutually valued 
ideal shared between elites and non-elites, forms both a useful tool for elites and an exploitable 
resource for non-elites. I take an ethnomusicological approach to the production of hegemony as 
a function of the mutual give and take, the push and pull, of generosity and praise. Praise doesn’t 
just mechanically respond to or account for generosity: it changes it, compels it, acts on it. In 
Oman, praise and generosity are not simply batted back and forth by vain elites and sycophantic 
non-elites: they circle each other in tense equilibrium.  
To draw out these varied aspects of performance and its relationship to the political efforts 
of elites, I often draw on Antonio Gramsci’s insights into the complex interweaving of political, 
economic, ideological, and cultural elements in the formation of state hegemony to help inform a 
critical perspective that attends to the actual material relations of domination as well as the 
intricacy and historical embeddedness of poetic performance, social relations, and gifting. I argue 
that subordinated praisers use praise—and the ideal models of authority that are communicated in 
praise—to insist on the mutual interdependence of lower and higher classes in making a just, well-
led, and moral community. They do so, in their view, without ceding autonomy. Praisers perceive 
their praise as continuing but also prompting circuits of giving and praising between dominant and 
subordinated classes. Praise opens palms. Ultimately, I and my Omani interlocutors see in praise 
the potential to shape the behavior of leaders in such a way that bends them towards justice, 
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redistribution, and caring responsibility—not by demanding representation due to taxation, but by 
manipulating the fame, name, and reputation of elites.  
Towards a Political-Economic Ethnomusicology of the Oman 
While I draw on a variety of fields, I cannot do so with equal expertise. I see this 
ethnographic and ethnomusicological research as making important contributions to three 
overlapping literatures: (1) the ethnomusicology and anthropology of the Middle East, specifically 
of the Arabian Gulf and Peninsula, and the relationship between men’s poetry and politics; (2) 
political and economic ethnomusicology; and (3) and the anthropology and ethnomusicology of 
the state. 
a. Poetry and Its Forms of Life: Ethnomusicology of the Middle East. 
I engage three broad strands in the ethnomusicology and anthropology of the Middle East. 
First, I continue and extend studies of the relationship between performance, politics, and social 
relations. Second, I draw upon studies of political organization to show how performances of 
praise intervene in a political economy that has historically been predicated on generous 
redistribution. Finally, I extend research on Islamic legal and intellectual interpretations of the 
permissibility of music in an Ibāḍī context, arguing that scholars have underestimated the 
pragmatic justification of sonic practices deemed practically useful by overemphasizing the 
capacity of sonic formations to help develop ethical or moral personhood.  
The Middle East is an ideal setting for this kind of research because, over the last thirty 
years, scholars have increasingly noted the deep relationship between politics and performance in 
the region. J. Andrew Bush has advocated that “the politics of poetry [in the Middle East] is a 
problem to be discovered anew in each milieu” (2016, 203). Tracing poetry as an everyday activity 
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of politics, rather than a spectacular one, compels us to reckon with how poetry works to “distribute 
obligations and attachments across a set of relationships” that call our notions of subjectivity, 
temporality, and the ordinary to “account” for themselves (202). Bush’s urge to rediscover the 
relationship between poetry and politics helps to situate the performance of praise as a crucial 
amplifying node in the circulation of elite generosity, praise, and legitimation.  
Anthropologists have shown how expressive practices form an arena for a variety of 
ideological and political engagement, ranging from discourses of urban modernity (Shannon 
2006), to tribal mediation (Caton 1990). The study of poetry, both formal, ceremonial poetry and 
local vernacular genres, has long been recognized as a lens into Arab men’s political worlds. As 
Khaled Furani argues, “poetic forms and forms of life are inseparable” (2012, 2). Such work has 
dealt with poets’ roles in managing interpersonal,1 intergroup,2 or socio-political conflicts,3 while 
other scholars have focused on poetry’s ability to manifest alternative social ideologies4 or its 
relationship to political power in the present and past.5 Anthropologically informed research into 
Arab poetry has sometimes taken its political function to be exhausted by its role as a medium for 
conflict. As Abu-Lughod pointed out in Veiled Sentiments (1986) and emphasized in her new 1999 
preface, the study of men’s poetry in particular has seen it as a form of agonistic contest, often 
ignoring its other pragmatic, economic, emotionally affective, affiliative, and communicative 
features. It was Steven Caton’s work in the late 1980s and early 1990s that helped to show the 
                                                          
1 Kurpershoek 1994-2005, 2001; Meeker 1979; Sbait 1989, 1993; Yaqub 2006. 
2 Abu Athera 1995; Bailey 1991; Caton 1990; Sowayan 1985, 1994. 
3 Bamia 2001; Elgebily 2017; Holes and Abu Athera 2009; Kadhim 2004; McDonald 2013; 
Miller 2007; Tamplin 2018; Wagner 2008. 
4 Abu-Lughod 1986; Al-Ghadeer 2009; Furani 2012; Reynolds 1995. 
5 Ali 2010; Ciucci 2012; Miller 2007; Rodionov 1992; Taminian 1999, 2001. 
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conciliatory aspect of poetry, one in which armed conflict is mitigated, rather than celebrated, by 
persuasive words (1987, 1990). Nevertheless, much work since Caton and Abu Lughod’s insights 
has refocused on the role of poetry in conflict, though this has been expanded beyond the narrow 
confines of martial valor, tribal bellicosity, or fakhr boasting to include critiques of colonialism, 
imperialism, patriarchy, tribalism, and Zionism. Other trends have moved to studying poetry’s role 
in creating selves, both religious and otherwise (Furani 2012, 2018; Bush 2015, 2016). Perhaps 
because previous research has so strongly emphasized conflict as the context for poetry, or the self 
as a central nexus, there has been little ethnographic attention to praise. Praise is quintessentially 
other-regarding poetry. Praise is neither the celebration of martial conflict nor its conciliation, but 
rather a deep affirmation of connection, dependence, and mutuality. Hearing praise as guided by 
Omanis, as this dissertation does, sheds light on a form of politics that focuses on building, 
affirming, and maintaining socio-political relationships within a status-differentiated group rather 
than amongst separate classes. Politics, so often seen as conflict in the Middle East, can be 
conciliatory and deferential without being “weak,” “indifferent,” or “passive.”  
Abu-Lughod’s conclusion further criticizes previous work on Middle Eastern politics for 
minimizing the role of emotional engagement in political activity, which is seen as a rational male 
domain (1986, 255-8). Flagg Miller’s The Moral Resonance of Arab Media (2007) helps to address 
this second issue by showing how particular registers of poetic speech and topicality help 
constitute poets as moral agents who eschew material gain (2007, 23). Yet, there is little research 
on the ways in which actual performance parameters help to shape and communicate the emotional 
content of ostensibly “rational” political speech. Khaled Furani’s (2012, 2018) sensitive attention 
to the technical aspects of poetic composition is a welcome examination of the ways in which 
poetry’s metrics are understood as a means of becoming “free” through formal mastery. I pay 
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special attention not to metrical features, but instead to the pragmatic features of performance that 
help build and propagate emotional states amongst performers alongside texts. I therefore respond 
to Sheila Carapico’s (2004) “invitation” to study the Arabian Peninsula by studying emotionally 
charged oral performance with explicit political-economic ends in Oman. My study extends the 
literature on the close connection between performance and politics in the Middle East by 
identifying a precise and historically continuous mechanism for this connection, contextualized 
within a process of authoritarian state-formation that has gained broad legitimacy via the expansion 
of historically salient modes of poetical-cum-political engagement.  
Much recent work in the anthropology of poetry has emphasized its sonic and linguistic 
aspects, seeing these aspects as a way to move between semantic, lexical and affective aspects of 
poetic speech (Fox 2016; Furani 2012; Webster 2016, 2018). Taking seriously the rhythmic, 
melodic, and performative features of sung poetry amongst Arabs in the Peninsula may be an 
especially helpful extension of this literature on Arab poetry. Ethnomusicology has always adopted 
this analytical specificity, but in the Arab Gulf states it is an emerging field. The publication of 
Lisa Urkevich’s The Musical Traditions of the Arabian Peninsula (2015), a comprehensive 
catalogue of performance forms grouped by geographic region, is an important basis for 
comparative work. Urkevich’s extensive fieldwork and broad familiarity with Gulf musical scenes 
is unequalled in English-language research. However, she does not include any examples from the 
“southern Gulf” (the UAE or Oman), despite the fact that many genres discussed in the text have 
direct analogues in those areas. The sensitivity of Urkevich’s fieldwork setting dissuaded fuller 
engagement with anthropological or historical literature, which prevents both generalization and 
further insight into social mechanics relevant to the history and development of the genres. Omani 
primary literature also prefers this documentary approach, eschewing historical and 
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anthropological detail for close but somewhat decontextualized investigation of particular regional 
art forms (al-Khusaibi 1985; al-Muwwaytī 1991; al-Shaydī 2008). Urkevich maintains that she 
does this to avoid “insulting” her interlocutors, and similar constraints were managed by other 
scholars working in English, including Aisha Bilkhair Khalifa (2006), Majid al-Harthy (2012), and 
Salwa El-Shawan Castelo-Branco and Dieter Christensen (2009), who worked with local scholars 
to produce engaged, critical historical and social scientific work. 
Christensen and El-Shawan Castelo-Branco’s 2009 monograph, which situates dozens of 
performance practices in their recent historical and social context in the coastal city of Ṣoḥār, 
Oman, is the most important ethnographic source for this dissertation. The main strength of the 
work is its simultaneous comprehensiveness and attention to ethnographic detail, which includes 
many direct quotes and excerpts from interviews. The commitment to comprehensiveness is 
important in basic research in the Arabian Gulf region, which boasts a bewildering number of 
practices, terms, concepts, and ways of organizing performance, but often leads to many more 
questions than answers. For example, the razḥa as performed in Şoḥār is considered by locals to 
be the most emblematic local art form, even though the government has declared a different and 
relatively unloved form as representative of the region and has prominently patronized its 
performance to the detriment of the razḥa groups. The investigation of why and under what 
circumstances this occurred is underdeveloped and is one specific question I hope to answer. More 
generally, the question of how the government has patronized and disseminated various art forms 
and thereby impacted developing national political spaces and framed its legitimacy amongst 
different regions can be addressed in dialogue with this existing work. Lastly, this work, in 
combination with Musallim al-Kathīrī’s (2005) and Christensen’s (2003) earlier work, provides a 
good basis for musical analysis that I will extend further and in more detail. In sum, no monograph 
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exists that focuses directly on a small number of related genres and attempts to historicize and 
localize them within relevant social mechanics based on anthropological theory.  
 The second aspect of Middle Eastern anthropology that I critically address is the study of 
political authority in state contexts, and specifically relations between rulers and ruled in the 
Arabian Peninsula. I offer an ethnographically informed analysis of what I term a “social 
mechanism” of legitimation through the directed generosity of rulers and the inducement of 
reciprocal responses to it. I will address the concept of social mechanisms after the literature 
review. By “directed generosity” I mean the way that distributions are managed by rulers in order 
to implement relations of dependency amongst subordinated classes, while also building alliances 
and mutual support. While historical research has identified this strategy as crucial to maintaining 
and even expanding a ruler’s sphere of influence as a general Middle Eastern pattern (Karateke 
and Reinkowski 2005), studies of Bedouin and Peninsular urban groups have explored it more 
ethnographically (Lancaster 1981; Lancaster and Lancaster 2011; Al-Rasheed 1991). However, 
few studies have explored what such directed generosity means amongst the ruled. Specifically, 
little ethnographic research has sought out the way that groups receiving such redistributions think 
about them, how they find meaning in them, and how they respond. If we recognize that directed 
generosity is one part of a larger circuit of exchange, then we should expect it to generate a specific 
response. I identify this response as the performance of praise poetry and collective dance. 
 This same arrangement has often been considered as an example of patronage-clientage 
relations. While I argue against this approach in Chapter 3, I nevertheless draw on this literature 
to explain certain socio-political relations in Oman. Michael Gilsenan’s well-known contribution 
to Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury’s edited collection Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean 
Societies (1977), entitled “Against Patron-Client Relations,” argued that focusing on the 
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integrative capacities of such patronage obscured the class relations of unequal power that sustain 
them. Rather than simply personal relationships or balanced exchanges of goods and services (see 
for example Campbell 1964), Gilsenan saw patron-client relations in the ‘Akkar mountains of 
Lebanon as shot through with power, with its implications being dependency and domination. Alex 
Weingrod (1977), in the same collection, also focused on power relations, but concluded that rather 
than dismissing personalized relations as the ideological constructions of elites, they might be a 
way to navigate relations of dependency. “Encounters between patrons and clients, or among 
patrons themselves,” he concluded,  
are highly stylised, ritualised performances, and hence patronage relationships 
can also be conceptualised as ceremonies of a kind. This is perhaps what 
[John] Campbell had in mind when he wrote that ‘the role of the patron is to 
give benefits; that of the client is to honour the patron by accepting 
dependence’ [Campbell 1964, 259]. To ‘give honour’ is to partake in a 
ceremonial offering, and hence patronage relationships can be conceptualised 
as a series of performances. (1977, 50) 
Praise, as we will see, is central to these performances. Is a turn to praise not a retreat from 
class- and power-oriented analyses, however? I argue that it is not—we can recognize both 
relations of inequality and the deeply personal ties and practices that manifest across class lines 
within those relations. In fact, this is what gives them such immense cultural importance. Isabelle 
Rivoal (2012, 2014, 2017), Andrew Shryock (2004, 2008, 2012), and Sally Howell (2001), for 
example, have argued that relations of hospitality, hosting, and honoring guests furnish a 
perspective on politics that richly attends to the dynamic tensions manifest in personalized, 
sociable interactions in the context of sometimes radical class inequality. Following the recent 
anti-utilitarian turn in Francophone anthropology exemplified by the Mouvement Anti-Utilitariste 
dans les Sciences Sociales or MAUSS, Rivoal’s research amongst Druze clients in the Shuf of 
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Lebanon reveals how patron-client relations are never a “duality”: “The understanding of Lebanese 
politics cannot be exhausted by describing power as it manifests itself in the confessional system 
and patronage relations, in terms of the control of resources and asymmetry alone” (2012, 17).6 It 
is not simply economic inequality that explains relations of clientage and patronage, but the way 
these relations are normalized, interpreted, internalized, and communicated. Clientage is intensely 
personal, even quotidian, motivating emotional attachments and desires even as it shapes them. 
This “return to hospitality” has prompted a special issue in the Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute devoted to the theme (2012).  
I take the insights developed within these studies to reflect on the way that deeply 
personalized relations with the state and its proxies can nevertheless manifest within structural 
relations of profound inequality. In the context of the state-form, however, such personalized 
relations take on new significance as they are motivated as the basis of claims of sovereignty 
(Rivoal 2017), and, in the case of Oman, legitimacy. I take this research on visitation, hospitality, 
and patron-client relations in new directions. Specifically, because I focus on the way the state is 
brought into these relations, I identify some important differences between hospitality, patronage, 
and generosity and what these distinctions imply. I argue that the correct way to interpret state-
directed giving to state citizens in the Arabian Gulf is not “hospitality,” which is more properly 
directed at “outsiders,” nor as “patronage,” which implies extra-state political affiliation, but as 
“generosity.” Peter Lienhardt noted that a common attitude towards foreigners in Kuwait was 
expressed in the formula lā ta‘ṭī al-ghārib al-‘āda; hūwa rāyiḥ, “give the stranger something better 
than everyday treatment; he will soon be on his way,” which I also found prevalent in Oman 
                                                          
6 “On ne peut épuiser la compréhension du politique au Liban en décrivant le pouvoir tel qu’il se 
manifeste dans le système confessionnel et les relations de patronage sous le seul rapport du 
contrôle des ressources et de l’asymétrie.” 
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(Lienhardt 1993, 50). Generosity is an attribute of leaders that is also an expectation placed on 
them by the ruled, which impinges directly on the behavior of all parties involved. Rather than 
leaders showing “hospitality” to their citizens, they are rendered as “generous”—a rendering that 
is achieved in a praise response. 
My research indicates that the response given by the ruled to the rulers is not a kind of tit-
for-tat account keeping, but the nurturance of a specific relationship based on mutual, reciprocated 
obligations: to give and to praise. Contrary to the predictions of “Rentier State” theorists,7 the 
absence of taxation does not compel a lack of engagement with the state or a kind of political 
quiescence (see Mitchell 2013), but in fact motivates a variety of praise responses. Praise, 
however, is neither simple nor straightforward. Giving and praising do not simply equal one 
another, match each other, or negate one another, but compel and catalyze one another. The 
profound emotional states and affective associations developed while singing praise poetry and 
jointly moving in collective dance are real and poignant, even if they occur in the context of class 
domination. Similarly, poets do not believe that their poetry falls on deaf ears, but instead fiercely 
contend that their poetry solves political problems, instructs leaders on how to behave, and pries 
open miserly fists. Praise poetry, far from sycophancy or money-grubbing, is concrete political 
practice. Conventional praise responses not only communicate the fulfillment and consequent 
recognition of state development (coded as generosity) but also serve to render state development 
and historical patterns of leadership based on generous redistribution as identical. It is in the 
context of the contemporary oil-state that this relationship of mutual obligations, densely 
interwoven with personalized relations and class asymmetries, is amplified and universalized to 
become a core pillar of the legitimation of the state. As Alice Wilson (2016) has shown, the same 
                                                          
7 See Giacomo and Beblawi 1987, but also updates in al-Farsi 2013 and Hertog 2010.  
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modes of governance can serve to sustain vastly different forms of socio-political organization, 
from tribes to state-projects. I see the recognition of generosity through praise as playing an 
important role in sustaining cycles of redistribution that are themselves a mechanism of political 
legitimation. 
b. Political and Economic Ethnomusicology  
“I mean, like, nobody owns the stuff [Irish traditional music]. You can’t own this 
stuff.”  (Irish traditional musician, reported in McCann 2001, 92). 
I see this dissertation as making critical interventions in ethnomusicological research on 
political and economic topics by explicitly modeling a political-economic approach to 
performance that builds on research on music, reciprocity, and the “moral economy” (Carrier 2017; 
Götz 2015). In this section, I briefly present these terms and my approach while foregrounding 
recent ethnomusicological literatures that take a similar line. 
As a point of departure, we might note that, speaking broadly, most ethnographic 
approaches in ethnomusicology have committed to both roughly holistic and roughly orthodox 
notions of “economies” and “politics.” While this is simply practical for research that does not 
directly critically engage with taken-for-granted political institutions like governments or practices 
like voting, my argument calls into question some of these common sensical usages by highlighting 
their deep embeddedness in one another. This research is not unique in this regard, but insofar as 
my ethnographic data interrogate such approaches, I think it is useful to pick out specific previous 
engagements with the notion of the “economic” or the “political” as independent categories, 
without implying any attempt to disaggregate them from their cultural and historical settings.  
This dissertation is predicated on two heterodox political-economic notions: reciprocity 
and the moral economy. Reciprocity at its most basic is concerned with the ways in which actions 
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compel responses and therefore lead to continued, mutually reinforcing (i.e., reciprocal) action 
chains.8 Linda Molm defines reciprocity as a norm that can be glossed as “the giving of benefits 
to another in return for benefits received” (Molm 2010, 119) but the inverse (punishments for 
punishments) also exists. While reciprocity has seen tremendous development as a theoretical 
concept in anthropology, economics, sociology, psychology, game theory, and other fields, my 
approach to reciprocity relies mostly on anthropology. Here, reciprocity refers specifically to the 
non-market exchange of goods, ideas, or labor, governed by a norm that demands the return of 
benefits extended. For more than a century, reciprocity has been exemplified by the practice of 
giving, receiving, and returning gifts, as sketched by Marcel Mauss (1923). The gift literature is 
vast; I examine it more closely in chapter 4. I frame praise and generosity as locked in reciprocal 
circuits that construct relationships between elite givers and non-elite praisers who are linked by 
senses of mutual obligation. The construction of a legitimate, well-ordered community is 
predicated on these inculcated senses of mutuality and inter-reliance that emerge in the acts of 
giving, receiving, and returning benefits of different types and qualities.  
The way that continued reciprocity—that is, the circulation of generosity and praise—helps 
to construct a community of mutual, contrasting obligations has most often been referred to as a 
“moral economy” (Carrier 2017; Scott 1976; Thompson 1971). For James Carrier, a “moral 
economy” is not one in which moral notions circulate or one that seems to have net moral benefits, 
but is instead one whose reciprocal relations “encourage us to look at economic transactions in 
terms of relationships and their histories” (2017, 32). Rather than the faceless, anonymous, and 
profit-maximizing transactions that operate in an admittedly hypothetical market economy, 
                                                          
8 This general view is often espoused in sociology: see Gould 2002; Molm 2010; Molm, Collett, 
and Schaefer 2007; Komter 2007.  
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transactions in a moral economy are based on trust, obligation, and mutualism. Mutuality and 
obligation are not simply structural features of something called a “moral economy,” but are 
instead produced by the continued norm-governed interactions of differently constituted 
individuals and groups. Reciprocity and the moral economy are linked concepts: we might say that 
moral economies are those economic networks that foreground relations of reciprocity and 
obligation. Profit and market logics still operate in a moral economy but are attenuated by human 
sociality, norms of reciprocity, and the centrality of obligations. In this sense, I identify a reciprocal 
relation occurring across class lines in a southeast Arabian context as a moral economy that 
manages the movement of goods and praise. What praise does in the Omani context, I argue, is 
highlight and commend the reciprocal elements of this moral economy, encouraging their 
continued salience. Praise is a bulwark against the collapse of a moral economy into a market 
economy. 
Before turning to the research in ethnomusicology to which this dissertation is indebted, 
we should briefly address some more orthodox economic approaches in the field. Much recent 
explicitly economic ethnomusicology is dedicated to understanding the role of music as a 
commodity within certain “markets,” which are often considered to be coextensive with an 
“economy” in a certain country. I am thinking particularly of the work done by Georgina Born and 
her interlocutors in the MusDig project: Music, Digitisation, Mediation: Towards Interdisciplinary 
Music Studies,9 and studies of particular “music economies” (such as Perullo 2011 in urban 
Tanzania, Beaster-Jones 2016 in India), but also the increased interest in intellectual property 
rights (best exemplified by the SAGE Handbook in Intellectual Property of 2014). This research 
effectively studies musical products as they circulate within narrowly defined state capitalist legal 
                                                          
9 Explained at https://www.music.ox.ac.uk/research/projects/past-projects/musdig/.  
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networks, which are taken to be an important context for studying the circulation of music, rights, 
and money. This is important research, but given the tremendous variety and historical time-depth 
of human musical practices, it is surely not the whole story—and to be sure, these scholars make 
no such claim. However, the study of music and “the economy” is often presumed to be a study of 
a capitalist music market, with musical products as commodities.  
Further, we might note two deeply linked problems with this presupposition of capitalist 
economies. The first is that the “national economy” is not a natural state of affairs but a deeply 
managed ideological construction that is coterminous with the rise of states and that therefore 
requires historicization.10 If there are broadly analogous processes occurring in various economies, 
it is unlikely to be the result of anything but the imposition of certain legal frameworks, economic 
modeling and tracking technologies, and the like. The “economy” imagined by this research is 
often overly systematized and circumscribed as a “market”. That is, this understanding of “the 
economy” posits a universality for global capitalism and its concomitant social effects that it does 
not have while it simultaneously excludes or effaces other forms of economic logic.  
The second problem is that such analyses operate with “music” functioning 
straightforwardly a “commodity.” While some scholars have investigated commodification as a 
process (notably Taylor 2016, 2017), accepting the commodity status of music as a given may 
discourage our ethnomusicological imagination. Taking reciprocity and moral economy 
approaches helps to show us how objects and performances do not necessarily emerge as 
commodities nor are they destined to become them. They are transformed into commodities. By 
eliding this process, or by assuming markets, or by ignoring other economic logics, we risk what 
                                                          
10 See Appel 2017, Bourdieu 2005, and Mitchell 1998, 1999, 2006, 2007, 2008. 
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feminist Marxist scholars J. K. Gibson-Graham have called “capitalocentrism,” that is, a bias 
whereby  
forms of economy (not to mention noneconomic aspects of social life) are 
often understood primarily with reference to capitalism: as being 
fundamentally the same as (or modeled upon) capitalism, or as being deficient 
or substandard imitations; as being opposite to capitalism; as being the 
complement of capitalism; as existing in capitalism's space or orbit. (1996: 6)  
Capitalocentrism renders “capitalism” as a totalizing system, a powerful and completed imposition 
of logics of market relations that have swamped and replaced all others. As Gibson-Graham have 
argued, “the economy” is in fact a dense, historically and culturally contingent collection of 
practices in which only some are governed by market-derived logics. Other logics of giving, 
exchange, sharing, communality, debt, sacrifice, theft, care, distribution, obligation, offering, and 
exploitation are always operating alongside and amongst market relations (1996).  
Against this prevailing logic, Mayfair Mei-Hui Yang’s work on what she terms “economic 
hybridity” in Wenzhou, China offers a way to understand how “indigenous economies are not 
always plowed under with the introduction of capitalism but may even experience renewal and 
pose a challenge to capitalist principles” (Yang 2000, 477). Yang’s investigation of ritual 
economies that involve the conspicuous accumulation and destruction of capital in rural China 
(similar to “potlatches” amongst Kwakwaka’wakw nobles) challenges the notion that capitalist 
logics fully replace other preexisting ones (2000; 2007). Yang and Gibson-Graham not only 
demonstrate that reductive, capitalocentric economism and the “Eurocentric assumption that the 
Midas touch of capitalism immediately destroys local indigenous economies and cultures” (Yang 
2000, 481) fails to describe our actual lives, but it also fails to imagine economics otherwise.  
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I want to be clear that I don’t think that research into the circulation of music objects within 
some circumscribed capitalist sphere is useless or trivial. It is emphatically not. The problematic I 
am picking out here is that such research takes too much for granted about “music,” its commodity 
status, and its relation to “the economy.” Rejecting this premise, ethnomusicologist Jayson 
Beaster-Jones asks us to consider “what makes music as a commodity different from, say, soap?” 
(2014, 336). Despite “not being as different as we might hope,” Beaster-Jones concludes that the 
experience of music and the use of music, along with its potential to “overwhelm” exchange, are 
two features to which we can concretely point (336-37). While we may quibble with that, the more 
important point here is that “music is only ambivalently a commodity,” a status that “must be 
enforced” with “rigorous policing, lobbying, legislation, and enforcement” (337). Anna Tsing 
shows precisely this enforcement and management of commodities as she traces the 
metamorphosis of the matsutake mushroom from gift to commodity to gift as it circulates around 
the Pacific (2015). This is a pivotal insight. It is not that we have failed to imagine the various 
ways music can circulate (“as commodities” versus “as gifts”) in or as “economies” but that we 
have failed to interrogate the conditions of possibility that undergird that circulation. One of those 
conditions has been the violent enforcement of capitalist social relations as they are folded into the 
ideological and material construction of the state form and its transnational legal frameworks.  
Gibson-Graham and Yang’s shared intervention is an important one if we are to try to 
understand reciprocal circuits of praise and obligation as not just reducible to rational actors 
exchanging tit-for-tat benefits, or as a simple manifestation of capitalist market logics, or as a mere 
puppet show of power since “gift economies” have historically been entirely replaced by “market 
economies” (Bowie 1998). Without a robust alternative model—say, reciprocity and the moral 
economy—and a good reason to think that capital relations might not explain all the facts—the 
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critique of capitalocentrism—the tendency to explain praise relationships as basically the purchase 
of consent seems just obviously true. It is not. So let’s sketch out such an alternative here. 
One way that economic anthropologists and ethnomusicologists have come to imagine the 
economic otherwise is to turn back to Marcel Mauss’s insightful research on “the gift” presented 
in his Essai sur le don published in 1923 (Buenconsejo 2002; McCann 2001; Morcom 2015a, 
2015b; Sykes 2018). A similar move has been to evoke the notion of “moral” exchange that is 
tentatively opposed to market practices (Hoffman 2002; Petrović and Hofman 2018; Potuoğlu-
Cook 2006; Tausig 2014). While in both anthropology and ethnomusicology this has often 
manifested in a tendency to invoke “egalitarianism” or “primitive communism,” in which 
reciprocal relations of gifting or music-making are devoid of structures of power and class, 
feminist scholarship has shown this conception to be quite false (Kisliuk 1998, among many).  
While there are many examples of this appeal to “egalitarianism,” we can focus on more 
fruitful analyses here. Ethnomusicologist Anthony McCann, for example, has argued that the 
traditional Irish “session”—a collective performance of “at least three people who play jigs, reels, 
hornpipes, planxties, and so on in heterophonic union” (2001, 91)—“conforms readily to the idea 
of a ‘gift cycle’ ” (93). Drawing on Lewis Hyde’s (1983) application of gift-thinking to art 
production, McCann argues that the free movement of authored music, learning, and expertise 
within sessions is a form of “de-commodification” in which tunes “written as commercial, 
commodified money-making works” are nevertheless transformed into “gifts to be distributed 
freely among musicians in a context of tradition and community” (McCann 2001, 92-3; see also 
Kaul 2007). While McCann develops this position into one that posits Irish traditional music as a 
“common property resource” (96), we can see how the concept of “tradition,” so often maligned 
as an ossifying, museumifying discourse which renders certain practices, attitudes, and relations 
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as “non-” or “pre-modern,” might actually be a social relation of a profoundly anti-capitalist nature. 
It is perhaps no wonder that “tradition” is so often seen as a source of backwardness. Nevertheless, 
as Ian Hayes argues, even such self-consciously “traditional” North Atlantic musicians must 
“strike a balance” between “sharing and charging” for musical performances (2011). 
Rather than positing traditional music as a protected reserve, shielded from capital relations 
and “market forces,” ethnomusicologist Anna Morcom has studied various Tibetan musicians’ 
integration into the “hegemonic world system” as “non-linear and inconsistent” (2015b, 293). “The 
capitalist nature of a given form of music or music making,” she writes, “is not simply a factor of 
monetisation or marketisation or technological or stylistic format and it cannot be judged in 
isolation” (293). Instead, as she shows, various logics, obligations, and values motivate Tibetan 
performers to give music away, use it for charity, or frame their performances as “community 
work” even as they engage with it as a money-making enterprise (288). Such work turns on the 
expectation that singers sing “primarily for the community rather than individual gain” (289). 
Morcom sees this as an example of Polanyi’s notion of an “embedded economy,” one in which 
economic activity is constrained and delimited by non-economic processes—for Tibetans, the 
experience of exile. For Morcom, tracing the impact of “capitalism” in music relies on a three-
layered approach consisting of “a lowest subsistence layer, the middle layer of market exchange, 
and the capitalist layer of the anti-market on top” (292). The “embeddedness” of Tibetan pop music 
in wider communal engagements creates an “air pocket” which selectively separates it from total 
inclusion in alienating capitalist relations, complicating straightforward narratives of the total 
subsumption of music making into global capitalist flows. 
Monograph-length studies that analyze musical objects as “gifts” are fewer. I’ll discuss 
two notable attempts: José S. Buenconsejo’s ethnography Songs and Gifts at the Frontier: Person 
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and Exchange in the Agusan Manobo Possession Ritual, Philippines (2002) and Jim Sykes’ 
ethnography The Musical Gift: Sonic Generosity in Post-War Sri Lanka (2018).  
Buenconsejo’s ethnography of Manobo possession rituals—which include “ritual song, 
dance, and speech”—shows how reciprocal relations do more than “perform formalized 
sociability,” but are basic to “envoicing” Manobo subjectivity (xi). Contesting the straightforward, 
utilitarian reading of Mauss that holds that gifts are given to receive gifts in return, Buenconsejo 
shows that Manobo gifting is best explained as a kind of sacrifice. For Manobo, “gift giving goes 
beyond ‘getting something in return.’ Instead, it is sacrificial because it is meant to be "eaten," 
distributed, destroyed, or shared… To give is to become a sociable being, one capable of sharing 
gifts with others because those others are also human beings like oneself” (300). Exchange, 
manifested in the movement of food, songs, and possession, makes persons and makes them equal. 
Through careful reading of Manobo ritual texts and contexts, Buenconsejo diagrams deeply shared 
values of reciprocity enmeshed in Manobo subjectivity and how these values have been 
“confronted” by Visayan lowland settlers, missionaries, money economies, and logging. He 
examines such figures as the sacrificed “anarchic pig,” the sharing of symbolically dense foods, 
and the role of literal and figurative sweat in indexing “togetherness” as the ritual, embodied, and 
symbolic manifestation of proper reciprocal Manobo sociality (50ff., 64). The narrative retelling 
of myths called sugilen not only relays messages like “ ‘one receives if one gives’ and that ‘those 
in a top position who will not participate in prestations now will later on be in the low position of 
the Other World,’ ” but also inculcates senses of the place of Manobo in the greater cosmos, 
kalibutan (64). Buenconsejo concludes that these kinds of narratives relate the “Manobo 
epistemology of the person: one that is inherently sociable because s/he is naturally predisposed 
to share food with his kin who is a katunged (i.e., one who is literally in front of the self). It is 
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shameful to be otherwise” (295). To be kin, in Manobo terms, is to share food without question or 
compromise—an implicit baseline reciprocity that is manifested and disseminated in ritual 
performance.  
The increasing imposition of market logics has caused some Manobo to modify ritual 
practice in order to build “strategies for circumventing that material inequality” (295). The 
increasing saliency of market relations and material inequality were heralded by the arrival of 
Visayan outsiders to the Agusan valley in the 1950s and necessitated a response in ritual form. In 
his studies of newly hybrid ritual forms, Buenconsejo argues for a conception of communication 
that is undertaken “to recreate a community, pulling what is distant into the circuit of affinity” 
2002, 240). “What is distant” might include Manobo persons, animals, deities, Visayans, and 
spirits, diwata, from whom Manobo learn how to share, how to live, and how to make community. 
Communication in dance, ritual, song, speech, and sacrifice pulls individuals into social relations, 
which are implicitly predicated on sharing and communality. The distant are drawn into gifting 
relations that bring them into safe contact with the Manobo. As spirit mediums take on the roles 
of the figures in myths and contemporary social life, they “sacrifice” themselves as a kind of social 
gift in order to (re)produce social harmony in the face of social disharmony of various types. 
Communication in ritual “bridges the experience of forces from strange distant realms outside the 
community” by incorporating them in Manobo bodies, cosmologies, and social relations (353). 
Gift relations achieve a similar end—they bring outside beings (spirits, Manobo kin, Visayan 
elites, missionaries, anarchic pigs) into humane communal relations. These gifts are often encoded 
in ritual song and dance, and so therefore operate on social and spiritual relations:  
the repeated act of giving ritual gifts to [spirits] does not place human beings in a fixed 
subordinate position. On the contrary, gifts can undermine the structural asymmetrical 
context of "dominance" and "subordination." They make participants— spirits and 
humans— acquire equal values. (353) 
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Rituals “viscerally [reinstitute] the notion of reciprocity and interpersonal exchange” amongst 
humans, spirits, elites, and affines by asserting their commonality as partners in exchange (349). 
Confronted by predatory elites, international capital, and material inequality, ritual forcefully 
asserts the continued relevance of a moral economy amongst the Manobo. 
Buenconsejo’s careful study itself tries to bridge political economic and symbolic, 
structuralist, and critical approaches. His exploration of a Manobo moral economy is one of the 
most detailed and rigorous I have yet read. There are two broad findings from Buenconsejo’s work 
that inform my analysis. The first is that while Manobo gifts may be intended to be sacrifices—a 
major way Buenconsejo contrasts Manobo gifts with Mauss’s conception—they nevertheless 
compel returns. Even if they are eaten, destroyed, gifts are not necessarily important as quantifiable 
objects that cue a later return, calibrated by some utilitarian maximization. Rather, they constitute 
both a social relationship and mark the giver as a human, one with whom relations can be made. 
However, Buenconsejo’s characterization of Mauss’s claim as a utilitarian calculus to which the 
Manobo gift-sacrifice is a corrective is a misreading of Mauss. Rather, anthropological 
theorization on Mauss’s gift has deliberately shown how it is the relationships formed in gift 
exchange that are as important as any objects or values moved between persons. More positively, 
however, Buenconsejo opens up a path for understanding how gift exchange might not always be 
a simple recapitulation of dominance and subordination, of magister and minister. Gifting 
relations, and the capacity to instantiate them, might draw participants into recognizing their basic 
equality as persons and as gifters. In Chapter 4, I try to show how the specific performance of 
razḥa as praise upsets straightforward readings of dependency on elite distribution. 
Jim Sykes’s The Musical Gift: Sonic Generosity in Post-War Sri Lanka (2018) takes a 
different tack. Rather than focusing on social relations, he focuses on the gift’s role in care, 
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protection, and peace-making. Sykes argues that “some sounds are meant to be given… as a 
technology of care… [as] ways of helping others with sound” (2018, 15). “Musical giving,” Sykes 
offers, “is perhaps the major missing actor from music studies” (16). “Musical gifts,” such as those 
prestations made and given by the Beravā drummer caste of Sinhala Buddhist ritual masters, are 
“given as public offerings to encourage deities to protect people” and to cement certain kinds of 
relations and obligations of protection between humans, gods, Buddhas, communities, demons, 
and animals (19). Beravā “drum speech” prestations are gifts given to achieve something: 
protection, care, relationships, access. He terms this “sonic efficacy”: the capacity for music to do 
things in the world. At the same time, these gifts circulate amongst many different social (and 
supernatural) groups in Sri Lanka. This reality directs Sykes to “think broadly about various Sri 
Lankan aesthetic systems that utilize sonic generosity” in order to understand how shared musical 
resources can become caught up in processes of ethnic differentiation (47). He claims that sonic 
generosity as manifested in a “sonic gift economy” (7) has been historically obscured by a 
“distinction between ‘the monetary economy’ and ‘the arts’ reinforced by British colonial 
liberalism and postcolonial ethnonationalism” (12). Sri Lankan sonic practices of various kinds 
came to be defined as “music” in the Eurocentric sense, and so were transformed from a “sonic 
gift” into an expression of certain static, bounded, and individualized identities. Much of Sykes’s 
theorization is, in fact, concerned with upending the “liberal aesthetic” construal of music as being 
important only to building and expressing identities, not as political action, not as nurturing or 
caring for others, and not acting as a gift. “Musical giving is ignored,” Sykes argues, “because of 
the centrality to the modern global imagination of the idea that music is a form of personal and 
communal expression” over and above anything else (17). This serves to bifurcate musical 
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practices from political and economic ones, which prompts Sykes to conclude that “the arts exist 
in economies but are not typically considered to be economies” (17).  
There remain lingering issues with Sykes’s argument, similar in shape to those manifested 
in earlier egalitarian approaches. From the outset, there are many scholars who consider music to 
be an “economy” of one sort or another: say, as an economy of emotion or aesthetics (Jarjour 
2018), of moral sentiments (Hoffman 2002), as overlapping systems of exchange (Quintero 2018), 
or just as a “music economy” (Perullo 2011). So it’s not a problem of recognizing that music 
circulates within certain prescribed networks, but rather a problem of conflating that circulation 
with market economies. Are there no other ways to impel the circulation of sounds? Obviously, 
there are: as Sykes points out, sonic gifts circulate between humans, animals, demons, Buddhas, 
and deities predicated on beseeching protection—and yet even then he ultimately posits that Sri 
Lankan “musical gifts” circulate within a “sonic gift economy” that might be separate from or 
folded into “the” capitalist “monetary economy.” However, this splitting of “the economy” into 
two “economies”—say, one motivated by the gift and one motivated by the market (pace Gregory 
1982, see Bloch and Parry 1989)—has been specifically challenged by much recent research in 
economic anthropology.11 Buenconsejo might be read as pursuing the same split, between 
exchange that makes persons and exchange that alienates them. Rendering Sykes’ “musical gift” 
or Buenconsejo’s “sacrificial gift” as an economy that is at least tentatively drawn against “the 
global capitalist economy” fails to recognize how “the economy” already contains an incredible 
diversity of relations beyond, beneath, and behind those organized by the market, as shown by 
Gibson-Graham, Yang, and others. Surely analyzing something as “an economy” does not show 
                                                          
11 Browne and Milgram 2009; Gudeman 2001, 2016; Hann and Hart 2009, 2011; Liebersohn 
2011; Marshall 2010; Tsing 2015; Wells and McAnany 2008; Yang 2000. 
29 
 
 
 
how it runs counter to a “monetary economy.” As we have learned from Morcom and McCann, 
diverse logics of exchange and the material realities of obligation, community, and inequality that 
constrain them are tightly interwoven. Musicians and ritualists draw on and are compelled by these 
various opportunities and constrictions. 
The most considerable oversight in Sykes’s invocation of “the gift,” however, is his failure 
to recognize the potential of gifting relations to produce dependency by sustaining economic and 
social asymmetries, especially in state spaces. Buenconsejo accounts for this potential but does not 
demonstrate its negotiation in musical or ritual life, rather relying on his understanding of the 
“sacrificial gift” to eliminate this potential. For Sykes, “musical gifts” seem to circulate freely 
amongst elites and non-elites, rulers and ruled in Sri Lanka, because there is almost no attention 
to questions of class, power relations, or state/elite domination—fundamental features of any 
“anarchist (ethno)musicology” that I would understand (2018, 47). Reciprocal systems are not 
innocent systems. I follow this thread very closely through the literature of the Middle East and 
within the anthropology of the state.  
While a few ethnomusicologists have framed their problematic in terms of reciprocity, 
more have usefully invoked the notion of a moral economy as a way of explaining the tense 
relationships between music production, money, obligation, market logics, and community. While 
most ethnomusicologists have invoked a moral economy to mean a domain in which moral 
sentiments circulate (Hoffmann 2002; Petrović and Hofman 2018; Potuoğlu-Cook 2006), others 
have invoked the more specific anthropological notion or something like it (Cooper 2015; Miller 
2002; Morcom 2015a, 2015b; Tausig 2014). Katherine Hoffman, for example, has modeled Berber 
women’s song poetry genres (tizrrarin and tinḍḍamin) in the Anti-Atlas of Morocco as a “moral 
economy” (2002, 510). While she does not draw on the economic or anthropological literature on 
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moral economies, she points out similar processes: the sung poetry is “uncommodified” (512), it 
trades in moral commentary, and it sustains relationships between participants. Benjamin Tausig, 
on the other hand, directly invokes the notion of “moral economies” in his discussion of moral 
dynamics in music making and monetary compensation at Red Shirt protests in Thailand (2014). 
Tausig takes the example of Mii, a mor lam musician, as a case to examine manifestations of a 
“musical morality” in the face of neoliberal reform, money-making in market settings, and teacher-
student dynamics (263). Mii negotiated his moral commitments—to students, both Thai and 
foreign, to “provincial culture”—in the midst of the Red Shirt protests and neoliberal 
developments in Thai society that opened up new spaces for money making as well as moral peril 
(269-71). Here, Tausig hints at the capacity of preexisting moral forms to retain their shape and 
their ability to induce behavior in the face of sometimes overwhelming neoliberal change—a 
critique of capitalocentrism as manifested in neoliberal myth-making.  
  Adjacent to research that shows how non-market-based practices (like reciprocity) or 
certain comportments and relationships (like moral sentiments and obligations) co-exist with 
market logics is research on alternative, non-state-based political modalities. There are two 
literatures that I think have been very effective in this way. The first emphasizes the radical 
potential of art to articulate, facilitate, or imagine non- or extra-state political interactions, and the 
second shows how music and performance has constituted a primary political activity before and 
during the rapid expansion of the capitalist state form. 
The first literature has found its most emphatic and convincing expression in dance studies 
(Graff 1997; Kowal, Siegmund, and Martin 2015; Martin 1998; Mills 2017; Thompson 2014). 
Dancer and theorist Randy Martin crystalized the capacity of dance to sharpen our perception of 
“a proliferation of political activity throughout the social fabric and not simply confined to what 
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are formally considered to be political institutions” (1998, 2). While Martin draws our attention to 
dance’s potential to carve out new political spaces, others have emphasized the ways in which 
dance questions normative understandings of expressive politics. Dana Mills theorizes studies of 
political dance in Dance and Politics (2017) as vacillating between “the weak reading of political 
dance—the use of dance to rearticulate the meaning of ideas discussed in verbal language—and 
the strong reading of political dance—dance expressing the meaning of political ideas 
independently of verbal language” (2017, 25). Strong readings of political dance show how dance 
can become a “source of possibility” for participants and spectators, as Ellen Graff (1997) showed 
in her studies of collective dance and Leftist political organizing in New York from 1928-42. 
The second literature is sparse but deeply suggestive. Here, I examine historical and 
contemporary studies of varieties of performance that have constituted a basic political activity in 
polities other than contemporary states. These are, in effect, studies that trace the incorporation of 
historically functional musico-political practices into the international capitalist state-system, the 
juxtaposition of musical forms of recognizing authority, or the historical roles of performances, 
instruments, and sounds to serve particular political orders. Since these studies operate on the claim 
that sound is/was political practice, they are often historical.  
Damascus Kafumbe’s Tuning the Kingdom: Kawuugulu Musical Performance, Politics, 
and Storytelling in Buganda (2018) presents Kawuugulu, a drum ensemble closely associated with 
the Baganda king, or kabaka, as a form of political action which predates the expansion of British 
colonialism and postcolonial state-building processes. Kafumbe argues that kawuugulu 
performances “articulate the very means by which Buganda and its society manage themselves” 
insofar as kawuugulu performance deals with the linked political domains of “kinship, clanship, 
and kingship” (7). In its role as a royal ensemble, kawuugulu was tasked with entertaining, 
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educating, celebrating, and even “protecting” the kabaka—a duty that was unfulfilled when the 
Ugandan government attacked and abolished the Kingdom of Buganda in 1966-67, killing 
performers and destroying musical instruments (25). State violence targeted music-makers and 
instruments in Uganda precisely because they were political “agents,” in Kafumbe’s terms (41-
42). Kafumbe shows that kawuugulu has functioned politically within and between Baganda clans 
as well as fulfilling obligations to the kabaka. By focusing on such ensemble performances, the 
Butiko clan that performs on kawuugulu, and other objects of the royal regalia, Kafumbe shows 
that this social arrangement of political musical practice “allows” kawuugulu “to manage, 
structure, model, and legitimize a collaborative relationship between the kabaka and his subjects” 
(62). The kawuugulu and its performers are clearly a basic political activity in Buganda, through 
which the Butiko clan “speaks for all clans… and also to all clans” (79).  
While Kafumbe shows how a particular drum ensemble is a crucial site in which the 
political operates in the Lake Region of Africa, musicologists, especially of the Renaissance and 
Baroque, have produced several useful studies that present music both as an expression of a certain 
political order and as a political activity that links ideals of royal authority to musical practice 
(Feldman 2010; Heller 2004). Katherine Butler’s Music in Elizabethan Court Politics (2015) asks 
“how and why was music useful” within this royal political order (6). In 1575, “Court musicians 
William Byrd and Thomas Tallis claimed that music was ‘indispensable to the state’,” likely 
drawing on “Plato’s notion that the character of the state could be moulded by the modes and 
rhythms that were permitted” within it (6). Similarly, music might also “inspire virtue” in the 
monarch, or persuade them to take good counsel, just as much as it might be used for manipulation 
(10 ff.). Butler concludes by noting three ways in which musical performance was concrete 
political practice for Elizabethans: “first as an audible harmony comparable to political concord; 
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second as a sign of education, social status, and even virtue (if correctly used); and third as a means 
of persuasion” (11). These three forms of music-making as politics can be found in many other 
times and places: performed music as an instantiation of cosmic harmony animated performance 
in 17th-century Spain (Gonzalez 2015) as much as it did Ancient China (Brindley 2012). To these, 
however, we must add music as praise, which has functioned as a mode of political engagement 
in the Middle East (where it has mostly been traced in literary works) and in sub-Saharan Africa, 
where its musicality and oral performance has been more appreciated (Omojola 2011; Waterman 
1990).  
The upshot to all this is that our deliberate investigations of music and the economy or and 
politics should not assume the economy or politics are generalizable domains. I want to conclude 
by pointing out two pitfalls that seem all too common: the assumption that “Politics” looks like 
the politics that occurs in capitalist states of the last hundred years or so, and that investigation of 
music in an economy is investigation of music as it relates to capital. I think we need to tread a 
narrow path between making everything into politics and too strictly defining politics to what 
conforms to conventional notions of the political. Similarly, we should be wary of slipping 
between talking about economies and interrogations of capitalism as a historical phenomenon. 
Neither of these things is identical to the other. Avoiding these pitfalls requires rigorous 
historicizing, a dogged commitment to ethnographic specificity, an open ear, and a willingness to 
be both surprised and corrected. More concretely, we should recognize how music functions as 
both a commodity and as a way to build relationships of obligation, responsibility, and care that 
constrain the mechanical grind of the market.   
c. The Cultivation of People in Song: The Ethnomusicology of the State 
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As a topic in social science, “the state” has inspired scholars to develop a dense and 
complicated literature. The state was an early interest as well, occupying some of the pioneers of 
the discipline (see Chapter 6). Rather than simply adopting a productive research agenda, this 
review will present some substantive critiques of the major positions and propose a novel 
rearrangement of them. Ethnomusicology and anthropology have often engaged with the state, 
usually because it is seen as the proper arena of “politics” (which I challenged above), but also as 
a patron of arts, a colonizing power predicated on white supremacy and genocide, a “fiction,” a set 
of institutions, a vanishing organizing power predicated on territory, an irrelevancy due to 
transnational media connections, and so on. While I will save a fuller review of this literature for 
chapter 6, I want to at least sketch my approach to “the state” here as both a material and 
ideological project. Assessing the “state” as a project, or as being composed of various projects, 
has produced considerable insight while acknowledging the simultaneous concrete existence of 
the state, the capacity of its elites to “improvise” (Jeffrey 2014), and its necessarily unfinished 
character. Further, grasping the “state” as a complex of sometimes contradictory or unaligned 
material and ideological projects shows how music, sound, and performance can abut, adjoin, and 
sometimes align with state power.  
 This dissertation began as a study of the contemporary authoritarian state in the Arabian 
Peninsula and the role of certain performance practices in legitimating its rule. In studying the 
multiple social and class relations, histories, ideals of authority, and aesthetics that animate this 
relation, I was drawn in several directions: towards praise, generosity, dependency, anti-political 
performances, notions of practicality, and Islamic legal discourses on music, amongst others. I 
approach all these topics as unfolding in conjuncture with “the state,” which I take to be an 
unfolding social project that attempts to organize, stabilize, and perpetuate social relations of 
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inequality between dominant class minorities and dominated class majorities through material 
strategies such as the centralization of bureaucracy, legal systems, delimitations of acceptable 
politics, regimes of audibility, and organized violence. “States” are not simply objects, or 
structures, or systems, or organizations, but are historically realized through lived, shifting, and 
“improvised” tactics, modes of governance, and patterns of class interaction that largely aim to 
concentrate power amongst the ruling classes. They are simultaneously the fixation of unequal 
social relations and the ideological strategies that mask this practice by rendering it intelligible as 
a social object.  
The state “has always been the patrimony of some privileged class or other,” Mikhail 
Bakunin noted, “a priestly class, an aristocratic class, a bourgeois class… but it is absolutely 
necessary for the salvation of the state that there should be some privileged class devoted to its 
preservation” (Bakunin 1972, 318).12 This concentration of power in a state is never complete, 
however, because states exist amongst other states: “whoever says state necessarily says a 
particular limited state, doubtless comprising… many different peoples and countries, but 
excluding still more… consequently whoever says state says a state, and whoever says a state 
affirms by that the existence of other states” (316). The coexistence of states, for Bakunin, is a 
virtual guarantee of “competition, jealousy, truceless and endless war,” conquest, and “conquered 
peoples, enslaved and in bondage” (316). This unavoidable conflict is grounded on the “supremacy 
of state morality” over particular, local, human interests, so much so that states can only co-exist 
                                                          
12 The broadly “anarchist” understanding of society as composed of “ruling classes” and 
“subordinate” or “ruled classes” has often been critiqued as idealistic, simplistic, or unable to 
capture the complexity of actual class identity. This is probably true. It is also true that those who 
rule are also very often social elites (Khan 2012), either being drawn from this stratum or 
entering into it predicated on rulership, especially when combined with capitalist markets. 
Further, much of the work of rule is engaged across this “class divide.” As I argue in chapter 6, 
the clearest way to address this weakness is with Gramsci’s notion of state hegemony. 
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for a short time (316). States, ideologically represented as territorial units, necessarily rupture “the 
universal solidarity of humanity” (316). “State morality” compels the ruling classes to “see to it 
that all its subjects think and, above all, act in total compliance with the patriotic morality of the 
State,” which construes the building and maintenance of the state as being “the supreme objective” 
(316-7). Here, Bakunin succinctly links the material social relations of rule to its legitimating 
ideological tactics. He probably overstates the case. What is important is to emphasize that this 
legitimation is profoundly empowered by the concentration of social power and material resources 
within the hands of the ruling classes, whatever shape this power takes. 
The scholar whose approach both best addresses the ideological construction of the “state” 
as a monolithic entity and interrogates its material basis of unequal social relations is Antonio 
Gramsci. Gramsci is useful here because, while Bakunin and other anarchist thinkers effectively 
and radically diagnose the state form, they have relatively little to say about why and how it is 
legitimated amongst the ruled, how it manufactures consent, how it coaxes and cajoles the 
populations it claims to behave in certain ways and to accept “the terms of order” (Robinson 
1983)—in Foucault’s parlance, how they “conduct the conduct” of the ruled. If we accept an 
anarchist definition of the state above, the question of how that system of inequality is maintained 
becomes crucial.  
This is precisely the question that Gramsci’s elaboration of hegemony seeks to answer 
(Crehan 2002, 104). Gramsci shows how inequality is sustained by the capacity of the ruling 
classes to employ a wide range of tactics to perpetuate their dominance: in one case, state elites 
might jail dissidents or murder drummers, in another they might build a highway or dam or protect 
a border from an enemy, in another they might overwhelm dissent with gifts, while in another they 
might implement piecemeal reforms or boast their defense of abstract notions like “the people,” 
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“law and order,” or “free markets.” All these strategies draw subordinate classes into recognizing 
the tacit topologies of power under state rule: its “general direction,” or “common sense.” For 
Gramsci, the “‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the general 
direction imposed on social life by the dominant influential group” is just as much produced by 
the state as it is produced by civil society (1971, 12, 263). These strategies function as yet another 
arena where the putative divisions between classes are obscured, as well as providing another way 
that state elites can impose their “general direction” on human life. One example of this is the ways 
that Omani state agents have targeted local civic performance groups for registration, requiring 
renewal every year. The Ministry of Heritage not only requires that groups register with the state 
before performing at state celebrations, but also uses these registrations to monitor their activity, 
edit their song texts, and delimit their performance repertoire. While I found this somewhat 
troubling, I ultimately had to acquiesce to my Omani friends who told me it was “better that we 
register than not doing razḥa at all” (nasaggal al-yawm ‘ashān ’āshwālinā min innā mā narzaḥ 
b‘ad). 
With this notion of hegemony, it becomes much clearer how praise poetry can legitimate 
the political order of authoritarian regimes when ideals of authority rest partially on generous 
giving. Praise poetry, especially public, collective praise poetry, is rendered from subordinates to 
rulers, that is, across class “boundaries.” It forms a link, a tenuous and temporary alliance, that 
might be strengthened or weakened over time. While it can be strengthened in various ways, the 
imposition of a general order is never complete, since it is routinely demystified by subordinated 
classes (Scott 1985, 305ff.). For example, as E.P. Thompson has pointed out, “even ‘liberality’ 
and ‘charity’ may be seen as calculated acts of class appeasement… what is (from above) an ‘act 
of giving’ is (from below) an ‘act of getting’” (1978, 150). Interpretations differ based on class 
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position, but competing ideologies do not just exist, they are actively cultivated and disseminated. 
Gifts are neither fully explained as “how elites intend [them] to be seen—as disinterested 
liberality” nor as how the critical analyst reads them—as “a cynical disguise for appropriation” 
(Scott 1985, 309). Instead, gifts are a constituting medium of social relations, whose character is 
deeply sensitive to context and manipulation.  
As James Scott argued in his study of class conflict and hegemony in a Malaysian town he 
named Sedaka, morally valenced stories that circulate across and between classes are “attempts to 
create and maintain a certain view of what decent, acceptable human behavior ought to be” (1985, 
23). “The implicit purpose of these competing ideologies is not just to convince but to control,” he 
continued, “better stated, they aim to control by convincing. To the extent that they shape behavior, 
they achieve a class purpose as well” (23). While Scott recognizes the vulnerability to elites to 
“slander, gossip, character assassination,” he overlooks another potential “weapon of the weak”: 
praise.  
Praise weakly exploits the very narrative that elites insist is true—that elites are generous 
and hence moral leaders—by asking them to “put up or shut up.” More important is that praise is 
not an element of state hegemony that can be modeled as a consequence of elite failures to 
effectively coopt, coerce, and constrain the available actions of the subordinated (Scott 1990, 
90ff.). Often, hegemony is tacitly understood as an equilibrium that maximizes exploitation while 
minimizing the potential for direct violent reprisals from the exploited. However, this 
understanding fails to account for how the subordinated actively, not just reactively, shape the 
contours of a given hegemonic order, as Bowie (1998) and Greenhouse (2012) point out. In the 
Omani case, I think that praise poetry can function for and against the prevailing political “terms 
of order” by strategically manipulating certain axioms of legitimated domination. Rather than 
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actively questioning that order, since, as Scott has noted, “most acts of power from below…largely 
observe the ‘rules’ even if their objective is to undermine them,” praise plays parts of the system 
against itself (Scott 1990, 93). It is a tool, a tactic, an attempt, a mechanism—an effort to shape 
the behavior of elites. It is an active practice of training elites to be members of the moral economy 
from which they claim their legitimation. Praise may be one way that the subordinated work a 
given system of exploitation to their “minimum disadvantage” (Hobsbawm 1973, 3ff.). 
d. A brief word on social mechanisms 
To conclude this overview, I want to briefly address a key theoretical device in my analysis. 
It is the concept of the “social mechanism.” The concept of the social mechanism was first sketched 
by Herdström and Swedberg (1998) but has been expanded by many others. Sociologist Neil Gross 
summarizes the social mechanism as “a more or less general sequence or set of social events or 
processes analyzed at a lower order of complexity or aggregation by which—in certain 
circumstances—some cause X tends to bring about some effect Y in the realm of human social 
relations” (2009, 364). I use social mechanisms in what Daniel Steel has called “process tracing” 
(2004, 67). “Process tracing,” writes Steel, “consists in presenting evidence for the existence of 
several social practices that, when linked together, produce a chain of causation from one variable 
to another” (67). As I trace the role of praise in compelling generosity, and generosity’s potential 
for producing dependency, I show how certain pragmatic features of performance address this 
danger. Tracing the relation between ideals (like what makes a good leader), practices that define 
social relationships (like generosity), and the social effects these practices have leads me to 
speculate on mechanisms that might plausibly explain such regularities. I hypothesize two specific 
mechanisms (described in chapters 3 and 4) and demonstrate their historical stability and the 
results of their joint operation. 
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This dissertation, my biases, and my research methods 
I am a white, cisgendered native English-speaking man that was born in a smallish city in 
western Massachusetts and lived most of my childhood in urban and rural settings. I was raised in 
a neighborhood of what used to be termed “ethnic whites” (Irish, Polish, Portuguese, and Italian, 
mostly) and Puerto Ricans, who liked one another mostly because they were all Catholic. Nearly 
all of my early communal memories were associated with my Parish, including schooling. My 
father, whose father was Irish and Yankee and mother was French-Canadian, grew up in the same 
city. His Yankee ancestors were land-owning farmers in a nearby rural area and his Irish ancestors, 
who spoke Irish well into the twentieth century, were carpenters and factory workers. My mother, 
Italian and Irish-German, grew up near Albany. Her father and grandmother emigrated together to 
the United States from southern Italy, while her Irish-German side had arrived in New York City 
about a generation earlier. My parents, two brothers, and I lived in a duplex with my uncle while 
my parents worked in a chain bookstore. Later, when my father got a job in IT and my mother 
attended community college to become an registered nurse, we were forced to move to a more 
rural area. 
I think the move, which happened around the year 2000, was personally very alienating for 
me, which is useful for an ethnographer. The change in social world was drastic. In a mostly 
WASP-y protestant farm town, I learned that everyone wasn’t Catholic and that not everyone 
wanted cannolis for dessert. Obviously, the attacks on the World Trade Center on 9/11 and the 
subsequent imperialist war-crime attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq were of tremendous importance, 
but I wasn’t aware enough at the time to do anything but to try and keep informed. My later studies 
at The University of Massachusetts, Amherst introduced me to Arabic and anthropology, while 
my musical background led me to investigate the Middle East’s various art traditions. Many 
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anthropologists of the Middle East note that studying the Arab world was “in” for a while due to 
the amount of government funding for language study and research. I didn’t benefit from this until 
I received a “Critical Language Scholarship” to study Arabic the summer before I began my 
graduate study in ethnomusicology. I received an email from the State Department asking if I’d 
prefer to study in Morocco, Jordan, Tunis, Egypt, or Oman. I knew that I didn’t want to study in 
Morocco or Egypt. I wanted to study somewhere that was not like those places. I chose Oman as 
a first choice and Jordan as a second.  
Visiting and learning in Oman changed my life. It felt simultaneously exotic and wonderful 
and also like none of the other students wanted to be there. I felt that there were interesting things 
going on everywhere, but even other anthropology students were profoundly disinterested. One 
memorable conversation included the gem that “Oman seemed like an orientalist’s version of 
Egypt.” In any case, I knew then that I wanted to do research there. Since I was already interested 
in music and performance, I asked around about “music in Oman.” To my surprise, nearly all my 
friends responded by claiming that where they were from in the interior, there wasn’t any music. 
But there was music in Dhofar, or maybe with the Bedouins. Later in my stay, I watched several 
āzī-s and performed in several razḥa-s, which, as I know now, are not music. But they were 
performed by those same friends who claimed that no music existed in the interior. Nizwā, being 
a cultural center of some import, would later be my base for conducting ethnomusicological 
research within the regional network of towns in the interior province of al-Dakhiliyya. 
I received a Wenner-Gren Dissertation Fieldwork Grant on my second try in late 2015 to 
fund a year of research on the role of “tribal arts” in political legitimation in Oman. (I did earnestly 
think “tribal” was the best way to describe them, to my current horror, but this phrasing is 
sometimes used in Oman). I secured recognition and support for my research from the Ministry of 
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Heritage’s office of the Popular Arts in Muscat, for which I will always be thankful. This was one 
of the main offices that helped to inscribe the ‘āzī as part of our Intangible Cultural Heritage in 
2012. I stayed in Oman, living near the north-south highway interchange in Nizwā, for about ten 
months before returning for another three. By this writing, I have spent about a year and half in 
Oman working on this project. 
A sketch of the performers and their social environment 
The Sultanate of Oman is a unitary, authoritarian state whose Sultan (and Prime Minister 
and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defence and Minister of Foreign Affairs) 
is Sultan Qābūs bin Ṣa‘īd Āl Bū Ṣa‘īd, the longest ruler in the Middle East and the absolute 
monarch. He issues law by decree, such as the constitution-like Basic Statutes of the State, which 
ostensibly affords basic civil protections for citizens. In actuality, governance is largely based on 
distribution networks—of legal arrangements, import rights, financial outlays, contracts, 
development funds, land, loans, and of government jobs or favors—and is therefore highly 
personalized, secretive, and contextual. This is called wasṭa (connections, “pull”) as it is in many 
Arab contexts. Much of the daily operation of government distribution flows from the Sultan or 
his agents in Ministries through the hands of many local leaders arranged in a loose but structured 
hierarchy. Elites (shaykh-s, government agents, hospital administrators, ministry officials, state 
media, government contractors, business owners) form the capillary ends of a distribution 
hierarchy that moves goods, services, cash, and opportunities from the state to its citizens. Hence, 
for everything distributed by the state, there is a long chain of gifters and intermediaries. This form 
of distribution may seem corrupt (or at least potentially corruptible) but it is not anathema to 
accounting and formal budgets, as we shall see, and can be extremely flexible to current demands. 
Nevertheless, it is extremely opaque, elitist, and can be easily weaponized against dissenters, 
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making it a major hedge against political reform. While suffrage was extended to most citizens in 
2002, most elections are perfunctory and the Sultan appoints members of the Majlis al-dawla 
personally. As of 2016, no independent media exist in Oman. The government actively discourages 
private assembly, social development projects, and political parties are outlawed. Journalists 
critical of the regime are routinely jailed or exiled, their books banned and families threatened. 
Some piecemeal democratic reforms were made to address the limited protests occurring in 2011 
and 2012, and while people remain enthusiastic for more involvement in the political process, 
opportunities are limited.  
While the Omani economy is one of the more diversified economies in the region, the 
largest sector (fluctuating between 60% and 80%) of GDP comes from the crude oil industry. 
These revenues accrue largely though state ownership of 60% of Petroleum Development Oman, 
the largest supplier of crude oil and natural gas in the Sultanate. A huge proportion of the state 
budget is redirected into social services, and, while this percentage has declined slightly in recent 
years, expeditures to citizens still hover around 40% of the total budget. With a population of about 
2.99 million Omani nationals (as well as some 2 million expatriates) and growth at a steady 5.2% 
clip, such expenditures are likely to continue at similar levels for some time. This support system 
is increasingly necessary as unemployment reaches 20%. 
As has been noted by many scholars, Oman has perhaps witnessed the most dramatic 
change in living standards of any country in the world over the last 50 years. The UNDP report of 
199713 reports an HDI of 0.704 and adds that since 1970,  
Life expectancy has increased by 30 years [to 70 years in 1996]… infant mortality was 
reduced from more than 200 per 1000 live births in 1960 to less than 30 in 1994… in 1970, 
                                                          
13 However, see Castles 1998 for criticism of this data. 
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there were ony three schools—all primary, providing an education for 900 pupils—all 
boys. By 1994 there were 454,000 students in 920 schools, and 49% were girls… Maternal 
deaths declined to 27 per 100,000 live births. (28)  
At the same time, the state had provided some 96% of its population with free basic health care 
access. As of the 2018 update, Oman has improved over ten percentage points from a “Middle” 
(up to 0.799) to “Very High” development score at 0.82 (UNDP 2018). Increases in mean years of 
education (nine and a half) and expected education (nearly fourteen) and increases in life 
expectancy (to 77 years) and general health have continued to show improvement, alongside a 
high Gender Development Index of 0.942. Crime, with the exception of smuggling and white-
collar corruption, seems to be very low.  
 It is this history that helps to explain why the Sultan is both a despotic autocrat and a 
generally beloved figure. While political rights are minimal, social welfare programs are 
considerable and incredible development—perhaps the most significant improvement in the entire 
world—is a demonstrable fact of everyday life (“Oman most-improved nation in last 40 years, UN 
index says,” The Globe and Mail, 2 May 2018). So while some agitate for democratic reforms, 
many others are hesitant to criticize the state’s own narrative of its success (Al-Farsi 2015). When 
we turn to praise, the situation becomes yet more complicated as payouts, obligations, manners, 
history, aesthetics, and community cohesion all come into play.  
Focusing more on my research area, the Dākhiliyya or “interior” province has long been 
the heartland of Arab Omani culture, as well as a center of Ibadism, the third great Islamic 
madhhab. Dākhiliyya iself is of modest populational size: government statistics put it at about 
350,000 Omani nationals out of a national total of 2.99 million, or about 12% of the Omani 
population (NCSI data 2019). The wilayat of Manaḥ has only about 15,000 persons, compared to 
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the 90,000 of Nizwa and 60,000 of Bahlā’, but in all parts of Dākhiliyya population levels are 
rising rapidly. Over the last 30 years, household size in the region has hovered around 8 persons, 
which, coupled with the significant population growth, indicates that many new households have 
sprung up, straining existing housing arrangements (NCSI 2019). The province is distinctly split 
between the large towns and the outlying agricultural villages, with certain parts seeming very 
urban and others very rural. Nevertheless, the towns in which I worked had thriving social and 
musical scenes—if one knew where to look.   
Luckily, the performance groups I had maintained contact with since my language studies 
and brief pilot research were gracious hosts. I worked with a number of neighborhood-based 
performance groups, but none were more helpful, patient, and engaged interlocutors than the Firqat 
al-‘Arabī li-l-funūn al-sha‘abiyya  bi-wilāyat Manaḥ in the neighborhood of al-Ma‘arā in Manaḥ. 
In Bahlā, I worked with the Firqat Bahlā li-l-funūn al-sha‘abiyya administered by the Shukaylī 
brothers and their sons; in ’Izkī, with the Firqat ’Izkī li-l-funūn al-sha‘abiyya and the Firqat 
Shamūkh al-Magid (which no longer exists); in Nizwā with the Firqat al-Shihabā’ and the Firqat 
al-Shabābiyya; and in Manaḥ with the Firqat al-‘Arabī, the Firqat ḥarat al-Bilād, and the Firqat al-
Ma‘mad.  
Groups like these are based in a neighborhood and usually include a number of generational 
cohorts: it is very common for brothers, fathers, uncles, and grandfathers to all be present for one 
performance. In a very real sense, the groups themselves form the core of a given community—a 
group of neighboring, relatively socially equal households that are well-known within this or that 
neighborhood. Groups are composed of friends and neighbors who typically have known each 
other all their lives. They were often groups of friends who had passed through primary schooling 
together, then transitioned to local sports and civic clubs, maintaining their social ties and 
46 
 
 
 
increasing their prestige in the community. Group members join because doing razḥa is an activity 
that is perceived as heritage, they can spend time with their friends, write poetry, and remain active. 
While not everyone in town joins these groups, the more connected people are with the local 
community, the more likely they are to be a member of the group. The extremely low performative 
barrier to entry means that most people can join in, even for a few songs, though they may not be 
able to be a permanent fixture in the group. When asked, members often report that razḥa is not 
only fun, but ismembership is incumbent upon them as members of their community. If people 
who can perform don’t, word spreads and they are cajoled back into the group. Certainly, young 
men sometimes drag their feet when asked to perform, some shy away from dancing and singing, 
and others are too busy. Nevertheless, performers, in general, are proud to perform part of their 
heritage.  
It is important to point out that I specifically based my research on groups that perform 
praise—hence, the perspective of those that find praise nauseating is lacking. There are certaintly 
people in Oman who find praise to be uninteresting, sycophantic, obsequious, and the like and 
consider praise of the state to be appallingly naïve. Those people also generally do not perform the 
funūn. I focused intstead on praisers and sought to understand how and why they praised the state 
and its agents. While praise of the state is sometimes offered because it is a “safe” and supposedly 
“neutral” topic and allows for performances to continue unmolested, much more often praise is 
given with real sincerity.  
Performance groups are often one aspect of broader civic organizations that might include 
a soccer team, committees that plan street and falaj cleaning days, organize workshops for health 
and safety, run a large, communal tanur oven, and so on. As we shall see, these performance/civic 
groups are more common in provincial areas, but they are by no means exclusive to them. Since 
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cities like Muscat and Sohar are sectioned into neighborhoods, groups often form within the 
confines of one of the older neighborhoods, performing much the same function as those I studied 
in the countryside. In Muscat, for example, the Firqat Sidāb in the neighborhood of Sidāb performs 
mālid, a choral, antiphonal singing practice, for local occasions and teaches younger neighborhood 
boys how to perform as well. Similar groups exist in Old Muscat, Seeb, and other older sections 
of town devoted to razḥa. 
Razḥa and ‘āzī flourished in both urban and rural locales within Dākhiliyya. While razḥa 
has a rural character to it, it is less seen as a specifically “country” performance as it is an 
expression of a primordial Omani identity, which is strongly associated, in part, with an imagined 
rural past. Similarly, coastal genres appeal to an imagined seafaring past. While of course there is 
some debate about the reality of these pasts, rural folks in the Dākhiliyya were happy to boast 
about a seafaring past. Part of the rural character of the razḥa is associate with bellicosity, warfare, 
and “older” or “traditional” values of community, egalitarianism, sovereignty, and self-reliance. 
These values are displayed in the organization of the dance, the costumes, and in the poetry, all of 
which inspire serious aesthetic fascination. The poetry is the primary interst of most performers 
and audiences, but costumes and weapons also arouse delicate attention and interest. Poetry is 
regarded as extremely evocative: it can be coy, boastful, prideful, flirtatious, and morally 
purposeful. While urbane, cosmopolitan folks may look down on razḥa because it is a little coarse, 
blustering, and loud, they do not, in general, disparage it as inauthentic or sycophantic. Part of this 
is due to the positioning of razḥa as a kind of national art form, and part of it is due to the way 
razḥa clearly reflects real socioeconomic divisions in the Sultanate. 
The socioeconomic status of group members may vary widely but shaykh-s and hence 
shaykh-ly families never participate. There is a clear distinction between families who are fairly 
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wealthy and those that are shaykh-s. For example, in Bahlā’, group leaders are significantly more 
wealthy than some of the other members, but no group members do not work for a living, be it in 
agriculture, auto repair, animal husbandry, or other service work. The groups leaders are not 
shaykh-s—at least not to a level where they might consider not performing. In fact, Oman has seen 
a significant decrease in wealth inequality over the last few decades (a GINI index drop from the 
low 40s to the high 20s since 2000, NCSI data 2019). This is especially striking in a country where 
a thin layer of elites control such a huge proportion of revenues. On the topic of money, while 
performers do make some money for performing (the amount varies with the patron) no one can 
make a living on just performing, since payouts are too low and inconsistent. Further, handshake 
deals (moderated through WhatsApp nowadays) between friends, locals, and acquaintances may 
mean playing a wedding for free or in exchange for a share in the feast. Other engagements, such 
as playing for the opening of a car dealership or a grocery store, might net the group a few hundred 
riyals, which usually ended up in a shared group account administered by one or two persons. The 
funds might be used for clothing, daggers, gasoline, swords, food, water, and other such things. 
During national holidays, especially the big celebrations every 5 years, a performer might be given 
a few thousand riyals, but this is not a subsistence strategy for most. This is evidenced by the fact 
that group members will sometimes choose not to perform at an event but instead set up a small 
booth to sell smallgoods, toys, and candy at the margins of a performance space rather than 
performing. Similarly, educational levels can vary: I spoke with doctoral students, college 
students, bank managers, and engineers as well as some older folks who had not had any formal 
schooling after learning to read the Qur’an.  
Within one town, several performance groups may be present, some of which boast 
histories from the early 1970s, while other are only a few years old. Of these groups, only one 
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contained a working agent of the Omani state, the Firqat al-Shihabā’ in Nizwā, whose manager 
worked in the Wali’s Office in Nizwā. Because so many individuals draw at least part of their 
income from the state (as cash, loan forgiveness, beneficial interest rates, land grants, etc.), it is 
impossible to draw a strict dividing line between folks who “work with the state” and those who 
avoid it. Most rural groups, like those in Manaḥ and ’Izkī, were composed of working-class rural 
men and lower-middle-class townsmen. Often rural men worked in service sectors in nearby towns 
(like clerking in cellphone offices) and on family farms, while others worked as private tow-truck 
operators, excavators, taxi drivers, or guards for governmental buildings or banks. Most 
supplemented their incomes in various ways: selling farm produce (mostly melons and onions) or 
trinkets, candy, and toys at stalls in town markets. Some group members were in technical college 
in Nizwā whiles others were in the army or police and only participated when they were home. In 
the larger towns of Bahlā’ and Nizwā, groups were considerably wealthier and concomitantly 
larger, more well-equipped, and more closely associated with state performances. The leaders of 
the Firqat Bahlā’, Muḥammad and Sālim bin Sulaymān al-Shukaylī, are nationally recognized 
experts and their performances were chosen to represent ‘āzī and razḥa in the new Omani National 
Museum. Pictures and videos of their performances frequently circulate on Omani social media 
networks. Despite the comparatively modest wealth that their performances have brought them, 
Sālim still works part-time in a smallgoods shop just north of Bahlā’ in al-Ma‘mūra. His sons and 
nephews raise shoats for local restaurants (which are very delicious) and are affluent enough to 
sponsor several Bengali “guest” workers. 
What all these groups have in common is that they perform razḥa and ‘āzī. Only one group 
performed a third genre, called al-rūgh, using a short, dual-reed pipe (similar to a Lebanese mijwiz) 
of the same name, and they did so because it was a shawāwī genre, that is, one that belonged, like 
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them, to a small group of semi-nomadic pastoralists. Razḥa and ‘āzī, on the other hand, are linked 
genres in the minds of these performers, and are performed by Omani townsmen in the Dākhiliyya, 
Bāṭinah, Sharqiyya, and Ẓāhira provinces of northern Oman. Bedouins have other genres, as do 
people in other regions. I chose to study in Dākhiliyya because of the density of towns with active, 
governmentally registered performance groups. While I could have situated my study in Sharqiyya 
and studied an arguably more vital performance scene (but with fewer formal registered groups), 
I was interested in the ways in which performance was related to state rule. Dākhiliyya seemed to 
be the best place to situate the research expressed in that way.  
Razḥa and ‘āzī in Dakhiliyya are most often performed to celebrate—as Omanis put it, for 
faraḥ, joy. This might include weddings, university graduations, religious holidays, or the opening 
of a new car dealership. I was often invited to perform razḥa for collective weddings, religious 
holidays, and more minor opening ceremonies, such as for sports events or branches of restaurants. 
These kinds of events were strictly opposed to those that celebrated government actions of one 
kind or another. Those are not for faraḥ, and, accordingly, I was never invited to perform in those. 
For example, I attended several events tied to the opening of a new majlis, or community center 
devoted to one or another neighborhood. The razḥa-s presented in those ceremonies were thought 
to express the solidarity of the neighborhood and reconfirm the mutual relations of political 
obligation that inhere in that act of giving and receiving. I, as a guest but not a member (nor even 
a potential member) of the political body in question, was not fit to participate in performances 
that express such political solidarity. Similar events might be held for opening a new satellite of 
the Ministry of Heritage and Culture or a new water pumping station. Other events I was not invited 
to participate in were those that celebrated National Day, that praised the Sultan specifically, or 
were organized by a governor for some special state occasion. ‘Āzī-s were only given at occasions 
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like these, ones of particular importance, those that might have a row of important elites seated 
before the performers. These elites would range in importance from local shaykh-s to members of 
the ruling family, ministry agents, and local governors, wālī-s. For these occasions, new ‘āzī-s 
were typically written, as was the ‘āzī presented in the beginning of this chapter. I discuss the 
importance of the distinction between celebratory and political performances throughout this 
dissertation, though I focus explicitly on political ones. 
 My research was almost entirely composed of various modes of interviewing, recording 
performances, and participant observation. I recreate many of my interviews throughout this 
dissertation so I will not belabor them here. It was important for me to bring Omani voices 
themselves into the text as naturally as possible. While I did not transcribe all my audio interviews, 
I notated them all and have transcribed relevant portions. By participant-observation I am happy 
to say that it mostly meant singing and dancing with people who were very kind, thoughtful, and 
welcoming. While I often took breaks to record the performance, I was welcomed in most dances. 
I was excluded from the most serious praise poetry, Omani music and praise videos, and state and 
civic events, which were highly politically charged. While I struggled with the decision to wear a 
dishdāsha and kumma, I ultimately decided against it in public. The next time I go I will consider 
wearing it to performances, but I think I was right to not wear it in general. I felt that it was too 
much like wearing a costume. Especially as a white-read Westerner, I was afforded considerable 
unwarranted respect and privilege, and I thought that wearing the local clothing was a situation 
where, even if it was wrong, no one would tell me so until it was too late. I asked Omanis I trusted 
many times and they were split—some thought it would be strange or disrespectful while others 
constantly encouraged me to do so. 
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I had hoped to convince a drummer to teach me how to play the raḥmānī and kāsir drums. 
Everyone I spoke to thought this was a bad idea—nobody else did that, so why should I? I would 
just pick it up as we drummed and danced, like everyone else. I did, but I felt like I wasn’t being 
a good ethnomusicologist. Surely there was a drum language, or some deep symbolic significance 
only understood by drummers that I would miss? There might be, but mostly the drums were not 
considered a very interesting thing to study. What most folks pointed me to was the poetry, the 
collective emotions of performance, the way that praise demonstrated their goodwill and joy, the 
way it connected them to the Sultan and local leaders. I attended many performances but I analyze 
only a dozen or so in this dissertation. I notated most of the razḥa melodies while I was in the field 
and drum parts back in the US. Transcription was sometimes interesting to my Omani friends, and 
I taught a few how to read the melodies as I had written them, which they decided wasn’t really 
helpful because they knew the melodies anyhow. I had to agree. 
 I realized a few things early on. First, and something with which I am not comfortable, is 
that I was never going to meet any of my friends’ female kin or wives, except for a few very kind 
grandmothers and young children. This was just not possible. At my first wedding in Manaḥ, our 
razḥa troupe was marching down a short side street toward the host’s home. Behind us, a larger 
group of women were performing al-wayliyya al-manḥiyya,14 a woman’s communal dance. 
Wayliyya is performed by women in public without an ’abāya, but rather in colorful sirwāl 
trousers, a tunic, and heavily decorated headpieces. As they linked arms around their shoulders, 
they swayed down the street in ten or so rows, free hands shaking the ‘aḍūd, an anklet that doubled 
as a rattle, like a maraca. They sang melodies in a manner very similar to razḥa, and so I lifted up 
my phone to record. As I did so, my friends grabbed my phone and tutted at me: “Hey, that’s not 
                                                          
14 See al-Shaydī’s description in (2008, 336-7). 
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for us. They wouldn’t like if you filmed them.” I didn’t protest, but it was not the last time I would 
be told by my friends not to record women performing wayliyya, al-kīdhā’, or wannā. Filming 
women performing would have been disrespectful and would have lowered me in the eyes of my 
friends. I chose not to, but it wasn’t much of a choice. 
Two other things bear mentioning. I was rarely invited to the “family” section of houses, 
which was a source of deep disappointment for me. I felt this meant that I was not really an 
accepted member of the society in Manaḥ, where I had spent so much time. I’m not sure this is 
true in retrospect, but it felt that way then. Second is that I was not considered wealthy by my 
Omani interlocutors. I was a guest, who, for some, overstayed his welcome. In any case, I had no 
problems that stemmed from perceptions that I had more money than anyone else. No one tried to 
get a visa to the US from me. Only rarely would someone ask me for cash or to buy a phone card. 
As a guest, I was an illogical target for requests. While some folks tried to see if I had any 
government or ministry connections, I struggled with a severe lack of wasṭa, connections, or pull. 
Without children and away from my wife, I was considered a bit of an anomaly, but there was 
some recognition that Orientalists (mustashriqīn, like me) could study Arabic poetry. And so I was 
affectionately integrated as the “duktūr/dukhtūr” who was studying al-funūn al-sha‘abiyya, which 
constructed me as honoring Omani heritage and bringing some respect and foreign recognition to 
it, which I hope is true. 
The dissertation outline 
I develop the argument of this dissertation over five ethnographic chapters. I begin with a framing 
chapter that focuses on Oman’s natural and social environment and then proceed to the core 
subjects of my research: praise, generosity, legitimacy, and the state. 
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 Chapter 1 is a presentation of information about Oman, its location, geography, flora and 
fauna, and rural life that is relevant to the study of sung poetry and praise as a political-economic 
practice. I present a historical, economic, and political overview that helps to situate my argument. 
I sketch some topics of significant importance: archaeological accounts of agriculture and 
irrigation, human geography, social structure, tribes, and political organization on several social 
scales. I round out the chapter with a critical account of the events and changes over the twentieth 
century in Oman, a period that has seen intense historicization by local and foreign scholars. 
 Chapter 2 is an attempt to “take praise seriously,” that is, attend to it with the same mindset 
as Omani poets and performers do. It connects praise poetry in Oman to the practices of political 
power in Oman. In it, I make the case that praise poetry, far from being an exercise in mere flattery, 
has in many times and many places been considered crucial to the maintenance and reconfiguration 
of social order. In scholarly discourse, maligning praise is a thoroughly modern obsession, the 
allergy to it a thoroughly modern disease. Chapter 2 also serves as an introduction to the ‘āzī as a 
poetic and performance form. 
 Chapter 3 links praise poetry to a social mechanism that I term the “Generosity/Legitimacy 
mechanism.” I show that generosity (amongst many other practices) has been considered a critical 
obligation of leaders in the Middle East, and that display of generosity, the act itself, is a 
demonstration of the effectiveness of that leadership. I show that generosity is not merely an 
ideological conceit developed by ruling classes to accrue consent or quash political resistance, but 
a profoundly and deeply shared moral commitment amongst all kinds of people in all sorts of class 
positions. This shared cross-class valuation of generosity does not altogether avoid the dangers of 
“the gift,” which compels response at the risk of signaling dependency. This chapter also serves 
as an introduction to the razḥa as a performance practice. 
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 Chapter 4 turns directly to the ways in which razḥa acts as praise of generosity without 
necessarily signaling dependency. I posit a second mechanism, the Razḥa Integration mechanism, 
to explain why razḥa performance changes (or appears to change) the dynamics and dangers of 
gift exchange in unequal social situations. I argue that praise integrates power into community. 
Since it is the role of leaders to give, but taking those gifts may signal weakness, I show how razḥa 
performance skirts the threat of dependency by framing the reception of generosity as an 
affirmation of support in continuing circuits of mutual obligation. It is, as I sketched above, a 
practice that asserts the moral character of this moral economy. This is delicate terrain, however, 
and this is not always seen as successful. Omani performers think of praise as a kind of work that 
sustains community as a moral economy, work which is invited and never imposed. Praise 
performance is a deeply shared emotional practice, but as a way of displaying dignity and pride, it 
can and sometimes does fail to waylay accusations of dependency, sycophancy, and weakness.  
 Chapter 5 turns to ’Ibāḍī legal interpretations of the proper role of music amongst good 
Muslims. I show that an underappreciated category of “acceptable” music, in certain Islamic 
contexts and at certain times, has been music that serves a practical purpose: in the Omani case, 
for war. Since war is, as Bakunin pointed out, the inevitable destiny of states, music for war is 
inevitably the music of the state. I analyze this situation because it shows how music can be 
rendered “Islamically” legitimate simply because it is useful for the ends of the state, not for the 
inculcation of religious orthodoxy or personalized practices of self-fashioning. 
Chapter 6 is a discussion of the ways in which razḥa and ‘āzī have become so closely tied 
to state power in Oman. Based on the previous chapters, I show how it has functioned as a real 
juncture in the political-economy of Omani state rule, a role it has had for some time. Within the 
contemporary state, this role has simultaneously expanded and contracted. As alternatives to the 
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state were destroyed, one by one, praise became centralized and served largely to render the Sultan, 
as the proxy of the state, as a generous giver and ferocious defender of Oman, hence legitimating 
his authoritarian rule over the country. The state has also capitalized on the “Arab” character of 
these genres, promoting an image of the state as masculine, militant, traditional, Arab, and Muslim.  
 Finally, the conclusion revisits some of these themes, questions some of their (and my) 
assumptions, and suggests some avenues for further research. I dwell especially on the category of 
“legitimacy,” which I construe as essential to the Omani authoritarian state, and, indeed to many 
other states. Is it? Are there other ways to understand the ubiquity and perpetuation of political 
domination? Lastly, I turn back to the notion of the “moral economy” and link it to recent 
approaches to ethics in ethnomusicology and anthropology, proposing a new old way of looking 
at things. 
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Chapter 1: Historical Patterns of Social and Political Organization in Oman 
I rely on a detailed understanding of the history and environmental setting of polities in 
Oman, and, while my focus will be mainly on the last two hundred years, certain background 
knowledge on the ecological and economic base of interior Oman will be valuable to contextualize 
the argument. This overview largely focuses on Inner Oman, the setting of the dissertation. 
There are four purposes to this introduction to Oman, its ecology, and the history of its 
peoples. The first is that the diversity of species, especially flora, displays the multiple avenues of 
movement for humans, animals, and even climactic patterns into and through the region, and neatly 
summarizes its unique location at the juncture of three major geographical regions. The second 
purpose is to draw attention to how the human settlement pattern of Oman has had implications 
for the development of structures of governance in Oman. These settlement patterns have helped 
to develop and privilege certain modes of group-based interaction, display, and communication.  
The third purpose is to familiarize the reader with the animals, plants, and material culture of the 
townspeople in the Omani interior. The genres under discussion are, generally speaking, performed 
by agriculturalists, and often invoke imagery and vocabulary unique to their experience and not 
shared with the elite written poetry of the literate ‘ulamā. As a fourth purpose, this chapter serves 
as an introduction to several social, cultural, and political concepts that will be referenced 
throughout the dissertation, including historical polities (the Ibāḍī Imamate, the Sultanate, tribes) 
and social structure (authority structures, human geography, historical economic interactions). 
Finally, this chapter will give a brief overview of my critical reading of the state in the twentieth 
century. 
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The Ecological Setting 
The Arabian sub-continent occupies a central position bridging Africa, the Levant, and 
Asia, providing both marine and terrestrial avenues of dispersal to humans and other animals 
between these larger regions. Situated on the extreme southeastern corner of the 2.5 million km² 
Arabian Peninsula, the Sultanate of Oman (roughly stretching between 16.5° N to 25° N and from 
52° E to 60° E) is bordered on all sides by inhospitably arid deserts and the sea. To the east and 
southeast is the Indian Ocean, which along the northern shore quiets into the Arabian Sea and 
funnels into the Persian Gulf proper through the Strait of Hormuz (on the Persian coast) and the 
Musandam Peninsula (on the Arabian coast). While the northern shore of Oman is relatively quiet 
and slopes gently from mountains in the interior to the sea, the eastern and southeastern shores 
plunge directly into the Indian Ocean. Framing the north and south of the country are two high 
mountain ranges (~3000m), between which stretches the long gravel plain and wadi outwash 
regions that extend the rocky piedmont of these mountains. As these gravel plains stretch on and 
water grows scarcer, they gradually transform into the arid desert region that characterizes the 
middle of the modern country and that separates the north from the south, called the Jiddat al-
Ḥarāsīs after the main Bedouin group that now inhabits it. In the south, the Ẓufār range extends 
still further along the coast into Yemen’s Ḥaḍramawt and frames the large southern coastal city of 
Ṣalāla.  
The north of the country (roughly 21° N to 25° N) is the most densely populated region in 
Oman. It in turn is dominated by the Ḥajar mountain range, which forms a central backbone 
mirroring the coast from Ra’s al-Ḥadd in the east to the tip of Musandam in the northwest. The 
mountains, topped by the limestone massif called Jabal Akhḍar or “Green Mountain”, are riven by 
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large wadi15 systems that drain rainwater from the tops of the mountains both northward and 
southward into large gravel outwash plains, which have been the main natural feature sustaining 
human settlement. The range itself is divided into two halves, western and eastern, by the Sumā’il 
Gap, which slopes rapidly upward from the coastal capital of Muscat into the high plains of the 
interior. This remains the largest and most accessible pathway between the coast and the interior 
of the country, though several other natural pathways radiate northward and connect interior and 
coastal towns along the range’s length. The broad gravel plain called the Bāṭina extends 
approximately 50km between the coast and the mountains and is heavily populated and extensively 
cultivated by tapping groundwater via wells. On the southern, interior side of the mountains, wadi 
outwash radiates outwards for more than a hundred kilometers into the central desert described 
above and the large sand dune desert of the Rub‘a al-Khālī—the famed “Empty Quarter”. These 
natural barriers have served to isolate the interior from the central high plains of the Arabian 
Shield, now known as Najd in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
Natural ecological zones in Oman depend on the availability of water. Contrary to the 
popular imagination, Oman is not devoid of plant and animal life, though it is characterized by 
uneven blooms due to fluctuations in rain. Vast stretches of gravel plain are only sporadically 
punctuated by seemingly unvariegated plant life. Annual rainfall averages one hundred millimeters 
and is both highly locational and seasonal, with some regions receiving nearly none (the Jiddat al-
Ḥarāsīs, for example, Chatty 1996, 79-81). In certain areas, especially near still or flowing wadi 
                                                          
15 Wadi, (Ar. wādī), refers to both a dry river bed and the valley or drainage area that it is 
situated within. Wadis are almost always named and are often named after the largest group that 
lives in its confines. Wadis are important geographical features because they channel available 
water in predictable ways, even if they are prone to dangerous flooding. 
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beds and in the many microclimates produced by the vagaries of the piedmontane and montane 
regions, plant life is arrestingly verdant and diverse.  
In general, plant biologists and ecologists note that Oman is separated into two main zones: 
the south, which is wetter and is largely composed of plants that are related to those in Africa, and 
the north, whose flora are continuous with the mountainous regions of Iran. Along the central and 
southern coasts, monsoon patterns driven along Indian Ocean currents result in far more available 
water arriving in the form of thick, moist fog than actual precipitation. It is here that Frankincense 
trees (largely Boswellia sacra, CLA. al-lubbān) have been harvested for thousands of years. This 
late-summer monsoon season, called al-kharīf, is an immensely popular time for vacationers 
throughout the Arabian Peninsula to visit due to this brief lushness. 
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Figure 1. Map of the Arabian Peninsula, © OpenStreetMap contributors: 
https://www.openstreetmap.org/copyright 
 In the north, moisture precipitates along the tops of the Ḥajar mountains and is funneled down 
along the wadi gullies and eventually into deep aquifers (though Al-Mashakhi and Koll 2007 
estimate only ~15% of precipitation reaches these). Snow is not unknown atop and along the 
ranges, where the temperature, as is common in semi-arid regions, can fluctuate more than 30°C 
in a single day. Plant life in Oman, as in most agricultural areas, is neatly divided between wild 
and cultivated species, and knowledge of plants as both crops and forage is distributed widely. In 
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fact, many regions are symbolized by a plant in their own and in governmental media—Samā’il 
by the date palm, Ẓufār by the Frankincense tree, and Manaḥ by the medicinal shrub mitk. 
Generally speaking, cultivated plants are more common in poetry than wild plants, but herbs, 
foreign spices like saffron and clove, fruit trees, and wild flowering trees that are used in honey 
production are very common poetic images in the oral poetry of Omani townspeople. While arid 
regions of shifting dunes may support a variety of grasses that sprout up after rains, the semi-arid 
gravel plains and piedmont regions that form the main ecological zone of this dissertation are 
characterized by stretches of tall grasses, both annual and perennial, and wild herbs.16 Grasses 
generally sprout for a few months after early spring rains and are valued fodder for pasturage, 
alongside commercially grown feed crops.17 Thorny Acacia trees18 are common throughout the 
plains of Oman, together with huge ghaf trees (Prosopis cineraria) and the ubiquitous date palm 
(Phoenix dactylifera). In the piedmontane regions, drupes19 flourish alongside many kinds of small 
shrubs and stubborn succulents. Flowers and various asters are commonly found higher in the Jabal 
Akhḍar range, where domesticated roses (mainly “Damask” varieties CLA. ward) are cultivated 
for rose water production.  
                                                          
16 Common varieties: Ruta augustifolia, “Rue”, CLA. sidhāb; Coriandrum, “Coriander”, 
“Cilantro”, CLA. quzbar; Eruca sativa, “Arugula” or “Rocket”, OA. , gargīr, pl. garāgir; 
various fragrant Ocimum species “Basil”, CLA. riḥān, including “African” O. gratissimum and 
“Holy” sanctum; Trigonella, “Fenugreek”, CLA. ḥulba. All of these types are both cultivated 
and foraged. 
17 Chiefly Medicago sativa, “Lucerne” or “Alfalfa”, CLA. al-fiṣfiṣa, OA. qāṭ, and Chloris 
gayana “Rhodes grass”, introduced in an agricultural project outlined by Dutton 1982. 
18 Both tortilis, CLA. simr, simra and ehrenbergiana, CLA. salam. 
19 Ziziphus spina-christi, ‘Christ’s Thorn’, Z. jujube ‘Jujube’, and the wild olive, Olea europaea 
CLA. ‘atm. 
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In love razḥāt, razḥāt ghazzaliyya, plants are often used as a metaphor for women and women’s 
bodies. Some are broadly shared motifs, including flowers: 
ةيلاخ لزانملاو كراد تيلخ لحترت دصاق نيو يهاز درو اي 
ةيقاب ةدوملا ماد يفظنت ام ةلعاش اياشحلا يف كران تيلخ    
Yā ward zāhī, wayn qāṣid tartaḥil,  
khalayt dārik wa-l-manāzil khāliyya. 
Khalayt nārik fī-l-ḥashāya shā‘ila  
mā tanẓafī, dām al-muwadda bāqiyya. 
 
O brilliant rose, where do you intend to go?  
You’ve left your home, the houses empty. 
You’ve left your fire in the hearth  
burning unextinguished—love yet remains. 
 
ولق عمجت مايقلاو يتلاص يف كتبلط اللههتتشمو ةمياه ب  
هتيم تناك سملااب بولق يحتو نيمسايلاو بنعلا نيتاسبلا يحت   
Allah, ṭalabtak fī ṣalātī wa-l-qiyām  
tajjama‘ qulūb hāyima wa mushattata; 
Taḥay al-basātīn al-‘anb wa-l-yasāmīn  
wa tahāy qulūb bi-l-’ams kānat mayyita. 
 
O God, your request is in my prayers; all creation 
 gathers love-mad and distant hearts. 
You enliven the gardens of grapes and jasmine  
just as you revive hearts yesterday dead. 
 
Others are more locally specific. Here, the anonymous poet imagines the issue of loving two 
people as similar to the problem of cultivating different fruit trees, the date palm and the banana 
plant. 
هنيواوع تيقبو لخنلا حاط يلاتغللا زوم اي يلاتغللا زوم اي 
 نم مدهتو حاط يلام ىلع فياخ يلام ىلع فياخهنيواوس    
Yā mawz al-lughatālī, yā mawz al-lughatālī,  
ṭāḥ al-nakhl wa baqayt ‘awāwaynuh 
Khayif ‘alā mālī, khayif ‘alā mālī,  
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ṭāḥ wa tahaddum min sawāwaynuh 
 
O, verdant and tall banana tree! O verdant and tall banana tree,  
The date palm has fallen and only its stalk remains. 
I fear for what’s mine, I fear for what’s mine, 
 It’s fallen and destroyed what I’ve built. 
 
This poem turns on the identification of kinds of women with kinds of plants—the banana 
tree, fertile and foreign, stands in for an extramarital and exotic lover, while the date palm, ordinary 
and local, for the loyal wife. The date palm’s falling represents the loyal wife leaving her husband, 
likely to take up with her kin, the husband’s shamag, thus destroying all that he has worked so 
hard for. The “verdant and tall banana tree” is informed here that the affair has ruined his life. This 
poem was explained to me several times referring to women from non-Arab or Zufārī 
backgrounds—just as they come from away and live in northern Oman, so did the banana tree. 
While it’s considered a little risqué, it is a poem known by many performers. 
 
Figure 2. Date palms (Phoenix dactylifera) growing over a cover crop of Rhodes grass, 
Chloris gayana, January 2016. Al-Ḥamrā’, Dakhilliya.  
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Figure 3. Maturing dates, July 2016. Al-Ma‘arā, Manaḥ, Dakhilliya. 
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Figure 4. A gelba of alfalfa, qāṭ, Medicago sativa, bordered with Rhodes grass, July 2016. Al-
Ma‘arā, Manaḥ, Dakhilliya. 
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Figure 5. Acacia tortilis, CLA. simr, simra, close, December 2015. ‘Ibrī, al-Ẓāhira. 
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Figure 6. Arabian toad (Duttaphrynus arabicus) in flooded falaj irrigation basin (galba) with of 
Coriandrum, January 2016. Wadi Bani Kharūs, ‘Awābī, al-Bāṭina. 
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Figure 7. Acacia tortilis, CLA. simr, simra, November 2015. Bāt, ‘Ibrī, al-Ẓāhira. 
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Figure 8. Ghaf tree, Prosposis cineraria, close, June 2016. Al-bilād, Manaḥ, Dakhiliyya. 
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Figure 9. Zizyphus, ‘jujube’, immature fruit, February 2016. Wadi Ḍamm, ‘Ibrī, al-Ẓāhira. 
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Figure 10. Wadi Ḍamm pool, February 2016. 
 
73 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Riḥān, ‘Holy Basil’, Ocimum sanctum in Hamad’s court garden, July 2016. Al-
Ma‘arā, Manaḥ. 
 
Fauna in Oman are also divided into Asiatic and African origins. While mammals are 
relatively sparsely distributed over the landscape, insects and birds are very common. Many birds 
are seasonal, moving with the monsoon around the northern Indian Ocean rim. One of these 
seasonal visitors is the iridescent blue Indian Roller, Coracias benghalensis, who makes its home 
amongst the dense foliage of the date palms in the north. Called variously bū ‘Azrāq or al-ṣuqrāq 
in the Interior, these jay-sized birds are known for their acrobatic and “rolling” flightpaths, often 
glimpsed as a flash of blue just beneath the dusty green of the palms. Other Passerines range from 
the drab: thrushes, scrub robins, swifts (Apus), cuckoos, to the spectacular Palestine sunbird 
(Cinnyris osea), hoopoe (Upopa epops), and white-eared bulbul (Pycnonotus leucotis). Desert 
adapted insects and arachnids occupy the most arid regions to the watered wadis, sharing space 
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with the arabian toad (Duttaphrynus arabicus, O. Ar. al-kurra), various dragonflies, mud wasps, 
lizards and geckos. Mammals are largely nocturnal, desert-adapted variants of species common to 
southwest Asia, ranging from the miniscule jumping mouse jarbū‘ (Dipodidae), various vesper 
bats, the Ethiopian hedgehog (Paraechinus aethiopicus), desert foxes, hares, and caracals, to the 
possibly extirpated arabian leopard (Panthera pardus nimr, CLA. nimr). The most varied and 
populous large mammals are bovid ruminants, including various species of Capra, wild (C. 
nubiana) and feral, gazelles, and the Omani tahr (Arabitragus jayakari). The magnificent arabian 
oryx (Oryx leucoryx, CLA. al-mahā) has recently been reintroduced (Chatty 1996). Perhaps 
because wild fauna are relatively sparse in Oman the discovery of species new to biology is a 
relatively common occurrence, with new lizards, plants, and even something as large as an owl 
being documented as late as 2013.20 Many of the bovids have held onto niches in the region for 
many thousands of years and have been primary prey species for human populations, as well as 
becoming rich and densely layered poetic and artistic symbols.21 The flighty and graceful gazelle, 
al-rīm, is a common stand-in for female beloveds; while the ostrich, al-na‘āma, long ago extirpated 
from Oman, stands for a speedy messenger or steed; the Arabian Oryx, al-mahā, has become 
something of a national symbol in Oman for a noble and strong individual. Just as women are often 
considered as prey species and as plants, men are often considered predator species. Clive Holes 
and Said Salman Abu Athera make an important note about the role of predators as poetic images.  
                                                          
20 “New owl discovered in Oman”:  http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/new-owl-discovered-in-
oman-1.1928796 
21 See Collins 2002 for an extensive overview of human/animal relations throughout the ancient 
Middle East, and compare with Sowayan’s 1985 discussion of modern poetic symbolism with 
camels, horses (32-3) and other animals (58). 
75 
 
 
 
Predators at the top of the food chain, like falcons of various kinds (ṣaqr, shihān, nadāwi), 
eagles (‘iqāb), lions (layth, asad, sabi‘) and cheetahs (fahad) are always used to represent 
the alpha male of the human species—noble, single-minded, ruthless, and brave. Thus a 
routine piece of praise for a prominent Bedouin tribal leader begins: 
 He’s like a noble falcon, and he’s generous to a fault; 
 Lavishly, unstintingly, he gives, and we exalt! (Holes and Abu Athera 2009, 19-20) 
Truly exceptional men and women, however, are often represented as celestial objects: the sun, 
the moon, comets, and stars. 
Human Settlement 
Human settlement in the Arabian Peninsula is ancient, owing to the Peninsula’s proximity 
to East African avenues of hominin dispersal and the later movement of peoples from the Levant. 
This is evidenced by both genetic data (Rídl et al. 2009; Cabrera et al. 2009) and Acheulean 
archaeological remains from the Early and Middle Pleistocene, from 2 million to 200,000 years 
ago (Petraglia 2003; Petraglia et al. 2009). These hominins likely migrated along with other 
African species, such as the Papio hamadryas baboons studied by Fernandes (2009), during times 
of favorable climactic conditions, even when the Red Sea was at a high point (2009, 90-91). They 
seemed to have settled along the coasts, exploiting near-shore marine sessile deposits like shellfish 
as they migrated from modern Yemen northward along the Red Sea and ringing the peninsula to 
the Gulf (Bolvin et al. 2009; Giraud 2009).  
Jumping forward to the Pleistocene/Holocene transition, by c. 7000 BCE an 
agrarian/pastoralist system based on domestic bovine and caprine domestication, blended with 
natural resource gathering in several biomes, was well-established. Dromedary camel (Camelus 
dromedarius) domestication is more recent, likely innovated within the last 5000 years due to the 
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increasing aridity of the Middle East and northeast Africa. Uerpmann (1999) presents a camel and 
horse graveyard in Sharjah, UAE, active between 300 BCE and 200 CE, which richly attests to 
their cultural and economic role amongst human settlers by that time. Wild dromedary remains in 
Yemen have been reliably dated to c. 7000 BCE by Grigson et al (1989). Almathen et al.’s 2016 
analysis of the largest dromedary DNA set so far leads them to conclude that dromedaries were 
first domesticated in the southeastern Arabian Peninsula, though they are also marked by 
continuous wild genetic inputs that are extremely varied due to the wide ranges of caravan routes. 
While dromedary and equine pastoralism is largely the province of nomadic groups and is present 
throughout the country (Janzen 1986; Chatty 1996), bovine pastoralism is more concentrated in 
the south, though some house cows are kept in the north for milk, manure, plowing, and meat. 
Various caprines are kept by villagers, shawāwī (semi-permanent pastoralists exploiting hilly and 
mountainous terrain) and Bedouin groups for milk, meat, leather, and wool.  
Regardless of its exact shape and origin, a recognizable nomadic pastoral technology 
complex seems to have been present in the region over the last 4000 years, during which human 
settlers began to divide into two broad groups. These groups have long recognized themselves as 
ḥaḍar and badū22 in modern Arabic. Ḥaḍar, or agrarian villagers and town dwellers, historically 
have clustered around reliable water sources and pursued large-scale agriculture and small-scale 
animal husbandry. Crops depended on the availability of water, elevation, and other specifics of 
climate, but staples were dates and grain, supplemented by fruit trees, vegetables, fodder crops, 
onions, and honey cultivation. Honey is extremely highly valued in Oman as a kind of medicine, 
and has been supplementing the incomes of agriculturalists for some time (Lancasters 2011, 
                                                          
22 Villagers also referred to badū as ‘arab, though this has largely come to refer to the broader 
ethnic group (cf. Jabbūr 1988, 1-3). 
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chapters 5,6). Badū, or Bedouin, are fully nomadic pastoral specialists, have historically exploited 
the vast expanses of semi-arid plains with their domesticated flocks. This has resulted in two linked 
but semi-separate populations who exploit two very different environments within the same 
geographic region that are nevertheless inextricably linked. This social structure, which Chatty 
(1983, 149-50) refers to as the “ecological trinity” of urban town, rural village, and pastoral 
nomadic, is the economic basis for human settlement in the Arabian Peninsula in the historical 
era.23  
No one segment could survive without interaction and exchange with the others, and the 
combined exploitation of each environmental niche was crucial for survival in harsh conditions. 
Pastoralists exploited arid and semi-arid environments by flexibly responding to changing weather 
conditions and took advantage of foraging opportunities over large ranges to produce dairy, meat, 
wool, and other animal products. These products were traded in larger market towns, which in turn 
imported foodstuffs (rice and coffee, animal feed) and technologies (firearms and cookware) that 
sustained nomadic life. Wealth from the villages, which produced the bulk of the food (dates, 
vegetables, fruits, and grains), handicrafts (from wool, leather, metal wood, and palm leaves), 
fodder, and labor in this system, was concentrated and distributed by the towns (Dutton 1999). In 
Greater Oman, interior economic systems were also connected to those on the coast, which formed 
the first node in the crucial overseas trading links that have sustained and connected these 
                                                          
23 On the urban town system, see Al-Torki and Cole 1989, Al-Rasheed 1991, Meneley 1996, and 
Limbert 2010; on rural villages, Eickelman 1984 (though al-Ḥamrā’ has some unique 
characteristics), Dutton 1999, and Lancaster and Lancaster 2011; on nomadic pastoralists, see 
Cole 1975, Lancaster 1981, Jabbūr 1988, and Chatty 1996.  There are of course many other 
authors, including early orientalists like Doughty (1932) and Thesiger (1959). Social movement 
between and amongst these groups is high. Several anthropologists have noted that as the badū 
have been forcibly settled by state apparatuses, the term badū has come to refer more to an 
‘identity’ than an economic niche (cf. Cole 2003 and Jordan 2011 for discussions of this process 
in Saudi Arabia).  
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communities to larger Indian Ocean trading networks. Coastal fisherman and the Jenaba Bedouin 
produced various species of dried sardines (‘awma) as feed for camels and fertilizer, along with 
dried shark for consumption (qursh), though with refrigerated trucks for seafood this is becoming 
rarer. Delighted to see my reaction to its relatively mild flavor but unforgiving texture, an older 
performer told me that “Sharks eat people all over the world, you know, but in Oman, we eat 
sharks!” The goal of all of this economic exchange and interaction, as the Lancasters (2011, 296) 
point out, was not necessarily wealth as much as self-sufficiency. 
a. Agriculture, irrigation, and settlement 
As has been noted by archaeologists, geographers, and historians, the availability of water, 
both natural and culturally modified, has played a major role in the dispersal and settlement of 
humans throughout their history in Oman. Though early theorists considered the availability of 
water in arid environments to be the determining feature of human social evolution, detailed 
scholarship has shown that these models fail to accurately account for observed patterns (Cleuziou 
2009). The cultural and technological management of water is nevertheless crucial in the 
agricultural belts that stretch northwest and southeast along the north and south faces of the Ḥajar 
range. These two regions form the agricultural belts of northern Oman, linked by cultivation up 
the wadis and down the main central gap. Different areas, of course, can sustain different 
cultivation patterns, but some features are common enough to be taken as generalities. The 
agricultural pattern of the interior of the country is substantially similar to other regions, and so 
will be taken as a model.  
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b. Irrigation Basins 
One widely shared feature, regardless of irrigation type, is the organization of cultivable 
land into small irrigation basins, usually called galba-s, measuring some twenty square meters on 
average.24 These irrigation basins are usually square and surrounded by a short dirt wall 
(approximately ten to fifteen centimeters) and are connected to an irrigation source, either a well 
or a falaj, so that they may be intermittently flooded. The rebuilding of the short wall (built up 
from dried soil at the surface of the galba) and the irrigation of the basin are often reciprocal labor-
trading events that culminate with a picnic or some other gift being exchanged for a few hours’ 
work. Galba-s need to be shaped and sloped to the available land and require a relatively large 
amount of labor-power to produce and maintain each growing season. Often, these galba are 
shaded by one or two date palms, which help trap moisture and dampen the sometimes-
overwhelming sunlight to provide a cooler, moister, and more hospitable microclimate for other 
crops and animals. Both family gardens and large fields in Oman are typically cut into a patchwork 
of these galba-s, which allows for the selective funneling of water to successful areas, simple 
fallow period rotations, and more varied cultivation in a small area.  
c. The Falaj-s of Oman. 
The technological innovation of falaj-s (CLA. plural aflāj, horizontal well and channel 
irrigation systems), in the eastern end of the Peninsula allowed for the typical pattern of nucleated 
settlement in the piedmont and wadi ecosystems that Costa (1983) identified and that still 
characterizes the Greater Oman region (see Potts 1990). The falaj system of Oman is based on 
tapping groundwater associated with wadi beds and their alluvial fans, with most channels dug 
                                                          
24 See Dutton (1999, 32-4) for a detailed discussion. 
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more than ten meters below the surface, as opposed to the surface-water trapping techniques like 
terraces and dams utilized in Yemen and the Hijaz (Charbonnier 2015). The very largest of the 
underground channels, qanat-s, may reach for more than 12 km, such as the extensive Mālikī falaj 
that runs through the interior. Dutton (1989) reports that by 1982, the Public Authority for Water 
Resources in Oman estimated that existing falaj-s irrigated some 55% of all arable land and this 
figure has likely expanded since then. The remaining land is watered by wells, as the falaj system 
has always been supplemented by excavated wells, both for concerns with defense (Wilkinson 
1987, 24) and due to local conditions and new settlements (Limbert 2010, 117-23).  
Figure 12. A ghayl or surface falaj and a holding pool irrigating Alfalfa and mixed crops on the 
left (west) and not on the right (east), July 2016.  Karshā’, Manaḥ, Dakhilliyya Province, Oman. 
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Though the source of the falaj technology and the identity of its original constructors remains 
a debate,25 the presence of agricultural crops like wheat dated to c. 3000 BCE points to the probable 
development of irrigation, likely wells, horizontal or otherwise by that time (Charbonnier 2015; 
Desruelles 2016). These “underground water-draining galleries” (Boucharlat 2001, 2003) were 
undoubtedly widespread by the time of expanding Iron Age settlements(1300 to 300 BCE), though 
controversial research in Bahlā has dated parts of an early falaj to the Early Bronze, c. 3000 BCE 
(Orchard and Orchard 2007; but see Charbonnier 2015 for criticisms). From the 6th century BCE 
to the 7th century CE the Oman peninsula was administered by successive Persian empires: the 
Achmaenids to c. 250 BCE, followed briefly by the Parthians, and by the 3rd century AD the 
Sassanians had expanded and seized control of coastal ports and larger interior towns. It is this 
later period that Wilkinson (1987) recognizes as the most likely period of deep qanat construction. 
The Persian colonists were already familiar with qanat technology in Persia and applied it to 
similar habitats in the mountains and wadis of northern Oman, starting with the western piedmont 
zone leading to the coast (Wilkinson 1977, 1983b, 1987).  Local Omani oral traditions date certain 
falaj-s as well, attributing some to rich families and others to mythic figures. The Mālikī falaj 
mentioned above was supposedly ordered by the mythic Mālik bin Fahim, the leader of the ‘Azd 
tribes out of Yemen and into Oman after the collapse of the Mārib Dam in Yemen in the 570s CE.  
Suffice it to say that the day-to-day management of falaj systems in Oman is extremely 
well-developed, despite Wilkinson’s (1983b) shock that Omanis did not verbally distinguish 
between the different “types” of falaj that he identified. The Arabic root from which falaj is derived 
                                                          
25 See English 1968, Wilkinson 1977, Potts 1990, al-Tikriti 2002, and Boucharlat 2001, 2003 for 
the discussion of the provenance; see these and Orchard and Orchard 2007 and al-Tikriti 2010 
for disagreements over dating. Charbonnier 2015 provides a thorough overview of this literature. 
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refers to “splitting” or “dividing” a source, and this accurately describes both the macro-level 
function of the falaj system and the everyday management of its water resources.  
Daily allotments of water from a main falaj or well are distributed to farmers’ fields over 
a certain period, which are monitored and administrated by local irrigation officials, wākil, some 
deputies, ‘ārif-s, and an accountant, qābiḍ (cf, Charbonnier 2014 on this system in Ādam). These 
administrators manage the distribution of the available water based on managing access and 
flow—each farmer is allotted a certain span of time, measured in ‘athar-s, (roughly a half-hour), 
during which water is shunted into their fields (Al-Ghafiri 2004; Al-Ghafiri et al. 2013). During 
the day, the sun was historically referenced for timing; at night, the stars against some physical 
feature (some towns still used these methods well into the 21st century, see Nash 2007 and 
Lancasters 2001, 193). Most falaj-s have been mapped and renovated by the Sultanate over the 
last 40 years, resulting in a visual and technical uniformity that may not reflect historical 
differences. Repair and amendment of the deep main qanāt falaj-s and subsidiary ghayl and saqiyā 
falaj-s has been a constant endeavor of Omani townspeople, even though massive new 
construction efforts were likely rare—limited by labor availability, cooperation, and intermittent 
foreign and civil warfare. Historically, the ‘Awāmir tribe have been contacted to maintain and 
repair failing falaj-s, but not necessarily to build new qanat-s, though wealthy families have paid 
for the expansion of falaj-s for particular towns or villages. Indeed, as Limbert points out, Omani 
historians have represented the prosperity of towns as inextricably linked to the status of their 
falaj-s, a connection continued by state ideology on water access (2010, 117-9) and in local chat, 
which often relates to water and where it is “feeding” (taghadhī) the land.  
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Figure 13. A raised falaj aqueduct, April 2016. Birkat al-mawz, Nizwā, Dakhiliyyah. 
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d. Concentric rings of settlement. 
At its most basic, interior settlement can be envisaged as a series of concentric and abutting 
rings of agricultural villages and market towns, drawing water out of a single wadi system and 
distributing it selectively throughout its alluvial fan. It is crucial to remember that these towns’ 
populations form more or less integrated systems, all trading, moving, marrying, and 
communicating with varying intensity as the natural and social environments permit. 
These wadi-cum-market systems begin with a ring of small but agriculturally rich villages 
at the base of the western Ḥajar that are situated near the head of a wadi. These towns often have 
smaller deposits of rich soil tucked into rocky crevasses and lack larger fields, and so some can 
invest more in orchard agriculture over field crops, including guavas and papayas, mangoes, 
Figure 14. A diversion to the southern spur of the same ghayl falaj towards al-Ma‘arā, Manaḥ. 
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pomegranates, bananas, lemons, citrons, and stands of date palms. Most agriculture in this area 
was undertaken on land held by the farmers themselves, but small amounts of sharecropping and 
seasonal labor was also present. From north to south and around the western Ḥajar: Yanqul, al-
Ḥamrā’, Tanūf, Birkat al-Mawz (“Banana Pond”), and ’Imṭī are examples of these small but 
agriculturally rich towns. These smaller towns are often valuable targets for the expansion of a 
certain shaykh’s power, a location where he might control a sufficient amount of the land to 
consider the area his power base. Al-Ḥamrā’ and Misfat al-‘Abriyyin are considered strongly 
linked to the ‘Abriyyin; Dārig al-Fawārīs, to, unsurprisingly, the Fawārīs. Tanūf is another 
example, once being the stronghold of the Bānī Rīyām under Sulaymān bin Himyār al-Nabhānī, 
“The Lord of the Green Mountain,” who, along with a leader of the Ḥirth from the Sharqiyyah and 
the last Imam Ghālib bin ‘Alī bin Hilāl al-Hinā’ī, led the Jebel ’Akhḍār conflict (1954-9) against 
the Sultan. Tanūf was flattened by a small contingent of British bomber aircraft at the direct order 
of the Sultan, in retribution for Sulaymān bin Ḥimyar’s refusal to cede power. Inhabitants were 
warned beforehand. 
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Figure 15. “Concentric rings of settlement”: the red line marks the approximate heads of 
wādī-s and the first ring of small towns. The blue line and the first major highway, in grey, 
mark the ring of market towns (the small outward jutting box includes Manaḥ). The black 
line marks the outer edge of settlement that is sustained by this wādī drainage and falaj 
network. © OpenStreetMap contributors. 
Further along the alluvial fan of the wadi are large, market towns that control falaj flow 
downstream and have served as administrative centers for governors and Islamic judges, qāḍī-s, 
during times of state centralization or as independent city-states otherwise: ‘Ibrī, Bahlā, Nizwā, 
and Izkī. These towns continue to play key governmental roles by being the seats of local 
administrative “states,” wilāya, that are named after their associated major town: wilāyat Nizwā, 
wilāyat Bahlā, etc. Nizwā, for example, was also the nominal capital of the Ibāḍī Imamate over 
certain periods, largely due to its geographic location and mixed population.  
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Most agriculture in these towns was and is composed of family-owned date palm gardens 
that shade mixed small-crop farming, amended by household animal husbandry. In these towns, 
the percentage of sharecroppers and seasonal laborers was also higher, as larger proportions of the 
total agricultural land was owned by absentee landlords, whether wealthier Bedouin or townsfolk. 
Nowadays, most farmland is owned by Omanis who employ foreign laborers from the Mashriq or, 
increasingly, South Asia. Dates and animal fodder are the largest crops. Typically, sections of 
these towns are densely inhabited by certain families and marked by the presence of a family sablā, 
a specialized majlis or communal meeting room. Often, these neighborhoods are named for local 
notables, like Al-Sayfī section of Nizwā, northwest of the market, or the Ṣabbagh neighborhood 
of Bahlā inhabited by several Al-Shukaylī families. Regional souqs, or markets, are invariably 
located in these larger towns, and they also therefore host the largest concentrations of trading 
families and handicraft producers, including weavers, potters, metalsmiths, carpenters, and other 
skilled professions.  
 These market towns are extremely ancient in Oman, have substantial forts, walls, and the 
oldest mosques. They are divided into many local neighborhood quarters (Wikan 1982; Eickelman 
1984) and often two tribal-cum-political “moieties,” usually referred to as “upper” (CLA. ‘aliyā) 
and “lower” (CLA. sifāla) sections.26 These divisions have remained salient even as they have 
been transformed and shifted by new state infrastructure, documented by Limbert (2010). A 
Qaṣṣābī inhabitant of ’Izkī’s wealthier Yaman division related to me that youths from the poorer 
Nizār division would pelt his car with rocks whenever he lingered too long while passing through. 
He explained this enmity as a lingering result of the fact that inhabitants of Nizār were active in 
                                                          
26 The sections are not equally divided as segmentary lineage theory would predict – rather, they 
are often divided into a larger (2/3) section and a smaller (1/3) section.  
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their support of the revived Imamate in the 1950s, while those in Yaman were pragmatically more 
receptive to whoever seemed to be winning—the Sultan’s army and foreign mercenaries. The 
subsequent wealth of Yaman in comparison to Nizār is not a coincidence, but an effect of state 
politics in Oman. Natives of the various towns also harbor a distinct competitive streak amongst 
one another, comparing the age of structures in the town, their historical importance and relation 
to key figures, stereotypical attitudes, foibles, differences in accent, and—especially in 
conversations with me—musical authenticity, techniques, and abilities. 27  
Further downstream from the market towns is a long and uneven ring of smaller towns and 
villages that often specialize in wheat-sorghum-barley agriculture due to wider tracts of available 
land. Most of these productive villages are small, such as Tan‘am, al-Bisyah, Gabrīn, Manaḥ, and 
Zukayt. Manaḥ is something of an outlier, as it is situated at the juncture of two large wadi systems 
(receiving water from falaj-s from Nizwā and ‘Izkī) and has soil rich enough to sustain both a 
relatively large population and, historically, a variety of orchard crops and flowers. Manaḥ has 
long been considered the “breadbasket” of the Interior, and control of it has been crucial to securing 
a base of production for Imamate leadership. Typically, dates and orchard crops are more difficult 
to sustain, but the concomitant increase of arable land makes these regions especially suited to 
grains, melons, flowers, animal fodder, vegetables, and herbs. In times when water is abundant, 
                                                          
27 Nizwāns and Bahlāwīs are undoubtedly the target of the most playful derision, likely due to 
their prosperity and renown in comparison to the other towns. According to one interlocutor, 
Nizwans are constantly “cackling like owls” (ḍāḥikīin mithl al-būma) amongst themselves but 
play at being deadly serious amongst other townspeople (owls are considered rather stupid birds 
in inner Oman). Other common insults claim that Nizwans use “Indian” or “Bengali” drums 
rather than true “Omani” drums, and that they wait to see what Bahlāwīs do musically in order to 
copy it. Bahlāwīs fare no better, accused of not being able to pronounce the glottal qāf (instead 
producing the weak velar kāf) while some of their performance troupes are described as being 
“yes-men” for the government (sometimes called muṭabbilīn (“drummers”) and sometimes 
ma‘ama‘aīyyin from ma‘, or “with”). 
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tree crops like almonds, mangoes, and citrons flourish. Further, the wide, flat plains filled with 
Acacia and various wildflowers make this area especially conducive to beekeeping and honey 
production, with towns such as Fīqīn hosting particularly productive hives. Increased water usage 
in the larger towns due to population increases and the concomitant stress on water availability has 
been particularly devastating to these agricultural communities. Outside this ring, towns are 
progressively less integrated with the large market towns of the interior and more Bedouin in 
character owing to their proximity to the more arid habitats exploited by them (such as ‘Izz and 
Sināw). 
Social structure and the development of states 
   The overview of human settlement patterns above gives us a good picture of the 
environment in which people have lived and labored through the historical period in question. The 
situation we find in the interior is broadly characterized by wide stretches of open, unsettled 
country punctuated by many small settlements, some extremely dense and well-developed. This 
situation produces a kind of paradox. There is both undeniable uniformity, in pastoral/agricultural 
technologies, especially highly complex skills like date farming and dromedary husbandry, but 
also in social structure (tribes, qabīla, pl. qabā’il; housing/family units, ḥayyān; bilateral kinship 
networks, ‘ayyāl, shamag; neighborhoods, ḥārāt; ‘moiety’ divisions), religion and religious law 
(Ibadism), customary law (‘urf, see Wilkinson 1987, 196-7; Weir 2008 for a case in Yemen), 
marriage patterns and law28 (generally patrilocal), modes of warfare, family roles, language, 
clothing and adornment, domestic material culture, architecture, musical instruments, social 
reproduction, cultural values, notions of authority and leadership, and shared markets. However, 
                                                          
28 See Dresch 2013 for an extended discussion of “equality” in marriage. 
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despite these broad simlarities, this settlement pattern also allows for the contrary possibility: to 
retract from these systems, remain isolated, autonomous, and separate. Wilkinson’s (1987) by now 
notorious theory of the “Imamate Cycle”29 relies on just this tendency in Oman, in which he posits 
a kind of “circulation”—of goods, ideas, technologies—that affords Omanis the reciprocal 
capacity for “fusion” into larger centralized states and for “fission” into independent units based 
on geographic and settlement structures. These twinned factors are expressed by very fine grades 
of dialect variance, vocabulary (gestural and linguistic), clothing style, and senses of “home”.  
Just as “fission and fusion” is shaped by the arrangement of settlement relative to water 
sources, we also find modes of communication between and amongst groups that are appropriate 
to this social system. Indeed, this intense cultivation of difference in the face of overwhelming 
similarity is no better expressed than in the wide variety of seemingly minor details that distinguish 
the collective performance styles in the various towns, with each town claiming their own as best 
and most authentic. A common difference cited between razḥa performers in Nizwa and elsewhere 
is that Nizwans tend to tightly cross their arms and rock from the waist when particularly 
emotionally aroused, a gesture that was glossed as “womanly” by other groups. When I pointed 
out that this was often associated with the ecstatic states of Sufis in other parts of the Arab world, 
this was taken as yet more evidence of the femininity of the gesture. As another brief example, 
drum shape, sound, and ways of addressing and playing drums, questions of what composes a 
matching set, the number and size of drums, whether they can be named, and how to wear them 
are all points of contention that invoke regional specificities. Some groups feel comfortable using 
                                                          
29 I do not deal with the “theory” in depth – see Eickelman (1980) for an unanswered critique 
based on Wilkinson’s earlier formulations. The theory attempts to account for state formation in 
Oman by looking at features that are internal to Omani society, and fails to adequately recognize 
features of state formation that are external – features that all theorists of state formation rightly 
prioritize. 
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drums as a seat, while others find this an unbelievable affront to the drum. This situation of 
settlement dispersal/cultural commonality and fission/fusion state formation reveals that Omanis 
had developed means of communication and interaction that could simultaneously allow for this 
broad-based sharing of cultural values, modes of behavior, and senses of authority and right 
leadership, but also flexible enough to allow for the expression of group-based identities that were 
often quite fine. To properly contextualize this claim, I now turn to a brief overview of the social 
and governmental system of Oman over the last few hundred years, with special reference to the 
interior.  
Tribes in Oman 
Any discussion of the notion of the “tribe” in social science discourse is complicated due 
to definitional variety, rampant misapplications, and the impact of colonial rule. In this 
dissertation, “tribe” is an English translation of the Arabic term qabīla, which refers to a kin group 
that shares a variable sense of identity or belonging based on a biological or fictive relationship to 
an eponymous ancestor. This definition is complicated historically in Oman by the presence of 
alliances and protections, shaff and khuwa, Arabian slavery, fictive kinship, and contemporary 
state attempts to curtail the social weight of tribes and tribalism. Nevertheless, historically, one’s 
position in relation to a tribe has largely structured one’s position in society and potentials for 
movements within it. As historians of Omani sources have pointed out, social movements and 
conflicts are often narrated by Omani historians as actions by “one of tribe X” or even simply 
“tribe X did such and such.” In this way, the anonymity of individuals is maintained and the tribe, 
however delineated in a particular instance, becomes equally implicated in the actual actions of a 
small number of people. Tribe names stand in for the actions of many people, such as when 
migrating or managing conflict, and thus have a certain role to play in historical and social thinking 
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more broadly. Qabīlī, an adjective based on qabīla, is nevertheless often used to describe 
nepotistic, stupid, or anti-social behavior—this is most often used in performance contexts to 
lightly criticize a group for not inviting other groups to perform alongside them, or for preferring 
nearby groups to ones further afield. One example of this was a discussion about how performance 
troupes are chosen to perform at events. A Nizwan performer brought up the situation in Birkat al-
Mawz at a collective wedding:  
Nizwan performer: Someone in Birkat al-Mawz might contact so-and-so from tribe so-and-so 
(bū fulān min bānī fulān) because they don’t want any trouble from other folks, I mean, they want 
to honor their guests with a troupe that is appropriate [to the occasion]. Some down the way hit 
the road (ba‘aḍu yaḍrab al-ṭarīq) up the mountain [Jebel Akhdar] to get a troupe. You were at the 
collective wedding there [in Birkat al-Mawz on 15 July 2017], no? Yeah, so you know that the 
group from Manaḥ was there. Now, what were they doing there? (Birkat al-Mawz is in the wilāya 
of Nizwā, Manaḥ is the capital of its own wilāya). That’s tribalism for you—al-Tawbī, al-Riyāmī, 
al-Rāshidī, so on and so on... look at the names! 
BJG: Hmm, yeah, that’s true, but there’s Tawbiyyin everywhere and there were also Manādhīr at 
the wedding as well, from al-Sulayf. And Firqat al-Shihabā’ (my interlocutor’s troupe in Nizwa) 
is available… 
NP: By God, we’re available!  
Later, when I was discussing the same topic with the group from Manaḥ that was performing at 
the group wedding, a member laughed: 
Manaḥ perfomer: [Laughs] they said that? We attended (ḥaḍart al-firqa) because we bring real 
arts, authentic art (fann ’aṣīl), and they know we throw new razḥāt (nilqā razḥat gidīda, meaning 
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newly written verses and suitable to the occasion] to honor the occasion. They are very new (Firqat 
al-Shihabā’) and I don’t think they have a manager (munassiq).  
This exchange indicates how charges of “tribalism” are levelled against certain groups to explain 
their relative success. Whether or not “tribalism” actually explains the troupe from Manaḥ’s 
presence at the collective wedding in Birkat al-Mawz or whether it is explicable by their superior 
marketing is unclear. 
 
One major way that tribes structured the social world in Oman was by tribal “divisions,” 
sympathies or antipathies that were assumed based on tribal positioning. These divisions and the 
number of terms relating to various subsets of them have changed over time. A current, if shifting, 
Figure 16. Public invitation to the collective wedding. The top two lines read: ‘Sponsored by His 
Excellency the shaykh ‘Alī bin Nāṣir al-Maḥrūqī, secretary general of the majlis al-shūrā’. Then 
follow other sponsorships, directions and times, and finally the name of the young men who are 
being married. AQAR is one of the largest Omani real estate and development firms and owns a 
large hotel just up the road on Jebel Akhdar. 
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major division in Oman involves one of two large groupings, or confederations, referred to as al-
Ghāfirī and al-Hināwī. Both of these confederations are composed of a shifting number of smaller 
tribal coalitions, such as the Bānī Rīyām, which were historically led by an ‘amīr. These large 
concatenations are composed of individual tribes, such as al-Tawbiyyin, which are headed by a 
shaykh derived from a prominent lineage within them. It is this level of organization from which 
individuals derive their third name: al-Tawbī for men, and al-Tawbiyya for women, for example. 
Today, these smallest tribal genealogical units are most important with regard to governmental 
policy, reputation, marriages, and social standing.  
While older sources (Eickelman 1980; Carter 1982; Wilkinson 1987) do take a critical view 
of the neatness of the tribal system and the degree to which it conforms to the “ideal type” of the 
tribe posited by segmentary lineage theory, the current situation of tribes in the new state has 
changed very much. As Limbert (2010, 40-1) notes, the role of the shaykh has taken on a new 
salience for the state. The position of the shaykh in the Arabian Peninsula has historically been 
very elastic, and could describe quite different situations of authority, derived from different 
sources—the term shaykh might refer to a religious figure with little in the way of political 
responsibility or a neighborhood leader just as legibly as it could be applied to a local power broker.   
 In order to curtail the authority of larger tribal leadership, the state now directly appoints 
the shaykh-s of a given neighborhood (and always favors those that have supported the Sultan), 
which may or may not correspond to the shaykh of a tribe. This has served to entrench deeper 
economic divisions between “shaykh-ly” families and non-shaykh-ly families, replacing the 
historically variable role with a hereditary one. By multiplying the roles of manufactured authority, 
the state has effectively divided tribal authority in such a way as to preclude historical methods of 
coalition building by tribal allegiance—“fusion.” This also results in the petty competition of an 
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increasing number of claimants on authority in a given place or group: one of Limbert’s 
interlocutors maligned the current situation as having “too many shaykh-s” (2010, 41).  
The most important aspect of tribalism for this study is its authority structure of shaykh-s 
and ’amīr-s (or shaykh-s al-tamīma) and the reciprocal obligations that manifest between them and 
their tribes or neighborhoods. The shaykh is a position of authority internal to a tribal grouping, 
but not necessarily in control of it in a coercive sense (contrast Lancasters 2011, chapter 7; 
Wilkinson 198,7 chapter 4). Nevertheless, the shaykh for any single tribal grouping is typically 
derived from a single family, often referred to as a shaykhly family, who share a tribal name with 
the broader lineage group (for example the shaykh of the Tawbiyyin would probably be named al-
Tawbī, of the Shukayl, al-Shukaylī, just like any member of the tribe). Shaykhly families maintain 
their status by extracting wealth from the people and land that they have authority over, not just 
their own tribe. A shaykhly family might own property in many locations, some of which might 
even be administered by a different shaykh. Nowadays, shaykh-s derive a large portion of their 
income and holdings from the Sultan’s government, which they then keep, distribute, or donate as 
they see fit.  
 Active coercion emerges through the relations with which shaykh-s solidify their 
economic position: collecting taxes and customs, demanding shares of crops in areas that they have 
leased to sharecroppers, seizing illegal property, leading raids, and the extensive and predatory 
money-lending that has plagued Arabian laborers for centuries. While never as baldly exploitative 
as the lending practiced in pearl fisheries, shaykh-s and wealthy trading families often engaged in 
money-lending practices that kept agriculturalists, tradespeople, caravaneers, and low-volume 
traders in a state of permanent debt. Agriculturalists, tied to land and reliant on the weather, have 
been perennial targets for exploitative money-lending, which only became more necessary over 
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the last hundred years. Of course, debt relationships and exchange relations are very common 
amongst agriculturalists exploiting highly variable niches all over the world, but, with the decline 
of in-kind trading (muqayatha) and the imposition of the money economy, shaykh-s and traders 
with cash at the ready were well-positioned to exploit cash-poor agriculturalists who were no 
longer able to pay taxes and debts with their produce. Borrowing against future agricultural 
production to replace crop loss, invest in new and necessary technological advancements, make 
household repairs, or pay for a wedding, farmers were often forced to give up their own property.30 
This land, was, of course, not farmed by the shaykhly family, but was instead sold, leased, or 
granted to loyal retainers or groups that the shaykh wanted to bring into his political orbit.  
At times when centralized state structures were weak or non-existent, shaykh-s could, 
through various means, come to rule larger and larger territories and thereby assume authority over 
larger groups of people. As many scholars of the region have noted, it is authority over people, 
rather than land itself, which is valuable in semi-arid environments. As an example, Al-Rasheed 
describes the expansion of the Rashīdī power base the town of Hail in modern northern Saudi 
Arabia over the past few centuries (1991). The Rashīdīs were largely recognized as leaders by their 
intense development of the Hail area in the 12th/18th century, investing widely in agriculture, 
drawing in regional trade routes, and restoring the local marketplace, or sūq. The financial outlay 
the Rashīdīs were able to afford solidified their position as ’amīr-s, an authority above that of 
shaykh, and the efflorescence of Hail was evidence of their success and leadership. The local 
                                                          
30 Farmers in Oman were generally free owners of their fully alienable land (mulk), rather than 
being organized into fiefs, semi-feudal’iqṭā‘ relations, or communal ownership as in other Arab 
contexts. Land and ownership of land is relatively poorly covered in sharī‘a law, and so various 
local systems have existed in the Islamic world. See chapters 5 and 6 of Wilkinson 1987 for a 
more detailed description of an idealized system, and chapters 2 and 9 in Al-Torki and Cole 1989 
for a more realistic description. 
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economic boom in Hail drew more people to settle there, and the Rashīdīs even drew a stipend 
from the Ottoman Sultan, under whose nominal authority Hail remained. Further, the family was 
instrumental in re-routing caravan trade from Mesopotamia and Persia through Hail to the Hijaz 
by organizing guards to guarantee their defense and ensuring public safety. The region of Hail and 
its hinterland came to be known as an ’imāra, the seat of a centralized authority related to a 
particular family. Hence, tribally related shaykh-s of non-Rashīdī families came to rely on the 
Rashīdī ‘amīr for benefits, legal judgments, defense, and arbitration. As more and more people 
came to recognize the Rashīdī ‘amīr-s as legitimate leaders, their reputation grew and added to 
their prestige. The ultimate failure of the Rashīdī ’imara to fend off the attacks of the Āl Sa‘ūd, a 
non-tribal alliance based on Wahhabi Islamic teachings, illustrates Wilkinson’s claim that the tribal 
state is ultimately a “dead-end.” As Al-Rasheed shows, the Rashīdī state could only expect to 
integrate people from outside its tribal network as long as its leaders could hold personal control, 
and expanding the ’imara was all the more difficult when it bordered other similarly derived tribal 
states. While expansion over friendly and related tribal groupings could be extremely rapid, 
expansion grew more and more difficult and expensive as genealogical links (fictive or otherwise) 
dwindled in contemporary relevance. 
Within Greater Oman, the ’amīr need not always exercise the excellence of leadership 
displayed by the Rashīdīs in Hail to remain ’amīr-s, nor even hold power within a defined ’imara. 
Rather, within larger tribal groupings the shaykh-s of certain families functioned more as ’amīr-s 
while also fulfilling the role of shaykh within their own branch (Lancasters 2011, 305). For 
example, historically, the shaykh of the Nabāhina has operated as the shaykh al-tamīma or ’amīr 
of the entire Bānī Rīyām, which includes the Nabāhina, the Tawbiyyin, and many others. The 
’amīr at this level represents the interests of his tribe and those that are aligned with it to some 
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higher ruler—in Oman’s case, the Imam, a king, or the Sultan. It is precisely this supra-tribal 
position that the current Sultan and his father succeeded in eliminating through murder, prison, 
exile, and politicking.  
Above the position of the tribal ’amīr, the very highest political position takes different 
names in different places and times. Local strongmen might take mālik (“king” or “lord,” hence 
the “Lord of the Green Mountain,” Sulaymān bin Ḥimyar who held power in the mid-20th century) 
while larger regional leaders might choose sulṭān, ’amīr, or ’imām under differing circumstances 
of state structural stability, loyalty, sources of legitimacy, and prestige. These names reveal subtle 
shades of difference between the assumed privileges and power bases of the wielder and the 
leader’s relationship to preexisting institutional regimes of power, which reciprocally places 
certain obligations and duties upon the holder. Many of these will be discussed more concretely in 
chapters 3 and 4. 
Government in Oman 
There is a tendency in Omani historiography to present the Imamate of Oman and the 
Sultanate of Muscat as “opposing” polities. While this is true for some periods, this antagonism 
was not the natural relationship between the interior and the coast, but the result of predatory elites 
of one region trying to capture the other. 
As a result of these predations, the present-day Sultanate of Oman is a concatenation of 
several largely independent historical polities and a number of peripheral regions that were 
officially integrated in 1970 (although unsettled borders remained a political issue until the early 
1990s). The two most important and historically stable polities were the Ibāḍī Imamate of Oman, 
which flourished and dissolved several times over its lifespan, approximately from c. 133/751—
1378/1959, and the Sultanate of Muscat, a thallassocratic coastal trading state that fissioned off of 
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and eventually eclipsed the Imamate due to its economic and military dominance in the mid-
12th/18th century. The Ibāḍī Imamate, a theocracy based on the well-developed political philosophy 
of the third great Islamic madhhab, Ibāḍism, was located across the central Ḥajar range, and, at 
times of maximum centralization and expansion, could stretch along the coasts of Oman to Julfār 
(modern day R’as al-Khayma), Ṣūr, ‘Ibrī, and Ādam. The Imamate should not be considered, as it 
has been in the past, as entirely located in the current interior province of Dakhiliyyah, since the 
capital of several Imamate governments was al-Rustāq, an old Persian capital (hence the name) on 
the coastal side of the Ḥajar mountains. Further, Imams were often interested in exerting 
administrative control over profitable coastal port cities like Ṣuḥār and caravan nodes like ‘Ibrī in 
order to supplement their often meager treasuries.  
The Sultanate’s leaders, on the other hand, who began as Imams, were largely interested in 
securing the coast of Oman and its important ports in order to extend their power over Indian 
Ocean trade. On the coast, much more emphasis was placed on mercantile trade throughout the 
Indian Ocean, with Muscat and Seeb forming crucial harbors at the headwaters of the Arabian 
Gulf. Over the 12th/18th and 13th/19th century, the coastal Sultans were able to take advantage of 
economic gains initiated by the Ya‘arībī Imams (reigned c. 11th/17th-12th/18th centuries) to build 
new naval fleets and impose their nominal and later functional rulership over Hormuz (which was 
actually rented from the Persian government), Bahrain, the East African littoral, and even parts of 
modern Pakistan and India. As European colonial powers gave more control to their colonial 
governments, these extra-governmental apparatuses were more able to thwart the Sultan’s 
ambitions in the Indian Ocean militarily and economically.  
The Imamate and the Sultanate of Muscat, when they coincided, alternated between open 
conflict and stable coexistence. Economic specialization was often maintained by regional politics, 
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since any attempts by the Imamate to expand into coastal trade were disrupted by, at first, the 
‘Abbasid Caliphs in Baghdad, and, later, the Persian shahs, both of which depended on the region 
for overseas trade and customs income and would not allow the establishment of an independent 
state on the coast. Thus, the Ibāḍī Imamate was often confined to the interior, while the coast was 
alternately threatened by or under the direct rule of foreign powers until the 18th century. Historians 
Patricia Risso (1986) and John C. Wilkinson (1987) have produced dense histories of these 
relations, both internally and regionally, and modeled their development as dependent on each 
other: as the Imamate gained centralized control over the interior, coastal power waned due to raids 
and defections, prompting its seizure by foreign powers and its defense or recapture by the Ibāḍī 
state; as coastal power increased and local elites could fend off foreign invasions and prosper 
economically, the interior languished and fissioned into smaller local political entities, allowing 
coastal leaders to extend their hegemony into the interior, and, eventually, to far reaches of the 
Indian Ocean and central Africa.  
a. The Ibāḍī Imamate in Oman 
The latest iteration of the Ibāḍī Imamate in Oman ended in the 1370s/1950s but can be 
traced back for over a thousand years prior. A strongly decentralized theocracy based on Ibāḍī 
Islam, the Imamate thrived between periods of the great expansions of nearby Islamic and, later, 
European colonial empires. Generalizing about such a long-lived, idealized, and variable system 
of government such as the Ibāḍī Imamate in Oman is difficult and is made even more so by the 
fact that the only extant historical sources were written by a small number of male Arab Ibāḍī 
intellectuals drawn from religiously trained families. This has resulted in accounts that are histories 
not of Oman and its people, but of one of its governmental systems from the perspective of those 
who most benefitted from it. Indeed, if we take Wilkinson, the main Orientalist historian of the 
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Imamate, at his word, the Imamate may not even be a particularly unique system of government 
in the Arabian Peninsula. Wilkinson (1977, 1987) describes the Ibāḍī Imamate as built out of and 
accommodating pre-existing tribal authority structures in the region, even as it was an overlay of 
certain Ibāḍī political principles over a largely tribal base. Further, Wilkinson is at pains to 
distinguish the Ibāḍī Imamate from other extant theocracies on the Peninsula, such as the Zaydī 
Imamate of Yemen and the Sa‘ūdī-Wahhābī state of Saudi Arabia, and even from similar theocratic 
systems across the Muslim world. In short, there is little that distinguishes the Ibāḍī Imamate from 
other theocratic supra-tribal states across the region, other than the highly developed political 
philosophies developed within each one.  
 Two such distinguishing features for the Ibāḍī Imamate were the notion of a drafted 
contract binding rulers to certain responsibilities and obligations (‘aqd), and the formal election of 
each Imam by oligarchs and theocrats, as outlined by Ghubash (2006). As Lienhardt (2001) and 
Al-Rasheed (1991) have pointed out, dynastic succession in Arabian tribal states (“shaykhdoms”) 
has the potential to be intensely violent, as no principles like primogeniture are recognized. The 
Imamate, however, was conceived as an elected position that was to be held by the most capable 
of a field of candidates. While in theory each election selected a candidate on his own virtues, 
electors (the ahl al-ḥall wa-l-‘aqd, “those who loosen and bind”) functionally created the major 
dynasties that have ruled Oman in various ways since 548/1154 : the non-Imamate Nabhānī Kings 
(mulūk), (548-1033/1154-1624), the Ya‘arībī Imams, (1033-1162/1624-1749), and the Āl Bū Sa‘īd 
Sultans, (1162-current/ 1749-current). The Imamate was predicated on sustaining the rule of a thin 
stratum of tribal leaders, landowners, and religious experts to the exclusion of common people. 
When those classes ruled, historians recognize the Imamate. When other ones did, they do not. 
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 Despite a long and contingent history, certain regularities of the Imamate can be 
established, and histories of nearby societies can help us understand the interim periods of non-
Imamate rule. The institutional structure of the Imamate was largely a thin administrative 
apparatus that spread over towns and villages that accepted the Imam’s appointment of a wālī, or 
governor, and a qāḍī, or judge, for the town. These officials were drawn from various elite shaykhly 
families who supported the Imamate, and while they acted largely independently from the Imam, 
they could be trusted to consult him on serious matters, side with his decisions, extract appropriate 
taxes, raise tribal levies, and ensure the peace (salāma) and rule of law (’imn wa ’imān). As the 
Lancasters (2011) note, the most crucial role of any leader was arbitration, ḥukm, from which 
common words for government, ḥukūma, and a wise leader, ḥākim, are derived. These terms are 
still used in the razḥa poetry of Omanis to describe their leaders and their attributes. Strong imams 
were noted for being arbiters par excellence, mediating between tribal elites near and far. The most 
binding and important of the Imam’s duties, however, was to uphold sharī‘a law amongst the 
believing community, as interpreted by Ibāḍī doctrine. Of crucial interest here to common folk 
was the Imam’s role in maintaining a responsible “police” force, ‘askārī-s, and guaranteeing 
“safety and security” in the Imamate (largely by controlling forts and the distribution of weapons).  
Importantly, the Imam did not command a standing army, and, indeed, a standing army was 
considered illegal and indicative of coercive intentions. While he did maintain retainers and 
guards, formal armies needed to be raised from the local population. The defense of the Imamate 
was considered the duty of all good Muslims within the Imamate, and this duty could be called 
upon by the Imam as was necessary. Imamate armies were raised by sending out a call for the 
organization of tribesmen via the beating of war drums and the circulation of war songs, razḥa, 
and associated genres, and these songs accompanied the warriors along their mission.  
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According to modern and contemporary sources, the Imam himself would hold majlis-style 
meetings in the administrative fort in his capital in the mornings and early afternoons to settle 
disputes and hear legal cases that could not be arbitrated through other means. In this way, the 
Omani Imam acted in a way that was almost entirely like tribal ‘amīr-s in the Arabian Peninsula 
more broadly, especially in the Gulf and Central Arabia. The main difference was the Imam’s 
severely constrained ability to impose taxes and the inability to maintain a private army, countered 
by his status as a religious expert. Only those types of taxes and amounts permitted in Islamic law 
were allowed. Nevertheless, Imams often held vastly different amounts of coercive and economic 
power. The interpretation of the Ibāḍī Imamate as being virtually identical to the overall function 
of tribal state formation is supported by the capacity of several Imams, like the first Ya‘arūbī Imam 
Nāṣir bin Murshid (r. 1033/1624-1059/1649), to assume a level of legitimacy with sheer economic 
and military might.  
Leveraging his success in waging war on the Portuguese and accumulating land, Nāṣir, a 
weak Imam elected during the tail end of the Nabhānī dynasty, successfully rejuvenated the 
Imamate and overshadowed the Nabhānī by building a large, multi-tribal coalition. Nāṣir’s nephew 
Sayf bin Sulṭān (r.1104/1692-3-1124/1711) distinguished himself by rebuilding damaged falaj-s, 
introducing new crops (including saffron and coconut), and buying up, reportedly, a full third of 
all agricultural land in his domains, earning him the nickname “qayd al-‘arḍ,” the “Chain of the 
Land.” The decline of the Ya‘arūbī dynasty in factional infighting amongst cousins with equal 
claim to the Imamate is yet more evidence to the closeness of the governmental styles.  
The capacity of some leaders to have their wider ambitions legitimated is underlined by 
the political-philosophical notion of the Imamate and the Imam as having two states: one of 
strength and one of weakness. Periods of open rulership and expansion of the Imamate apparatus 
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were ex post facto called ẓuhūr, “open, visible,” and the Imam might even have certain military 
capabilities penned into his election contract, in which case his leadership would be referred to as 
shārī (literally, “seller.” i.e., one who sells his life in battle). The other was a period of weakness 
of the Imam’s powers (a ḍa‘ifī imam), manifesting in his inability to fulfill his main obligation in 
“enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong” (The Qur’ān, Āl ‘Amrān, 3, 104, 110), leading the 
Imamate into a state of decline or concealment (kitmān).  
 The most recent expansion of the interior state was not possible until the arrival of 
European colonial powers (primarily the Portuguese, Dutch, French, and British) in the 11th/16th 
century, when coastal Omanis were able to leverage the Europeans against their Safavid rulers. At 
first, the Portuguese simply replaced the Persians at the top of the Gulf tax and custom collection 
hierarchy, which resulted in the Estado da India imposing their own cartazes system all around 
the Indian Ocean rim (Newitt 1986). By the 1060s/1650s the Imam Nāṣir bin Murshid had driven 
the Portuguese from the Omani coast, though they remained entrenched in southern Iran, east 
Africa, and India. Imam Nāṣir’s sons pursued the Portuguese relentlessly using their own captured 
caraval-style ships, waging generally successful campaigns to the south, capturing East African 
city-states, and generally unsuccessful campaigns along the coasts of Cochin and Malabar in India. 
The weakened Persian Empire (during the Safavid/Afsharid transition) could not afford to 
reestablish its control of the Omani coast, and the Imamate quickly took this opportunity to seize 
coastal towns and install themselves as the main beneficiaries of maritime economic activity, 
resulting in a brief period of Imamate coastal control that brought considerable wealth to the 
Interior. The dynastic rule of the Ya‘arubā Imams, noted above, led to a succession crisis which 
was resolved by one of the parties inviting the aid of Persian armies, which, upon completion of 
their mission, seized control of the coast for Persian leaders once again. This final direct colonial 
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aggression paved the way for a coastal Ibāḍī elite of the Āl bū Sa‘īd tribe, Aḥmad bin Ṣa‘īd Āl Bū 
Ṣa‘īd, to lead the fight against the Persians from his base as appointed wālī of Ṣuḥār. He was 
eventually formally elected Imām of the Ibāḍī state in 1749, largely by virtue of his military 
success and wealth, since he possessed virtually no religious credentials. His dynasty, still in power 
today, saw the extension of Omani overseas economic activity into the western coast of India and 
the present-day Congo of central and southern Africa, the occupation of Zanzibar, Mombasa, 
Baḥrain and Gwadar on the Makrān coast. The immense Omani maritime empire had, by the 
1840s, established itself as an important trading power in the eastern Indian Ocean, especially in 
the export of slaves and spices from central Africa to south and southwest Asia. In 1856, due to a 
colonially imposed succession crisis, the unified state was divided into two separate realms—one 
located in Oman proper, the other in Zanzibar on the Swahili coast of modern-day Tanzania. The 
immense productivity and wealth of Zanzibar compared to Oman, and the collapse of the slave 
trade due to the British Moratorium in the 1840s, prompted nearly 80% of all Arab families in 
Muscat to migrate to East Africa, many of whom are now only beginning to return. This state has 
often been called a “trading state” by historians, as it survived mostly on the imposition of customs 
and taxes and extended its control of coastal cities largely for economic reasons—legitimacy was 
linked more to economic control and military strength than anything else. As the focus of the 
Muscat Sultans turned ever more away from Oman and toward East Africa, shaykh-s of the interior 
were more able to build their own increasingly independent city-states. 
b.  A critical approach to the twentieth century 
 Much of the rest of this dissertation discusses the twentieth century, so I will only briefly 
sketch it here. The twentieth century witnessed the end of the interior Imamate and the unification 
of Oman as a Sultanate by 1959. In 1913, the largely independent tribal states of the interior fitfully 
106 
 
 
 
united under the banner of the Imamate and elected Sālim bin Rāshid al-Kharūsī as Imam in Tanūf, 
simultaneously declaring the Sultan as illegitimate. The Sultan soon afterwards died of natural 
causes. Imamate-affiliated elites immediately began raiding the rich cities along the coast, who 
they saw as valid legal targets for pillaging. The Imam eventually agreed to endorse the Treaty of 
al-Sīb in 1920 with the coastal Sultan Taymūr bin Faisal (r. 1913-32), which tacitly recognized the 
Imamate’s autonomy in the interior in exchange for their cessation of raids on coastal cities. The 
treaty remained relatively stable until Taymūr’s son, Sultan Sa‘īd (r.1932-1970), sold oil 
exploration rights in the interior to the newly formed British Petroleum Development Oman 
(PDO), which interior leaders saw as their legal prerogative. This move unexpectedly 
corresponded with the death of the Imam, Muḥammad bin ‘Abdullah al-Khalīlī, which pushed the 
newly elected Imam, in a bid to legitimize himself, to initiate a secessionist movement by securing 
Saudi Arabian military and political aid. By 1959, and with the help of the British, the movement 
had been defeated, the Imamate abolished, the treaty abrogated, and tribal elites had formally 
capitulated to the rule of the coastal Sultan. With the relative stability that this produced, oil 
production was increased, export regularized, and the Sultanate’s finances began to improve. After 
this victory, Sultan Sa‘īd withdrew to the southern Ẓufār region and isolated himself from everyday 
politics. His isolation, sluggish development, and ineffective leadership led to the spread of a 
Marxist rebellion in the southern region of Ẓufār in the 1960s, and periodic unrest in the interior.  
In 1970, Sultan Ṣa‘īd bin Ṭaymūr’s son, Qābūs, led a successful and bloodless palace coup 
and installed himself as Sultan. His rule has seen the gradual expansion of an efficient 
transportation network, intense infrastructural development, the establishment of a modern 
hospital and education system, and regularization of international trade and foreign relations. As 
many critical anthropologists have shown, the Omani state in this period has often been described 
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as progressive and developing merely by the juxtaposition of two numbers: one from before 1970, 
and one from “today.” Such and such miles of road existed before 1970, observers claim, while 
many more miles exist today. The same is replicated for schools, hospitals, electrical transformer 
stations, banks, and so on. This is useful, but it portrays development and urbanization as “the 
inevitable juggernaut of progress,” as Emily Yeh puts it (2013, 203), and perhaps more 
problematically renders development as a simple matter of numbers.  
In any case, the numbers are arresting for their incredible growth and much of this is due 
to the expansion of the state’s institutional presence predicated on booming oil revenues. It is easy 
to overemphasize the gross export of oil in Oman and ignore the structural reality of its tiny 
population, rendering the per capita distributional potential of the Omani state incredibly high in 
comparison to other states. Eickelman notes that in 1979, Egypt’s state oil-derived income in fact 
doubled Oman’s (1987, 181). This capacity for distribution is often used to make claims about the 
“nature” of the state that distributes: that it is predicated on “rent,” that it is an “allocation state,” 
that it is “distributional” or has a “reversed tax system” (Eickelman 1987, 181). While I challenge 
this conception more in chapter 6, I want to point out now that this is a peculiarly “capitalocentric” 
construction, as Gibson-Graham put it. It takes for granted that “the Midas touch of capitalism,” 
manifested as oil export-derived profits, overwhelms, displaces, and eventually obliterates 
preexisting ideas about fairness, exchange, distribution, generosity, and many other social 
relations, obligations, and ideas about mutuality (Yang 2000, 481; Yang 2005). As anthropologists 
have shown, this is not quite right: a wide range of practices, logics, and orientations to money and 
obligation concurrently circulate alongside the market. For example, the notion that state 
distributions of wealth result in a “rentier psychology” that produces political quiescence is an 
ahistorical misreading of social life before such distributions (Luciani 1987). Political scientist 
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Jocelyn Sage Mitchell has shown that the political stability of Gulf regimes is not fully explained 
by distribution (2013). A number of the theses derived from the “rentier state” school are incorrect 
(“loyalty is to the system, not the individuals in power,” “an allocation state does not need to refer 
to a national myth” [Luciani 1987, 74-5]) but some are very insightful (that appeals to ethnic 
belonging and genealogical tradition restricts claimants on distributions (Luciani 1987, 75)). 
Therefore, the assumption that these oil export-derived profits resulted in drastic changes in local 
social norms in ways that are similar all over the world is probably wrong.  
Nazih Ayubi developed a detailed and profoundly insightful analysis of Arab states that 
draws on both “political economy” and “political culture” approaches (1995, 6ff.). He, more than 
most others, has been able to show how various Arab states progressed in different directions based 
on their “lop-sided” development: some were guided by the military, others by national 
bourgeoisies, mineral extraction, or factories. The most profound insight is his insistence on the 
“articulation” between the capitalist mode of production and a variety of others, including 
tributary, control-based, and circulationist modes. “Articulation” is the neo-Marxist term for the 
process by which forms/modes of production coalesce into and change one another, which shapes 
and is shaped by ideological production. This is broadly analogous to Gibson-Graham’s and 
Yang’s critique of “capitalocentrism.” This high level of articulation is why Ayubi describes many 
Arab states as having a “fluid class map” in which movement is possible and hardened class 
identities are rare. Such a class distribution makes attending to anarchist approaches to the state, 
sharpened by a Gramscian attention to the ways in which alliances, ideas, and values are shaped 
across strata and throughout that class map, more appropriate. The money derived from the export 
of oil, as we shall see, not only changed the way that ruling classes perpetuated their rule but 
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changed the stakes of political interactions between rulers and ruled in affect-laden and historically 
charged arenas like praise. 
So let’s now turn to praise. 
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Chapter 2: “We salute the designs that are in good order”: Praise, Power, and Poetry in 
Oman 
     لوأ يملاس ع رادلا هلحلاو  
 مكيلعو يرطاخ نمو نكس هيف     
يف ةريد زعلا لها مركلا   
هلف سوباق اي ارون اجراش اهيف   
My first greetings go to the homeland and the encampment;  
you are on my mind, and those who live there. 
The people of generosity are in pride’s homeland!  
it is for him, Qābūs, O its eastern light! 
    - Anonymous welcoming razḥa. 
Ne al soh ne al les ꝥat leod-scopes singeð.  
What minstrels sing is neither all true nor all lies.  
-Laʒamon, The Brut, a 12th century Middle English history poem. 
This chapter is about praise poetry and its relationship to power in Oman. Following other 
ethnomusicologists, I take poetry and its performance as a crucial lens on sociality. While the focus 
is on one country in the Arab Middle East, it draws on examples from many historical periods and 
regions. This is justified by the fact that praise poetry is one of the most extensive, ancient, and 
common forms of poetry in the Asian, African, and European continents. Praise is and has been 
deeply embedded in the social poetics of everyday life and in the relationship between rulers, 
patrons, poets, and communities. These widespread practices, while varied, resemble each other 
in ways that point to profound similarities in social function and, as Lila Abu-Lughod puts it, an 
“ideology of social life” (1986, 32). In examining this ideology, I follow Abu-Lughod’s (1986) 
call to situate poetic performances more firmly within the “background” of social life and 
investigate the “basic cultural notions” that animate it (1986, 32). Likewise, I am guided by Saad 
Sowayan’s recently repeated call to bring more theoretical rigor to the study of Arabian poetic 
performance practices, especially due to his interest in examining it in light of “cultural notions” 
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that are broadly shared with Classical societies (2003, 2015). Finally, I embrace certain political 
economic strands of linguistic anthropology that argue that we should recognize the role of praise 
poetry as a constituent practice within certain political economies, rather than a more conventional 
argument that traces how a broader political economy impacts one or another genre.  
Almost 30 years ago, Susan Gal (1989) and Judith Irvine (1989) pushed us to consider 
language performance as constituting what we call political and economic practices, not just as an 
arbitrary system that represents actual political and economic practices. It’s the difference between 
a protest song and a vote. One reflects, the other just is. Irvine identified West African praise as 
the perfect example. It doesn’t reflect broader political economic concerns. It just is a political and 
economic practice of certain social arrangements, like selling or buying or voting or giving things 
away. Without it, things don’t work.  
 I argue that in Oman, today and in the past, ideals about how rulers should rule, how power 
can be exercised, and what constitutes proper and dignified exchange between rulers and ruled are 
modeled in men’s performance of public praise poetry. The crucial cultural notion that manages 
poetic exchanges between rulers and ruled is the notion of madīḥ or madīḥa, “praise.” Praise (CLA, 
madḥ), for Omani Arabs of the Interior, is a crucial function of ‘āzī and of razḥa, and each 
performance of these genres is at least partially animated by it. Praise poetry in Oman is now and 
has been a vital indicator of relationships between rulers and the ruled. It makes claims on correct 
behavior and works to facilitate the exchange of deeds and goods between ruling classes and the 
ruled. Praise is not ironic or facile, and is, in fact, deeply engaged in the everyday creation of both 
class hegemony and shared values between classes.  
Unlike other praise contexts, the general pattern of gift exchange animates this Omani 
praise relationship, in which gifts and good deeds obligate a public reception which stimulates a 
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return of the gift and a replication of the cycle. In this case, good deeds and correct action obligate 
praise which in turn stimulates continued correct action. Furthermore, the ties between people and 
their home is so tight that they feel obligated to respond to good deeds with thanks and recognition, 
and to do so in a way that is related to or representative of their location. How and why praise 
functions in managing relations of power and creating communities in the context of the 
contemporary authoritarian state is investigated in this chapter but is also essential to 
understanding the analytic arc of my argument.  
 In this chapter, I argue that thinking with Omanis about the function of praise in regimes 
of power reveals the ways that exchanges of praise manage relations between communities and 
ruling classes in Oman. Further, I hypothesize that aspects of this relationship continue to operate 
today, primarily to symbolize ideals of rulership that undergird Arabian authoritarian regimes. To 
make this argument, I review some general literature on praise poetry and compare and contrast 
various systems (Early Irish; West and Southern African; Greek; Icelandic; Chinese; English; 
Arab; Nepalese) through history and space. I will review some of the literature on the classical 
Arabic qaṣīda to show how it overlaps with and differs from the Omani choral ode, ‘āzī. Finally, 
I take a close look at relationships between poetic forms, praise, authority, social structure, and 
good manners in Oman.  
a. Hearing Praise 
How can we hear praise? And more to the point, aren’t we already? The simple answer is 
no; the more complicated answer is—who’s we?  
Music that involves praise is probably studied very often in ethnomusicology because it is 
found almost everywhere, praising all kinds of things: humans, Gods, prophets, animals, seasons, 
food, ancestors, plants, lineages, and so on. And yet, ethnomusicologists have said surprisingly 
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little on praise as a social tool. It was obvious to my Omani interlocutors that I would study praise 
in relation to power. It is less obvious to Western academics and intellectuals. Serious investigation 
of praise poetry is, to some extent, harried by the deep antipathy with which praise poetry has been 
regarded in Europe and the Americas in recent times.  Praise poetry has come to be deeply suspect, 
if not the height of inartistry, in the academy and among academics. The writing of ostentatious 
praise, modern wisdom goes, is the province of the dimwitted, the weak, the purchased, or the 
duped. Why is this so? I think part of this is a latent ideology of individualism in academic 
discourse. Despite idealizing “strong” communities based on interdependence and mutuality, we 
tend to sneer a bit at overt expressions of that same dependency when it admits to the central 
weakness that is a predicate to interdependence. Similarly, the “romance of resistance” remains 
alive and well: we prefer our subjects to hiss and spit at powerful elites rather than see those elites 
as a part of society (even if deleterious).  
The question of why praise has declined so far in the estimation of the literary elite 
motivated J.R. Burrow’s short but insightful work, The Poetry of Praise (2008), which traces this 
profound shift in English language poetry’s relationship to praise since Beowulf. In it he writes,  
This study of praise in medieval poetry grew out of the observation that modern critics and 
readers (myself included) commonly find it hard to come to terms with the many varieties 
of eulogistic writing that are encountered there. So we either turn our eyes away from this 
‘poetry of praise’ or else look in it too eagerly for such ironies and reservations as may 
accommodate it to modern tastes and values. (2008, vii) 
 
Indeed, for a thousand years after the inscription of Beowulf, the English language and its ancestors 
had been used for praise poetry. Praise was a valuable and important function of poetry in England, 
and in many other places besides. However, at the time of his writing, Burrow can comfortably 
claim that “praise is no longer a prime function of poetic activity” (2008, 3).  
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While Burrow points to the c. 1688 CE development of the English Poet Laureate as the 
beginning of the decline in English praise poetry, whatever the cause, I was raised in a society that 
did not value praise poetry. I was not alone in this, however. During a discussion of my fieldwork 
with an anthropologist of Oman, I was told that in Oman “no one takes that [praise] stuff seriously; 
they all laugh at it… it’s embarrassing.” During my fieldwork, an Egyptian friend told me he 
despised Omani poets who “pull on scraps of meat (sharḥat laḥm) like dogs” when they compose 
praise poetry for the elite. Ethnomusicologist Eric Charry reports similar “derogatory remarks 
about the apparently unabashed soliciting of gifts by praise singers” in European reporting on 
Malian jeli, or praise singers, whose great crime appears to rest largely in accepting remuneration 
in public (2000, 98). 31 Praise, and the movement of material and non-material goods relating to 
this praise, is undignified.  
Drawing on literatures of praise poetry from many places and times, I argue for the exact 
opposite approach. By hearing praise, I mean to think against this modern wisdom regarding praise 
poetry. It is not tit-for-tat exchange, or blame, or accounting, or sycophantic. To be clear, it can be 
those things. The kneejerk reaction to hear praise as embarrassing or sycophantic is probably 
sometimes right but is also not nearly the whole story.  
Let’s dwell on this kneejerk description of praise for a moment. There are two useful and 
cautionary criticisms of this logic predicated on the critical position that I sketched in the 
introduction. Think about why we work. Obviously, money is high on that list, because it allows 
us to survive in a monetary economy. But, consider this: would you take one penny less a year if 
it meant that you got honest, sincere validation and respect from your peers? A lot of us do more 
                                                          
31  Charry continues to make a crucial point, reflected in many other societies: “Whatever is provided to 
the jeli [praise singer], be it cash, food, animals, land, or whatever, is not traditionally considered to be a 
payment. But rather is seen as cementing an ancient historical interdependence” (2000, 98). 
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than just take a penny less: we get on airplanes and fly all over the place to conferences and talks 
for the chance to get that validation. Praise, at its most effective, validates persons for their actions, 
predicated on some shared sense of social and moral commitments. Of course, validation and 
conferences can be explained by invoking some kind of maximized capital-rationalization. But 
here we should be wary of capitalocentrism, as defined by Marxist scholars J.K. Gibson-Graham 
(1996, 2006). I noticed this in myself. When I thought about the problem of work and validation, 
I kept thinking until I could explain this behavior in terms of getting money or ways to make more 
money in the future. I just entertained other explanations until I could really explain it with 
reference to market economics and money or earnings maximization. Why did I think that was 
more correct than thinking of validation, senses of community, being heard, sharing a passion for 
a topic, or any number of other motivations? That’s a perfect example of capitalocentric thinking, 
which is deeply engrained and naturalized in us. Searching for a broadly capitalist practice instead 
of recognizing other, potentially anti-capitalist or non-capitalist practices is precisely the way that 
market capitalism comes to be understood as a stable, universal system in which all other things 
are embedded—including praise, gifts, wealth destruction, and whatever else. 
The second criticism also includes a minor reformulation of Gramsci’s notion of 
hegemony. I want to suggest that praise, because it not only recognizes good deeds and ties them 
to ideals like generosity, keeping promises, and the like, might keep those ideas in circulation 
amongst the ruling classes. The way Gramsci sees hegemony construction is mostly (but not 
completely) a one-way process: it is an imposition of a “general direction” on life, based on elite 
bourgeois values and ideas, whose imposition is managed by both coercion and cooptation. I think 
this is right. However, there are reasons to think that the reverse might also be possible. For 
example, this imposition might not be complete (that is, “the general direction” isn’t everything), 
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or maybe some ideas are shared at such a basic level that they bleed across class position, or maybe 
some ideas move from the subordinate to the ruling classes. We should entertain the possibility 
that hegemony is a bit more of a compromise than we at first suspect. Gramsci was, after all, 
generally suspicious of anything being a fully completed and stable system, including things we 
often think of as “systems,” like “culture” (Crehan 2002). We already know that elites take ideas 
and practices from subordinated classes: think of blue jeans that cost $1000, working class 
“authenticity,” or eating offal and off-cuts of meat in fancy restaurants. The best example of this 
is the white elite adoption of cultural practices of racially subordinated groups, like the musics, 
languages, and comportment of African-Americans in the US. Could praise be one way that ideas 
and values are communicated and even shared across class boundaries in Oman?  
Ideas like “you should be generous if you can” might ultimately be derived from something 
like “the moral economy” identified by James Scott and others as obtaining within non-elite 
groups. I think it is possible that praise sustains ideas that are derived from or benefit subordinated 
classes. Praise might be one of the few ways that anti-political or anti-capitalist ideas are even 
heard or entertained by the ruling classes, because praise is explicitly targeted at them and is 
imaginatively dreamt up by the subordinated specifically to catch elite attention. I’m even tempted 
to consider the sneering disregard for praise on the part of some middle-class folks and elites as a 
handmaiden to the inculcation of a capitalist work ethic. Why ask for things when you could be 
working towards getting them yourself? But let’s return to the issue at hand. 
If a general disinclination to studying praise can be discerned, we can turn to the question 
of “who’s we?” Here, I’m thinking of ethnomusicologists, and specifically of ethnomusicologists 
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who see praise as functioning within a broad notion of political economy.32 Ethnomusicologists of 
West Africa have certainly dealt with praise the most, and amongst those Christopher Waterman 
(1990) and Aaron Carter-Ényì (2018) have been particularly insightful. Despite the richness with 
which Waterman studies praise, I expect many ethnomusicologists share Veit Erlmann’s feelings 
on the topic in his analysis of Waterman’s 1990 Jùjú: A Social History and Ethnography of an 
African Popular Music. Erlmann suggests that jùjú serves to “underline a mode of transaction 
focused on the generous distribution of wealth in exchange for favorable portrayals of the social 
role of the rich and powerful” (1996, 22). Drawing on Bataille’s work on the gift in The Accursed 
Share, he suggests that in jùjú “the lies of the rich are changed into truth” (22). Erlmann in turn 
praises Waterman for seeing through the “embarrassingly obsequious song texts in modern jùjú” 
and for Waterman’s tremulous denial that jùjú is entirely in the service of power (Waterman 1990, 
227-8). Embarrassing to whom? To the praisers? To the praised? Or to the academic?  
We might step back here and ask, why should Yorùbá elites pay for yìn, praise, or want to 
have a good name in the first place? Mostly, it seems like reputation and networking. The 
circulation of praise and money as delayed reciprocity is, in Waterman’s words, a “life strategy” 
for people along a wide range of the class spectrum, a way of “making it” in urban West Africa in 
uncertain times (1990, 177). Occasions for generosity, like jùjú concerts, funerals, weddings, and 
all manner of other social occasions, are chances to “[activate] crucial socioeconomic networks” 
and to “raise [one’s] standing in the community” (Waterman 1990, 174, 177). Waterman concludes 
that it is music that “establishes norms legitimating public demonstrations of wealth, generosity, 
and good character” as good deeds like generosity are refracted through praise to construe them 
                                                          
32 Socio-cultural anthropologists in general fare worse here: even if they do admit that 
performance might have a legitimate social function, all the criticisms we might level at 
ethnomusicologists then take over. 
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both as a general social good and as an example to others (187). In her study of songs for the gurna 
dance in northern Cameroon, Clare Ignatowski argues for the normative power of poetry as 
operating in a similar way (2006). While Yorùbá weddings raise the status of the host, they also 
“function as a support system for the poor, tálákà” who are “allowed to gather around the edges 
of the host’s compound, and to partake in the food, drink, and gifts circulated among the invited 
participants” (177). That’s a social good that should be encouraged, even if grounded on inequality. 
There are lots of other good reasons to cultivate a good reputation, and many of them are shared 
with humanity in general: to be represented as trustworthy, powerful, and well-connected is 
probably useful in lots of contexts.  
What differentiates the Omani context from the West African one is social structure and 
orientation. In Lagos, praise performance is the medium of individual social networks; in Oman, 
praise circulates between communities and their leaders. Praise does circulate in personal networks 
wherein one poet habitually praises a web of patrons from whom he takes money in public 
performance in Oman and the Gulf, but it is relatively rare—not a “life strategy” chosen by many. 
Omani Arab poets do take money for their work (as they should) but it is not “sprayed” on them 
in public as it is during jùjú concerts. In fact, we shall see that movements of money in that way 
do occur and are explicitly contrasted with good, effective praise. The lack of public “spraying” 
for praise is probably due to the fact that there is no social position devoted to praise like griots or 
oríkì poets in Oman. What leaders are praised for in Oman is not helping individuals, but for 
helping communities—villages, towns, cities—and so praise responses are often similarly 
communal. Communities, or representative groups therefrom, praise leaders, which necessarily 
disrupts the “ego-centered” praise networking so common in urban Lagos and other places. The 
fact that there is no independent praising group means that there is correspondingly no criticizing 
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group: in fact, without those personalized networks of competing patrons, much of the power that 
critical poetry would be deeply diminished. If you criticize a big family in one neighborhood of 
Lagos, you can expect that its rivals will throw some cash at you when they have a celebration. If 
you viciously criticize the Sultan in Oman, don’t expect anyone else to be generous, because he 
doesn’t have any rivals.  
That music plays some positive or normative role in defining proper social comportment 
is a strongly validated finding in ethnomusicology. Often, however, this function is not regarded 
as “praise” so much as it is considered “discourse” in the Foucauldian sense. This is accurate, but 
it is also important to disaggregate the clutch of speech and performance genres folded into the 
notion of “discourse” to see how any single one operates in particular, historical ways.  
In this chapter, I want to take praise poetry for what praise poets, the praised, and audiences 
in Oman take it for—an authentic commendation of good deeds with an eye to promoting them in 
the future. Praise picks out and celebrates social relationships between individuals and their 
community in virtue of their fulfillment of ideals, moral norms, and social obligations. This is not 
to take attention away from the crucial role that criticism and the threat of criticism also play. For 
praise poets, however, praise communicates with leaders in a manner far subtler than criticism. It 
also does so in a way that is “virtuous” and “high-minded” both for performers and for their 
communities. Where praise and blame co-operate, blame, criticism, and invective are modes of 
speech that beget only more blame, criticism and invective, which might quickly spiral into 
violence. Praise, we shall see, has been conceived by many groups, including Omanis, to 
encourage and amplify the lives, reputation, and sociality of all those involved. Praise is not 
undignified—rather, the exchange that occurs in praise contexts is a crucial medium for the 
communal portrayal and maintenance of dignity. That praise might be cheaply bought is true. That 
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poets exaggerate and can be manipulated is wisdom shared in the Islamic world and outside of it. 
However, praise, when done carefully and honestly, has lasting social effects that are important. 
And, indeed, we shall see that these kinds of effects can be manipulated as well. But when we try 
to hear praise, we can see that not only do Interior Omanis take praise poetry seriously, for very 
specific reasons, but that their commitment to it is vital to the ways in which power, authority, and 
governance are naturalized and rationalized in the Interior.  
Praise in Many Times and Places 
I was highly skeptical of praise poetry when I first sat down with a poet of ‘āzī, the most 
vaunted vocal poetic genre in the Interior of Oman. I was mainly interested in learning how poets 
overtly or covertly demand goods and services from authority figures through the threat of 
invective. Invective in Arabic poetry was fun, humorous, and also dangerous—speaking truth to 
power! Praise poets, on the other hand, at least to my mind, were sycophants and money-grubbers. 
Listening to early interviews is now difficult due to my impatience to hear about the “real” secret 
behind the poetry: veiled criticism, invective, bald-faced demands made on leaders deemed only 
marginally legitimate. Despite the fact that I had been trained not to think in this way (see Abu-
Lughod 1990 on “resistance”; Asad 1973 on “sultanic authority”; and Rosaldo 1989 on 
“imperialist nostalgia”), I was not wholly naïve to expect this as an ethnomusicologist. The role of 
the poet as a dealer in invective and social criticism is very strongly emphasized in the West 
African literature on modern griots (Hale 1998; Kaschula 1999) and in Zulu and Xhosa izibongo 
(Kresse 1998; Mafeje 1967; Opland 1975), on Yorùbá oríkì (Barber 1991; Barber and Waterman 
1995), on ancient Irish filidh and baird-s (Carney 1985), Greek panegyrists (Kurke 2010[1991]), 
Norse skald-s (Mitchell 2001), Somali poets (Andrzejewski 2011), medieval Chinese fu poetry (
賦) (Wu 2009), and so on. 
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Praise is indeed often twinned with blame, and this twinning is often recognized as the 
source of poetry’s social efficacy. Oftentimes, political economies of praise function largely 
because the threat of invective is ever present. However, praise and blame operate in different 
ways to impel or curtail action. Andrzewjewski, for example, writes that  
Somalis often say that a good poet can sow peace and also hatred: he can win friendship 
by praise and appreciation, deepen an existing feud, or lead to a new one… For a political 
party it is a great asset to have a good poet devoted to its cause: poems in praise of sultans 
and clan chiefs are increasingly giving way to panegyrics on party leaders and members of 
the government, and political crises are enlivened from political bombardments on all 
sides. Such polemical pieces seldom descend to the scurrility and churlishness of 
eighteenth-century English lampoons, but use such weapons as exhortation, praise, 
reproach and emotional blackmail. (2011, 6-7)       
Hoffman notes that amongst the Mande, “the power to praise as well as to rebuke belongs to the 
griot caste” (2000, 242). Throughout her ethnography of Malian griot, Hoffman highlights the 
ways in which the poet wields a capacity for social change through words and the threat of words. 
Opland (1975) writes that the Xhosa imbongi tribal poet in southern Africa had the role of herald, 
praiser, disseminator, but also of critic. Public criticism, in fact, was the sole province of imbongi—
“the chief’s councilors could also criticize him [the chief], of course, but never in public, as the 
imbongi did” (1975, 193). Fusheng Wu (2008) adds, however, that criticism, even in verse, was 
not always open. Amongst early Chinese poets the function of panegyric was “to advise…in the 
disguise of praise” (Wu 2008, 6). This amounted to the development of “indirect criticism” (feng 
諷), which was a practice of Chinese poets “because it was dangerous to directly admonish the 
Son of Heaven” (20). So much so, in fact, that the poet “Sima Xiangru put his political advice in 
the mouth of His Majesty to create the impression that it came spontaneously from Emperor Wu 
himself [r. 141-87 BCE]” (2008, 20). Chinese court poets used praise, rather than criticism, in 
order to subtly influence rulers.  
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 In all these varied contexts, we find that the poet has a clear social function in relation to 
worldly power and to relationships between autonomous groups. This was also the case in the 
Middle East amongst Arab groups, both before and after the rise of Islam. 
a. The Pre-Islamic Arab Poet 
There is a long history of writing on the social functions of poetry amongst the pre-Islamic 
Arab tribes. This mode of writing is perhaps typified by citing Ibn Rāshiq al-Qaywarānī’s (d. 
456/1064) famous description of poets in his treatise al-‘umda: 
When there appeared a poet in a family of the Arabs, the other tribes round about would 
gather together to that family and wish them joy of their good luck. Feasts would be got 
ready, the women of the tribe would join together in bands, playing upon lutes, as they 
were wont to do at bridals, and the men and boys would congratulate one another; for a 
poet was a defence to the honour of them all, a weapon to ward off insult from their good 
name, and a means of perpetuating their glorious deeds and of establishing their fame for 
ever. And they used not to wish one another joy but for three things—the birth of a boy, 
the coming to light of a poet, and the foaling of a noble mare. (Cited in and translated by 
Sir Charles Lyall 1930, xv-xvii) 
The poet, for the pre-Islamic Arab tribe, was a mouthpiece. Arabist R.A. Nicholson has claimed 
that: 
In those days [the Pre-Islamic period or jāhiliyya] poetry was no luxury for the cultured 
few, but the sole medium of literary expression. Every tribe had its poets, who freely uttered 
what they felt and thought.33 Their unwritten words “flew across the desert faster than 
arrows,” and came home to the hearts and bosoms of all who heard them… the pagan shā‘ir 
is the oracle of his tribe, their guide in peace and their champion in war. It was to him they 
                                                          
33 Compare this to Kresse’s (1998) claim for the “poetic license” fiercely maintained for praise poets 
“which applies to most south-east African societies, granting freedom of expression to public statements 
in the form of praise poetry” (171). 
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turned for counsel when they sought new pastures, only at his word would they pitch or 
strike their ‘houses of hair.’34 (2010[1930], 72-3)      
 They advertised the tribe’s successes and virtues and lambasted their enemies’ failings within 
conventionalized poetic forms utilizing meter and rhyme (qāffiya) instead of the rhymed prose 
(saj‘) used by soothsayers and fortune-tellers (McDonald 1978; Nicholson 2011[1930], 74-6).  
b. The Qaṣīda 
The primary form of poetic contest amongst these pre-Islamic poets was the classical 
qaṣīda, the polythematic monorhymed ode. Nicholson presents a number of theories on the 
meaning of qaṣīda, though certainly the most compelling is that the poem is composed for a 
specific purpose or as an entreaty, owing to the trilateral root q-ṣ-d, referring to “intention” (though 
see Nicholson 2010[1930], 76n.3). This style spread with the expansion of the armies of Islam and 
became a crucial part of the urbanized social poetics of the Islamic Caliphates, especially in courtly 
contexts (al-Tha‘alibi 1990, 222-27; Sperl and Shackle 1996; Ibn Qutaybah 1986, 1:167-73, 1:388-
391, 3:135-219). Many scholars of Arabic literature have made contributions to our understanding 
of praise poetry and the qaṣīda in the cultural milieu of medieval Islamic polities (Ḍayf 1960-8835; 
Gould 2015; Sharlet 2011; Sperl 1977; Sperl and Shackle 1996; Stetkevych, 2002, 2010). Rebecca 
Gould concisely presents the qaṣīda, amongst other panegyric forms including Sanskritic praśastī 
carvings and Chinese fu poems, as “a discourse about, within, and sometimes against sovereign 
                                                          
34 ‘houses of hair’, i.e., the woven goat-hair tents of the northern Arabian Bedouin, sometimes called 
“black-tent Bedouin.” These are contrasted with southern (including Omani) Bedu groups, who did not 
historically use woven goat-hair tents (see Chatty 1996, Ch.4, for example). 
35 For purposes of this study, cf volumes 1-5 (al-‘aṣr al-jāhili [The Pre-Islamic Era] (1960), al-‘aṣr al-
Islāmī [The Islamic Era] (1963) al-‘aṣr al-‘Abbāsī al-‘awwal [The Abbasid Era, v. 1] (1966) and al-thānī 
[The Abbasid Era, v.2] (1973), and ‘aṣr al-duwwal wa-l-imārāt: al-jazīra al-‘arab, al-‘Irāq, ’Irān [The 
Era of States and Emirates: The Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, and Iran] (1980). 
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power” (2015, 264). More particularly, Suzanne Pickney Stetkevych has located Arabic classical 
and vernacular poetry’s potency in its “mythopoetic function,” that is, its role in (re-) producing a 
community in words, history, and myth (1993, 2002). This is a broad function of poetry in which 
it is a medium to present history, character, myths, and a sense of communal heritage to an 
audience.36 While earlier Arabists noted the social and normative role of poetry amongst tribal 
groups, Stetkevych has tied this function to the ways in which praise in qaṣīda form “created, 
encoded and promulgated a myth and ideology of legitimate Arabo-Islamic rule” in the courts of 
the early Islamic Caliphates (2002, ix).  
The formal classical qaṣīda was a means by which authority was recognized, 
communicated, and legitimated. “The panegyric qaṣīda,” Stefan Sperl writes, is “a formal 
testimony of the legitimacy of political authority” in which “the glory of the social order is 
proclaimed” (1989, 26). Sperl especially notes the relationship between panegyric poetry and 
cultural notions of kingship: “[the development of the praise qaṣīda) is a perfect illustration of the 
function of Kingship in society.37 It suggests that this poetry is a liturgical expression of the basic 
values and political ideals of the ‘Abbasid state” (1977, 90). The qaṣīda, then, models and vocally 
iterates the qualities of the king, his leadership, and the basis of his authority.38  
 If this was the case for qaṣīda-s in the courts of the Caliphs, it was no less the case in the 
vernacular and within non-state contexts in post-classical Arabia up to the modern day. “The 
                                                          
36 See the example of the ‘āzī from 1996 cited below as one example of the mythopoetic function of 
Omani poetry. 
37 For more in-depth looks at Islamic kingship and legitimacy see Belkaziz (2009) for a presentation of 
modern Islamic philosophical perspectives; Oakley (2006, Ch. 2) for a historical comparative perspective; 
Akbarzadeh and Saeed (2003) for a contemporary comparative perspective; Reid and Gilsenan (2007) on 
Islamic state legitimacy in South and Central Asia.  
38 For a recounting of the major changes that the qaṣīda underwent in this period see Badawi’s (1980) 
description of “primary” (Pre-Islamic) versus secondary (later) qaṣīda-s. 
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vernacular poetry of premodern Arabia,” according to Sowayan, “is a register of social events and 
a codification of the moral principles and cultural values that made life… meaningful” for Arab 
communities (1985, 17-8). In addition to this larger function, poetry was a critical means of 
communication between tribes and individuals, whether badū or ḥaḍr (see Sowayan 1985, 53-66 
for badū contexts, Ch. IV for the ḥaḍr). It is in this sense that vernacular poetic genres, be they the 
nabaṭī traditions so valorized by the Gulf states, or the ‘āzī and razḥa in Oman, have formed a 
crucial form of social commentary for Peninsular Arabs.  
Yemeni vernacular poetry especially has been studied as a discourse “about, within, and 
sometimes against” power. Steven Caton, in his study Peaks of Yemen I Summon: Poetry as 
Cultural Practice in a North Yemeni Tribe (1990), highlights the moral and political role of 
improvised oral poetry in a number of violent and nonviolent feuds, weddings, and everyday 
interactions in Khawlān aṭ-Ṭiyāl in Northern Yemen. Caton writes that, for his tribal interlocutors, 
rather than espousing universal truth or beauty, “the poet reveals only specific truths: he is 
concerned with providing solutions to particular and concrete problems of political action” (1990, 
182). Rather than wreathing universal truths with the garlands of beautiful phrasing, the poet has 
a social obligation to identify issues of concern and prompt their solution. Lucine Taminian’s 
(2001) dissertation on genres of Yemeni poetry documents how norms and practices of the 
classical qaṣīda are managed and creatively transformed into the vernacular in a community of 
other poets, who are often critically engaged in both poetical and social change. The form of the 
qaṣīda is not a limitation on expression, but rather a set of norms that “[turns] poetic production 
into a craft and the mastery of which requires the acquisition of specific linguistic and prosodic 
knowledge" (Taminian 2001, v). Anthropologist Flagg Miller writes in his 2007 The Moral 
Resonance of Arab Media: Audiocassette Poetry and Culture in Yemen that “Yemenis praise the 
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use of folk poetry for ‘solving problems’ in the community…like doctors, I was told, poets could 
‘reveal the truth’ (yikshif al-ḥaqīqah)” (2007, 107). He details what he calls the “epistolary 
practice” of audiocassette poetry in the bid’ wa jiwāb (he translates this as “initiation and 
response”) genre, in which poets trade poetic works that share prosodic patterning, melodic and 
thematic material, and phrasing. Poems, Miller concludes, cannot be understood in isolation from 
the answers or responses they have elicited or are responding to, nor can they be separated from 
the political and material realities of the time of their composition. He cites a number of bid’ wa 
jiwāb exchanges that occurred between regional governors and their constituencies: one in 
particular, composed in 1957, sought to restore tribal unity in opposing British aerial campaigns 
and colonial presence in Aden (Miller 2007,148-50). Kantrien Vanpee’s 2015 dissertation has 
brought literary examination of the classical qasīḍa themes of praise and boasting into the nabaṭī 
poetry of the 21st century by studying their use in waṭaniyya (“nationalistic,” or “patriotic”) poems 
in the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Vanpree examines both printed scholarship and the popular 
nabaṭī competition TV program shā‘ir al-milyūn (“Poet of the Millions”) and ultimately concludes 
that these poems “should be understood as one of the many guises of mubāya‘a,” an iteration of 
“the performative lexicon of allegiance” to recognized leaders dating to the time of the prophet 
Muḥammad (2014, iii, 99-102). These scholars all show how Arabic vernacular poetry constitutes 
social action within a certain milieu, highlighting the agonistic, persuasive, moral, political, and 
affiliative aspects of sung verse. 
The Path of Glory: Praise in Oman 
In my initial interviews on the subject of Omani poetic forms, I chose not to focus on the 
literary qaṣīda, but rather on uniquely Omani forms of oral poetry: the processional choral ode, 
‘āzī, and the shorter war-dance razḥa, which are forms linked in performance and function. I 
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expected to find shades of the previous role of Arab poets in these Omani forms, especially the 
mixture of praise and invective within single poetic genres. Such a mixture of types had been 
reported by other scholars of post-classical oral poetry: in the non-qaṣīda genres of zāmil, bālā 
and Jewish ḥumaynī poems, along with the vernacular bid‘ wa-jiwāb qaṣīda-s of Yemen (Caton 
1990; Miller 2007; Wagner 2009); in both ghinnāwa and nabaṭī poetry amongst the Bedouin (Abu 
Lughod 1986; Lavie 1990; Holes and Abu Athera 2009); nabaṭī in Saudi Arabia (Sowayan 1985, 
1992; Kurpershoek 1994, 1995, 1999, 2002); as well as extemporized verbal dueling genres in 
Palestine and Saudi Arabia (Sbait 1989, 1993; Sowayan 1989; Yaqub 2007 and Urkevich 2015, 
23). Further, studies of the classical medieval qaṣīda indicate that praise neighbored blame even 
in panegyric poetry (Sharlet 2011; Sperl 1989, 2009; Stekevych 2002, 2010). However, I did not 
find Omani poets to wield invective as much as they wielded praise, nor do I expect invective—
covert or otherwise—to be some putative core of Omani oral poetry at all. The reason for this is 
not that Omanis are not or cannot be sharp-tongued, but rather that the very poetic genres that I 
had chosen to study were appropriate for some kinds of poetic expression but not others: namely, 
for praise and not for blame. 
a. Introducing the ‘āzī in Oman 
I translate the term ‘āzī, as a performance practice in Oman, as a processional choral ode.39  
This is because the ‘āzī is a presentation of an ode, a qaṣīda, by a single declaimer who calls to a 
responding chorus, usually several dozen individuals, as they all march in a line or circle. The 
declaimer stands at the head of a small group of drummers and swordsmen, which in turn march 
                                                          
39 The Omani Ministry of Culture, when it sought to inscribe the ‘āzī as a part of our human intangible 
cultural heritage through UNESCO, prefers the term “processional elegy.” The English term “elegy,” 
derived from the Greek elegeia, is incorrect. Elegy refers to lament and is dedicated to the dead.    
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at the head of a larger group. Often, these groups march together in a long line, but occasionally 
the declaimer’s smaller group marches around the inside of a large circle framed by the chorus 
group. During my fieldwork, the declaimer held an Omani straight-bladed sword, sayf, and a 
buckler, turs. Sometimes, the poet carried a smartphone or a piece of paper behind the turs or even 
instead of it, but this was frowned upon. The chorus members usually carry weapons, which might 
be swords, shields, or rifles. After hemistiches, the chorus might discharge their rifles, slap the 
swords and shields together, or snap their swords in such a way that the blade “buzzes” and shakes 
(O.Ar. verb: hāz, yihizz), a crucial gesture of armed manliness and grace in wielding the weapon. 
Drummers would play short bursts after hemistiches, but also play fast rolls after full lines, trailing 
off in tempo as the declaimer took up the verse again. All participants also shout conventional 
phrases at particular structural locations that varied from one region to another. 
The term ‘āzī refers both to the person who “recites” or “throws” (O. Ar. yilqā’) the poem,40 
and the form of the poem itself. ‘Āzī itself means several things. It can refer to praise and praising: 
“Omanis say: ‘So-and-so ‘āzī-s41 you!’ or ‘He ‘āzī-s42 of you!’, meaning, he enumerates your 
virtues and your fine and noble distinctions. He is proud of you all, or he humbly requests of you 
that you support him” (al-Shaydī 2008, 204). The term ‘āzī can also refer to an act of appeal for 
help, support, or aid in an activity. Most importantly, at least conceptually, it can also refer to 
genealogy and lineage, and especially the invocation or elucidation of them. In classical Arabic, 
this term refers to the delineation of a lineage, or of tracing some thing back along a history.43 Al-
                                                          
40 This person is also sometimes called the “poet,” shā‘ir, “singer (of nasheed),” munshid (al-Shaydī 
2008, 205), or “performer,” mu’addī. 
41 A form I verb of ‘-z-ū. 
42 A form VIII verb of ‘-z-ū. 
43 The classical definition includes, interestingly, “laying blame,” but this is not a part of current usage in 
Oman. I do not know if this relates to the former capacity of ‘āzī to lay blame. 
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Shaydī offers a linguistic example: “so-and-so traced [themselves] back to so-and-so by way of 
lineage (‘azwā’an or ‘aziyyan)44, or, his relation to him, truly or falsely” (2008, 204).  
In fact, famed ‘āzī Muḥammad bin ‘Alī al-Marzūqī describes the opening section of the 
‘āzī as ‘azwā, referring specifically to the tracing of an ancestry, a commonality of history. What 
most poets think was summed up by al-Marzūqī when he described ‘āzī as a kind of nasaba (root: 
n-s-b refers to “relation; tracing”), that is, a kind of genealogical reckoning. Al-Marzūqī stated in 
a television interview on ‘āzī that: 
āzā [the root of ‘āzī] means nasaba [n-s-b]. So the ‘āzī-singer is a nāsib [n-s-b], a 
“genealogist.”45 And the Omani, because he is the son of glory, because he is the son of 
history, you always find this same inclination to a relation (intisāb, n-s-b) to his 
community, a relation to his ’umma, a relation to his glory, history, civilization. And due 
to that, this art came, this art unique to Oman, only Oman, and it expresses this Omani 
characteristic. If an Omani, it’s said, ‘āzī-s another, perhaps his bin ‘am (extended family), 
or his nation, or his tribe—(he states) his relation to them; he makes clear to them the path 
to glory by way of example. 46 
 
An ‘āzī is both a presentation of and a claim on a certain genealogy. The ‘āzī calls on living 
ancestors of a certain lineage to praise them and to compare them to their forbears, thus praising 
them all and exhorting them to certain actions or continued good behavior. Most scholars refer to 
the main text of the ‘āzī as a “qaṣīda,” even as a qaṣīda nabaṭiyya (al-Shaydī 2008, 205-8). Al-
Marzūqī echoes most of my interlocutors when he claims that the main theme of the ‘āzī is fakhr 
                                                          
44 This is an awkward translation, utilizing the adjectival ḥāl construction, or “accusative of state,” of ‘azā 
(Hassanein 2006, 79). That is, “s.o. traces their lineage back in the manner of tracing one’s lineage back.” 
This is made more difficult by the disagreement of the trilateral root: either ‘-z-ū or ‘-z-ā (Wehr, 1994, ‘-
z-ū/’-z-ā). 
45 The active participle, or ’ism fā‘il of n-s-b in Omani Arabic. In classical Arabic, a genealogist is nissāb, 
a construction similar to the construction for carpenter (nijjār), butcher (jizzār), qaṣīda writer (qaṣṣād), 
zajal writer (zajjāl), etc. 
46 OmanTvGeneral. “liqā’ ma‘ ‘U. Muḥammad bin ‘Alī al-Marzūqī li-l-ḥadīth ‘an “fann al-‘āzī” fī 
barnāmaj Min ‘Umān” [An interview with Muḥammad bin ‘Alī al-Marzūqī to discuss the ‘āzī on the 
program ‘From Oman’ ”]. Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, 2 Dec. 2013. Web. 13 July 2017. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eHAxsbwJBP8  
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(self-praise or boasting) and madḥ (praise). He does not mention blame, satire, invective, lampoon, 
or criticism—a number of terms denoted by hijā’—at all. 
 This omission is interesting especially when we consider the structure of the ‘āzī. The 
opening section, which al-Marzūqī calls the ‘azwā, is usually referred to as al-ṣayḥāt (shouts), al-
hitāfāt (calls, acclamations), or, in the interior, al-ta‘iyūṭa (to call out). This is a sequence of calls 
and responses (in parantheses) that begins: 
Yā muslimīn tikabbar!      O, Muslims! Stand proud! 
(Allāhu akbār!)      (God is great!) 
’Asūd a‘āzī bi-‘asūd!    Lions! I praise/call on lions! 
(’Asūd!)     (Lions!) 
’Asūd wilād al-‘amm!   Lions! Kin! 
  (’Asūd!)     (Lions!) 
’Asūd baḥar al-ṭumm!   Lions! The depths of the sea! 
  (’Asūd!)     (Lions!) 
’Asūd jabal al-ṣumm!   Lions! The massive mountains! 
  (’Asūd!)     (Lions!) 
’Asūd ahil al-rakiḍāt!   Lions! The riders of war-mounts! 
  (’Asūd!)     (Lions!) 
’Asūd ahil al-sayḥāt! Lions! The people of the sayḥāt! [treeless 
gravel plains] 
  (’Asūd!)     (Lions!) 
After this introductory call-and-response, the ‘āzī presents the poem to a conventional melody. 
Depending on the location and the form of the qaṣīda, the poet calls out either two or four lines of 
poetry before the procession responds. To mark the beginning of the declaimer’s poetry, he would 
sing: āh, iwāb yallah iwāb47 (Answer, Oh God, answer). Between hemistiches, or a certain number 
                                                          
47 Iwāb = O.Ar., gawwāb = CLA, jawwāb. I do not know why some words are pronounced with the 
“Emirati” pronunciation of jīm as yā’ rather than the Inner Omani gā’, or why others, like qāf, are 
pronounced as gā’, a characteristic of the upper Gulf, Yemen, and the central and northern Arabian 
Peninsula. 
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of feet, taf‘īl, the chorus responds with: wa silimt! (Surely; unobjectionable!). After the conclusion 
of the couplet or quatrain, the poet usually sings subyān akbār al-shiyim!48 (youths of the greatest 
moral character!) or mulk allah yidūm!49 (the reign of God is everlasting!). After this, the 
procession would give a long loud vocable cry: Āh! In analysis, final vowels are lengthened such 
that silence is only very brief and avoided if possible. It is the wave of sound produced by the 
chorus that propels the ‘āzī to sing.  
 We can take a short example from an ‘āzī “thrown” by a young Muḥammad bin ‘Alī al-
Marzūqī at the Sultan’s tent in celebration of the Eid al-Adha in 1996 in the northern Bāṭina coastal 
town of Ṣaḥam.50 This is one “unit” of an ‘āzī couplet, by which I mean the couplet itself and the 
frame markers that surround it and orient the listener.    
āh, iwāb yallah iwāb    Answer, O God, Answer. [First frame marker.] 
suna‘a al-’imāna wa-l-ḥalāl   [The ‘Azd tribe] made peace and rightness 
ṭaradu al-furus wa burṭughāl!   [by] Throwing out the Persians and Portugal. 
(wa silimt!)    (Surely!) [distich line marker.] 
Al-‘azd yā nimr ar-rigāl,    The ‘Azd!, O tiger of men, 
Ahil marwiyya wa-sh-shiyim!   Storied people, of great moral character. 
Ṣubyān ya akbār al-shiyim! Youths of the greatest moral character! [Ending of 
couplet marker.] 
(wa mulk allah yidūm!)                 (And the reign of God is everlasting.) [End of unit 
marker]. 
                                                          
48 Usually considered a conventional ending in the coastal Bāṭina region. 
49 Usually considered a conventional ending in the interior Dakhiliyya region. 
50Oman video. “Al-‘āzī – wilāya Ṣaḥam (Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī al-Marzūqī) / al-mahrajān al-sha‘abī (‘īd al-
aḍḥā al-mubarak) 29-4-1996” [The ‘āzī – The State of Ṣaḥam (Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī al-Marzūqī) / Popular 
Festival (Eid al-Adha) 29-4-1996]. Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, 28 Aug. 2016. Web. 13 July 
2017. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8qXBRYx86A&t=0s&list=PLtxUcpgmZ5So0KE9u3lfkoGutVDSO0
Ofq&index=12 
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Here, we can see how the conventional “frame markers” orient the listener to the text and 
aid in the memorization of the text. Before the couplet begins, the ‘āzī cuts through the long cry 
given by the procession to make the couplet heard. He then gives the first line of the couplet and 
the procession responds. Finally, he completes the couplet and marks its completion with another 
formula. Between full couplets, the procession carries the note in their long cry and the sequence 
begins again.  
b. Praise and Blame in ‘āzī 
  Here I want to present some transcriptions from my initial interviews with the ‘āzī Aḥmad 
al-Riyāmī in al-Ma‘arā, in wilāyāt Manaḥ in 2015: 
BJG (author): What would you say are the main topics of ‘āzī? 
AR: The main topics? Well, praise, pride, the community (al-gumā‘a), the local homeland (al-
dīra), the nation, Qābūs,… these things. Al-‘āzī is praise (madīḥa), of course. 
BJG: Praise? Who do you praise in al-‘āzī? Or what, I mean. 
AR: I mean, it depends on the, the occasion. You need to praise the group you are with… The 
community, Qābūs, the patron (rā‘ī), the same things as the topics, really. Like I told you, I write 
an ‘āzī on the basis of the celebration, the occasion. Of course in the old days (zamān al-’awwal), 
it was the tribe, tribal boasting (fakhr al-qabīla) was a part, and spreading news or events, meetings 
between tribes, peace negotiations (al-ṣulḥ), and the like. 
BJG: Now, praise, that’s one of the main types of poetry, is that not so?  
AR: Yes, that’s correct… 
BJG: And there are other types, several other types: there’s praise, there’s love (al-ghazal wa-lā 
al-ḥubb) for example…  
AR: Yes, of course! 
133 
 
 
 
BJG: … there’s boasting (fakhr), there’s description (waṣf), there’s elegy (marthiyya)…  
AR: …marthiyya, yes [laughs]…  
BJG:…and then finally, there’s invective or satire (hijā’). So, praise and invective are the most 
important… 
AR: [cutting the air with his hand] No, no, no, no, no. Never invective, no, no, no. Without 
invective, no, ‘āzī is praise, like I said. Love, maybe, description, maybe, but it is first and foremost 
praise. 
BJG: By God, you don’t use invective in ‘āzī?  
AR: By God, we never use invective, not really. (Hushed tone) How could I throw lines of 
invective (kayf ilqā biyūt min al-hijā’) in an ‘āzī from my own mouth? No, that’s completely 
disrespectful (ghayr muḥtaram b-il-tamām). No, no, no (softly tutting). 
BJG: … I mean, never? You’ve never heard a line of invective in an ‘āzī? 
AR: (Gently) No, doctor. Never in my life in this art. Imagine, a line of invective sitting amongst 
the praise! (khayyal bayt min al-hijā’ gālis ‘and al-madīḥa). 
 This is a very strong response, and not typical of most of my interviews. Often, poets or 
performers would not disagree as strongly as Aḥmad. What Aḥmad is explaining to me for the first 
time is how to properly separate madīḥa and fakhr, praise, from hijā’, blame. In ‘āzī, the proper 
theme is only praise—of the self, the tribe, the ruler, the nation.  
I translate hijā’ as “blame” here advisedly, because the category of satire, invective, and 
defamatory verse in English language scholarship is largely collectively referred to as “blame” 
when it is explicitly contrasted with praise (see Burrow 2008; Kurke 2010(1991]; Sharlet 2011). 
As it turns out, this distinction is not only of extreme antiquity, but also crucial to the social 
functioning of panegyric. I now want to turn to investigating this separation, alongside several 
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other general principles that become important to hearing praise. We shall see that in ‘āzī the result 
of this separation bears more resemblance to the “indirect criticism” (feng 諷) of Chinese praise 
poetry than to the outright mixture of praise and blame that animates other such praise contexts. 
This, in turn, interrelates with Omani notions of shūrā, or consultation between rulers and the 
ruled. 
 There are five general principles that are important to the social function of praise poetry 
in Oman that are relevant to my argument:  
1) the separation of madīḥa and fakhr from hijā’;  
2) that proper praise “magnifies” and improper praise or blame “diminishes”;  
3) that praise is addressed to power and aimed at integrating power into community;  
4) that praise manages power relationships by manipulating fame, name, and reputation; 
5) that praise is civic labor, an obligatory response to generosity and an inducement to 
further giving. 
In this chapter, I discuss the first two points in depth. The other three will be addressed in 
subsequent chapters that present why I believe praise poetry facilitates generosity and grants 
legitimacy borne out of sense of cross-class mutuality in Oman. What is interesting about Omani 
conceptions about the relationship of praise poetry and power is that they highlight both cultural 
notions of poetry, praise, and authority of extreme time-depth and the impact of more recent 
conflicts borne of authoritarian state formation, cultural policy, and the flows of global capital. 
When we consider that the primary patron and target of praise poetry nowadays is the state, 
symbolized by the personage of Sultan Qābūs, this leap is less daunting than it may at first seem.  
Praise and Blame 
Ní fuilet a maíne,     
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nocho mó a-tá a maisse    
nocho mór a géire:    
Nocho déine acht braisse.   
  
His riches are non-existent, 
 and his beauty is no greater, 
nor great is his acuteness. 
He does nothing but boast. 
(A Middle Irish satirical verse, c. 1036). 
As this short Irish poem shows, praise and blame are considered close kin in many places 
and times: the mere removal of negative markers would render this poem as praise. Aḥmad’s 
insistence on separating praise and blame is not unique to Omanis, but the way in which this is 
achieved in Omani oral poetry does distinguish Oman from its near neighbors. In this section, I 
trace the evolution of the separation of praise and blame in poetic discourse in Ancient Greece, 
Latin and Northern Europe, and the Medieval Middle East. This circuitous route is actually much 
more straightforward than it initially may sound.  
Of primary importance to generalized (and elite) notions of poetics51 in all these societies 
was Aristotle’s Poetics (c. 335 BCE), translated into Arabic c. 320/932 from a Syriac version 
dating from c. 81/700 CE (Kemal 1991, 1-2). Poetics was the subject of a series of commentaries, 
syntheses, and summaries by nearly every light of “Golden Age” Islamic philosophy, especially 
in the Aristotelian and anti-Aristotelian continua adumbrated by al-Fārābi (d. 339/950, Latinized 
as “Alpharabius”), Ibn Ṣīnā (d. 428/1037, “Avicenna”), al-Ghazzālī (d. 504/1111, “Algazel”), and 
Ibn Rushd (d. 594/1198, “Averroës”). Rather than comb through the various analytics and claims 
                                                          
51 While it is true that Islamic philosophies of poetics circulated amongst the elite, recent scholarship by 
Jocelyn Sharlet (2011) makes the important case that, especially in the case of poetry and poetics, there 
was a huge degree of social mobility in the Medieval Middle East and Central Asia. Successful court 
poets came from many backgrounds and were exposed to elite culture, including philosophy, during their 
stay. Further, Burrow (2008, chapter 2), makes the case that elite Latin cultural notions were just as 
present in the English vernacular, evidenced by their discussion in Beowulf.  
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made by these philosophers, it suits our purpose merely to distill the differences that they felt they 
were justified in making to Aristotle’s notions of poetics. Though such skirting over of details is 
certainly and avowedly problematic, excellent summaries, commentaries, and investigations from 
much more qualified scholars are readily available (for example, Adamson and Taylor 2005; 
Butterworth 1977; Corbin 2001; Dahiyat 1974; Kemal 1991).  
Simply put, all of these scholars were interested in understanding both the social role of 
poetics and its logical status vis-à-vis formal logic, language, mathematics, music, and geometry. 
The reason for this, I would argue, is the high status accorded to poetry amongst the early Muslims. 
Later Islamic scholars, in Kemal’s words, had to reckon with the fact that poetry was considered 
to have “a relation to our minds, emotions, and behaviour which make it important to politics and 
the community of Islam,” which also justifies its use as a grammatical aid to the Qur’ān (Cantarino 
1975, 80-99; Kemal 1991, 79).   
The most important and succinct summary of Aristotle’s work is Ibn Rushd’s, in which he 
claims that “every poem and poetic statement is either praise (madīḥ) or blame (hijā’)” (1986, 54).  
It was this bifurcated conception of Aristotle’s Poetics that was brought into Latin as laudatio and 
vituperatio by Hermannus Alemannus (Hermann the German) in 13th century CE Spain. While 
later commentators criticized Ibn Rushd’s translation of the Greek terms for “tragedy” and 
“comedy” as “madīḥ” and “hijā’” as incorrect, Rebecca Gould has suggested instead that “Ibn 
Rushd transposed Aristotle’s historical genealogy [that all poetic discourse originated from 
distinguishing encomium, or praise, from lampoon, or blame], which pertained only to past literary 
production, into a general theory of poetry” (2014, 3). Ibn Rushd’s intent was to universalize the 
insights he found Aristotle’s Poetics and to “explicate a poetics more appropriate to his Andalusian 
milieu” (4). When understood as Ibn Rushd did, “praise and blame were to shape subsequent 
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discourse about literature in the Islamic world and Christendom well into the early modern period” 
(3). A near contemporary of Ibn Rushd, the Qur’ānic scholar Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (“The Monk 
of Iṣfahān,” d. 502/1109), neatly summarizes the intensity of this distinction: “let one who is not 
moved to pleasure by praise or who does not react to blame with repulsion be reckoned dead” 
(cited in Sharlet 2014, 8).  
If we can clearly show that elite literary discourse embraced a strict distinction between 
praise and blame, it is no less the case that this distinction operated throughout the society in 
question. In a 2012 dissertation on the social milieu of pre-Islamic poets, Hamad Alajmi relates a 
story about the relationship between praise and blame. Bishr, the great poet, composed some lines 
of blame against the family of ‘Aws and his mother Su‘adā. After capturing Bishr,  
Aws went to his mother, Suʻdá, and told her, “I got the one who attacked you and me [in 
his verse], what do you think I should do with him?”  Suʻdá replied, “I think you should 
give him his property back, forgive him, and provide him with gifts, and I too will do the 
same, for nothing can, except his madīḥ, wash away his hijā’. ” (2012, 186-7) 
Praise and blame counteract each other. However, and more importantly, they are meaningful 
because they have real social weight, because the poem outlasts the poet. This is evidenced by 
examining any of the many societies in which poets have held a crucial functional role in relation 
to authority.  
a. Praise and Blame in Early Medieval Ireland 
I want to take an extended look at one such society. I present some data on early medieval 
Irish society (c. 8th-12th century CE) as an example of both the heights to which this division of 
praise from blame can be theorized and the crucial social role that poets could claim in this context. 
In a highly conservative, hierarchical, and decentralized society, poets played a crucial role by 
communicating between leaders and managing the circulation of praise and blame by manipulating 
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honor.52 Honor was not the abstract but reciprocal system of self- and other-regarding senses of 
personal and collective worth that was formulated in Juliian Pitts-River’s classic 1965 article, but 
rather, as Roisin McLaughlin’s Early Irish Satire (2008) puts it:  
The importance of reputation in early Ireland is reflected in the concept of lóg n-enech 
‘honour-price’. This established the amount of compensation due to a person in the event 
of an injury and also acted as a measure of his status in a hierarchical society. (21) 
This was a literal price that varied with structural position and could be voided due to improper 
behavior. McLaughlin provides a useful overview of Old and Middle Irish sources that 
demonstrates the types and varieties of satire available to the Irish poet, fili. Her description of the 
fili’s milieu and role will already seem familiar to us: 
Operating within such [an honorbound, highly conservative, hierarchical, and 
decentralized] society, the poet wielded considerable power through his ability to praise 
and satirise: just as a person’s honour could be enhanced through praise, so his standing in 
society could be diminished through satire. (2008, 1) 
Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī would likely agree with a law recorded in the Irish heptads: “There are seven 
kings in Irish law who are not entitled to compensation or honour-price… [one of them is] a king 
who tolerates satire or satirising” (McLaughlin 2008, 3-4). Here rendered as satire, blame was 
accorded legal status in early Ireland and was tightly regulated. The early Irish judged satire to be 
“justified or unjustified” according to the facts of the specific case. Justified satire was the due of 
evil, greedy, or stupid deeds. Unjust satire required the payment of the honour-price of the 
slandered party. This tight regulation was partly due to the cultural notion that blame was 
considered a very serious threat to life and limb53—specifically one’s honor, enech, literally 
                                                          
52 Fergus Kelly, in his A Guide to Early Irish Law, relates that only kings, lords, priests, and poets (I., 
filidh) were reckoned as having “fully privileged” status, called nemed (1988, 43).   
53 Poets were considered to have magical means at their disposal as well – in a famous episode of The 
Annals of Ulster, the poet-chief of all Ireland, Cuán ua Lothcháin, was killed in Tethba. Those that killed 
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“cheek” or “face.” Kelly points out that the Irish terms for satire are commonly rendered as áerad 
(striking) or rindad (cutting), and McLaughlin notes that a common motif of “cutting the face” of 
the satirized so that blood would pour down their cheeks, literally and figuratively, was particularly 
evocative (Kelly 1988, 137; McLaughlin 2008, 4-5). As late as 1414 CE, we are told, Lord 
Lieutenant John Stanley died of satire-induced wounds (McLaughlin 2008, 4-5). Satire was also 
legally regulated because rampant, uncontrolled blame could deeply upset the balance between the 
various Irish túath, or kingdoms. Just as early Irish filidh had access to a powerful legal sanction 
on their rulers, so too were unsanctioned satirists (cáinte) “reviled by both secular and 
ecclesiastical authorities” because they wielded blame without the proper credentials (McLaughlin 
2008, 4). Praise and blame were so well divided that “fraudulent poets” (filidh díupartach) were 
considered to have their nemed status degraded, and “false praise” (tár molta) was considered to 
be the “equivalent of satire” in its ill effects and legal status (2008, 6, 7).  
Part of the credentials required by Irish filidh was understanding the varieties of legal satire, 
outlined in the Old Irish tract Cis li Fodlai Aíre?, “How Many Divisions of Satire Are There?” and 
various later commentaries. To cement the point, McLaughlin has translated a selection of 87 
stanzas of Middle Irish poetry that classify the versified modes of satire (which she helpfully 
numbers for our clarity): 
1) Satires and curses (nos. 1-30). 
2) Invectives, which are further classified into four types: 
Type A: a series of abusive epithets in the vocative in which the subject is addressed 
by name (nos. 31-49).  
Type B: a series of abusive epithets in the vocative in which the subject remains 
anonymous or is at most identified with a particular place (nos. 50-6). 
                                                          
him all “became putrid within the hour. That was a poet’s miracle” (Mac Airt and Mac Niocaill 1983, 
462-64). 
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Type C: a series of abusive epithets in the nominative in which the subject is named 
(nos. 57-79) [for an example, see the poem 68, Rí Connacht, cenn lemain, “The King 
of Connacht, a block-head”]. 
Type D: a series of abusive epithets in the nominative in which the subject remains 
anonymous or is at most identified with a particular place (nos. 80-6) (2008, 2-3) 
 
That satire was simultaneously a powerful tool and carefully regulated in Early Ireland should now 
be abundantly clear. Palinode-s, praise poems, however, were considered an even more powerful 
social tool. An unjustified satire demanded praise as recompense, rather than honor-price, because 
“praise was believed to negate the ill effects of satire” (McLaughlin 2008, 7). What makes this 
case so interesting and relevant to the separation of praise from blame, however, is the extent to 
which the Irish agreed on why this was so valuable. An example from an Old Irish text on law is 
worth quoting in full: “No wise or learned person should doubt that blood is shed by words and 
tongue as it is seen to be shed by hands with weapons, i.e., no knowledgeable person thinks that 
false words are any less of a sin than shedding of blood by hand” (McLaughlin 2008, 4-5). Satire 
is a dangerous game, for it draws blood as surely and as easily as a sword or spear. Satire is a 
means of last resort. 
b. Praise, blame, and conflict 
While we cannot ask early Irish filidh why this was so, they might agree with what an ~60-
year-old ‘āzī54 from the wilāya of ’Izkī had to say. 
BJG: O bā, have you heard of blame being used in al-‘āzī?  
                                                          
54 Who requested to remain anonymous throughout this dissertation. 
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AI: Hmm, blame. You mean strong/harsh words (kalām shadīda), is that not so? Hāāāāy, you 
know the stock phrases of the ‘āzī… Asūd, gabal al-ṣumm! Asūd, baḥar al-ṭumm! (You lions, you 
massive mountains! You lions, you depths of the sea!) 
BJG: This is blame? This is… 
AI: Asūd al-mashhūrīn! (You lions of the famed ones!) No, it’s not blame (hijā’) as the qaṣīda 
poets have it (‘and munaẓẓim al-qaṣā’id). No, that’s not for ‘āzī; these are strong/harsh words, 
meaning, words of war. Fighting words, you might say. (AI pushes out his chest and gestures 
broadly) We will come at the enemy like the crashing waves of a typhoon! We are as steadfast as 
the massive mountain peaks; unmoveable! (Iḥnā b-agī’ ‘a-l-‘adū ka-amwāg al-‘āṣifa! thābitūn ka-
qimmat al-gabāl al-ṭumm, ṣāmudūn!) You know, among the old-timers (kibār al-sinn), these 
words were heavy (kān wāgid thaqīl), very heavy.  
BJG: Heavy? Do you mean it was a declaration of war? Between the tribes, or…? 
AI: Al-ḥamdulillah, no, may God preserve His Majesty Qābūs bin Sa‘īd Āl Bū Sa‘īd. Honestly, I 
mean more like these are words one needs to believe in (‘alayh yu’min bihā), do you follow me? 
They’re not weak words. 
I believe that AI invoked the personage of Sultan Qābūs in order to avoid talking about 
tribal conflict, even conflict that, in his case, was purely theoretical. He was just a boy when the 
Royal Air Force was being deployed against the Nizār quarter of ’Izkī and further up into the 
mountains.  
However, as political scientist Marc Valeri has recorded, Interior Ibāḍīs still clearly share 
the “memory of the Jabal Akhdar war in the 1950s, when the Sultan’s Armed Forces and the British 
destroyed the Imamate… people in Inner Oman remember how bad the al-Būsa‘īd were and know 
they are all alike” (2015, 36-37). As I learned from other young performers, there is a shared 
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memory of tribal conflict, all relegated to the time “before Qābūs.” Here I discussed the issue with 
a young member of the Firqat ’Izkī lil-funūn al-sha‘abiyya in 2015: 
MFI: Al-ḥamdulillah, there are no bloody conflicts (mā shay ṣarā‘āt damawiya) like that 
nowadays (referring to fighting between the Nizār and Yaman sections of ’Izkī). But why are we 
called Yaman, doctor?  
BJG: Tell me, akhī. 
MFI: Because we are true Arabs, we came from Yemen. We are of the Qaḥtān. You know, ’Izkī 
is far older than other towns, Nizwā for example. Nizwā is a youth compared to us greybeards in 
’Izkī, [we laugh] truly, truly. But the important point is that us in Yaman, we are brothers of 
Yemenis. And what of them now? Their situation is dire, dire, I mean (ḥālathū ḥāāāl, ya‘nī). 
Fighting between the tribes, there is no winner, blood flows without end and the battles stretch out 
(ṭālat)… may God preserve and protect them, the good-hearted, the humble. Wallahi, we are blood 
brothers… God is all-knowing. 
 There but for the grace of God go I, MFI seems to be saying. His rumination on the current 
conflict in Yemen links it directly to tribal and state conflict, a conflict that drags on and on. He is 
making a point that is commonly heard in Oman: that without the guidance of Qābūs, or Omanis 
“natural” distaste for conflict, or some other reason, contemporary Oman might look just like 
Yemen (Phillips and Hunt 2017). The linkage here, between “strong words” and the potential for 
tribal conflict, underlies the contradictions that swirl around the popularity of performance 
practices so deeply linked with warfare and tribal conflict occurring in a state context that presents 
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itself as an “oasis of peace” (wāḥa al-salām). In a conversation with an ‘āzī in Bahlā,55 he 
responded to my question about whether he had heard of hijā’ in ‘āzī with a snort:  
No, he said, and do you know why? When you are with your friends and you make a 
mistake, they mock you “O fool, congratulations on such and such” in a sarcastic way, 
what do you do? I said, you return the insult! Exactly, he said, it’s back and forth, reply, 
reply, reply, reply like bullets shot back and forth. Then everyone is fighting, everyone’s 
face is blackened [everyone is shamed]. The nature of ‘āzī is above this. (Fieldnote: 
5/23/2016) 
The poet is making the case that praise in ‘āzī is more high-minded, more collectively ennobling 
than blame.  
Kurke makes a similar point in her discussion of epinikia praise poetry in 5th century BCE 
Greece when she writes that for Pindar, “each act of praising [was] a deliberate choice not to 
blame” and incite conflict (1991, 87). For Pindar, there must be nothing mean in the praise, because 
while praise is the construction of poetic community, blame is the active destruction of it, and 
giving praise well and honestly is a reflection on the praiser’s virtue as well as the praised (87-90). 
We shall see more of this discourse when we discuss the role of praise in facilitating generosity 
and community in chapter three. We can conclude by examining Hoffman’s report that, during the 
conflict between Kita griots, the very act of listing all the problematic behavior of the belligerents 
would be physically dangerous:  
So extreme was the anger and consternation of the griot leaders over their Kita brethren’s 
refusal to resolve their conflict that to communicate it in elaborate speech, to go over every 
detail, to rehearse all the faults and lay blame upon the guilty would have had even more 
deleterious effects. Primary among these would have been the release of lethal quantities 
of ɲama,56 of which more than enough to maim, kill, destroy relationships, and disturb the 
                                                          
55 This conversation was not recorded due to a technical failure. I reproduce his answer from my 
fieldnotes written in my car after the interview, hence the looser translation. 
56 The impersonal natural/mystical energy that Mande believe suffuse all things and activities. Exertion 
and conflict, even or perhaps especially in words, release quantities of ɲama that are considered deadly 
(Hoffman 2000, 67-8). 
144 
 
 
 
peace of the griot had already been unleashed during the two years of warfare… all had 
been wronged; all had done wrong. So much hurtful individual and collective history, so 
much emotional damage, could not be adequately expressed with words. (2000, 182) 
The Mande griots cited here see explicitly laying out every personal and collective wrong as simply 
rousing antipathies that are best left unroused. Further, as Hoffmann adds, every party was guilty. 
The recitation of these wrongs, especially amongst such a tight community, would simply lead to 
more conflict. The Baṣran Islamic jurist al-Mawardi once wrote that the poet “is one who rides a 
lion: people fear him because of his mount, [yet] he himself is even more fearful” (cited in Sharlet 
2011, 35). Poets are powerful, but they must be wary of that power.  
At the end of a conversation with Ḥamad al-Tawbī, he once grew frustrated with my 
insistence on criticism. “Look,” he said, 
all of us have faults and have erred. What good does it do, what benefit is there to casting 
blame at one another? (natalāwimu b‘aḍinā b‘aḍ?) Everyone knows the failings of the 
others (nadrī kullunā al-muwalimāt wa-l-mashākil māl al-‘awkhirīn), do we say, ‘I 
rebuke/blame you, O whoever? (alūmik yā hūwa yā hīya)? No, no. Do you remember the 
first razḥa we talked about? [sings] Khūtī lā talamūnī /hināk rūḥī makhazūnuh (O brothers, 
don’t blame/rebuke me, There is where my soul is kept). ‘Don’t blame/rebuke me’, he is 
part of the community, we don’t distance ourselves from him (mū nab‘ad ‘anuh). 
 In small, rural societies like Manaḥ and its villages, where population is low and the future, as 
anthropologist Mandana Limbert (2010) has shown, is felt as deeply uncertain, picking fights and 
casting blame is a self-destruction that must be avoided.  
c. A lesson in praise and blame 
 Praise and blame were separated because they had different functions and they had 
different results. Sharlet indicates as much when she writes that, amongst Medieval Islamic praise 
poets, “intentional ambiguity of praise and blame was valorized, unintentional conflations were 
not” (2011, 18). Similarly, among the early Irish, two types of mixture are telling: “áer co ndath 
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molta, ‘satire with the colour of praise’, and molad co ndath aíre, ‘praise with the colour of satire’” 
(McLaughlin 2008, 8). Praise and satire could be mixed, but carefully and without confusing the 
two. Confusion between blame and praise could be socially disastrous. While the results of satire 
could sometimes be dangerous, with praise it was rarely so. Of course, anyone who participated in 
systems of praise was aware of the danger of false praise, seeking payment, and the like. However, 
for Omanis, it is not just that blame can instigate social troubles. Rather, it is, as many 
ethnomusicologists have noted, that speaking praise and blame has effects on the moral climate 
within which one is constituted (an idea particularly well-studied in India, cf. Rahaim 2012; 
Weidman 2006). 
 One night, sharing strong ginger tea with a performance troupe in Manaḥ after hours of 
dancing for the ‘īd al-fiṭr, the conversation drifted to an ‘āzī performer that I had recently 
interviewed. Several members of the group I was now sitting with in the mājlis had warned me not 
to talk to him, saying, “We bring the drum-pair out for honor, he only brings the drum-pair for 
money.” When I interviewed this poet, his son posted a picture of the interview on Instagram and 
WhatsApp and I was instantly outed. I spent a day thumbing through a torrent of half-joking 
“frowny face” emojis from my friends in Manaḥ on every social media platform available. This 
failure was especially embarrassing since by then I thought I had learned to hide my activities from 
others as best as possible, just as Anne Meneley had in Zabīd, Yemen (1996). I thought making a 
joke would be appropriate, so I said, “You know, here you start the ‘āzī with “Yāh, iwāb!” (“O, 
(hear me and) answer!”) He starts his with “Yā, riyāl!” (O, the currency of Oman!). While most of 
the group laughed, falling over each other and tugging at each other’s sleeves, the eldest performer 
cut us off with a pained look. “Imagine, strong words from the Amrikī! Do we not all forget our 
manners sometimes, doctor? It is important to respect our kind-hearted neighbors in [ that village], 
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just as they respect and honor us.” Suitably chastened, I sat in silence until we broke up and went 
home.     
d. Praise increases, blame diminishes 
 Later, when I reflected on this event, I understood that “strong words” had the capacity to 
break bonds—not only for the speaker, but also for their community. Kurke, discussing the 
“integrative” role of Pindaric odes, writes that “the encomium that occurs for the sake of one man 
is an ornament also for the rest of the citizens” (1991, 164). Reflecting on the idea about praise, 
blame, and manners that eldest performer was trying to communicate to all of us, I offer a mixed 
metaphor: “rising praise lifts all boats.” That is to say, everyone in the community is bettered when 
praise is administered honestly, well, and as a response to a legitimate good deed. Offering praise 
with generosity is a reflection of the good manners of the community as a whole, while belittling 
a good deed with unjustified blame, false praise, or jealousy is the opposite. Good manners increase 
good manners, and bad manners not only encourage bad manners, but decrease good manners. In 
Dwight Reynolds’s Heroic Poets, Poetic Heroes (1995), he notes how Egyptian oral poets use a 
praise song to the Prophet Muḥammad to quiet crowds and gain their attention. Since such stock 
phrases “require the appropriate responses,” the singing of praise verses to the Prophet Muḥammad 
reminds the group of their shared interests in cultivating appropriate bodily and mental conduct 
(1995, 184). Reynolds notes that this practice is similar to how the automatic recitation of 
“religious formulas which require responses from all present” can “[diffuse] tensions” and draw 
others into safe social contact (1995, 184).  
 Many groups have seen that praise augments, increases, adds, or magnifies the praised, 
while blame reduces them. The Roman orator Quintilian wrote quite specifically that “to praise a 
subject is to magnify it and adorn it” (cited in Burrow 2008, 28). Correspondingly, “when someone 
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is praised,” Hoffman writes of the Mande griot, “it is said the person is enlarged. When someone 
is generous, the person is said to be boundless” (2000, 275n.14). Charry quotes a jeli who claims 
that “when a praise song is sung for someone, his energy to enact is augmented,” requiring 
recompense in the sacrifice of money or goods (2000, 51). In the case of early medieval Ireland, 
blame could literally reduce the honor-price of the target, to ignore the fact that it might reduce 
their life by killing them (as seen amongst the Mande, as well). Marie Lecomte-Tiloune, in her 
study of Nepalese bards, likewise notes that they “increase” their noble patrons with praise, badhai 
(2016, 216-7). In Oman, praise increases (often the CLA. zād, yizīd; ziyāda) and rouses or 
encourages (O. Ar. shag‘a, yushag‘a; shugā‘) the ’adab, or the good manners and refined behavior 
of the praised. In a short discussion of praise, the Omani chronicler bin Razīq writes that “and it is 
said that praise (al-ḥamd) is oral commendation (al-thinā’ bi-l-lisān) intending [for] 
aggrandizement” (1978, 69).  
One day, sitting alongside a dry falaj in al-Ma‘arā, Ḥamad extemporized on the different 
roles of drums and poetry in Omani music: “Drums bring beauty; poetry increases/amplifies the 
expression” (aṭ-ṭabl ya’tī al-gamāl wa-l-shi‘r yizīd at-ta‘bīr). Indeed, one of his own wedding 
razḥa poems, on the theme of love, uses this same term: 
اناقتلم مويلا يف رتنلأا                  
يفتحن حرفلاب هديزتو   
سورعلاو ديزت رتخمتتو  
اي ةلاح سبللا يف هديع                
Multaqānā al-yawm fī-l-’inter 
 Naḥtafī bi-l-faraḥ wa-tzīdu, 
Wa-l-‘arūs tzīd wa-tatmakhkhar 
 Yā ḥillāt al-labs fī ‘īdu 
 
Our meeting today is at the Inter[continental Hotel] 
We celebrate in joy and you increase it! 
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The bride adds [to it] and walks swaying; 
O, how beautiful the clothes on their wedding day. 
 
Burrow calls this the auxetic function, a capacity of poetry to render ordinary things as 
magnificent: the largest, the biggest, the tallest, the wisest, the most generous (2008, 12). Recall 
the most fecund of all possible banana trees in Chapter 1, for example. Auxesis might also be seen 
in the way that every object in praise poetry is made of gold, perfume is omnipresent, swords are 
legendarily sharp, armor always gleams, and feasts are never-ending. Another razḥa, this time 
unattributed: 
كسبلب كسبلب متاخ  
 بهذ يلاغ نمثو   
كرطعب كرطعب رطع  
 درولا نيمسايلاو   
Bi-labisik, bi-labisik, khātim  
dhahib ghālī wa ṭhamin 
 bi-‘aṭirik, bi-‘aṭirik, ‘aṭir  
al-ward wa-l-yāsimīn. 
 
By your clothing, by your clothing;  
a tent, golden, rich, and valuable. 
By your perfume, by your perfume,  
perfume of rose and jasmine. 
 
Burrow traces the development of this auxetic function as amplificatio through Latin, derived, 
once again, from Aristotle’s discussion of praise’s ability to “magnify” the praised (2008, Ch. 1). 
Burrow cites Vincent de Beauvais’ (d. 1260s) approving citation of al-Farābī when he wrote:  
the special business of poetry is, by its utterances, to make people imagine 
something to be more beautiful or more repulsive than it really is, in such a 
way that the hearer, believing, will be roused to either shun or seek what they 
imagine. (cited in Burrow 2008, 17-8)  
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Poets urge action by having the ability to exaggerate, to build up, to increase and using it well. 
Indeed, Robert Von Hallberg has argued that “the objective of poetry is encouragement… poets 
cannot praise constantly, granted, and yet the deepest power of poetry comes from praise, not 
criticism” (2014, 40). Similarly, Burrow writes that the “standard medieval poetic justification for 
poetic auxesis” was that Latin Christian medieval poets “have as their purpose to urge men on to 
certain actions that are subject to the will, and to dissuade them from others” (2008, 19). This is a 
familiar notion in Oman, though it is not necessarily held to only function within poetry.  
Learning from Praise: Education and Manners 
The concept of increasing or rousing “manners” or “refined behavior” was an important 
one for Omani poets and performers. This is not the only emotion that music can evoke, by any 
means, as we shall see in chapter 4 and in our discussion of Islamic jurisprudence regarding music 
and warfare in chapter 5. However, a common story told by older Omanis who remember ‘āzī 
from their childhood is that it was these poems that taught them not only proper comportment, but 
also the numbers, the abjad (the ordering of Arabic letters), the days of the week, and the months 
of the year. The qaṣīda that forms the main body of the āzī can take a number of shapes based on 
ordering principles. Poetic line-groups might progress by using words that start with subsequent 
letters of the Arabic abjad “alphabet,” called “al-’alafiyya.”57 Schematically, 
A: A--- / ---a 
                                                          
57 This kind of didactic pattern was also used for runes in Anglo-Saxon, Norse, and Celtic poetic 
traditions, and likely many others. Irish briatharogam-s presented the letters and sounds of Irish with 
accompanying lines of kenning, or word combinations that, in this case, define the meaning of the letter 
(MacManus 1988). According to Halsall (1981), Norse and Anglo-Saxon runes were enumerated and 
sequenced in rune-poems which were “alphabetical” and also mnemonic. Two famous lines of the Anglo-
Saxon poem are worth quoting. The ‘X’ rune, gyfu, was presented with the word for “gift” and the 
accompanying line “generosity brings credit and honor, which supports one’s dignity; it furnishes help 
and subsistence to all broken men who are devoid of aught else.” Feoh, ᚠ, “wealth”: Wealth is a comfort 
to all men; yet must every man bestow it freely, if he wish to gain honour in the sight of the Lord.” 
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     ---- /  ---a 
     ---- /  ---a 
     ---- / ---b 
B: B--- /---a 
     ---- / ---a 
     ---- / ---a 
     ---- / ---b 
C: C --- and so on.58  
 
See al-Shaydī 2008, 207-9 for a textual example. The āzī al-‘adidiyya proceeds by a sequence of 
numbers, recently used by the Omani-Emirati artist al-Wasmī to structure an āzī for the 45th 
anniversary of the Qābūs state in Buraimi. Further, rarer, sub-types proceed by day of the week or 
months of the year.  
  ‘Āzī are clearly didactic in the conventional sense. More important for oral poets in Oman, 
however, has been their ability to bestow virtuous behavior and ensure good behavior. This is a 
pattern that also has wide historical and geographic reach, especially in reference to praise. The 
Dutch theologian Erasmus (d. 1536) made this educational function clear when he  
criticized his contemporaries “who think Panegyrics are nothing but flattery 
[and] appear not to know with what design this kind of writing was invented 
by men of great sagacity, whose object it was, that by having the image of 
virtue put before them, bad princes might be made better, the good 
encouraged, the ignorant instructed, the mistake set right, the wavering 
quickened, and even the abandoned brought to some sense of shame.” (cited 
in Gould 2015, 255) 
Not only does Erasmus explain a function of poetry, but he also shows that praise corrects in a 
way that does not necessarily endanger the social order. Like Chinese poets putting words in the 
mouths of their patrons, panegyrists can instruct without the use of blame. Von Hallberg’s 
                                                          
58 Interestingly, but likely just another quirk of philology, is the fact that hijā’ refers to both satire and to 
the alphabetical ordering of things. This was never brought up by my interviewees, who knew precisely 
what I meant by hijā’, but scholars sometimes use it in the alphabetical sense. 
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statement that “to praise noble power encourages the powerful to act nobly” (2014, 69) would ring 
true to many praise singers, and certainly to Omani poets. To return to the Islamic Peripatetics, Ibn 
Ṣīnā’s notions of the moral status of poetry is relatively unambiguous: poetry attains a moral status 
insofar as it renders honorable and valuable those values that a society has rendered virtuous, and 
condemns and mocks those that are without virtue. Ibn Ṣīnā justifies the social status of poetry 
through a clear social function. He also articulates inherited and developing Islamic notions that 
correlate speech with clarity, sincerity, truth, revelation, and the inimitability of the Qur’ān by 
clarifying poetry’s status within them.59 This cultural notion equating structured, thoughtful, well-
mannered speech with truth and rationality is crucial to the ways in which poetic speech becomes 
the medium through which power is addressed. 
 
 
a. Manners and Propriety 
Unni Wikan (1982) and Christine Eickelman (1984), two ethnographers working in 
different places in Oman in the late 1970s and 80s, made note of the intense cultivation of manners 
and refined behavior where they studied. Wikan, in her study of coastal Sohar, argued that the 
notions of sharaf (honor) and ‘ayb (shame), while rarely articulated in casual talk, were deeply 
embedded within a notion of a personal cultivation of right behavior. Honor, for Soharis, was both 
an “ideal” and a “measure of one’s actual value as a person,” meaning that it was both measured 
                                                          
59 See also Charles Hirschkind’s (2006) The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic 
Counterpublics for a presentist discussion of this notion in contemporary Egypt. This is especially 
problematic in his contentious claim that aesthetic and rational aspects of ‘piety’ cannot be 
“disarticulated,” despite this being a hallmark of every Islamic Peripatetic [for an example of 
Hirschkind’s thinking, see 220n4]).  
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by a kind of shared conceptual yardstick and contingent on other’s measurements derived 
therefrom (1982, 148-153). However, to her chagrin, she found that censuring talk was not at all 
common among Soharis, who had little interest in slandering others and picking over their failures. 
“If people are barred to this extent from censuring each other,” she asks, “how then is honor 
secured?” (1982, 162). Her conclusions bear quite strongly on my argument:  
Whereas among the poor in Cairo, life seems to center on the shaming of 
others so as to gain value for oneself by contrast, in Oman the concern is to 
build merit within oneself by honoring others… In Sohar, everyone is seen as 
vulnerable—that is, the human condition, inextricably bound up with life in 
society… Honor, in this society… demands of men and women alike that you 
do not offend, but in a manner unassertive, graceful, and dignified, you must 
treat everyone as politely—that is, tactfully, correctly, hospitably, morally, 
and amicably—as possible. That is the essence of honor in Oman. (1982, 166-
7) 
Honor is manifest in treating others with respect and dignity, in maintaining a sense of propriety 
and dignity even when difficult. It is a refusal to do otherwise that is hallmark of honorable 
behavior in Oman.  
Eickelman’s 1984 ethnography, Women and Community in Oman, similarly documents the 
nested notions of “propriety” and good manners in Oman, in this case, in the interior at al-Ḥamrā’. 
Khajal, a kind of female-gendered bodily social comportment, animates Omani women’s behavior 
amongst related and non-related kin in social situations (1984, 68-78). Maintaining khajal 
demands a certain kind of deferential behavior, as it places a series of “constraint[s] caused by the 
fear of doing something improper” (1984, 70). This sense of constrained action is traced through 
the conduct of persons eating, marrying, and managing social inequality. We should not interpret 
this, as Wikan can sometimes be read to do, as a kind of “hollowness” in the intensity of sociality 
in Inner Oman. Rather, it is a shared and common gestural and cognitive vocabulary that creates a 
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field of social interaction that is profoundly communal, despite social inequalities obvious to all. 
Eickelman concludes (similarly to Wikan), that these differences 
are overridden by the shared perception that the people of Hamra form part of 
one tribe and one community, separate from others… this sense of trust in the 
comportment of others in the community gives women considerable freedom 
within the oasis—freedom to organize their workday and their visiting as they 
see fit. Paradoxically, the people of Hamra place a high value on individual 
responsibility and noninterference in the affairs of others. At the same time, 
the range of comportment in public, and even within the household and family 
cluster, is sharply limited by a strict code of conduct that everyone is assumed 
to know and accept. The consequent necessity for indirectness in dealing with 
others magnifies the most minute details of social interaction. (1984, 131-2) 
These deeply shared senses of comportment, in these cases embodied largely by women, are 
similarly central to maintaining social grace. By limiting the kind of agonistic social interaction 
that so animates the Egyptian urban neighborhood and other Mediterranean societies, these shared 
senses of propriety militate against the destruction of communal ties. Wikan’s shock that Sohari 
women maintained social contacts with a “flagrant prostitute” is a particularly clear example of 
the primacy of neighborly and communal ties over more agonistic ones. This is not to say that 
agonistic ties do not exist. Instead, we should look for kinds of “indirectness” as they manifest in 
praise and the didactic roles of Omani praise poetry. 
The efficacy of indirectness can also be manifested in very direct ways. Indirect comments 
in ‘āzī, we shall see, can help to produce direct results. I want to conclude this section with a longer 
example of this direct indirectness which comes from my notes on a public performance of razḥa-
s. One afternoon after the maghrib prayer, Ḥamad, the munassiq (manager) of the Firqat al- ‘Arabī 
li-l-funūn al-sha‘biyya was preparing to address the group in the parking lot before a performance 
at the opening of a new Science and Engineering building  at Sultan Qaboos University. We had 
driven out from Manaḥ in order to “bring pride to the students” at the opening of the building. The 
154 
 
 
 
group, divided between the old-timers and the youths (al-shayb wa al-shabāb), was practically 
giddy with excitement because the campus was packed with people. The parking lot was jammed 
with cars, and the youths had taken their time in straightening their matching maṣar-s, or 
headwraps, and hazm-s, or embroidered belts in the reflections of tinted SUV windows. Older 
performers relished flicking their swords up and down: “zayn il-hizz il-yawm” (“The sword-flicker 
is fine today!”) one said to another. “Al-ḥamdulillah!” came the whispered reply. The building 
itself was a few stories tall and groups had gathered to see the performance in a central square.  
The group was scheduled to perform before and after the SQU skateboarding club, which 
was anxiously setting up and testing various jumps and ramps. Outdoor staircases led up the 
corners of the building, whose façade arced like a “C” around the central square. No one under 
thirty failed to point out to me that each landing was packed with young female students from the 
university. “Il-ḥarīm, khawī, shūf! Wayyak binarzḥa taḥt al-munẓar wa aqūlik…” (“Girls, khawī,  
look! And we’re gonna be dancing the razḥa with you right underneath their gaze…”) one of the 
boys gestured weakly to a woman high in one of the spiral stairs leading up the building, “al-bint 
māl al-azraq traaaaaaaykī inta” (“The one in the blue is loooooooking at you!”). The wave of 
cackling somehow knocked into an older youth down the line, who feigned that it had caused him 
to pull his maṣar down his face. He turned toward us with his brand new maṣar pulled down over 
his eyes, cocked his head slowly to one side, and mocked pulling out his khanjar belt-dagger—a 
gesture to spurned honor. “Yā guma‘a!” (“Hey, Everybody!”) came the shout from Ḥamad. “Sima‘, 
sima‘ (listen, listen). Today, we’ve been honored to be invited to perform razḥa at the college of 
His Majesty, His Highness Sultan Qābūs, may God lengthen his life.” He explained how the group 
would enter the square in the mashiyya, a processional razḥa, but did not stipulate the poetry or 
the melody. There was some squabbling about who would recite (ilqā’/yilqā’) the first line, and 
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whether they would have an ‘āzī. The main ‘āzī performer begged off, saying that they had written 
so many razḥa-s for the event that there was no need, which basically sealed the deal since no one 
else was going to give an ‘āzī. Ḥamad continued, “we are guests here today, just as they are our 
guests in the razḥa. We will not forget our manners (ma binansā adabunā baynū). I don’t want to 
hear that “they had no manners, they had no respect” or anything like that (mū bāghī asma‘ illī ma 
lahu adab, ma lahu iḥtirām walā shay kidhā). We will be amongst male and female students, 
young women, so act like men and be good-mannered people (mu’addabīn).” When I spoke with 
Ḥamad after the event, I asked him why he stressed the comportment of the group amongst the 
students: “Well, first, as you know, regarding the mixture of men and women, this is the source of 
many problems. You must [act] respectful, and our adab increases the adab and the good moral 
behavior of the students, as well (’adabnā yizīd’adab wa-akhlāq aṭ-ṭalaba gumī‘an, b‘ad).”  
A Case Study of Praise: Examining Praise at a Soccer Pitch 
 In the summer of 2016, a large private bank in Oman, Bank Muscat, was funding a huge 
social development campaign which consisted of providing the numerous official soccer clubs of 
Oman with turfed soccer pitches. Artificial and actual grass was trucked in to replace the gravel 
and packed dirt fields that were (and still are) common in rural areas. This initiative, though funded 
by the bank, was overseen by the Ministry of Sports Affairs, a ministry established by Royal decree 
in 2004. Manaḥ’s Farīq al-‘Arabī, a sporting club, was chosen to receive one of the turf fields on 
their field in the neighborhood of al-Ma‘arā, and it was built over the course of a few months: 
equipped with high walls, bright lights, new goals, fresh artificial turf, and a watering system, the 
pitch was completely transformed.  
 When the pitch was near opening, the performance troupe attached to the same 
neighborhood civic club, the Firqat al-‘Arabī l-al-funūn al-sh‘abiyya, was called by the Ministry 
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of Sports Affairs, the local wālī in Manaḥ, and the local shaykh-s of al-Ma‘arā to plan a 
performance. The local Manḥī groups Firqat Ḥārat al-Bilād and the Firqat al-Ma‘amad were also 
called upon to share the honor and to ensure a large body of performers. The poet Rabī‘ al-Mallāḥ 
was chosen to write and throw the ‘āzī (though others have said that he “presents himself/puts 
himself forward to be chosen” (huwa yataqaddam nafsu)” thereby forcing others to relent to his 
wishes). In any case, the opening ceremonies for the soccer match would include several razḥa-s 
written for the occasion, a qaṣīda written by local poet Ābū Ghaṣṣān, speeches by several figures, 
and the ‘āzī.  
 After the ‘aṣr prayer, at around 3:30, I met the gathering Firqat al-‘Arabī just outside the 
southern gates of the new field. As I moved around the group shaking hands and bumping noses 
in greeting, someone called out, “Go and see the field, doctor, let us get ready!” Several of the 
younger members of the group were straining to set their maṣar-s just right on their ears and 
foreheads: straight, overlapped just so, and crisp. I walked out onto the beautiful green field, 
completely at odds with the surrounding dusty browns. Several “big personalities” (kibār al-
shakhṣiyāt) greeted me as I entered and began to set up my microphones.  
 “He’s the one researching the popular arts,” I heard one whisper as they approached, “and 
he hangs around al-Ma‘arā.” They greeted me warmly and insisted I take some water and other 
drinks. “This is a big day,” I said, and before I could continue, one of the shaykh-s added, “It’s a 
big day indeed! We are greeting a son of the Āl Bū Sa‘īdī, a minister from the Ministry of Sports 
Affairs. And just look how we have responded: this is Manaḥ! We recognize [their] help and 
support, the provision of services and the guarantee of safety and security.” As we chatted, I 
reflected that this response was typical of talk about the role of the state in developing Oman into 
a “modern” state. There is little that logically connects “safety and security” with laying artificial 
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grass on a soccer pitch except that it is a similar kind of expectation placed on the state and its 
leadership.  
 A few moments later, I heard the crack of the young brothers Aḥmad and ‘Abdallah bin 
Ga‘arūf testing the tightness of their drums. I excused myself and made my way over, but they 
pointed with the noses over toward the eastern gate of the field, where two lines of dancers were 
forming. About 50-60 dancers formed two long rows extending out from the gate across the field, 
framing a kind of walkway for the distinguished guests to walk down. Over the hubbub of the 
crowd, I heard a voice shout, “someone give a razḥa!” As I sidled up to one of the lines, I heard 
an older performer give a long, elaborate mulālā’, a kind of unaccompanied vocable melody that 
outlines the melody of the coming poetry. I scanned the opposing line quickly and it turned out to 
be Khalfān, an older performer from the Firqat al-Ma‘amad—an appropriate person to give the 
first razḥa. His voice was almost caught off in the wind, but as he concluded, our line erupted in 
response, echoing the mulālā’ back and establishing the rhythmic interchange of choral parts. After 
a few more exchanges, Khalfān sang the poem that would “ride” (tarkab) the melody: 
     لوأ يملاس ع رادلا هلحلاو  
 مكيلعو يرطاخ نمو نكس هيف    
يف ةريد زعلا لها مركلا هلف  
 سوباق اي ارون اجراش اهيف   
’Awal salāmī ‘a al-dār wa-l-ḥilla, 
 w-‘alaykum khāṭirī wa-man sakin fīh 
Fī dīrat al-‘izz ’ahil al-karam fa-l-hu 
 Qābūs, yā nūran shārqan fīhā  
 
My first greetings go to the homeland and the encampment, 
you are on mind, and those who live there. 
The noble people of generosity are in pride’s homeland; 
it is Qābūs’s, O it’s eastern light!] 
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 This was a good choice by Khalfān because this particular poem is very common, so the 
wind did not interfere with our ability to respond to it. Our line roared back, enthused by the poem 
and by the incoming guests. As the drummers took their place between the lines, the choruses 
began to sway back and forth. After a few exchanges of the poetry, the drums roared into action 
and the dance began in earnest.  
 In this welcoming mode, the dancers simply took a step forward and back, starting with 
the right foot and closing with the left, then rocking back on the left and closing with the right. 
When the drums moved closer to one line or the other, those nearest to the drum bent their knees 
deeply but kept straight backs, tilted forward at the waist toward the drums and bobbed together, 
sometimes throwing their heads backwards and forwards in a deep nod. Others shouted 
encouraging “Ho ho!”s on upbeats, eliciting a range of shouted responses. As the guests filtered in 
and waved to us, I took a step back and began filming. I noted early on in my fieldwork that guests 
rarely dance with the dancers—unlike in other parts of the Gulf for example—a topic I take up in 
Chapter 4. For now, the dancers closed ranks behind the guests and marched them safely across 
the field to their designated seats.   
 As the dancers took their seats, towards the northern goal, I watched as a procession of 
well-dressed Omani bankers and businessmen made short speeches to the crowd. No one around 
me appeared to pay any attention, due to the high winds and distance. After a few moments, Ābū 
Ghaṣṣān, the talented local poet, brought his wheelchair up to the microphone and read a relatively 
short qaṣīda, dedicated to the al-’Arabī team, the town, the shaykh-s, and the local representative 
from the Ministry of Sports Affairs, Khālid bin Ḥamad Āl Bū Sa‘īdī. As Ābū Ghaṣṣān concluded, 
several people nearby whispered, “aḥsant,” meaning a mixture of thanks and recognition for a job 
well done. Soon after, our phones lit up as Abū Ghaṣṣān sent us the poem as a picture over 
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WhatsApp. The managers of the event then beckoned the poet Rabī‘ al-Mallāḥ to start the ‘āzī, 
and Rabī‘ waved his hands to gather the performers. They formed a dense group behind him and 
moved to the center of the field with another razḥa. As they reached the center, Rabī‘ came to the 
front of the group, turned them toward the seated guests, took out his iPhone and performed the 
following ‘āzī in the manner described above—sword in one hand and phone in the other. 
Hear him, O Lord of Splendor / The Everlasting God lives forever 
Scattering peace like pure, fresh water / to guests and the graciously received group. 
 
I greet you, O issue of the generous / You have honored your people and the station 
And have given us from you a badge of honor / O creator of wondrous sayings. 
 
O creator of sayings and art / O soother of the grievous mood; 
Our homeland yearns to play a melody / Directly to you, O understanding one. 
 
When we heard of your coming / We came to be in your presence. 
O my lord, this is your [appearance] / We are proud of it, without doubt. 
 
Lord and son of a lord by grandfather / You, Khālid bin Ḥamad, 
If you undertook your actions my / pen is prepared to respond in its way. 
 
Every homeland is built by men / When those men work hand in hand. 
As for laziness, it has no place / neither near nor far. 
 
This is the mission of every youth / Wading into challenge and difficulty. 
And for those that walk the path of rightness / It's impossible for their actions to fade. 
 
These are our benefits in Manaḥ / We salute the designs that are in good order, 
[Those] that Qābūs taught us and acts in good faith / Qābūs is a physician to the 'umma. 
 
O my homeland al-Ma'arā, peace! / You gave me pride, you gave me respect. 
Around you men are on the lookout / For any strange thing. 
 
In conclusion, I ask for your forgiveness / Time passes by so quickly. 
If I only had more lines / to give the 'āzī right up to the setting of the sun.60 
 
                                                          
60 Appendix 1, poem 4. 
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 The poem itself is perhaps not beautiful but is a perfect example of the themes that we 
examined in this chapter. First, the poet begins by placing the listeners into a certain context: God 
is great, and we are Muslims gathered here in the long tradition of guests and hosts. He then greets 
the host, “the issue of the generous,” and commends him for his actions in giving al-Ma‘arā a 
“badge of honor” in the form of the soccer pitch. Note that the field was funded by Bank Muscat, 
not just the Ministry of Sports Affairs. Nevertheless, neither the bank nor the Ministry are the focus 
of praise. Instead, it is a minor member of the royal family, a ministry member sent off to attend 
these kinds of celebrations probably dozens of times before. Next, Rabī‘ shifts to the desires of the 
“homeland” to “play him a melody”—that is, give the razḥa—and have him hear it. In fact, he 
continues, when the people of Manaḥ heard of Khālid’s attendance, they all rushed to volunteer to 
sing praises for him. The voluntary nature of praise is established. This instance of praise is a 
recognition of Khālid’s good deed of helping to establish the field, but also in attending the opening 
and gracing it with his presence.    
After this, Rabī‘ shifts to pointing out that the people of Manaḥ are not lazy. Why is this? 
First of all, I think it is a way to represent praise as a civic labor, outlined in chapter 4. It is also a 
recognition of the kind of gift that this soccer pitch is. It is unreturnable. It is a service that is given 
in good faith to the people of Manaḥ to use and enjoy. Rabī‘ seems to say, “this is a fine gift, one 
that we did not have. But don’t confuse our not having it with laziness, no, we’ve done our part in 
cooperating again and again, and are not shy of work.” At the end of these two lines, he turns back 
onto the praised: those who do good deeds are never forgotten. The gathered performers and the 
neighborhoods they represent have done the hard work of building a community, but it is 
“impossible” for the good deed of building the soccer pitch and attending the opening on the part 
of Khālid to “fade.” It will. But playing on his vanity is a kind of social insurance. 
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Finally, Rabī‘ praises the leadership of Sultan Qābūs, highlighting the “benefits” he has 
brought and the “designs” he has wrought. Such a display links the current situation to broader 
national and regional concerns with development and the Omani renaissance, mythopoetically 
drawing the connection between soccer pitches with grass and broader narratives of national 
development. Finally, Rabī‘ stamps the performance as indelibly emerging from the rightful, 
watchful, and patriotic people of al-Ma‘arā. This good deed is good because it accrued to the 
people of Manaḥ, as rightful recipients and watchful protectors of the state. In a way, the ‘āzī 
concludes by claiming that the good deed so praised today is only possible because the people of 
Manaḥ are “on the lookout for any strange thing.” 
Conclusions 
 This ‘āzī is an exceptional example of praise in the Omani case. It moves between the core 
interests of praisers and constructs the praised as ultimately reliant on the community, though 
through their actions they are momentarily individualized and lauded. Despite the organization of 
this chapter, it was hearing and discussing this ‘āzī that taught me so much about the circulations 
of praise in Oman, and its deep connections to senses of community and political relationships. 
The poem is not uncontroversial: many interlocutors found something to criticize. Often, they 
pointed out that the poem was much too short and brief, but in my view, the brevity of the poem 
distills the core elements of praise into a dense string of deeply meaningful statements full of 
implication. It is, in a very real sense, a concentrated and forceful expression of what praise is in 
the context of the Omani ‘āzī. What became clear to me after hearing this poem is that it is both a 
recognition of a good deed and a way of ensuring those good deeds continue to happen. It is both 
a response and a provocation, a reflection and an incitement. This is what is meant by praise as an 
intervention: praise leaps into social relations to modify, manipulate, induce, and commend them. 
162 
 
 
 
It is an exhortation as much as a recognition. Ideally, it shapes future action by extolling past 
actions, linking them in the creation of community. In the next chapter, we will discuss what kinds 
of good deeds deserve such praise, and in the following, we will examine why and how 
communities perform in such a way as to demonstrate the mutually entangled political lives of 
rulers and the ruled. 
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Chapter 3: Swords and Gold: Generosity and Legitimacy in Omani Praise Performance 
 
Praise poetry is by its very nature a gift exchanged. (Kurke, 1991, 91) 
 
Authority is root and radical, sense and prescience. (Robinson 1983, 30) 
 
Wealth is the measure of hope / and likewise it magnifies the despicable. 
Even if he’s a falcon,61 if his palm is empty, / no one will look upon him. 
And if I had the cup of wealth / [but] travelled like a poor camel-driver, 
Folks would redouble greetings / and everyone would extend their hand.62 (al-Falāḥī 2013, 115) 
 
The next two chapters examine how social relationships of authority and political 
legitimacy are enacted in Oman through the obligatory circulation of praise performance and 
generosity from leaders. Such economic arrangements are often called “distributive economies” 
because goods circulate insofar as they are doled out by certain individuals, organizations, or 
institutions. Generosity may seem a strange place to look for the relationships between authority 
and performance, even in distributive cases. In fact, Omani performers I spoke with encouraged 
me to conceive of praise for leaders in this way. Speaking with the ‘āzī Rabī‘ al-Mallāḥ about the 
role of leaders after his praise performance at the opening of the soccer pitch in Manaḥ, he said 
“Why do I say, ‘If you undertook your actions,  / my pen is prepared to respond in its way’? This 
mean that if he shows generosity, we will remember it (law yubayyin al-kirāma 
binatadhākruh)!”  
This chapter makes the case that generosity, manifested in many ways, is a shared 
commitment of both performers and leaders in a variety of authority and political structures, 
                                                          
61 Ṣaqr, a type of falcon, as discussed previously, refers to a noble and brave fighter. 
62 An Omani occasional poem, a qaṣīda nabaṭiyya. Composed in Buṭayn by Khalfān bin Sayf al-
Falāḥī known as “Wālid Shuṭṭa” after being ignored in the sabla in Ghussār. 
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ranging from “tribal” to “state” (Wilson 2016). Leaders (both shaykh-s and sultans) are expected 
to be generous to their followers, and when they are, performers from subordinate classes 
respond with praise. For the ruling classes, this expectation of generosity can secure their 
legitimacy in the eyes of polity members. For performers, displaying their appreciation of 
generosity also displays their commitment to the generous leader and the social relations that 
bind them. Many performers see the relationships between giving and praising good leadership 
with razḥa as evidence of the efficacy of that relationship—a confirmation of a healthy social 
order.  
Two Takes on Generosity: The Gift and a Social Mechanism 
“Generosity” is the term I use to generally translate a number of Arabic terms. Most are 
used interchangeably (sakhā’, sakhāwa or ṣakhāwa; karam or kirāma; jūd or jawad; samāḥa) 
some are considered archaic and only really used for poetry addressed to elites (like naddā or 
marūwa), and others are somewhat specific to patronage and wasṭa. I think that more able 
Arabists would try to match these terms to more specific English terms like “liberality,” 
“magnaminity,” “open-handedness,” or more neutral terms like “giving,” but I think “generosity” 
is an adequate covering term. It fails to distinguish between those who give because they are rich 
and those who give even while poor, but this is in accordance with local usage. The underlying 
notion of all these terms is plainly “generosity”: giving of oneself freely and indiscriminately. 
Generosity is valued across social classes. In Oman, generosity is as much a virtue of the 
pauper as it is the prince. It is precisely this mutual valuation that makes “generosity” a useful 
basis for the inculcation of temporary cross-class alliances—hegemony (in Bowie’s 1998 terms). 
Speaking very generally, elites see generosity as a strategy to legitimate themselves, and non-
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elites see the inculcation of generosity in elites as a hedge against uncertainty. Generosity, like 
praise, lifts all boats. 
I analyze this situation in two ways: first, as a manifestation of reciprocity and gift 
exchange, and second as a mechanism that produces political legitimacy.  
a. The Gift 
I see the relationship between giving leaders and the receiving led as motivated not by 
strict market logics of loss and gain, but as motivated by logics of reciprocity that are most 
effectively studied in the literature on “the gift.” It is emphatically not a one-way process of 
“distribution,” but one in which the led give the leaders something quite material in return. As 
recent scholarship on the gift has shown, what makes circuits of exchange so crucial to social 
reproduction is not that they merely circulate goods, but that they also form and define social 
relationships. As anthropologists Keith Hart and Chris Hann conclude, Mauss’s most basic 
insight was that “society” or “the social” could not be assumed to be “pre-existent,” but were, in 
fact, always under construction, even demanding construction (2011, 166). Generosity and 
giving form social relations, especially generosity from leaders, and that givers are rarely 
disinterested in how that society takes shape. The risk of becoming dependent and subservient to 
generous givers is very real. I show how a model of generosity that produces political legitimacy 
has unique ramifications for performance in Oman. Because generosity is linked to good 
leadership but also has the capacity to produce dependency and inequality, praise performance 
becomes a site of distinct social tension. Praising generosity has been construed as sycophancy, 
groveling, and self-interested—my research reveals a different aspect of this cycle. This case of 
generosity and praise response illustrates several important features of Omani conceptual and 
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behavioral associations between performance, sociality, and authority that are thrown into relief 
by the social tensions that figure within such performances.  
Generosity has been studied by anthropologist Margaret Wilson amongst Chinese traders 
in Papua New Guinea, where she described it as “a model of giving which incurs no debt, and 
emphasis on status that does not imply hierarchy” (1989, 26). “Generosity,” Wilson claims, 
“emerges as a system for simultaneously negotiating status and for maintaining equality within 
the community” (1989, ii). What is compelling about such a notion of generosity is how it can be 
cited as the basis of actions that have profoundly divergent results—producing relations of 
equality and also differentiating status. If such a claim is surprising for our critically minded 
readers, it is not for those who have studied gifting and its relation to hospitality in the Middle 
East, particularly in women’s networks of visiting. As Anne Meneley (1997) has shown in 
Zabid, Yemen, gifts, generosity, and hospitality are serious business in the play of social 
distinction but are nevertheless forms of caring redistribution. While circuits of visiting between 
women are crucial in producing such distinction, the very predictability and obligations inherent 
in visiting form a tenuous social network of “near-equals” who recognize themselves as 
constituting the social elite of Zabid. As we shall see, generosity is a basic expectation for 
leaders in the modern state just as much as it has been in the past for smaller-scale leaders. One 
element in the endurance of this expectation (and the practices that follow it) is the continued 
relevance of praise poetry as mediating relations between dominant and subordinated classes. 
Praise largely circulates between classes. 
More critically minded readers might balk at this formulation. They would prefer that 
“generosity” in this case be framed in terms of bribes, intimidation, corruption, patronage 
politics, or some other obviously coercive function of power. As I have argued previously, the 
167 
 
 
 
ability to give in this way is a predicate of social inequality. The social relations that index this 
inequality are sustained by material concentrations of social power, organized violence, and 
practices that differentially arrange economic capital. However, in this chapter, I want to 
examine the range that a word like “generosity” can exhibit, and how it can be deployed in very 
different social situations to shape behavior. Generosity is not an ideological construction of the 
ruling classes. It is a profoundly social impulse that challenges simplistic, capitalocentric 
descriptions of social life, like those that balk at generosity. Pace Gregory (1982), markets and 
gifts may be different ways of thinking about circulation and what impels it, but one does not 
simply replace the other (Tsing 2015). This is why an Omani performer can buy a beautiful new 
belt with cash from a wage job in the morning, freely Google a new melody on a phone gifted to 
them in the afternoon, and praise generosity from elites through razḥa in the evening. Market, 
mixed-market, and reciprocal exchanges co-exist.  
b. A Social Mechanism 
My second overarching contribution is to frame this mutualistic generosity and response 
circuit as a social mechanism that produces political legitimacy. I term this the 
Generosity/Legitimation mechanism and discuss it in detail in this chapter’s section on authority. 
Even though generosity is a value and ideal that crosses class boundaries, it is clearly 
differentially understood within those classes—and therefore makes generosity a potential basis 
for hegemony construction. While conceptions of generosity may differ amongst the ruling class 
(think noblesse oblige), it is also true that the material benefits derived from redistribution speak 
for themselves. Who cares what the king thinks when you’ve got your goose, or your hospital, or 
a paved road? What if, though, your king is Donald Trump and he has crazy ideas about 
“bootstraps” and no regard whatsoever for generosity? What becomes interesting with praise is 
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that it keeps ideas like “generosity” alive, afloat, worth something, circulating, mattering not for 
just everyday folks but also for the ruling classes.  
An ethnomusicological approach to this mechanism uncovers, or at least forefronts, the 
performed response to the directed generosity of elites as praise. While other studies of 
distributive economies do not record responses to generosity or fail to consider that generosity 
might obligate a response, this study shows that generosity is not just repaid with “political 
quietism” or necessarily results in a decayed civil society, but instead prompts praise responses. 
These praise responses are not simply natural, spontaneous outpourings of joy, nor are they 
entirely overdetermined, shaped, and controlled by elites—a kind of obsequious puppet show. 
Rather, they are a negotiated, respectfully agonistic, not-quite-cooperative and not-quite-
competitive arena of compulsion, cajoling, and urging. Praise and generosity are locked in 
continuous circuits of tense persuasion. The circulation of praise and generosity, locked in 
circuits of obligation, leads to the construction of stable relations that undergird a moral 
economy. 
As we saw in the last chapter, praise is not a simple affair. Praise performance plays on 
the differences between ideals and realities. As many scholars have shown, seemingly straight-
forward praise can hide multiple meanings, even if never stooping to outright criticism (Abu-
Lughod 1986; Barber 1991; Gilman 2001, 2009; Hoffman 1995; Gunner 1995). Ideally, praise 
attempts to subtly guide authority through persuasion (Caton 1987). In contemporary Oman, 
however, praise is both very common and socially problematic. Authentic praise is understood to 
be necessary to sustain mutual obligations toward generosity between rulers and ruled and 
promote good leadership, but it can easily shade into sycophancy and undignified begging. This 
is not unknown in Oman or in the broader Middle East. This danger of dependency and 
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sycophancy is especially acute in the context of obligations of reciprocity inherent in “gift” 
exchange and patronage. Many scholars examining different cultural contexts have shown how 
gifts and generosity from social elites can put individuals and communities in a bind: refusal 
jeopardizes social ties, but overeager acceptance can signal dependence and weakness. 
c. Outline 
I analyze the social uncertainty of generosity, gifts, and political legitimacy by drawing 
insight from two literatures on norms of authority and gifting relationships in the context of the 
state. Both of the approaches I just outlined move into and out of focus in the following 
discussion. In the first part of the chapter, I discuss the razḥa as a performance practice. Next, I 
present a deep survey of the ethnographic literature on the social norm of generosity underlying 
the legitimacy of Arabian and Middle Eastern polities. I briefly present some recent social 
scientific research on the notion of “legitimacy” (Cohen 1988; Jeffrey, McConnell, and Wilson 
2015; Karateke and Reinkowski 2005) and “authority” (Agrama 2010; Feldman 2008; Gibson 
2007). In the second part, I outline the tensions manifested in gift-exchange relations by 
highlighting the social uncertainty manifest in obligations of giving, receiving, and returning 
gifts (Douglas 1990; Mauss 1990; Sigaud 2002). Specifically, I examine how recent approaches 
to “the gift” in the context of the nation-state have highlighted its role in legitimating the 
dominance of the state over local communities. I review recent work on the construction of 
Tibet’s political “indebtedness” to China via development programs (Caple 2015; Yeh 2013), the 
ways in which gift exchanges recalibrate relationships in Asia and Africa (Campergue 2015; 
Caple 2015; Coderey 2015; de la Perrière 2015; Wilson 2016), and most importantly, the 
sometimes agonistic sociality of obligation in women’s visiting networks in the Middle East 
(Eickelman 1984; Limbert 2010; Meneley 1997; Al-Torki and Cole 1989; Wikan 1982).  
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I argue that the mutual obligations that are tacit in gift exchange relationships can be 
manipulated in various ways to create and recreate new social relationships. In the view of 
practitioners, the social uncertainty manifest in the Scylla of conceding dependency or the 
Charybdis of being ungracious, immoral, and asocial is obliterated in razḥa performance. Ruling 
classes may have a very different view. Praise and its return in generosity and its return in praise 
is an ever-evolving dynamic. While razḥa works in several ways to “integrate power into 
community” (Kurke 2013), I conclude the chapter by suggesting how this cultural complex has 
been manipulated by elites to secure and legitimate the authoritarian state. 
Razḥa as a performance form and a model of interaction 
Razḥa is the most common Arab men’s communal dance form in most of northern Oman. 
Razḥa-s can break out at many occasions, really wherever a group of men are gathering in public 
in celebration: at religious festival days, weekend nights at the souq, soccer matches, national 
holidays, and so on. Razḥa are most often planned for a specific event, however, by inviting and 
engaging a firqa that specializes in razḥa performance. These planned events are even more 
numerous: national festivals and cultural fairs in several Gulf states; opening celebrations for 
stores, auto dealerships, roads, highway exits, infrastructural developments; horse races, human 
races, camel beauty pageants, auto shows, date exhibitions, and local cultural exhibits. 
Oftentimes civic groups will hire a firqa to enliven some public seminar or demonstration. 
Weddings are a staple venue for many groups. I am most interested in those performances that 
are directly funded by or have as their patron state agents, including the Sultan. They are neither 
the most nor the least common type of event, but they are a rich site for exploring the relation 
between these performance practices and ideals of authority and state legitimacy. 
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Let’s talk a bit about razḥa as a performance practice. I will focus here on the 
understanding of razḥa that was common amongst male performers in Manaḥ during my 
research period. Razḥa in Manaḥ was very similar to other places I visited—certainly Manḥis 
could dance with any other group, and others with them—but I will point out some places where 
their conceptions differ from their neighbors.  
There are a number of kinds of razḥa-s in Manaḥ, including those that are called 
“walking razḥa-s” (razḥāt al-mashiyya), “fast razḥa-s” (razḥāt al-qaṣṣāfiyya or just al-qaṣṣafī), 
and “slow razḥa-s” (razḥāt al-nāḥiyya). Some folks thought there should be a fourth, the razḥa 
al-ḥarbiyya (war razḥa). A few folks in Manaḥ would refer to al-qaṣṣāfī as al-qaṣṣābī or as al-
gaṣṣābī. Outside of Manaḥ, al-naḥiyya is usually called al-nā’iḥa. For some, there was no 
difference between razḥa-s and another practice called razfa, but whenever this topic came up 
people who “knew” the difference corrected those who thought there was none. The main 
difference was the presence of drums and who participated: razfa had no drums whereas razḥa 
requires drums, razfa was for Bedu and razḥa for townspeople. 
Razḥa-s were almost always performed in a long sequence of linked dances with short 
pauses between them. As many as ten razḥa-s might be sung in a row before dancers take a more 
substantial break, with individual members joining and leaving the lines of singers and dancers 
as they saw fit. 
Depending on the type of razḥa, performers are arranged in one of two ways: either in a 
long line, for mashiyya, or in a circle, facing lines, or a crowd divided into two groups for the 
other types. Razḥāt al-mashiyya usually begins with the performers clustered as a group, but as 
the group begins to move, they collect into rows of five to six dancers and follow the drummers 
in a marching step. In al-qaṣṣāfī and al-nāḥiyya, dancers stand in two arching unlinked lines that 
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frame a circle, within which circulate the drummers. The size of the circle was dependent on the 
number of performers, but dancers in one line were usually touching shoulders, a situation called 
takātif, or “rubbing shoulders.” Usually having enough space wasn’t an issue, but at the Fī ḥubb 
Qābūs festival the number of participants made the performance space inadequate, and so the 
circled dancers were two rows deep. This was not considered a good solution by the people with 
whom I discussed it. The best setup for the circular razḥa-s is to have two facing semicircles of 
dancers, close enough to hear one another. 
All razḥa-s I heard had a few features in common. While mashiyya simply moved from 
one location to another, the other types all occurred within a delimited area. Usually razḥa-s 
were called for by one line or the other—if a member of line A began the last razḥa, then the 
haqq, or “right” (but in this sense meaning obligation), was upon the other line to give the next. 
One line might berate another: “verse,63 somebody! Who’s versing [giving the razḥa]? Where’s 
the razḥa? (Shill! Man yishill? Al-razḥa hayna?)” When a specific razḥa began, say a qaṣṣāfī, 
one initial singer took the lead, though he might not leave his spot in one of the lines of dancers. 
He would gesture for silence, then yulāli’ or “give the mulālā’.” A mulālā’ is a string of vocables 
sung to the beat of the poetic line that sketches the melodic arc of the piece. Mulālā’-s are based 
on a few syllables and vowels: yā, layl, lay, way, āh, and lā. Mulālā’ are not fixed. Instead, they 
are semi-improvised in order to “ride” (yarkab) the melody well and highlight the predominant 
rhythmic feel. They are also not always sung the same way, even for the same text. The same 
melody might be used for many texts, and often serve as a basis for composing poetry: if the line 
“rides” the melody, then it is good poetry.  
                                                          
63 Dieter Christensen and Salwa El-Shawan Castelo-Branco’s translation of shill/yishill (2009). 
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The mulālā’ is sung until everyone knew it, which usually requires a number of cycles. 
When the person who gave the razḥa is satisfied, he raises his arms for silence a second time and 
gives the first poetic line. With this, the dancer/singers pick up the line and “throw” (yilqa‘) it 
back and forth antiphonally, until the second poetic line iss given. This is usually called the radd, 
the “response.” Due to the din of performance, not everyone understands the poetic lines before 
the drums kick in, and so often singers would look down the line for someone who knew it and 
listen in for an explanation while the other line was “carrying” (yaḥmul) the verse. One could 
elbow one’s neighbor and ask, “what’s the radd?” and expect to hear the second verse spoken 
out clearly. Oftentimes, singers would forget the first or second line and return to the mulālā’ for 
a few sequences, or even just mumble through lines hitting major syllables. Only occasionally 
was this criticized, and even in those situations very lightly. 
This textual sequence is sketched in an example from Bahlā’, in Music Example 2. The 
first three measures present the mulālā’ and the second three present the text to which the 
mulālā’ corresponds. 
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Music example  2. The relation between a mulālā’ and a poetic line, over a simplified 
raḥmānī and kāsir rhythm. 
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When the poetic lines were sufficiently spread along the lines, the razḥa began in earnest. 
The dancers had usually already begun to sway and dance to the rhythm of the mulālā’, though 
this often shifted with the introduction of the drums.  
The drum pair, called the zāna, was usually composed of one larger drum and one 
smaller drum. They were usually a pair of drums made together to be played as a pair, and so 
were similar in design and construction. The larger of the pair was called raḥmānī, while the 
smaller was called kāsir. Some groups used more than two drums, and the doubled drum was 
always considered to be an extra raḥmānī, rather than the “middle” sized ranna reported by El-
Mallah (1998). The biggest difference in playing style was playing with the hands (bi-l-yid) or 
with a striker (ḍarb, pronounced ẓarb) and a switch (radd). The other difference that was 
commented on was the shape of the drum. Some were barrel shaped and made of very thin 
plywood, while others were carved into an hourglass-shape and lathed with decorative lines. 
While both styles were two-headed and tightened with ropes, the hourglass shaped drums were 
usually considered higher quality—some even considered them “Omani” as opposed to the 
cheaper drums, which were called “Bengali,” “Pakistani,” or “Indian.” 
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Figure 17. Barrel-shaped drums used by the Firqat Bahlā’, played with the hands. 
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Figure 18. The zāna drum pair played by the bin Ga‘rūf brothers in the Firqat al-‘Arabī, 
played by a striker, ẓarb, in the right hand and a switch called radd, the “response,” in the 
other. The drums were hung from the shoulder and the tightening straps along the ropes 
were pushed toward the “striker” end. 
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Figure 19. The Firqat al-‘Arabī with an ‘āzī singer from ’Adam with the zāna in the 
foreground. The kāsir is leaning on the raḥmānī and both are hourglass-shaped. Both the 
ẓarb and the radd are made of date palm parts. The ẓarb is carved from the heartwood of 
the trunk and the radd is made by stripping the leaves off of an older leaf-stem. 
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Figure 20. The Firqat Bahlā’ records an ‘āzī in the Bahlā’ Fort. Drummers play a raḥmānī 
(right) and a kāsir (left) between poetic lines, both played with the hands. 
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Groups that played with the hands (Bahlā’, Nizwā, and some groups in ’Izkī) were often 
maligned by groups that played with sticks. The striker and switch combination was considered 
to be the “original” or “authentic” (’aṣlī) way of playing. They point to the fact that this way of 
playing is common in the Sharqiyya, which is taken to be the origin of razḥa in general. The 
variety of techniques and sounds produced by the sticks was larger than with the hands, which 
could only vary the sound of drumstrokes by hitting the rim of the drum or the center. In 
performance, the raḥmānī (the “great” or “big one”) was considered a kind of “ground,” 
emphasizing beats with which dance steps were coordinated. The smaller kāsir, or “cutter,” 
played more elaborated lines against the raḥmānī beat. However, both drums often settled into 
long stable patterns (as in music example 2 and 3), meaning that the kāsir player was not always 
improvising over the raḥmānī, even though he was free to. On the other hand, drummers who 
frequently played together often had cues for more complex drumming sequences that they 
would use variously throughout performances. In music example 3, I have sketched some 
interactions between the raḥmānī and the kāsir in a common razḥa al-nāḥiyya as played by the 
Firqat al-‘Arabī (using strikers and switches). In this example, X noteheads are played with the 
switch and filled ones with the striker. Measures 1-2, 5-8, 11-12 are a “stable” pattern that might 
continue for 90% of the performance, while mm. 3-4 and 9-10 are some common zāna 
variations, where both drummers coordinate to enliven the rhythm. These are common because 
they shift the perception of the downbeat by emphasizing the upbeat after them, as in the 
raḥmānī part in mm. 9-10, which is a typical variation that takes many forms. I have sketched 
purely kāsir variations from the Firqat Bahlā’ in music example 4. In this example, normal 
noteheads represent open, right-handed strokes on the right side of the drum, while crosses 
represent open, left handed strokes on the left side. 
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Music example  3. Zāna interactions in a razḥa al-naḥiyya.  
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Music example  4. Kāsir variations from drummers of the Firqat Bahlā’.  
 The drum, especially the raḥmānī, anchors the dance steps. While they can be very 
idiosyncratic, the basic steps are also sketched in music example 3 and 7. Upstemmed quarter 
notes represent the right foot, while downstems represent the left foot. Arrows to the right over 
the note mark a step forward, toward the center of the circle, and arrows to the left are steps 
away from the circle. The basic step was a right foot forward on beat one, then a close with the 
left foot, a step back with the left, and then with the right. Usually, this last right-foot movement 
was “bobbed,” not really taking weight before it was emphatically stomped down on beat one 
again. The shoulders and head were all used in different ways, usually bobbing on upbeats or 
following the drumming. As a whole, the two lines danced in place for a few cycles of singing 
the poetic lines, then the group that “gave” the razḥa would widen their dance steps and start to 
move as a group around the circle counter-clockwise. When they reached the other line, that line 
would begin moving around the circle as well until they made one full circuit and all dancers 
were in their original positions. If desired, this circuit would continue. When movement around 
the circle ceased, performers could then signal for a second sequence of moves, in which one line 
would march forward until it reached the other, sing a few lines, and then retreat. This was 
mirrored by the other line. Occasionally, both lines would march toward the center and surround 
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the drums, with all the dancers in close contact. This sequence was usually only done once or 
twice during a performance and was a period of intense invigoration. All of these dance figures 
were signaled by one or more dancers by holding up their arms or otherwise communicating 
nonverbally. To conclude the performance, one dancer at the center of the line would hold up 
their ‘aṣā-s (camel sticks) or swords and waggle them in the air, and all the other would join in. 
This meant that the poetry should not be repeated by the opposing line, and the performance 
would cease.  
a. Razḥa as a “Model” of Social Life 
Amongst men familiar with it, razḥa is often used as an example of how social life is 
imagined, or as an example of how it “used to be.” Since razḥa is based on communication, 
cooperation, and interaction amongst peers that nevertheless includes some tensions (who should 
give the poetry, how long to dance, who can stop a performance, and so on), this is not a huge 
logical leap. Most interviewees described the basis of razḥa as “shakhṣayn mutiqābilayn,” that is, 
“two people meeting” or “two facing parties.” When I asked who the people were—were they a 
shaykh and a tribesperson? Two equals? The Imam and a shaykh? Enslaved people? one 
respondent from Nizwā answered this way: “It is a meeting between folks on the same level, 
dignified and honorable men. No one is beneath the other, one is not above [the other]. They are 
equal—slaves or no, they are all Omanis and so they can razḥa.” When I pressed that the people 
who played the drums in the last razḥa were all from formerly enslaved families, he answered by 
seizing a kāsir drum from the SUV trunk next to us and playing it with ease. A few members 
called out “yalla!” in approval since he rarely played anymore. “Who was a slave? All [can] 
play, it’s to his taste. Whoever wants to play, he takes the drum. Stay awhile and you will see, 
people take the role that they are comfortable [with].”    
184 
 
 
 
A performer from Manaḥ concurred:  
We are all Omanis, here we play together (nal‘ab ma‘ b‘ad). Tribes, slaves, we are sons 
of al-Ma‘arā and we razḥa together because it is incumbent upon us to show that we are 
united, strong, steadfast. I mean… We are one in razḥa because we are one in al-Ma‘arā. 
Our lives are twisted up together (ḥiyatnā tafattala) like this, so [if] one has a good year, 
we all do. We share our joys and our setbacks. Believe me, I lived in Muscat, we were 
alone, each had their castle and we lived alone among many people, no neighbors, no 
circles of friends [da’ira), no razḥa.                                  
           
Contrast this with a discussion with a performer from Izkī. We were discussing the various arts 
in the Arabian Peninsula, when we came to al-‘arḍa al-najdiyya, a war dance from the Najd 
plateau of Saudi Arabia. In the ‘arḍa, I noted, the royal family also participates, whereas the 
Sultan of Oman never does.  
That’s true, yes. Of course, they are Saudi propagandists (literally “drummers,” 
muṭṭabbilīn). Ordinary folks do sāmir, or sometimes they call this samra. Or ad-daḥḥa, 
this is the authentic art of Najd [see Urkevich 2015 for descriptions of ‘arḍa (64-70), 
samrī (73-5), and al-daḥḥa (24-8)]. Razḥa is authentic here in Oman, it’s in the blood. 
The shaykh-s and the Sultan don’t razḥa because that’s not appropriate to their station 
(maqāmuhum). You play the ‘ūd, yes? If you play the ‘ūd on stage, do you clap when you 
finish? No, it’s the same thing. We razḥa for the Sultan, why should he razḥa with us 
shoulder to shoulder (laysh yarzaḥ ma‘nā tikātifan)? 
 
I asked if the Sultan even knew how to razḥa:  
I don’t know. Remember he’s from Ṣalāla, on his mother’s side. The first time he arrived 
in Muscat, he was the Sultan, he didn’t grow up in Oman but he knows it (Oman). When 
he goes to Musandam [an exclave on the tip of the Oman peninsula] does he know the 
rawwāḥ or the līwā or the nadbah?64 No, that’s not his role. 
 
I pressed him as to whether shaykh-s or Majlis al-Shūrā representatives perform when razḥa 
events were held for them:  
No, they don’t. I heard that one of them said, he said, “I wish I could perform the razḥa 
here in ’Izkī with all of you like I did when I was a child!” Now I don’t know if he did 
                                                          
64 Rawwāḥ and nadbah, a collective drumming practice and a formalized war-cry, respectively, 
are  common amongst the Shiḥūḥ in Musandam. Līwā is an Afro-Arab practice that takes 
different forms up and down the coasts of the Persian Gulf. 
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razḥa or not. But the government does not allow [it].65 You know, I told you we have 
many police officers in the group, they can’t perform on National Day, or for government 
representatives, or things like this. 
 
During the second night of the ‘īd al-fiṭr in Manaḥ in 2016, I had driven over to meet 
many of the performers in the Firqat al-‘Arabī who were going to dance in the center of town. I 
parked at the junction of the main ring road around Manaḥ and a central branching thoroughfare 
that hugged the northern edge neighborhood of al-Ma‘arā. The troupe slowly filtered in and 
began performing razḥa-s a few hours after the later afternoon ‘asr prayer. Passing cars, filled 
with other locals, honked and pulled over to film, join the dance, or watch. Members of nearby 
houses slowly filtered out, women looking from windows and men bringing out sodas and water 
bottles and shouting encouragement. Others opened their front gates and beckoned members 
inside for meals, snacks, and conversation. Children played in and around our dancing lines, 
demanding to have portraits taken, to handle swords, and to join the dancing and drumming. 
We stood in two facing lines of fifteen men each, with many people joining and leaving 
the lines over the evening. Men were dressed fairly casually, relaxing after a long day of visiting 
and family events in kumma-s and unbuttoned dishdāsha-s. The dance lines stepped slowly in a 
wide circle to the beat of the drums, dancers nodding and swaying their camel sticks in a loose 
unison. One line, the line that received the poetry from the other, looped in a long arc toward the 
others, who danced in place. When the moving line met the stationary one, they all moved in one 
long line together in a full circle, finally coming to rest where they began. Members held up their 
sticks to signify the final iteration of the song, which ends with little fanfare as the drummers 
place their drums on the ground. As different members showed up, they were greeted with shouts 
to join the lines. New arrivals moved down the lines of dancers shaking hands and touching 
                                                          
65 I am unable to confirm if this is a written policy, an unwritten rule, or just a rumor. 
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nose-to-nose (khashma), sharing conventional greetings. As the maghrib prayer approached, we 
switched from the circle dance formation to the marching formation, snaking under the pastel 
yellow street lights of the old town and between plots of heavy, ripening date trees to the old 
masgid where most performers prayed. Others had prayed beforehand. As we waited for others 
to finish, I spoke with Muhanna, a middle-aged performer. I asked him why they held a 
performance of razḥa for the Eid and why they chose that part of town. 
Of course we have to celebrate the ‘īd, we’re celebrating the fulfillment of Ramadan. 
We’re expressing joy that we’ve fulfilled a religious duty, that we are in Manaḥ with our 
families and our loved ones, that we can share in the joy of the holiday. And how can we 
celebrate anywhere else? Are we not Manḥī-s, from al-Ma‘arā? So we perform in the 
center [of al-Ma‘arā]. How can we go to Bilād [a nearby neighborhood] and razḥa? They 
do their razḥa, they are proud of their heritage there (yaftakhirū bi-turāthihim), and so it’s 
upon us to do so as well (‘alaynā nasūwīh b‘ad). Every town celebrates like this. Did you 
see, not everyone performs, some, you know, they celebrate in different ways. The 
shaykh-s won’t celebrate this way, but we do, for their sake (‘alā khāṭirhum). 
 
This situation does not emerge solely from the dynamics of gift exchange, but also from 
the tension between social norms and ideal models of authority. Social inequality, egalitarian 
ideals, obvious hierarchy, and associations of performance and publicness also manifest. These 
are closely tied, but useful to distinguish in analysis. These quotes highlight the juxtaposition of 
social ideals like radical egalitarianism and personal autonomy with concrete social realities of 
entrenched class inequality and hierarchy. This is especially complicated in the context of 
racialized slavery and racialized guest workers. Everyone can play the drum, but drummers 
descend mostly from enslaved peoples. The razḥa is about a meeting of equals, but modern 
razḥa does not admit the Sultan or other minor leaders or authorities to participate. Leaders, like 
women and non-Omani Arabs, are exempted from the razḥa, from the “burden” of representing 
the community in this way.  
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In this study, the context of recognizing the generosity of leaders is the most potent 
generator of social tension because it places several deeply shared Omani cultural ideals at odds. 
Generosity, especially by leaders, is often associated with the production and sustenance of 
unequal relations. Kings give, and followers receive. However, cultural ideals of personal 
autonomy, legitimate authority, radical equality, and dignity are directly undermined in contexts 
of hierarchical generosity and a history of institutional slavery. Razḥa performance re-frames 
these hierarchical arrangements by foregrounding the community they represent as Omani, Arab, 
dignified, and as part of a circuit of exchange between rulers and ruled. 
Generosity: An Ethnographic Interlude 
One cool summer night, I sat in the breezy, aqua green painted majlis, or reception room, 
of the poet Ziyād bin Khālid al-Shukaylī66 a northern neighborhood of Bahlā. The TV was 
blaring a Turkish soap opera dubbed into Syrian Arabic. After his grandson brought in the coffee 
and snacks, the fawālā, Ziyād poured coffee and handed me sambūsa after sambūsa, or fried 
triangular dumplings (though in this case baked, because Ziyād needed to watch his fat intake 
due to a heart condition. He mused “by God, these are just as good, anything baked is as fine as 
fried!”). Eventually, we relaxed into chatting. We sat with our backs to the low green couches 
that ringed the room, tiny porcelain coffee cups gently tinkling together as they floated in a bowl 
of water between us. The topic of discussion was his ‘āzī performance, filmed earlier that 
evening in the Bahla Fort, a UNESCO World Heritage site. The filming was for their entrance in 
the 2016 Sultan Qabūs Prize for Culture, Arts, and Literature. Certain performance troupes were 
                                                          
66 A pseudonym. 
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invited to submit for the prize, one for each state, which Ziyād claimed amounted to some 50,000 
OMR (129,861.70 USD).  
“Wow, that’s a lot of money,” I said, rocking back.  
“Yes… of course, it’s nothing to the Sultan.” He rubbed his short, jowly beard and fixed 
his hazel eyes on me.  
“I didn’t compose this ‘āzī for money, doctor, it could be five riyāl and I would be 
pleased and honored to win.” 
“Of course, bā.” 
“This [prize] is a gift from the Sultan, God lengthen his life and bring him health. He 
supports the arts, poetry, the traditions of the Omani people. You see this in the festivals, in the 
celebrations and the rest. That is the role of the leader (ḥākim): he must hold the nation (yumassik 
al-waṭan) and he must have an open palm, then the people will respect him. What a generous 
man the Sultan is! He gives liberally, him (yusakhkhī huwā), but he is no fool.” 
“Yes,” I interjected, “you know I’ve heard that the shaykh is the ‘sayf wa-mansaf’, the 
sword and the meal, is that not so?” 
“Yes,” he laughed,  
“Yes. I’m laughing because that’s the way Bedouin talk, country folk, you know, old 
Bedouins and those long in the tooth talk that way. Why did they say that? They said that 
because in the old days, everything came from the shaykhs, the shaykh-s held the country 
for the Imam. In the time of the last Imam, it was harsh, there were no drums except in 
the festival days and for war. This was a bit before my time, but if you were hungry, you 
could go to the sabla or the fort up there and the shaykh or the wālī would have a meal 
and he would share with anyone who came. It was open, it was democratic like you 
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Americans. Now, yes, we wanted to play drums and do razḥa, but the Imam forbade 
those things. Perhaps he was wrong, perhaps he was right—I don’t want to enter into that 
[issue, ḥayn mū abī dākhiluh).  
“Now, with Qābūs, I arranged this ‘āzī as praise for the Sultan. Why? Who has 
been a better leader (ḥākim) for Oman and for Omanis? He brought about the 
renaissance, he brought everything. We had nothing before him. Nothing, it was nothing. 
Do you know why the Sultan is the most generous leader? He brought cars, trucks, you 
know, these things. Why is this so important? Because this is not just for humans, no, no, 
no, no, no. No, it was also for the animals, the donkeys, the camels, the horses, God 
lengthen your life. Imagine, in the days before Qābūs, we had a donkey, and we had all 
these things, piles and piles of things, clothes, baskets, everything was on this donkey. 
And me, right on top! I feared I would fall off, you know. But at night I wept, I wept! I 
was small. I said to my uncle, why do we have to tire the donkey so, she works so hard 
and carries so much? And he said to me, “look, every day a hundred donkeys go up and 
down the Jabal ’Akhḍar, carrying more than that. They know the work they must do, and 
we feed them and care for them. They have no tongue to speak pain, so we must treat 
them well as Muslims and we do.” Then I understood, but I am glad now that they don’t 
have to do such work, that’s why I say in the poem that Qābūs was generous to everyone, 
to the animals and the humans. That’s how generous he is. Who is happier for Qābūs and 
his rule? Us or the animals? I don’t know, I don’t know.” 
Note that this conversation moved from performance to the personal acceptance of 
money from a government culture prize to the generosity of minor shaykh-s to the generosity of 
the Sultan. Such ideas are linked and circulate through class positions. If leaders are generous, 
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bigger, greater leaders are yet more so. The Sultan’s generosity, for example, expands even to 
the non-human. Had anyone claimed that Qābūs’s generosity extended past humans and to 
animals but the poets? Praise, in turn, must recognize this greatness—not merely because of 
money, but because of the social benefits it demonstrably brings. Authority well enacted and 
demonstrated is praised, which, in turn, is a basis of legitimacy. It is, in the minds of Omani 
praise poets, their poetry that augments the honor and reputation of those they praise. Poetry 
augments leaders as it guides them. Part of that guidance is the promotion and inculcation of 
generosity. 
Two Linked Social Mechanisms 
Due to these social tensions and the values that variously undergird them, I model the 
case of praise for good leadership manifested in generosity as one in which two social 
mechanisms are operant. Importantly, mechanisms and their effects are dependent on culturally 
learned understandings and expectations of sociality.67 I will briefly explain the two models here. 
The first mechanism refers to the long-standing obligation of redistributive generosity for 
Arabian leaders, manifest in small- and large-scale social organization (Karateke and 
Reinkowski 2005; Al-Rasheed 1991). Such generosity is both obligatory and understood to 
secure the legitimacy of the giver. However, because of norms of reciprocity, this mechanism 
also produces social uncertainty by putting social ideals like egalitarianism and autonomy in 
tension. I call this the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism, and it is the focus of this chapter. 
                                                          
67 In this case, mechanisms explain these interactions better than framing them as processes that occur 
within “ideal models” (Gibson 2007), “cultural models” (D’Andrade and Strauss 1992) or “cultural 
schemas” (Karateke and Reinkowski 2005; Strauss and Quinn 1997) of authority because mechanisms refer 
to cause and effect processes rather than dispositions. Whether we call this set of dispositions or norms a 
habitus with Bourdieu or a schema with cognitive anthropologists or habits with pragmatists is a, 
theoretically speaking, relatively fine issue that is not crucial to the discussion here. 
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The second mechanism is the way in which razḥa performance intervenes in the 
Generosity/Legitimacy Mechanism. It does so by managing the social uncertainty produced by 
elite giving and framing givers and praisers as part of a mutual moral economy. I refer to this as 
the Razḥa Integration Mechanism, and it is covered in the next chapter. 
Let’s now turn to the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism.  
Swords and Gold: The Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism 
"A tribal leader," claimed [Shaykh] Zayid [bin Sulṭān al-Nahyān] of Abu Dhabi, "should 
have a sword in one hand and gold in the other and know when to use either inducement" (Rabi 
2011, 124). While it’s possible that Shaykh Zayed read Gramsci, it’s more likely that Zayid was 
just a very astute leader who knew his cultural milieu very well. Here, we’re going to focus on 
one of Zayid’s hands: the one with gold in it.  
In this section, I give an overview of the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism. The 
Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism is a widespread and ancient Middle Eastern practice wherein 
leaders display generosity in order to legitimate their own authority, solidify relationships to their 
followers, and the demonstrate the efficacy of their rule. Note that this is just one of the 
mechanisms that rulers use to legitimize their rule (Karateke and Reinkowski 2005). This 
particular model, however, is one that is most likely to be connected with praise and 
performance, which is why it is highlighted here.  
This link, I contend, is not random, but deeply structured by the values and institutions 
that operate within this mechanism. Generosity, often seen as a personal quality, may seem a 
strange thing to attribute to state practice. As classicist Paul Veyne claims in his Bread and 
Circuses, however, while Imperial Roman leaders were compelled to provide welfare in order to 
sustain their position, “people did not talk about the craft of kingship, instead they exalted the 
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virtues of the reigning prince” (1990, 37). It is the personal qualities of the prince, like 
generosity, rather than effective statecraft, that are praised. States cannot have personal qualities 
like generosity but can be praised as if they do. 
Such a mechanism, or something substantially like it, may be familiar in other parts of 
the world. It is a way of framing that is available to leaders in many times and places. 
Anthropologist Emily T. Yeh shows, in her ethnography of Chinese development in Tibet, that 
“since the 1980s… the Chinese state has staked the legitimization of its sovereignty over Tibet 
on Tibetan gratitude for the gift of development” (2013, 231). If anything makes the Omani and 
Arabian Peninsular context unique it is the time-depth of this practice, its connection to praise 
practices, and its co-occurrence on multiple social scales, from the smallest tribal units to modern 
states.  
I choose to frame this discussion as analyzing “generosity” as opposed to “patronage.” 
Patronage is well-studied in the case of Arabic poetics (e.g., Sharlet 2011) and in social science 
in general (e.g., Gellner 1977). However, framing this discussion as generosity allows two 
important facets of the relationship between performance and authority to emerge. The first is 
that “generosity” is a trait that is valorized within different social classes in largely the same 
way. Just as individual people are praised for generosity, so is the Sultan. This co-presence at 
differing social scales shows how “generosity” compels praise responses regardless of the 
provenance of the generosity. Secondly, generosity is sufficiently generalized in Omani and Arab 
society so as to include charity, personality, building infrastructure, hosting feasts, gifts, a moral 
stance, and a variety of other practices and dispositions that are picked out for praise. The patron 
is praised for his actions, many of which are glossed as generosity. Certainly, “patronage” can 
and should be analyzed in the Arabian Gulf, especially in the case of actors peripheral to the 
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“state” itself. In other contexts, Lisa Gilman (2009) fruitfully characterizes the gifting practices 
of Malawian politicians as “patronage,” as does Wenner in Sri Lanka (2015). These are analyses 
of the ways in which particular personalities draw followers into their sphere of influence 
through gifting. In this sense, “patronage” is a style of pragmatically exhibiting the wider norm 
of generosity. In this section, I analyze how widespread discourses of “generosity” and embodied 
praise responses to it form a basis of legitimate rulership in Oman.  
a. Authority and Legitimacy: Distinctions and definitions 
In order to understand why “good deeds” like generosity on the part of leaders work to 
promote legitimacy, we need to understand how notions of authority, leadership, praise, and 
generosity interact. If generosity produces legitimacy, one important way it does so is through 
public praise for figures of authority. In short, generosity is an ideal obligation and a concrete 
practice that reinforces the claims of individuals to authority in the Middle East. Such an 
investigation will also show why praise is seen as an obligation of the ruled. Due to the paucity 
of sources on this relationship directly dealing with Omani material, we will need to look at 
nearby related social forms in other Arabic-speaking regions. While there is by no means a large 
literature on the topic, we can sketch a fairly coherent picture of the ways in which authority has 
been understood by rulers and ruled in the Arabian Peninsula for the past few hundred years by 
looking at a range of historical and ethnographic research.  
First, we should briefly address the definitions of “legitimacy” and “authority.” These 
ideas are tightly interlinked. Hakan Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski open their volume 
Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power with the statement that “authority 
and legitimacy are closely related concepts” (2005, 1). “Authority,” they write, “signifies the 
claim by a group, an individual or an institution to the right to rule… whereas legitimacy must be 
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understood as a form of ‘belief’, ascribed as a distinctive feature by the subjects to those in 
power” (2005, 1). We can contrast this with anthropologist Ilana Feldman’s (2008) research into 
the differences between authority and legitimacy in the bureaucracies of British Mandate and 
Egyptian-administered Gaza (1917-67). Citing sociologist Richard Sennett’s 1980 monograph 
Authority, she refers to authority as a “process of interpreting power” in the functioning of 
government (Feldman 2008, 14-5).68 The government in Gaza, like other colonial situations, 
could make little claim to “authenticity,” and so claims to its authority “could not provide a 
stable ground” for governing (2008, 15). It was instead the reiterative and quotidian aspects of 
bureaucracy that formed a basis of authority, drawing people in to participating in the everyday 
“work of rule” (2008, 17-8). This participation, however, did not instill a “belief” in the 
legitimacy of these administrations in ordinary Gazans. Gazans did not believe that these non-
native administrations had to be (or perhaps even could be) evaluated in terms of the “rightness 
of a political pattern” (Apter 1965, 236) but rather that they were simply able to get things done 
in a limited, circumscribed fashion—what Feldman calls “tactical government” (Feldman 2008, 
18).  
So what do we make of these terms? I want to specify what I mean by “legitimacy” and 
“authority” in the following two brief sections. 
b. Legitimacy as belief and evaluation 
                                                          
68 We should note here that Sennett sees authority as a kind of “emotional bond” (1980, 3), arguing that 
authority “can become a process, a making and breaking, a remaking of meanings. It can be visible and 
legible” in his conclusion (1980, 168). Sennett’s definition of authority is much less firm than Feldman’s 
citation implies, but this reflects more on the weakness of Sennett’s argument than on her use of it. 
Authority remains practice-based and iterative in something we can identify as a process, even if Sennett 
fails to recognize it. 
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Hakan Karateke bases his study of Ottoman legitimacy on two interrelated aspects of 
“legitimacy”: the normative schema and factual measures of legitimacy (2005, 17). A 
“normative schema” of legitimacy refers to the established legal apparatuses, norms, and 
institutions that legitimate a particular leader: heredity (“I come from a long line of Sultans”), 
claims to the divine (“I have divine right”), or tradition (“We have always been ruled by a 
Sultan”). Karateke claims that such normative schemas of legitimacy are of primary importance 
to other political elites (2005, 18-9). Factual measures of legitimacy refer to the actual concrete 
practices and results of those practices: building hospitals, offering welfare, distributing clothing, 
food, weapons, horses, and the like. In Karateke’s view, these forms of legitimacy operate on 
different social classes: political elites are often interested in normative legitimacy, while 
subordinated classes are drawn to factual measures.  
A similar perspective on “legitimacy” as a belief was put forth most rigorously by Ronald 
Cohen in the introduction to the 1988 volume State Formation and Political Legitimacy that he 
co-edited with Judith D. Toland. Here, Cohen formulates a “synthetic” definition of legitimacy 
as a “function of its [1] coercive capacities,69 [2] the benefits derived from compliance, [3] the 
moral validity of governmental practices, and [4] the continuing evaluation of these practices by 
the polity members” (1988, xxx). Legitimacy is a belief that is predicated on practices, both of 
authorities and of polity members. In this view, generosity from leaders produces legitimacy by 
operating through propositions [2] and [3], while the praise response operates on [3] and [4] by 
                                                          
69 This is an important aspect that is overlooked in this chapter and taken up partially in chapter 6. 
However, a similar argument could be produced by evaluating Omani performers’ understanding of 
Sultan Qābūs’s success in curbing tribal conflict and making Oman “an oasis of peace and security,” 
another crucial aspect of Arabian peninsular authority. The razḥa was without a doubt a war-song in the 
past, thought this is not retained in current practice. Indeed, as Allen, Jr. and Rigsbee (2000) point out, 
Qābūs understood himself, at least through the 1980s, as a war-leader whose chief success was ensuring 
peace through force of arms and widespread generosity and amnesty. 
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commenting on [2]. More directly, generosity provides benefits [2] that are enacted through 
morally valid practices of hospitality and obligation [3]. Praise evaluates these practices [4] in 
light of their putative benefits [2] and their moral validity [3]. Where Cohen can fruitfully be 
combined with Karateke’s account is in recognizing the ways in which people evaluate leaders 
not just in terms of practical effects, but also the ways that these practical effects conform to 
widely shared moral norms. 
Put another way, legitimacy also means that there are rules constraining those in authority 
from the arbitrary use of the power or office. These rules constrain kings as well as their 
subjects, governors as well as those they govern. Authority (or the powers distributed to 
offices and statuses by tradition) formally relates officials, rulers, and other authorities to 
one another and to their subjects; authority ‘structures’ (i.e. arranges) the way power is to 
be used… in other words, all human societies contain inequities fostered by authority 
relations that are culturally approved and morally valid. The study of how and why this 
develops and changes is encompassed in the concept of legitimacy. (Cohen 1988, xviii) 
Following Orlando Patterson’s view in his 1982 Slavery and Social Death that “legitimacy is a 
process involving incorporation of power relations into a moral order or a system of beliefs about 
how things ‘ought’ to be done,” Cohen’s perspective shows how praise figures into structures of 
power that are, at root, coercive (Cohen 1988, xvi). Here, Gramsci would agree: arguably, the 
Euro-American concept of “legitimacy” is just the liberal figleaf affixed to his wider concept of 
hegemony. “Legitimacy” and “hegemony” both probe how “inequities fostered by authority 
relations” come to be considered “culturally approved and morally valid” (Cohen 1988, xviii). 
  So, if praise is a belief that is constantly evaluated with reference to some shared norms, 
praise and blame is one way that this might be accomplished. And yet praise is a response in 
some places and times and not in others. Praise exists, as Gould (2015) contends, at the 
ambiguous juncture between speaking to and speaking against power. As we saw in the last 
chapter, outright “blame” precludes this productive ambiguity. “In other words,” Cohen writes, 
“it is never altogether clear whether the acceptance of a political order involves grudging or 
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whole-hearted acceptance” (1988, xvi). Such a position allows for both the inclusion of the 
individual (and the community) within a shared, if contested, moral economy with leaders, along 
with a capacity to speak and act. In Oman, praise is a medium of communication between leaders 
that saves the honor and dignity of all those involved by acknowledging their interdependence.  
 Practices such as praise are a useful vehicle for the evaluation of legitimacy because they 
span both ideal beliefs and concrete realities. Geographers Alex Jeffrey and Fiona McConnell 
and anthropologist Alice Wilson (2015) similarly view legitimacy as a belief based on practices 
evaluated through some “system of beliefs” regarding the right exercise of authority. In their 
introduction to a special volume on the concept of legitimacy in the journal Geoforum, they note 
how renewed interest in state theory examines the legitimation of particular structures of 
authority by “focusing on the practices and performances through which legitimacy is secured” 
(2015, 178). Expanding on this, however, they want to understand how legitimacy operates both 
as normative (“under what circumstance can a governing authority be considered valid?”) and as 
processual (“a technique of governance rather than an achieved status”) in order to destabilize 
the state as the sole holder of legitimacy (2015, 179-80). Such a perspective, they argue, allows 
scholars to “move beyond the unidirectional idea that legitimacy emanates from the state” and 
adopt a “more nuanced and critically attuned engagement with the notion of legitimacy” (2015, 
179-80). Such a perspective, they hope, will help illuminate how legitimacy is produced and 
sustained in what they call “anomalous political spaces” like refugee camps, government-in-
exile, and the like (2015, 180).  
 I use legitimacy in Cohen’s sense, but I will occasionally borrow Karateke’s useful 
terminology (specifically factual measures of legitimacy) and Jeffrey, McConnell, and Wilson’s 
deliberate juxtaposition of normative and processual approaches.   
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c. Authority as a role and a practice 
If framing “legitimacy” as a process that is constantly undergoing revision and adaptation 
has proved useful, it has been no less so for the concept of authority. While classic essays on 
authority have considered it a basis from which to give orders and have them obeyed, as we shall 
see, this only accounts for part of the Omani and Arabian Peninsular case. Authority is a slippery 
concept because it has two broad meanings. It can refer to a positional role or to a basis upon 
which advice or orders can be given.  
In Hussein Ali Agrama’s investigation of authority in relation to ethical practice in al-
Azhār’s fatwā council, he writes that his “concern is not the source of authority, not the question 
‘why does it bind?’ but, rather, its mode, that is, to ask, ‘what kind of binding is it?’ ” (2010, 4). 
Agrama is skeptical of the notion that authority “binds” because it has some unassailable basis 
that we can point to, but is rather interested in what actions it impels, its effects, the relationships 
it produces. Authority, in the fatwā council, does not imply that orders will be followed, or even 
that they can be given (Agrama 2010, 4). A similar notion holds in Oman and the Arabian 
Peninsula. Arabist Clinton Bailey records a common saying amongst the Bedouin of the Sinai 
that was also recognized by Omanis: “ ‘a hand forced to grip the sword will not strike” (al-yid illī 
ma‘sawbā a‘-l-sayf lā taḍrub). Thus, every chief understands that it is inviting trouble to try and 
force a tribesman to do what is not in his interest” (Bailey 2009, 14). This is certainly the 
perspective of many groups in the Interior with reference to the state: they are invited to perform, 
not commanded. 
Following such recent anthropological research into the concept of “authority” and the 
anthropology of the state, I see authority not as a finalized achievement that is secured prior to 
governance, but as constantly reiterated via social practices (Feldman 2008). Such practices can 
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help to establish both the claim to authority (Karateke and Reinkowski 2005) and also 
demonstrate the range of proper actions accorded to that status. As noted above, Feldman rightly 
contends that “authority” should be distinguished from “legitimacy” (2008, 12-17). Such a 
distinction is contrasted to Weber’s claim that authority is “legitimated domination”—a notion 
that fails to account for the situation she found in Gaza. Whatever authority that Gazan 
administrators enjoyed was not legitimate nor legitimated (2008, 17-18). A role and its powers 
can be recognized, while any individual holder may be legitimate or illegitimate. Feldman claims 
that Gazan administrators were authoritative largely through their own “self-referential” 
bureaucratic practices, through their capacity to draw ordinary Gazans into participating with 
them in governance. They did not simply “hold” authority, they were authoritative insofar as 
they were effective in deploying governmental resources “tactically.” This is why Cohen refers 
to authority as the “powers distributed to offices and statuses” (Cohen 1988, xviii). In this study, 
“authority” refers to the position of leadership (be it shaykh, Imam, or Sultan) and the array of 
historically and culturally variable practices available to that position. These range from taxation 
to giving advice to imposing capital punishment. Different leaders seize more authority, others 
less. For example, in the past, religiously minded Imams often discontinued lucrative taxes when 
they were not justified by Islamic law.70 Such rights also come with obligations and expectations, 
and here is where authorities and their practices come to be seen as legitimate or not. I also often 
use the term “authority structures,” which refers to an idealized understanding of the various 
roles and statuses and their capabilities that are associated with some polity. Hence, the 
                                                          
70 See the example of Imam Muhanna, secretly elected against the wishes of the more powerful tribal 
confederations in the early 18th century. In his brief stint as Imam, he cancelled custom taxes at the port of 
Muscat because they were higher than stipulated in Islamic law, clearly within his authority as Imam. The 
move did not gain him any legitimacy, however, and he was murdered soon afterward (Bathurst 1972). 
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“authority structure” of a tribally organized polity might accord shaykh-s high status and a large 
range of capabilities, whereas in state-organized polities such capabilities would be highly 
constrained. 
d. A Word on Ideal Models 
The complexity of thinking about authority and legitimacy is in what Karateke refers to 
as “normative aspects” and what Cohen calls “systems of beliefs.” Thomas Gibson (2007) refers 
to these developed, symbolically dense, and historically contingent sets of expectations and 
practices with which leaders are evaluated and political goals are framed as “ideal models” of 
authority. “I use the term ‘ideal model’ [in Makassar],” Gibson explains,  
for the way the experiences and relationships generated by the symbolic complexes 
present in a social formation are brought to consciousness and synthesized into an 
explicit model, which then becomes the goal of political action. The power of rulers 
within a social formation largely depends upon the legitimate authority that is granted to 
them by their subjects when they act in accordance with a widely accepted ideal model. 
(Gibson 2007, 5)  
Such an approach is well-formed for the Omani case, in which social organization is extremely 
fluid and yet shares many basic ideals and practices. These models are flexible enough to admit 
of different forms of rulership, whose legitimacy is demonstrated and evaluated according to the 
model. This helps to explain why tribal, religious, Sultanic, and state-based social organizations 
can be legitimated through the same suite of practices: in our case, generosity and praise in 
razḥa. Ideals often outlast the political order in which they operate, though they are always 
reshaped in the present. 
One of the reasons that Gibson insists on the “ideal model” as opposed to “ideal type” or 
any other such construction is because he recognizes that ideal models are constantly updated 
and re-evaluated, and therefore can inform different modes of social organization. They assume 
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very little about the mind, psychology, cognition, biology, or whatever else. They are not fully-
formed and inherited, but rather cobbled together and unsystematic. This conforms with 
Wilkinson’s (1987) convincing argument that the ideological rationalization of the Imamate was 
a kind of “Islamization” of a pre-existing tribally based authority structure. Eickelman’s (1985) 
study of authority and legitimacy in Inner Oman concurs. He makes the case that, in 1955, after 
the Sultan seized the cities of the Interior, the former Imamate populace did not consider him to 
be prima facie an illegitimate leader for them (1985). To the contrary, insofar as he fulfilled his 
duties as a leader—duties that are similarly idealized in theocratic and monarchic form—he was 
not rejected. The Imamate and the Sultanate, as different ideal models of authority, nevertheless 
shared a wide array of features and expectations.  Even predating the military takeover of the 
Interior, qāḍī-s trained and working in Imamate towns were allowed to transfer to Sultanate 
towns with the Imam’s blessing. Imam al-Khalīlī wrote to one such transfer applicant that he 
“could serve Islam equally well by working for the sultan” (1985, 11). From these kinds of social 
exchanges (and from reports of oil wealth in other Gulf states), several tribal tamīma-s pressed 
other notables to accept absorption into the Sultanate in order to benefit from the modernization 
campaign they thought Sultan Sa‘īd bin Ṭaymūr would initiate with oil resources discovered 
further inland. After 18 months, however, elites mobilized a popular rebellion against the 
Sultanate due to repeated failures to conform to expected models of leadership.71 
                                                          
71 Though see Rabi (2011) for Sultan Sa‘īd bin Ṭaymūr’s apparent anxiety over his claim to any Islamic 
authority. He immediately, for example, refused to be called sulṭān al-muslimīn (“Sultan of the Muslims,” 
a portmanteau of sulṭān and imam al-muslimīn, “Imam of the Muslims” and a clear example of the 
“cannibalization” of one political system by another) because he knew he lacked the proper Islamic 
credentials (Eickelman 1985, 17; Rabi 2011, 87, 100-1). His piecemeal efforts from 1955 onward to 
demonstrate that he would promote putatively Islamic social values (such as limiting the playing of “music” 
and personally ordering the flogging of tobacco smokers “caught” in Maṭraḥ square) were more an attempt 
to “forestall criticism from Ibadhi circles in the interior” than a grand gesture to Islamic legitimacy (Rabi 
2011, 88). 
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e. Thinking about “ideal models” of authority at different scales through history 
With these definitions and evaluation through ideal models in mind, we can start to trace 
how the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism has worked over time. Rather than soliciting a full-
fledged “ideal model” of authority from interlocutors, I take praise poetry as one way that these 
models are shaped, communicated, and learned by Omanis. Before we look at praise, however, I 
want to look at areas of convergence between different historical descriptions of tribally based 
social authority furnished by researchers on several social levels and from several class 
perspectives throughout the Arabian Peninsula. This will give us a sufficiently broad 
understanding of authority from which to analyze specific mechanisms of generosity and praise. 
These descriptions range from small-scale Bedouin society,72 to towns and shaykhdoms,73 to 
regional and state levels.74 Of course, not all these accounts focus directly on authority at the 
same social level or agree in all respects. However, there are important features of Omani social 
organization that make such comparisons more acceptable. “In the Trucial Coast,” Lienhardt 
points out, “one finds no such strongly marked division between the life of the bedouin and the 
life of the settled people as exists in the more fertile parts of the Middle East" (2001, 81). 
Keeping in mind that the Peninsula is extremely diverse, we can still note certain regularities in 
political structure amongst Arab groups. 
                                                          
72 Abu Lughod 1986; Chatty 1996; Cole 1975; Janzen 1986; Lancaster 1981; Lancaster and 
Lancaster 1999; Young 1996. 
73 Al-Torki and Cole 1989; C. Eickelman 1984; al-Rasheed 1991; Lienhardt 2001; Limbert 2010; 
Meneley 1996; Wikan 1982. 
74 Adra 2001; Caton 1990; Dresch 1989; D. Eickelman 1985; Meeker 1979; Miller 2007; Al-
Rasheed 2002; Sowayan 1985; Vasiliev 2000; Wilkinson 1987. 
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 As William and Felicity Lancaster put it, the basis of social authority in the Arabian 
Peninsula is “ḥukma, from the [Arabic trilateral] root ḥ-k-m, basically, ‘arbitration’ ” (Lancasters 
2011, 298). Rulers at all scales were respected and legitimate insofar as they were successful 
arbiters of disputes, keepers of peace, knowledgeable of customary law, honorable, generous, 
and open and available (Lancasters 2011, 298-309; Onley and Khalaf 2006). Historian James 
Onley and sociologist Sulayman Khalaf conclude their article on shaykh-ly authority in the pre-
oil Arabian Gulf by noting that it was “frail, vulnerable, and precarious” (2006, 204).75 Such 
frailty was predicated on the basic ideal models that informed political authority, namely, that 
“the entire premise of organization is equality, autonomy, and the acquisition of reputation” in 
which the “only political power available is the ability to influence the decisions of others” 
(Lancaster 1981, 73).  
Note that coercion, violence, was not a part of these most basic assumptions. Other than 
keeping the peace, there is little sense in which leaders were able to coerce action. Caton (1987) 
has argued that we recognize the limited role of coercion as basic to the play of power in tribal 
societies in the Arabian Peninsula. It is “persuasion” based on dialogue, rather than violence, that 
is the crucial form of power within these systems. “The leader in tribal society is a man who 
must know how to persuade an audience by rhetorical means as opposed to coercing them by the 
use or the threat of force,” Caton argues (1987, 93). Such a system, he concludes, “must be 
explained in light of cultural notions such as autonomy because an actor would only try to 
persuade someone whom he could not or should not compel” (1987, 96). I believe that the 
ethnographic record supports such statements. However, how do these ideal models of authority 
                                                          
75 An idea developed by Max Gluckman (1956) and refined by Aronoff and his collaborators in the 1986 
edited volume The Frailty of Authority. 
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and “cultural notions” of autonomy, equality, and reputation function in the context of 
centralizing states? Or in the contexts of strong patriarchy, ethnic border maintenance, and 
authoritarian governments? The answer is that such frailty could be overcome by ambitious 
leaders in various ways, through appeals to religious unity, alliances with merchant families, 
relations to outside powers (Western and Ottoman), or oil revenues. These latter examples, 
especially, show the importance of the generosity/legitimacy mechanism. 
f. Ideal models of authority and generosity across class 
Ideal models of authority, as Karateke noted, may vary with class distinctions. While 
elites require justifications for one elite to claim the throne—however modern it seems—most 
non-elites find little difference between one leader and another. As the Lancasters point out, 
while the lack of primogeniture in Arab polities in the Oman Peninsula may shock Europeans 
and lead to bloodshed amongst elites, non-elites show little concern. They paid the same tax, it 
just went to someone else. It was action that has differentiated one predatory elite from his 
similarly well-heeled doubles. Generosity is a virtue that relies on both concrete action and 
reputation. Giving generously is an action that has salience for everyone, and everyone can judge 
it, read it, and praise it. Later, we will both discuss how generosity’s mutual valuation is a tool of 
hegemony construction and how it might function as “small arms in the class war,” as James 
Scott put it. Keeping the virtue of generosity circulating as a virtue amongst elites might be a 
more efficient tactic in “class warfare” than burning a police station or robbing an elite’s date 
store. 
Here, we turn to a discussion of how generosity has been a mechanism for legitimation 
on multiple social scales and across different class lines. As noted in Chapter 1, social 
organization in Oman has historically ranged from loosely organized Bedouin family groups to 
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tribal chieftaincies right through to centralized states and empire. Al-Rasheed refers to this range 
in the Northern Arabian emirate of Hail [Ḥā’il] as being between “two leaderships” (1991, ch. 3). 
The first is manifested in the smaller-scale shaykh and the second in the larger scale ’amīr (1991, 
82). Shammar shaykh-s led small-scale, autonomous groups and worked within a “decentralized 
political structure ideology” which allowed them limited authority in mediation, resolution, 
settlement disputes, and redistribution of resources (1991, 77, 81). In her view, ’amīr-s were 
leaders of states composed hierarchically of shaykh-s related within one tribal confederation (in 
Inner Oman over the last few centuries the role of ’amīr would be called tamīma), the settled 
oasis population, and nomadic groups (1991, 78-82). The crucial difference is the ’amīr’s ability 
to coerce individuals and inflict punishment by way of access to a militia predicated on their 
expanded economic base. While some scholars (notably those who have generalized from 
Bedouin data i.e., Bailey 2009; Cole 1975; the Lancasters, 1981, 1999, 2011) have 
overemphasized the practical reality of the strong egalitarian strain in Arabian ideal models of 
authority, Al-Rasheed notes that the two leaderships were in constant tension, fluctuating 
between, in Robinson’s (1980) terms, the “political” and the “anti-political”: 
The growing tendency towards greater centralization and the creation of more stable 
forms of government was constantly being checked by the decentralizing tendencies of 
the Shammar tribal system [the tribal confederation to which the Rashīdī ‘amīr-s 
belonged]. This system was not favorable to the maintenance of permanent political 
relations and alliances. It was based on the principle of local group autonomy at the 
political, military and economic levels… the tension between the two tendencies was 
dispersed, encompassed and partially overcome through the system of subsidies to tribal 
sheikhs. The amirs maintained a tradition of subsidizing these sheikhs through the 
continuous distribution of cash and gifts of rice, coffee, sugar, camels, and weapons. 
These gifts operated as a bribe to maintain the allegiance of the sheikhs, who remained to 
a great extent autonomous. The subsidies cemented, enforced and strengthened what 
would otherwise have been a loose, fragile, and weak political relationship between the 
Hail leadership [the Rashīdī ‘amīr-s] and the Shammar. The system remained operative 
as long as the amirs were able to provide these subsidies and as long as their interests 
coincided with those of the Shammar. (Al-Rasheed 1991, 81-2)   
 
206 
 
 
 
What these two modes of leadership have in common is the ways in which they are 
legitimated through the practice of generosity. Generosity is a general expectation for properly 
socialized and honorable individuals, but it is a critical lynchpin of legitimacy when it comes to 
leaders. The same notion of generosity is operant in both “leaderships.” If authority is predicated 
on autonomy and equality, generosity and hospitality are mechanisms of integrating, persuading, 
and drawing these autonomous units together.  
“The Sultan’s influence,” writes Bannerman on the Omani state in the late 19th century,  
was spread by the same mechanisms that the shaikhs used, but on a grander scale… he 
dispensed a regular and substantial supply of gifts and money to local shaikhs. These 
payments were very important as tribal leaders became dependent on the Sultan for the 
revenue necessary to maintain their own positions. In this manner a hierarchy of wealth 
was established whereby the Sultan increased his own prestige and influence through 
giving or withholding gifts from shaikhs who pleased or displeased him. (Bannerman 
1976, 28) 
 This is not to say that financial outlays cannot be perceived as “bribes”—the case of 
Yemen (Phillips 2008) make this extremely clear—but only that this outlay is not illicit. It is an 
expectation for how things work, even though it can be framed in different ways. What is 
important to note in the case of the new states in the Gulf is why and how these states have been 
able to utilize the same mechanisms of legitimacy as those on much smaller scales. The question 
of why this mechanism works and why it is praised in the way that it is in Oman depends on 
understanding the various roles it takes in Middle Eastern societies. 
g. Killing Horses for Dinner: Generosity as a Social Premise 
Now we can turn to the ways in which generosity is understood and inculcated as a value 
in individuals from various class backgrounds.  
Generosity is, as the Lancasters put it, a premise of Arabian Peninsular society, “the 
cement of social practice” (2011, 10). “There is no option,” they conclude, social premises like 
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generosity “have to be done” and are expected as much between equals as between those of 
differing status (2011, 10). James Onley and Sulayman Khalaf concur, noting that “tremendous 
importance is attached to a ruler’s reputation for generosity” (2006, 199). Wedeen similarly cites 
generosity as a prerequisite of the North Yemeni Imams (2006, 33). Lienhardt agrees: 
The members of any bedouin groups would be easy prey to human enemies and a harsh 
environment were they not bound together by very strong ties of social and political 
solidarity. The bedouin ethos sets a high value on generosity and the right to expect and 
demand help from each other. A bedouin who is generous to her cousins does no more 
than the bedouin ethos requires of her. Private resources are only private in a limited way: 
they are subject to many and strong communal demands. (Lienhardt 2001, 41) 
 
Generosity and its virtues are well reported in the Bedouin literature. Thesiger (1959) 
records that his Omani companion Bin Kabina marveled at the stupefying generosity of Bakhit, a 
visitor warmly welcomed to their camp one night:  
He had rheumy eyes, a long nose, and a thatch of grey hair. The skin sagged in folds over 
the cavity of his stomach. I thought, ‘He looks like a proper old beggar. I bet he asks for 
something.’ Later in the evening he did and I gave him five riyals, but by then I had 
changed my opinion. Bin Kabina said to me: ‘He is of the Bait Imani and famous.’ I 
asked, ‘What for?’ and he answered, ‘His generosity.’ I said, ‘I should not have thought 
he owned anything to be generous with’, and Bin Kabina said, ‘He hasn’t now. He hasn’t 
got a single camel. He hasn’t even got a wife. His son, a fine boy, was killed two years 
ago by the Dahm. Once he was one of the richest men in the tribe, now he has nothing 
except a few goats.’ I asked: ‘What happened to his camels? Did raiders take them, or did 
they die of disease?’ and Bin Kabina answered, ‘No. His generosity ruined him. No one 
ever came to his tents but he killed a camel to feed them. By God, he is generous!’ I 
could hear the envy in his voice. (Thesiger 1959, 71) 
 
Such reports are familiar and can be multiplied. John Lewis Burckhardt recounted a story 
circulating amongst the Bedouin he traveled with concerning “Djerba, the present powerful 
sheikh of Beni Shammar in Mesopotamia,” who agreed to slaughter his prized horse to feed two 
hungry guests (1831, 195-6). As he tied the poor beast’s feet to do so, he heard camels 
approaching bearing sacks of rice that had been sent as a gift from Qāsim, saving his horse from 
the cook-pot. This story harkens back to Ḥātim al-Ṭā’ī, the semi-legendary pre-Islamic figure 
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famed for his generosity. Here’s his story narrated by a young Omani in Nizwā, proud to tell me 
the story in front of his uncle: 
Storyteller: Ḥātim was a shaykh of the Ṭā’ī of the Qaḥṭānī. He was the most generous (akram) 
shaykh, anyone who had a request he fulfilled it. His generosity (gawdu) was [so] great that 
when another shaykh demanded his territory and title from him, he just gave them away and 
lived in the desert. Just like that! So, he lived there for many years with nothing. A man heard of 
his famous generosity (nadā), and so came to the evil shaykh and said, “I am looking for Ḥātim, 
the great shaykh, for aid.” The evil shaykh was greedy, he didn’t help anyone but himself (lā 
yibūl ‘alā garaḥ).76 So [the man] returned home, and he saw a poor man in the desert, and this 
was Ḥātim but he did not know. So he said, “I am searching for this Ḥātim, because I need aid.”  
Storyteller’s uncle: And Ḥātim, what did he say? 
ST: He said, “I am Ḥātim, and I know the evil shaykh is looking for me (yibānī) and will pay you 
for me. Bring me to him, and he will reward you (bayasakhkhī ‘alayk).”  
STU: That’s generosity (dhak al-ṣakhāwa)! That’s generosity, he gave himself up (yistislim 
ḥiyātu), is that true or what?  
ST: Yes. The evil shaykh was sad when he saw Ḥātim come to give himself in to help this man, 
and when he saw how Ḥātim held himself together in the face of this (kayf Ḥātim masika nafsu 
imam kullu hadha), he gave everything back to [Ḥātim]. 
BJG: Wow, what a story. 
STU: Yes, there is another part. There are many stories.  
                                                          
76 I triple checked this translation, because this phrase literally means “he did not or would not 
urinate on a wound.” This refers to extreme stinginess, and in this sense, didn’t elicit laughter 
from anyone but me, which I have omitted here to keep the story intact. Others I discussed this 
term with considered it a Bedouin-derived expression or extremely old-fashioned, and so it 
would fit the context of the story. 
209 
 
 
 
BJG: Please, please. 
STU: Now, listen [nephew], I don’t think you heard this one in school. One day, long ago, a king 
heard of Ḥāṭim and said, “I am more generous than he (askha’ minnuh). I will ask him for the 
best of his horses.” He asked for this because Ḥātim loved his horses. So, the king sent a 
messenger to Ḥātim, and [the messenger] spent the night in his tent and they had a meal, this was 
the custom… In the morning, the messenger said, “I have come from King so-and-so, to ask 
from you your favorite horse.” What did Ḥātim say? He said, “I wish you had told me last night, 
for I killed my favorite horse last night for our dinner.” Imagine! Now, you wanted examples of 
generosity (al-sakhāwa), he is the most generous of Arabs. And he was a Christian; later the Ṭā’ī 
became Muslims of course.77 
Generosity is likewise among the four “cardinal” virtues used to evaluate Shlaywīḥ al-
‘Aṭāwī, the famed raid-leader and “Desert Knight,” according to Kurpershoek (1995, 86). These 
virtues were the same as those picked out by the Medieval scholar Qudāma bin Ja‘afar al-
Baghdādī (d. ~377/948) in his Naqd al-shi‘r, which included generosity, courage, intelligence, 
and temperance (Kurpershoek 1995, 85n114). In the poems that record his life, 
These cardinal virtues are stressed as the key to Šlēwīḥ’s success as a leader: in 
dangerous situations he personally takes the greatest risks; he is the one who climbs 
mountains in order to spy out the country, but he is generous in letting the others share in 
the booty and modest in his own demands; and if the group is hard pressed by hunger or 
thirst he chooses to abstain and voluntarily renounces his legitimate part of the remaining 
rations in favour of his comrades. As Šlēwīḥ’s famous verse put it, ‘When the water-skins 
are dry except for a few last drops, I leave my share of water to the others, proud to 
abstain’. (Kurpershoek 1995, 86) 
                                                          
77 Abdulla El Tayib cites Ḥātim’s poetry as emblematic of a particular moral stance on generosity and its 
relationship to fame in pre-Islamic Arabia, one mirrored all over Eurasia: “O, Mawiya [Ḥātim’s wife], 
wealth comes and goes. What lasts of wealth is to be well spoken of and leave a good memory” (1983, 
31). Irish mythic hero Cu Chulainn adds: “‘Little care I,’ said Cu Chulainn, ‘nor though I were but one 
day or one night in being, so long as after me the history of myself and doings may endure” (Greene 
1985, 51). 
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Just as Shlaywīḥ is considered a good leader for his generosity in sharing his food and 
“abstaining with pride,” so are the shaykh-s who routinely spend their entire fortune in the name 
of their community. Lancaster (1981) reacts with a mixture of annoyance and admiration when 
he writes that:  
one of the sheikhs [of the Ruwāla), through whose hands tens of thousands of pounds 
sterling passed annually, was frequently strapped for cash and used to borrow £50 off me 
to pay for repairs to a truck. On the other hand, when money was available he would 
hand out hundreds with gay abandon or buy a new car (which was given away in a few 
weeks). This insouciant attitude is attractive but it makes it almost impossible to maintain 
accounts… this carefree attitude to money is in part genuine and in part impression 
management… the women, who are equally generous, keep household accounts fairly 
carefully and are keen on the value of money. (Lancaster 1981, 97-8) 
 
Similarly, Lienhardt recounts a tragic story between two brothers, Ḥamdān and Sulṭān bin Zayid. 
Ḥamdān ruled Dubai from 1912-22. 
Hamdan was a man of extreme generosity, giving away all he had to those who asked for 
it and therefore extremely poor. Thus he was not able to give his brother the sums of 
money which the brother and his wife thought he should. They appear to have imagined 
that he was much richer than he was, because he was generous, and that he was 
intentionally depriving them of money. When Sultan killed Hamdan, quite suddenly and 
unexpectedly with his own hand, he is said to have immediately opened the treasury 
where he found nothing, and then to have turned and wept. (Lienhardt 2001, 180) 
 
Vasiliev notes that generosity was a basis of Sa‘ūdī rulership since the times of the 
Emirate of al-Dir‘iyya (1745-1818 CE), when Sa‘ūd bin ‘Abd al-‘Azīz (r. 1803-1814) hosted 
“several hundred guests a day” and perhaps some 50% of state expenditure was for 
“entertainment of guests,” the “relief of paupers,” and infrastructure (2000, 119-21). “The money 
thus allowed for guests,” Vasiliev writes, citing Burckhardt, “is paid into the hands of sheikhs, 
who keep a sort of public house, where all strangers may halt and be fed gratis; it is thought just 
that the whole community should contribute toward their expenses” (2000, 119-21).  Ibn Bishr, a 
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historian of Najd, claimed that the budget of al-Ḥāsa was divided into three parts, with one 
allotment going directly for “gifts and monetary allotments” to local shaykh-s (2000, 121-2). 
‘Abd al-‘Azīz (r. 1765-1803), according to Ibn Bishr, once “pricked [one of 25 sacks of riyāl-s 
that came to the palace as revenue) with his sabre and said, ‘The Lord has given me power over 
this, but He has not given this any power over me!’ and started distributing the money” (2000, 
122).  
Gifts that Flatten Houses: Generosity and Dependency 
In the opening of this chapter, I noted that I would take two approaches to generosity: one 
investigating mechanisms of political legitimacy, and one involving the gift. While we will see 
many more examples of the ways that ideal models of authority and generosity are textually 
exchanged in verse and speech, we can turn now to the literature on the “gift” to see the more 
dangerous aspect of such giving, especially as manifested in strict power differentials.  
Anthropologists have long applied Mauss’s (1950) unexpected insight into the mutual 
obligations incited by gifting in his 1923 Essai sur le don to describe the ways in which the 
movement of goods helps to weave a social fabric. Mauss’s key discovery was that in many 
societies, gifts are not freely given, but are obligatory: “one gives because one is compelled to do 
so, because the recipient possesses some kind of right of property over anything that belongs to 
the donor” (1990, 13). Leaders give, partially, because they have no choice. Socrates made a 
similar point in Xenophon’s Oeconomicus about the endless duties and obligations of the 
wealthy—to fund wars, receive guests, raise horses, and organize choruses—warning that 
“wherever you seem to do any of these things inadequately, I know that the Athenians will 
punish you no less than if they had caught you stealing their own property” (cited in Kurke 2013, 
147-8). The obligation to give further catalyzes a chain of obligations—to receive the gift and to 
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return the gift (Mauss 1990, 8-14).78 The “potlatch,” the ritual giving, consumption, and 
destruction of goods in the native Pacific Northwest, is a paradigmatic example. In the potlatch, 
X̱aayda (Haïda) and Kwakwaka’wakw (Kwakiutl) elites sought to draw others into their sphere 
of influence by giving so generously that the humiliated recipients, unable to reciprocate, were 
put “‘in the shadow of [the giver’s) name” (Mauss 1990, 39). This, in Mauss’s terms, is one way 
that rivalrous givers “transform into persons having an obligation those that have placed [them) 
under a similar obligation” (1990, 37). Nobles engaged each other ritually and economically 
through agonistically competitive generosity in order to gain followers and to avoid having their 
name and house “flattened” by failure (Mauss 1990, 39).  
Scholars such as Mary Douglas (1990), Anne Meneley (1997), Florence Weber (1989), 
Annette B. Weiner (1992), Margaret Wilson (1989), and Emily T. Yeh (2013; 2014) have shown 
us the ways in which what is glossed as gift exchange creates, regulates, and manages social 
relationships. While many anthropologists have taken for granted that Mauss was describing the 
history of the contract through “a theory of exchange whose primary feature is the identification 
of the gift with the spirit of the donor,” Lygia Sigaud argues that Mauss’s primary lesson is that 
gifting produces obligations and social relationships (2002, 335). In light of such data, Mary 
Douglas states that “a gift that does nothing to enhance solidarity is a contradiction” (1990, vii).  
In this sense, generosity, gifting, and reciprocity have the capacity to produce social relationships 
of equality and inequality, that is, they are capable of affirming equality or of creating and 
                                                          
78 Though see Campergue 2015; Caple 2015; Corderey 2015; de la Perrière 2015; Godelier 1996; 
Heim 2004; Sihlé 2015; Testart 1997, 1998, 2007, 2013; Testart, Lécrivain, and Govoroff 2002; 
Weber 1989, 2000 for a substantial Francophone critique of these interpretations of the “gift,” 
“exchange,” and “reciprocity.”  
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sustaining hierarchy. As Jacques Godbout concludes, “the gift between equals gives rise to 
equality, the gift between those who are unequal gives rise to inequality” (1998, 137). 
 In the context of the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism, goods and praise are circulated 
but not merely equated—rather, a social relationship is confirmed. The failure of either party to 
“play their part” promises a failure of the system. “The relationship established” through gifting, 
as Weber shows in her study of French peasant life, “is more important than what occasioned it” 
(1989, 81). Lancaster reports a similar finding among the Ruwāla Bedouin. A display of 
generosity from a Ruwāla shaykh “is not wholly disinterested,” but rather “is, in itself, a political 
statement of autonomy and a means of spreading reputation and gathering information” (1981, 
94-5). It is not the livestock, ammunition, trucks, or cash that is important, it is that the act of 
giving, receiving, and recognition of mutual obligation is an active claim to community as much 
as it is a claim to the capacity to sustain its autonomy via distribution. 
a.  With Friends Like These…: Women’s Visitation Networks 
In the Middle East, the most in-depth and nuanced discussions of the ways in which 
generosity, hospitality, and gift exchange manipulate social relationships is found in the 
ethnographic record on women’s visitation networks (Al-Torki and Cole 1989; Eickelman 1984; 
Kanafani-Zahar 1983; Limbert 2010; Meneley 1996; Wikan 1982). Neighbors and the neighbor 
group hold special status in Islamic thought, but its patterns and conception are historically 
contingent and variable (Limbert 2010, 54-7). Nevertheless, visitation and the quotidian 
exchange of gifts and hospitality are the focus of women’s intense scrutiny and evaluation. Any 
inequality or failure of reciprocal relations is evidenced both as a moral and as a material one, 
and hence can lead to social ostracization, weakness, and dependency. 
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Meneley’s Tournaments of Value (1996) is one of the most sustained analyses of the 
topic, focusing on the intense and strategic practice of khurūj, “going out,” amongst women of 
the nās (respectable people) and kibār (landowning elites) in Zabid, Yemen in the 1980s and 
1990s. “Exchange of hospitality in Zabid,” she writes, “like in other ethnographically known 
forms of exchange, has both unifying and divisive aspects” (Meneley 1996, 4). Among Zabidi 
women, the exchange of visits and hospitality defines the borders of their community of 
interrelated bayt-s (family households), partially through the financial outlay required to throw a 
respectable event. Wealth does not mean honor for a bayt in and of itself, rather, “their 
honourable status is contingent upon the appropriate distribution and consumption of resources” 
(1996, 57). Eickelman (1984), Limbert (2010), and Wikan (1982) report similar processes of 
social differentiation in Oman, resulting in a pattern of distinction between elite shaykh-ly and 
non-shaykh-ly families circulating in different but partially overlapping circles. Material wealth, 
in Zabid, should be shown off through hospitality, since such generosity is a “glorious deed” that 
builds honor (1996, 3-4, 37). However, Meneley shows us a paradox built into this system. 
While the visitor adds to the honor of the host by the host’s “aggressive welcoming” whereby the 
guest is subordinated, visitors also delight in making hosts fetch them things—food, drink, better 
pillows (1996, 101). Kanafani-Zahar adds that in the United Arab Emirates, the host and guest 
try to assert their dominance over each other—in Zabid, these demands on the host are a way to 
“tilt the balance” a bit back in the favor of the visitor (Kanafani-Zahar 1983, 98). While lower-
status women visit higher-status women more often, patterns of visitation are remembered for a 
long time and unreciprocated visits are not forgotten. Such long memories are activated through 
the attribution of praise and blame: good hosts are praised, bad ones are criticized mercilessly, 
mostly in gossip (1996, 97-101). Such constant comment and jockeying typifies Zabidi social 
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life because hierarchy is “continually re-enacted or altered through the process of recognition 
inherent in the exchange of hospitality” (1996, 180). Meneley highlights the crucial feature of 
this Zabidi visiting network in the dual nature of generosity: “generosity is a positive quality, 
but, by being generous, one is attempting to encompass, at least temporarily, those to whom one 
is being generous”—in other words, to flatten them (1997, 194). 
Another important aspect that these scholars point out are the mutual benefits derived 
from visiting, hospitality, and generosity. As Kanafani-Zahar, Wikan, Eickelman, and Meneley 
all stress, honor accrues to the guest as well as the host. “To honor a guest is a duty (wajib) of the 
hostess: if a woman honors her guest she honors herself and if she does not, she demeans 
herself” (Kanafani-Zahar 1983, 101). Such a mutual benefit does not mean that interaction in 
Oman is always as smooth as it appears to be (Eickelman 1984, ch. 4, 6). In Zabid, for example, 
Meneley points out that “the solicitous insistence of the hostess is in contrast with the stylized, 
decorous refusal of the guest,” who seeks to represent herself as controlled and not dependent, 
greedy, or vulgar (1997, 103). Such a personal display brings honor to the guest and tests the 
commitment of the host. This mutual benefit is also understood to be at work in explaining why 
Zabidi women adorn themselves with jewelry. Adornment brings honor to the wearer and to the 
viewer, though it may risk the “evil eye,” and displays the generosity of the wearer’s bayt (1996, 
117). I was personally struck by the amount and intensity of personal grooming before praise 
performances in Oman, sometimes taking a full two hours before an event was scheduled. 
Groups of men would help each other fasten belts, arrange daggers and cellphones, and 
straighten dishdāsha-s. Men would stare into the reflections of car windows for minutes on end 
arranging the folds of their maṣar headwrap so that they would be perfectly straight and crisp. 
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These kinds of behaviors need to be understood in the context of the mutual accrual of honor and 
in the ways that obligations of sociality operate with the tensions of equality and encompassing. 
b. “A Wilderness of Hearts”: Generosity and the State 
[The Ottoman Sultan) was the one who bestowed, and every act of bestowing 
reaffirmed his prosperity. “Man is a slave of benevolence,” declares the 17th-century 
scholar Katib Çelebi, describing the desperate situation of soldiers in Erzurum during 
the Yerevan campaign. “A shortage in generosity and bounty can result in a 
wilderness of hearts.” (Karateke 2005, 47) 
 
If generosity is a strongly felt obligation within families and an important part of ideal 
models of authority, it is no less so in the context of the state. And, just as generosity can 
produce legitimacy, a shortage of it is dangerous, as Çelebi shows. Anthropologists of the state 
have recently adopted a practice-oriented approach to the state-form, just as they have towards 
its ideological basis of authority and legitimacy (Akhil and Gupta 2006). Such social practices, 
as we have seen, can range from the quotidian—filing (Feldman 2008), paperwork (Gupta 2012; 
Hull 2012), rituals of voting (Wedeen 2007)—to the spectacular (Adams 2012; Chatty 2009; 
Rasmussen and al-Harthy 2012). As we have seen, generosity as a practice can be small-scale 
and personal (such as handing out cash or slaughtering animals) or spectacular (massive 
development projects). Generosity and its symbolic construction is vital to the construction of 
state dependency, and hence hegemony, in the Arabian Gulf. 
Karateke’s (2005) essay on the legitimating practices of the Ottoman sultans reveals the 
logic of this mechanism for the state. In the distribution of welfare services and the deployment 
of symbols, the maintenance of “order,” and other such concretized demonstrations of 
generosity, Ottoman sultans demonstrated the efficacy of their leadership. This is Karateke’s 
factual legitimacy, or what Cohen calls “the benefits of compliance.” These practices were 
variegated and situational but always predicated on asymmetry. “Since the lands the Ottoman 
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sultan ruled belonged to him personally,” Karateke notes, “he was materially beyond compare 
relative to his subjects” (2005, 46). Such prosperity made a “positive impression only insofar as 
its possessor was generous” and so “generosity and charity figured high on the list of 
characteristics of the ideal sultan” (47). For common folk, Ottoman sultans fulfilled requests for 
cash, distributed meat on Fridays, established welfare programs, funded charitable buildings 
(bath-houses, caravanserais, schools, dervish lodges, bridges, public fountains), held public 
celebrations, cancelled taxes, abolished debts, and made charitable donations to hospitals or for 
natural disasters (37-53). By 1831, such charity was routinely published in the official newspaper 
Taqvim-i veqayi (51). Directed at other elites, this generosity took the form of subsidies given in 
order to “undermine potential opposition or critical voices” (47). “Expensive horses, precious 
clocks, jewelry, swords, orders, and many kinds of robes of honor” were distributed amongst 
bureaucrats, doctors, and other intellectuals to secure their loyalty through unmatchable gifts (47-
8). 
Unmatchable “gifts” become the basis for a more coercive form of generosity. 
Lienhardt’s account of the practice of shūfa in the Trucial Shaykhdoms is just one example 
(2001, 200-1). According to Lienhardt, shaykh-s in need of cash would inform merchants that 
they would be paying them a formal visit, with all their retainers in tow—certainly a high honor. 
However, they expected not only a meal for dozens or hundreds of participants, but a large sum 
of cash as well. Failure to give over the cash could result in legal actions, beatings, or worse. I 
was told tales of the same practice of agonistic visiting by Omani leaders—if an up-and-coming 
shaykh was too ambitious, a formal visit from a higher authority would show him what the 
burden of rulership really meant. The sheer outlay of generosity expected by the higher authority 
from the presumptuous shaykh would bankrupt the lesser over the course of single feast. 
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 If the dangers of dependency and encompassment are understood in women’s visiting 
networks, they are no less a threat in state and community relations. The capacity for the gift to 
be used to foster dependency is manifested in the context of structured unequal access to 
resources. “Generosity” can help produce social arrangements by manipulating the way this 
gifting is framed by actors. For states like Oman, development can be framed as generosity by 
drawing on long histories of the practice and on idealized models of authority and distribution. 
Even if such a framing is resisted or contested by Omanis (which it sometimes is), various state 
apparatuses can draw on both traditional and developmental discourses to justify their programs.   
In other contexts, re-framing can be considerably more contested. Emily T. Yeh’s 
ethnography Taming Tibet (2013) takes the “Janus-faced nature of the gift” as a way to 
understand divergent responses to the development practices of the People’s Republic of China 
in the autonomous region of Tibet (2013, 15). “Gifts always establish relationships or bonds,” 
Yeh writes, “as well as their accompanying obligations to give, receive, and reciprocate. Thus, 
the act of giving contains within it two opposite movements: it is an act of both generosity and 
violence, of sharing and debt. To be given a gift is also to lose some measure of autonomy and 
freedom” (2013, 15). Drawing on Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic domination, a form of 
domination that naturalizes existing exploitative relations, she shows how Chinese perceptions of 
development are framed as a generous gift that requires appreciation. The transnational Tibet 
movement, however, “rejects the idea that development has been a pure gift” (2013, 14). One 
example of such gift-giving was The Comfortable Housing Project, begun in 2006, in which the 
Chinese state spent some 13.3 billion yuan ($1.95 billion) to build “socialist villages” for over 
23,000 families in Western Tibet (2013, 232). This gift, for Yeh, amounts to “a form of 
indebtedness engineering” in which the giver is primarily interested in drawing the recipient into 
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a relationship of dependency. Tibetans are expected to show gratitude and appreciation, 
acknowledging their “indebtedness” to the Chinese state (2013, ch.7). Yeh shows that 
“development as gift” really hinges on the creation of the “identities of the subjects involved,” as 
“giver and receiver” (magister and minister, for Mauss). It is in the framing of development as 
gift that the Chinese “state” becomes, in Yeh’s word, “ontologically” real—by drawing 
individuals into the deeply human relationship of giving, reciprocity, and obligation, the “state 
comes to be recognized as if it were a concrete entity” (2013, 16).   
 Yeh’s ethnography offers an orientation to the ways in which cultural norms of 
generosity and good leadership are brought into the era of the current state-form. Tracking this 
translation of a historical ideal model, sociologist Sulayman Khalaf and economist Hassan 
Hammoud have described Persian Gulf states as “oil welfare states” (1988). Such states are 
based on the state’s control over oil wealth and its redistribution. As opposed to “welfare 
societies,” wherein political rights (suffrage, representation, citizenship, etc.) precede the 
attainment of social rights (welfare, healthcare, stipends, etc.), “oil welfare states” fulfill social 
rights before political ones (1988, 345-350). “One of the first and most significant changes,” they 
write,  
is the emergence of a new economic configuration within the old pre-oil traditional 
support structure of the Shaikhs’ authority. …through their control of the government 
executive apparatus the shaikhs found themselves in control of the flow of wealth in 
society.79 This direct control aided the ruling and traditional forms of tribal allegiances. 
This new structural disarticulation, in a sense, helped the state to come closer to the 
masses of society. This was achieved simply through the ruler’s new economic capacity 
and commitment to modernize state and society. Modernization has meant the building 
up of a modern institutional infrastructure, through which wealth and lavish welfare 
services have begun to be distributed among the population. However, this process of 
distribution is done with some measure of calculated care and, until now, it seems at the 
expense of the population's political rights. (Khalaf and Hammoud 1988, 350) 
                                                          
79 I would add that this is not new, but is an increase in both access and in quantity due to flows of 
international capital. 
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Khalaf and Hammoud point out that this new politics of allocation is represented as a kind of 
paternalism, with the leader as a symbolic “father” to the nation (1988, 351; see also Abu-
Hakima 1972).80 “The right of rulership of the Shaikhly aristocratic families,” they conclude, 
“who are linked to notable tribal origins, is still legitimated in part by shared beliefs in old values 
and traditions” (1988, 351). One of these “old values” is the notion of generosity and its links to 
legitimacy and right leadership, built into ideal models of authority. This generosity-cum-welfare 
is so extreme, and its existence so crucial to legitimacy, that Khalaf later described it as “the 
image of unlimited good,” wherein the state is a never-ending source of wealth, security, and 
privilege (1992).  
 Yemen, in contrast, offers a good example of the limitations of this mechanism. In the 
fractious Yemeni political scene, many scholars have noted how the state has attempted to 
maintain control by both relying on tribal legitimacy while simultaneously undermining its 
political potential. In this manner “the state remains slightly stronger than the fractured society 
over which it presides” (Phillips 2008, 93). The Yemeni government, through the current 
Department of Tribal Affairs (which has gone through many permutations and names since its 
establishment in 1963) distributes a variety of gifts to some 4-5000 “significant sheikhs” 
throughout the country (Stephen Day estimates it at “as much as half the government’s total 
outlays”) (cited in Phillips 2008, 96, 104-5). “The DTA works on a simple carrot-and-stick 
principle: in the first instance, the government pays the sheikh a monthly stipend… the more [the 
                                                          
80 Blending kinship and political terminology as a tactic of normalizing governance is common in nation-
building rhetoric throughout the world. One example will suffice: Gilman notes that dictator Hastings 
Kamuzu Banda fashioned himself the nkhoswe, an authoritative male figure that women consult in times 
of crisis, to all women in Malawi (2009, 47-8).   
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sheikhs) get from the government the more support they provide the government in doing what is 
asked of them” (2008, 104).  
In this vein, Caton has observed that, while the role of Yemeni shaykhs has remained 
stable over the last twenty years:  
what was different was their newfound wealth, resulting from government subsidy and 
capital accumulations, evident in their big cars, expensive guns, and many retainers. How 
long tribals leaders in Yemen would continue to be primus inter pares and deal with their 
constituents in direct, face-to-face communication was an interesting question… a good 
sheikh has to perform a delicate balancing act between his obligations to his followers 
and the demands of the state, which put a strain on him that might have always been but 
never in so acute a form. (Caton 2001, 331-2)  
 
In Sarah Phillips’s view, financial outlays to shaykh-s are tactical because they cannot co-opt all 
challengers to state authority: “while the Yemeni regime might like to co-opt all potential 
dissenters into its patronage system, it simply does not have the financial resources to do so” 
(2008, 7).81 As state revenues have dwindled, political fault lines have emerged, since conversely 
“legitimacy that is gained through the ability to distribute wealth is compromised when that 
capacity deteriorates” (2008, 93). Due to this, the Yemeni state needs to marshal many other 
complementary “legitimacy enhancing” mechanisms, including piecemeal democratic reforms 
(2008, 4-5).  
 
 
                                                          
81 In the Yemeni case, “patronage” is an appropriate term to describe this system, because it refers to 
“state-adjacent” individuals producing their own power bases. These individuals might mostly funnel 
state generosity but they do so for their own sakes, rather than for the state. 
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c.  “It does not become the generous to forget benefits”: Generosity in Omani 
Statecraft 
In the Omani case, a similar argument can be made. For as far back as we have records, 
historical patterns of authority amongst sedentary and nomadic leaders (shaykh-s, imām-s, 
sulṭān-s, malik-s, and amīr-s) in Oman (and the Arabian Peninsula) have relied on these leaders 
being perceived as generous (Badger 1871).  Ḥumayd bin Muḥammad bin Razīq’s late 1800s 
histories Al-shu‘ā‘ al-shā’i‘ bi-l-lam‘ān fī dhikr ’asmā’ ’I’ma ‘Umān (Well-known Rays of 
Brightness for Remembering the Names of the Imams of Oman, a mnemonic poem and history 
of the Imams until the rise of the Āl Bū Sa‘īd dynasty, 1978) and the Al-fatḥ al-mubayn fī sīra al-
sāda āl Bū Sa’īdiyīn (The Clear Conquest concerning the Tale of the Sayyids of the Āl Bū Sa‘īd, 
1977)  both document the close link between generosity and legitimacy. These works were 
compiled, editied, and translated into English by Badger (1871) as The History of the Imams and 
Seyyids of Oman.  
The first Omani Imam, Julānda bin Mas‘ūd, (r.132/749-134/751) is described by bin 
Razīq as “just, generous, and pious” (fāḍilan, ‘ādilan ḥilmian, taqīyan ‘āliman) (bin Razīq 1978, 
21; Badger 1871, 7). In fact, virtually every Imam and Sayyid covered in bin Razīq’s chronicle is 
distinguished by the retelling of a number of examples of his generosity and the praise that it 
deserves (written in CLA as madḥ, ḥamd, thinā’; see bin Razīq 1978, 69 for example). Such 
generosity was manifest in gifts (like fruit trees, goods, horses, robes, cash, saddles, gold, houses, 
hospitality, and administrative positions), stipends distributed amongst tribespeople,82 along with 
                                                          
82 Of course, the opposite movement of goods was possible and institutionalized. See Vasiliev (2000, 45) 
and Lienhardt (2001, 105) for wisaya, money paid by some individual seeking protections (dākhila or zabīn) 
from a shaykh, and Vassiliev (2000, 47-8) and Lancaster (1997, 120-5) for the famous khuwā, or payments 
that excluded a group, village, or caravan from Bedouin depredations.   
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repairing and expanding falaj-s (Badger 1871; Bathurst 1972; bin Razīq 1978; Rabi 2011; Al-
Rasheed 1991; Wilkinson 1987). Infrastructure, such as the maintenance of falaj-s, roads, 
markets, orchards, masjid-s and jāmi‘-s, courts, sabla-s, feasts, and the like, was also the 
province of local and regional leaders (Wilkinson 1987, 38-9).  
The obligations of generosity were directed and situational. Imams and sultans routinely 
gave gifts of land and employment to politically active elites with an eye to coopting threats to 
the state. Those same elites conspired to host rulers as they moved around the country on 
business, incurring useful debts. Throughout bin Razīq’s chronicle, he makes mention of the 
ways in which Imams, kings, and shaykh-s were able to gain legitimacy in the eyes of common 
people through generosity (see Badger 1871, 7, 41-2, 90, 134, 158-88, 193, 241). Further, 
regional leaders often tried to win the favor of Omanis with gifts. One example is the ’amīr of 
Hormuz, who in the 1270s sought to extract tribute from the Omani coast and distributed robes 
(and likely food) amongst various leaders to secure it (bin Razīq 1978, 72). 
Many of the great castles, forts, and mansions that dot the Omani landscape are the work 
of one or another Imam, King, or other ruler. In Bahrain, historian Nelida Fuccaro recounts that 
the residences that the Āl Khalīfa built around 1900 “became powerful symbols of tribal 
authority” (Fuccaro 2009, 38). “In this period,” she continues, “the consolidation of dynastic rule 
led to the emergence of a new type of public architecture which affirmed the tribal pedigree of 
the ruling family and celebrated the Bedouin arts of generosity, hospitality, and physical 
prowess” (2009, 38). As noted in Chapter 1, certain Omani leaders like the later Ya‘arūbī Sayf 
bin Sulṭān I (cousin of Nāṣir) attempted to revive and renew the agricultural and architectural 
base of Oman, but most leaders could not support such grand efforts (Wilkinson 1987, 220-1). 
By the time of the 19th and 20th century Imamates, the issue of wealth (and its distribution) put 
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pressure on the Imam. While he could reward his followers with relatively lucrative 
administrative positions in certain circumstances, especially in periods of greater centralization, 
it was the Sultan whose economic power allowed for greater latitude in gifting and payments 
(recall the above discussion of the transferal of qāḍī-s from the Imamate to the Sultanate offered 
by Eickelman 1985).  
For the Ya‘arūbī Imam Nāṣir bin Murshid (r. 1033-59/1624-49), for example, who 
successfully forced the Portuguese from the Omani coast, gifts and generosity secured political 
alliances. Historian R.D. Bathurst writes that  
the election of an imam is not sufficient in itself to guarantee a return to law and order. 
Nasir bin Murshid, the first Ya‘rubi imam, elected in al-Rustaq, had first to gain control 
of one of the traditional seats of imamate rule in Oman proper, the forts of Nizwa or 
Bahla. Thenceforth the success of his campaigns would depend on raising forces strong 
enough to defeat the powerful provincial muluk (mulūk, “kings”)… He could only 
persuade the tribal leaders by appealing to their piety, by offering them governorships of 
provincial towns captured, or by holding out opportunity of plundering territory overrun. 
By these methods, in approximately 8 years, the entire country was subdued. (Bathurst 
1972, 95) 
 
It was by extending gifts that the Ya‘rībī dynasty was able to centralize and strengthen the 
Imamate state apparatus. If early on Nāṣir had little to give, denied profits from coastal trade by 
the Portuguese, by the later 11th/17th century his dynasty was able to fully benefit from maritime 
links. Nevertheless, Nāṣir’s successful attacks on the Portuguese outposts on the coast were able 
to furnish him with enough booty to construct the massive cylindrical fort at Nizwā, secure trade 
relations, and dispense horses and arms to his followers as well as repair a variety of falaj-s 
between his capital and ’Izkī (Badger 1871, 88-9). “Once full involvement in maritime trade had 
become possible,” Bathurst writes, “patronage dispensed by successive imams far exceeded 
anything experienced before” (Bathurst 1972, 106). 
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Resorting simply to extensive generosity and largesse was not enough to prop up the 
legitimacy of the later hereditary Imams of the Ya‘arībī, who, despite huge gains in economic 
and imperial development, faced opposition on religious grounds (Ghubash 2006, 60-5). This 
massive outlay of generosity-qua-patronage could not stave off internal conflict and what can 
fairly be termed a “legitimacy crisis” sparked the the Hināwī-Ghāfirī civil war of c. 1130-
61/1718-1737, which “debased the office [of the Imamate] by making it a trophy to be won by 
force of arms” (Kelly 1972, 108). The lack of centralized authority and number of pretender 
Imams over this period point to a lack of legitimacy accruing to any particular leader: the 
Ya‘arībī family was wealthy and had hereditary claims to the Imamate which were not 
recognized by other tribal groups or large swathes of the ‘ulamā’. 
In this account, it is no coincidence that the first Āl Bū Sa‘īd Imam, Aḥmad bin Sa‘īd Āl 
Bū Sa‘īdī (1154-1197/1741-1783), seized power from his base as the governor of the richest 
Omani coastal port of the time, Ṣuḥār. Aḥmad distinguished himself by repelling the Persian 
army of Nadir Shah, invited by the desperate Sayf bin Sulṭān II to fight Imamate “pretenders” 
during the civil war. The Shah saw a golden opportunity to extend his hegemony over the Omani 
coast and his armies refused to leave, eventually seizing control of Muscat and imposing a poll 
tax on other coastal cities (Ghubash 2006, 65-7). Aḥmad eventually tricked and repelled the 
Persians and took Muscat for himself, which led to his quick election as Imam. Aḥmad’s 
subsequent consolidation cemented his place in Omani history as a shrewd and effective leader. 
Even though bin Razīq’s chronicle is often considered overly laudatory of the Āl Bū Sa‘īdī 
dynasty, his stories of the generosity of Imam Aḥmad are telling. Even before he seized the 
Imamate, Aḥmad the governor was dispensing generosity as befit a leader:  
Ahmed carried on the government entrusted to him with justice and equity, and was 
exceedingly liberal to the inhabitants, by whom he was greatly beloved. The tribes of esh-
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Shamâl and ezh-Zhâhirah also came to him, sometimes in crowds and sometimes singly 
and in couples, and he entertained them with profuce hospitality. He was urbane to rich 
and poor, to the learned and ignorant, and his condescension to all ranks raised him in 
general estimation. The sheikhs of the el-Jibûr, also, from el-Hufry, and el-Harâdy, and 
Hai-’âsim paid their respects to him, and he treated them most munificently, so that his 
renown spread far and wide, all the people obeyed him gladly, and all tongues extolled 
the justice of his administration… when Seif-bin-Sultan (the nominal reigning Imam that 
appointed Aḥmad to his post in Ṣuḥār] heard of these proceedings he said to some of his 
officers: “Ahmed-bin-Saîd acts in this way in order to estrange the people and draw them 
to himself, his object being to make his what is now mine.” (Badger 1871, 134, his 
translation of bin Razīq 2001, 291) 
 
Such a tactic was common and his rivals were quite aware of its efficacy. Later in the 
chronicle, Aḥmad is especially praised for his generosity to the author’s father and grandfather 
(Badger 1871, 158-9), whereupon the author then lists the gifts that Imam Ahmad sent out to 
recognize loyalty shown to him before his ascent (159). He was specifically praised in poetry for 
drawing out the good virtues in the people, dealing defeat to stinginess (Bin Razīq 2001, 323). 
Aḥmad even went out of his way to find and water a then-withered tree that he had taken shade 
under years before. A qāḍī in Nizwā questioned his wisdom, to which Aḥmad reportedly replied: 
“ ‘It does not become the generous (ḥurr83)… to forget benefits: he who does so is not generous. 
The generous should recognize benefits received either from the animate or the inanimate.’ ‘I 
think it is a wise precept,’ rejoined the Kadhî; ‘the generous and noble ought not to forget such 
recognition’ ” (1871, 160; Bin Razīq 2001 311-12). In the later provenanced section, which 
updates the work through the mid-19th century, the author writes: 
The Imâm Ahmed was a most liberal man in every respect: he never listened to 
those who slandered his friends, and he never questioned the accounts of any of his 
Wakîls [agents]. The bare statement of the latter that they had expended so much and had 
received kharâj [generally a land tax but see Wilkinson (1987, 180-1)] to such an amount 
was accepted by him; if any thing was due by him he paid it at once. One of his Wakîls, a 
                                                          
83 The word ḥurr here refers to being “free,” noble, and generous, as well as implications of 
purity and lack of external restraint. Freedom here is predicated on the capacity to give and 
recognize social obligations—even to a tree.   
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man of er-Rastâk [al-Rustāq]—I think he was of the family of el-Hally—came to him on 
a certain occasion… and reported he had expended one thousand silver Mahmûdis for his, 
the Imâm’s household. The Imâm forthwith ordered one of his servants to go to the house 
and bring him one of the bags labelled one thousand silver Mahmûdis; the man went and 
brought a bag which contained one thousand Mashkhases [Venetian zecchino; gold 
ducats] in gold. When the Wakîl opened it and found that a mistake had been made he 
returned with it to the Imâm, whereupon the latter inquired how much the bag contained. 
On being told that it contained one thousand gold Mashkhases, he said: “It is God’s 
bounty; therefore, be grateful to Him for the gift.” So the Wakîl retained the money and 
thanked the Imâm for his liberality. 
Another instance to the same effect is as follows:—The  Imâm had appointed 
Rabîaah-bin-Ahmed, el-Ruwâhy, who was a poor man at the time, Wakîl over the 
property of Nuamân-Barkah. Two years after, Rabîaah began to purchase property on his 
own account, as also date-trees at Barkah and el-Jau. This fact having been reported to 
the Imâm, when the letter came to Nuamân from er-Rustâk on his way to Máskat 
[Muscat], he said to Rabîaah: “Is it true as people say that out of this agency you have 
managed to purchase property in the town of Barkah and in the towns of el-Jau and 
Nakhl?” The other replied: “O Imâm, I found a treasure and with it was enabled to 
purchase property.” “Where did you find it?” rejoined the Imâm. “Just where you are 
standing,” replied Rabîaah. The Imâm, comprehending at once the figurative speech, 
smiled and said, “It is God’s bounty towards you; so thank God for it and praise Him for 
His goodness to you.” (Badger 1871, 186-7)  
 
Later dynasts of the Āl Bū Sa‘īd would wield generosity in precisely the same way, and 
extensive holdings in East Africa and later oil revenues would expand this capacity many times 
over (Owtram 1999,125). However, due in part to their lack of religious legitimacy and in part to 
the greater profits promised overseas, successive Āl Bū Sa‘īdī sayyid-s and sultans focused on 
building their Omani empire abroad, directly leading to the election of a family rival ‘Azzān bin 
Qays as Imam in 1868. As many scholars have noted, from the early decades of the 1800s the 
coast and the Interior of Oman began to separate administratively. Largely, the coastal sultans 
ignored Inner Oman, whose inhabitants were repeatedly harassed by the expanding Saudi 
emirate of al-Dir‘iya.  After the immensely successful reign of Sultan Sa‘īd, the Omani empire 
was divided by the British into the Omani and Zanzibari portions in 1856. The reigns of the next 
Omani sultans, Faysal and Tūrkī, were plagued by British interests, restive tribes, and resistance 
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from the ‘ulamā’, ultimately resulting in the election of the Imam Sālim ibn Rāshid al-Kharūsī as 
Imam and the nominal deposition of Tūrkī in 1913 (Wilkinson 1987, 249).  
However, as Wilkinson (1987) and al-Hashimy (1994) have shown, the financial 
situation of any claimant to the Imamate was dire. Imam ‘Azzān (r. 1868-1870) and his branch 
were related to the Sultanic family, but despite shrewd leadership he could not consolidate power 
with his meager tax base (Wilkinson 1987, 238-40). Imam Sālim’s (r. 1913-1920) economic 
situation was no less dire, as al-Hashimy shows—for example, he began his reign with 300 
Maria Theresa dollars and nearly all of his many military expenditures were covered by tribal 
shaykh-s, couched in the terms of hibāt, or donations “with the intention of helping the State 
meet its obligations” (al-Hashimy 1994, 250-9). Sālim also combined the role of wālī and qāḍī in 
several towns, in order to save money on salaries (al-Hashimy 1994, 236). The split between 
Oman and Zanzibar, and later Oman and Muscat, would prove disastrous for the Omani people. 
Historian Robert Landen, writing in 1967, could claim that in the early 1860s, in the midst of a 
cotton boom lifting other Gulf states,  
Oman plummeted into a depression from which it never recovered… [From the early 
1860s] Oman dropped into insignificance within the space of a few years. Unlike other 
areas of the Gulf, Oman has yet to experience an oil boom. She exists as an example of a 
country which has suffered but has not benefitted from modernization. (1967, 89-90, 
italics mine) 
 
Obviously, in a few years an “oil boom” and its attendant economic growth would be secured 
under Sa‘īd bin Ṭaymūr and his son, Qābūs. The profits derived from oil would lift Sa‘īd’s last 
few years, but early on he had to maintain a fairly strict budget. Nevertheless, Bierschenk writes 
that Sultan Sa‘īd bin Ṭaymūr’s  
policy to outbuy the Imam, who was unable to compete with it financially, was 
remarkably successful. Between 1937 and 1939, the Sultan of Muscat was visited by the 
two leading sheikhs of the Eastern Province (al-sharqiya), Ali Abdullah al-Hamuda of the 
Bani Bu Ali and Isa Salih al-Harthi, leader of the Hinawi faction of the Omani tribes, 
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Sheikh Ahmad Muhammad, the son-in-law of the Imam, as well as by the leading men of 
the Dhahirah tribes. They all left Muscat showered with gifts and arms.  (Bierschenk 
1989, 213) 
Historians Francis Owtram and Uzi Rabi have shown that Sultan Sa‘īd did, however, 
operate a tight budget at the time—showing that such payouts were crucial to maintaining rule, 
rather than an extravagance (Owtram 1999; Rabi 2011). The Sultan was notorious even for 
remaining aloof from Omanis: according to Owtram “this helped him avoid expenditure: by 
refusing to see the many supplicants for aid at his palace in Muscat and by spending ever more of 
his time in Salalah he reduced the need to pay out subsidies unless it suited him” (1999, 126). 
Such a policy may have made Sultan Sa‘īd a fiscally responsible Sultan, but he was not a popular 
one, with all manner of cruelties attributed to him (Rabi 2011). If Sa‘īd bin Ṭaymūr’s efforts at 
political unification often involved engaging in practices of generosity to secure his legitimacy 
(doling out positions and gifts amongst tribal leaders in Inner Oman) this was no innovation, but 
a standard mechanism of rule (Rabi 2011, 165-74). It was not forgone by his son, Qābūs, the 
modern “father of the nation,” either. On the paternalistic aspect of Omani political authority, 
historian J.E. Peterson concurs with Khalaf and Hammoud’s description:  
The ruler, like the shaykh of the tribe, like the father of the family, is the father of the 
country. He demands respect, obedience, and total loyalty. In exchange, he assumes 
responsibility for the protection and welfare of his constituents… This traditional pattern 
of patriarchy has been reinforced in Oman, as well as to an even greater degree in the 
other Gulf states, by the accrual of oil revenues to the state and thus to the ruler as the 
guardian of the state… It also produces a social dependence on the state as employer 
(including both the civil service and the security services), provider of social welfare 
programs, arbiter of propriety and acceptability, and definer of cultural, social and 
political values. Just as the members of a patriarchal family depend on the father to take 
care of them, so Omanis display an expectation that the state must initiate and supervise 
action in nearly all spheres and to guarantee the results. (Peterson 2005, 8) 
 
There are several points to critique in this formulation (see Chapter 6) but for now, the 
general frame is accurate. Nearly all works on Oman, scholarly and popular, remark upon the 
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Omani “renaissance” orchestrated by Sultan Qābūs. However, when compared to other Gulf 
states, Oman is relatively poor, “barely [producing] enough oil to cover its development costs” 
(Allen, Jr. and Rigsbee 2000, 108). Calvin Allen, Jr. and W. Lynn Rigsbee have shown that 
“while the commercial and tribal elite sought domination in revenue-producing economic 
development, infrastructure and human resource development were left largely to technocrats 
and central government control” (2000, 155). Sectors where profit was more difficult to obtain 
were left to the state, whereas other sectors (industry, fisheries, finance, tourism) were privatized.  
This pragmatic generosity, coupled with increased efforts to extend benefits like healthcare and 
transportation networks, allowed the Sultan to extend his authority over larger and larger areas. 
This policy allowed the Sultan, and the state apparatus of which he was the figurehead, a reason 
to intervene in tribal structures of authority throughout Oman—to provide welfare for Omanis 
(Rabi 2011, 158-60). Sa‘īd extended centralized control over Inner Oman by building a main 
access road from Muscat through the Sumā’il Gap and extended the benefits of scientific 
agriculture by establishing a model farm outside of Nizwā. He laid plans for multiple schools, 
communication networks, and hospitals, which would remain unfulfilled until his son ascended 
to the throne. This same policy of generosity-cum-development was adopted by Qābūs after his 
1970 ascension. One such example is the extension of healthcare to the Ḥarāsīs tribe of the al-
Wusṭa region in 1980, documented by anthropologist Dawn Chatty:  
Several days into our journey and halfway across our proposed itinerary, we came upon a 
small group of nomadic pastoral Harasiis tribe families preparing to attend a wedding. 
We stopped and asked their permission to begin vaccinating their children. We were 
asked why we wanted to do this. 
We said, “The Sultan of Oman wishes to see all Omanis immunized against these 
diseases.” 
“Why should he want to do this for us?” they persisted. 
231 
 
 
 
We were initially at a loss for an answer. We had assumed that the sense of 
belonging to one nation and of the obligations of leadership had reached this part of the 
country. It had not. (Chatty 2009, 39) 
 
If it had not in 1980, the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism was still available. In fact, Chatty’s 
convoy was instrumental in that mechanism.  
However successful this approach has been, it is also costly. In Sulaiman al-Farsi’s study 
of democratization in Oman, he shows that, like other states that rely on the 
generosity/legitimacy mechanism, state distribution of wealth has a limited horizon (2013, 5). 
One of al-Farsi’s interlocutors reflected that gifts and wealth distribution 
has left no chance for a real political opposition to coalesce. But he also argues that this 
positivity from the government needs appreciation not confrontation. Indeed, [the 
interviewee] refers here to the implicit social contract and political initiatives that come 
as gifts from the government, but the question that must be answered here is, ‘Will the 
government be able to continue with the rentier state model in the post-oil era?’ (al-Farsi 
2013, 203) 
 
Certain scholars take yet a more critical approach. Political scientist Marc Valeri, for example, 
has documented this same division in development planning (and the frequency with which the 
Omani state has been forced to cut social programs) as having serious drawbacks for political 
stability (Valeri 2007, 2013). It is no coincidence—from the perspective of Valeri—that Qābūs 
has turned oil revenues toward social development: 
Early on, Sultan Qābūs had to broaden his base of allies and forge personal ties with the 
population that were no longer dependent on a unique social force. To do so, he will 
utilize for his own account the homogenizing power of the state. The exploitation of a 
nascent oil rent makes possible an economic and social development without precedent, 
in which the state, in expanding over the territory, will be the pivot. In sum, the objective 
of the Sultan is the rendering of Omanis individually as dependent for their daily lives, 
not on ‘aṣṣabiyya (CLA, “tribal cohesion”), but the state. (Valeri 2007, 111-2)84 
                                                          
84 Très tôt, le sultan Qabous se doit donc d'élargir la base de ses alliés et tisser des liens 
personnels avec le population qui ne le rendent plus aussi dependent à une force sociale 
particulière. Pour ce faire, il va utiliser à son compte la puissance homogénéisatrice de l'état. 
L'exploitation d'une rente pétrolière naissante, mais croissant de manière exponentielle, rend 
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This drawing in, what Valeri and Peterson (and many others) refer to as a production of 
dependency, is the generosity/legitimacy mechanism at work. Such a perspective bring us back 
to the more socially detrimental aspects of generosity and gift-giving, so often exploited by 
elites. Gifts that, as Mauss said, can “flatten.” Gifts that reproduce inequality while ostensibly 
recognizing equality.  
By showing these shared ideals operating on different levels of society, I argue, along 
with Al-Rasheed and Khalaf and Hammoud, that “the amir’s basis of legitimacy was to a great 
extent similar to the sheikh’s” from small to state scales, in terms of both the practical effect and 
the symbolic weight attached to certain practices: in this case, the obligatory generosity of the 
leader (Al-Rasheed 1991, 78). Generosity does, however, form a common logic. For shaykh-s on 
the smaller end of social structure, generosity refers to the redistribution of wealth created by the 
community. On the larger scale, the ’amīr was not only expected to perform this function, but 
also to distribute yet greater wealth and infrastructure for the benefit of townspeople, 
agriculturalists, and pastoralists. He was also motivated to extend his generosity to co-opt 
political rivals, smaller shaykh-led political units, and the ‘ulamā’. Gestures like holding feasts 
on festival days and funding the construction of communal buildings (masjid-s, markets, and the 
like) were symbolic manifestations and demonstrations of the leader’s generosity. And 
generosity, as we have seen, is valued all across the class spectrum. 
In the Persian Gulf states that emerged from the rapid decay of British colonial power 
after the Second World War, the expansion of the power of the traditional elites was dramatic, if 
                                                          
possible un développement économique  et social sans précédent, dont l'état, en expansion tous 
azimuts sur le territoire, sera la pivot. En somme, l'objectif du Sultan est de rendre les Omanais 
individuellement tributaires pour leur vie de tous les jours, non plus de la 'assabiyya, mais de 
l'état. 
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not unprecedented. Valeri’s claim that the Omani state was a “development without precedent” 
should be interpreted as referring to scale, not organization or cultural model (2007, 112). A 
delicate balance between claims to modernization and to traditionalism has animated the political 
destinies of new political elites and informed their symbolic and historical mythologies. Gibson’s 
“ideal model” takes seriously the symbolic aspects of authority and politics and accords well 
with research that investigates the role of ritual (Geertz 1980; Kertzer 1988) and “aesthetic” 
practices in the construction of the nation-state (Adams 2010; Mookherjee 2011). The political 
symbolism manifest in performance, as many scholars have pointed out, shifts and changes with 
changes in social organization (Atkinson 1989; Bloch 1986; Guss 2000; Gilman 2009; Leach 
1954; Reed 2010). However, as I have shown, the same kinds of ideals are drawn on to justify 
the social order on multiple social scales. In some ways, this is reminiscent of the ways in which 
kinship terminology is co-opted by the state in hopes of manifesting within state-society relations 
the same kinds of relations that are manifest in the family unit. The symbol of the leader’s 
generosity and the praise response it engenders has been often utilized in legitimating state 
power. 
Encompassing Relations: A circuit of Generosity and Praise in the context of the “gift” 
In this final section, we turn to the performance of praise, the other half of the circuit of 
exchange between rulers and ruled, and evaluate its form in Oman in relation to insights drawn 
from studying gift exchange. The sense that generosity is an obligation of leadership is, as we’ve 
seen, a widely held ideal. A leader of a razḥa group in Bahlā’ remarked that, as the leader (ra’īs), 
it was his responsibility to feed and clothe every member at each performance, even those that 
only rarely showed up. “None can razḥa with us without a belt-dagger khangar, without the 
same maṣar, without a neat dishdāsha, a sword and buckler, and all this.” He pointed to cases of 
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bottled water on the ground in the middle of the dancing circle. “I bring him water,85 I will bring 
him food if he needs it. Anything he asks, it honors me to be available [to him].” All leaders of 
groups made similar statements to me, though some were more interested in expressing the 
communal aspect of group life. “Some people from towns like Bahlā’, Nizwā, [he] manages 
razḥa troupes like he is the Sultan, like he can take command (mithl yirūm yahbish al-amr),” 
responded a performer from Firqat al-Bilād in Manaḥ. “Here, we’re more like people in al-
Sharqiyya,” he continued, waving at the group, “everyone participates as they like.” In fact, most 
groups do have a rotating leadership role, which carries little importance other than the title. The 
same performer in the Firqat Ḥārat al-Bilād joked with me that “if the group had anything at all, 
we would share it all among us—luckily, we have nothing like the rich groups.”  
A similar sense of obligation informs praise performance responses to leaders’ 
generosity. Performers consider generosity to be a “good deed”—fulfilling a social obligation—
and as such obliges a response in praise, which strengthens the leader’s reputation (cf. Caton 
1985 for a broader discussion). The inducement to respond with praise was, in my interlocutors’ 
terms, “incumbent upon us” (‘alā ‘ātiqunā, lit. “[to be] upon our shoulders”), or simply “upon 
us” (‘alaynā). “If he [an authority figure] comes to our hometown,” reflected one performer from 
Manaḥ, “we must go out (‘alaynā naṭla‘) and meet him with the razḥa. If we do not, we have not 
done well, this is a great shame; when someone comes you have to represent yourself… as a 
community. We appreciate his coming (naqaddar ḥuḍūruh).” Praise is seen as a “turn” in the 
relation between rulers and the ruled. “The poet praises the king for justice, generosity, acuity, 
and might,” writes Arabist Suzanne Stekevych, “but the poem at the same time challenges the 
king to prove or confirm this praise through an immediate action that all present will witness as 
                                                          
85 See Limbert (2010, ch. 5) for a discussion of norms of generosity regarding water in Bahlā’. 
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proof of his authority and legitimacy” (2002, 34). Indeed, it can be seen as a guarantee for further 
generosity from rulers. According to an older performer, Sulṭān:  
The Sultan is very generous to Manaḥ. Why? Because we are true sons of Oman, and we 
hold our traditions and he knows this when we snap and buzz the blades (lamma nihizz 
al-asyāf, “when he sees us razḥa”). You know, he brought the ḥuṣn al-shamūkh, he 
brought the language school [the SQU extension for teaching Arabic as a second 
language], there is a new museum, he is rebuilding the Old Quarter of Bilād. These are 
true treasures of Omani heritage, and soon Manaḥ will be a center of tourism and all this. 
Wallahi, he knows that everything he does in Manaḥ we welcome [it] and we respond [to 
it]. 
 
Generosity that is not responded to with praise might disappear, as well. Sulṭān continued by 
saying that “If we don’t do the razḥa to welcome our guests, the big and the small, how are we 
any different from the Indians and Bangladeshis? We are no different. If we are from Manaḥ, 
then it is upon us that we razḥa, just as it is upon the Sulṭān to aid [us].” In this framing, Sulṭān 
points out the direct and deep link between regional and national identity and the obligations to 
perform. This circuit of obligation between authority and praise is clear to him as a properly 
socialized member of a broader moral economy, a functioning social order. Such a social order is 
composed of people who contribute different things to maintain it. 
 There is no question that people in Manaḥ, not just performers, recognize that these 
different contributions are unequal. Anthropologist David Graeber refers to this kind of 
economic relation as a moral relation of hierarchy, as opposed to communal relations (which 
involve giving freely) and exchange relations (which are “tit-for-tat” exchanges between equals) 
(Graeber 2014, ch. 5). Such a hierarchical relationship does engage widespread human norms 
about reciprocity, even though in this case a return gift is totally impossible (Graeber 2014, 109-
13). A small agricultural community—even a prosperous multi-tribal market town—cannot give 
an electrical transfer station, generous loans for house construction, a highway off-ramp, or a 
new soccer pitch to the Sultan, let alone the apparatuses of the state. “When gifts cannot be fully 
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reciprocated,” writes Yeh, “they establish, express, or legitimize relationships of power and 
inequality” (2013, 15). Such a response would be plainly absurd—I diligently asked about it 
anyway, to the derision of my Omani interlocutors.  
We were discussing an upcoming performance in ‘Izz, a small town near Manaḥ, over 
tiny cups of milky karak tea. Standing near the idling car, I asked where the drummers were. 
Ḥamad stared out over a low wall dividing the café from a small masjid prayer room. “Oh, they 
heard the Sultan was arriving at the Ḥuṣn al-Shamūkh and so they are looking for a little money. 
And so they’re late.” The Ḥuṣn al-Shamūkh is the Sultan’s gigantic and opulent palace just 
outside Manaḥ, where he has held court more and more as his health has declined. It is 
surrounded by a tremendous wall and houses many complexes, including a wonderful and 
wholly under-utilized library. 
 “The Sultan hands out money? We should go,” I laughed. 
 “No, it’s the guards who do it. Also, I don’t think you’d get any, O Englishman,” said 
Ṭalāl, turning his sleepy eyes towards me. He shaded them with his hand, pushing his light blue 
kimma back on his head and breaking into a slow smile.  
 “Well, what if I recite a poem? Does anyone know one I can use? Does anyone remember 
the ‘āzī Ḥuṣn al-Shamūkh by al-Marzūqī? That was given at the opening of the ḥuṣn, no?” 
 “Yes, that’s right, it’s a really beautiful ‘āzī, and the razḥa-s were the real thing (wāgid 
’aṣīla). It’s a great honor to have it here in Manaḥ, and it brought jobs. The Sultan gifted us with 
the construction of the ḥuṣn in Manaḥ because he knew that we are true sons of Oman, he feels 
comfort among us.” Ḥamad finished the cup of karak and threw it almost into the nearby trash 
can. He smacked his lips and said to himself, “The Nescafe is better here.” 
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 “You said it was a gift? Is it not so that you should respond to gifts, you should give an 
equal gift, or something like that?” I asked, expecting the performers to talk about their role in 
the opening of the ḥuṣn.  
“Yes, doctor,” replied Ṭalāl, “we gave another Ḥuṣn al-Shamūkh to His Majesty 
(naqaddam li-l-galāla ḥuṣn thānī) in Ṣalāla, you see.” 
“Don’t mind him,” his brother replied, “he’s being sarcastic. The ḥusn is a great symbol 
of the renaissance and of the glories of Oman (amgād ‘umān). That’s why it’s called ‘Fort of 
Glory/Loftiness.” 
Ṭalāl’s is an important joke. The very notion that the group—and by extension, the moral 
community that they represent—might respond to the generosity of the Sultan in kind is so 
ridiculous that it is openly mocked. Material social relations forbid it. Rather, it is the obligation 
of good leadership to provide such things. The receivers of generosity expect such dispensations 
based on their being part of a community with a leader who acts according to their expectations, 
and not, as many political scientists have it, because they pay taxes. In fact, such a simplistic 
cause-and-effect relation is precisely what leaders want who they “lead” to think.86 The 
Lancasters describe the situation this way: 
Participation by tribal and rural groups or notables in the activities of decentralised or re-
centralised states is often seen by historians and political scientists to be as clients of the 
                                                          
86 The vagaries of taxes, payments, dispensations, stipends, paid services, religious charity (ṣadaqā and 
zakā, not an exact analogy to Christian tithe systems), and the state’s or shaykh’s treasury cannot be fully 
analyzed here. Suffice it so say that while Al-Rasheed (1991) finds “bribes” an appropriate translation for 
stipendary payments issuing from the Rashīdī shaykh-s in Hail, my use of the CLA term rashwa to describe 
pay for performance was met with strong disagreement. Further, Eickelman (1985), Wilkinson (1987) and 
Rabi (2011) note that a shaykh’s acceptance of stipends from the state treasury was not in any way a contract 
or pledge of allegiance to that leader. A perfect example of this is the shaykh of the ‘Abriyīn tribe (based 
in al-Ḥamrā’) accepting a stipend from Sultan Taymūr in the 1950s but not aiding the Sultan’s armed forces 
as they marched to confront the former Imam’s brother Ṭālib in Balad Sayt at the outset of the Jabal Akhḍar 
War in 1957 (Allfree 1968, 55-6). This withdrawal of support was not a failure of morale, resolve, or 
breaking a promise or contract on the part of the ‘Abriyīn and their shaykh. Rather, it was a pragmatic move 
based on evaluating the jeopardized strength of the Sultan. 
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patron state/polity or as being tributarised by the state (e.g. al-Azmeh 1986:82, 86; al 
Rasheed 1989: 232; Kostiner 1991: 225; Velud 1995). Central government may intend 
such a dependency. Locally, payments of subventions by the Ottoman Empire, the 
Mandate governments, the early and modern bin Sa'ud rulers are seen by tribal leaders 
and tribespeople as a return for their help in keeping the peace. (Lancasters 1999, 345-6) 
 
In other words, local groups do not see the acceptance of pay as a promise or a contract 
for future behavior, but rather as a fulfillment of an existing relationship. The mutual obligations 
examined here—to give and to praise—are not framed as debts, requirements, duties, coercion, 
economic exchanges, bribes, services, or paid labor. Rather, they are the evidence of a 
functioning relationship between rulers and ruled, a continuing circuit of goods and recognition 
predicated on shared notions of the good. The way that Omani Arabs explained razḥa as a 
“response” (CLA, radd) indicates to me that they saw it not only as linked to generosity, but also 
as engaging it, meeting it in some equal way. It is the quality of that relationship—egalitarian, 
hierarchical, critical, respectful, dignified or humiliating—that razḥa operates on, as we shall see 
in the next chapter. 
a. Why praise is not saying ‘Thank you’ 
Performance groups present themselves as dignified, historically “located” collectives 
when they praise because generosity is not free from ulterior motives. Florence Weber writes 
that the gift “masks” other goals and relationships (1989, 74). This is in fact what makes 
generosity and praise so compelling—it is potentially dangerous to the social order. This is 
especially the case when it is hierarchical. “Gifts” that come from the Omani government are 
given to those who deserve them—Omanis, ostensibly equals with any other—but 
simultaneously put them in danger of signaling dependency.  
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I asked several times whether or not the razḥa was a way of saying “thank you” to the 
Sultan—to my mind, the proper response to a gift. None agreed with this interpretation. Aḥmad, 
the nephew of Sālim bin Sulaymān al-Shukaylī of Bahlā’, replied that “when you do something 
that is your role [to do so], what do we say?” I answered, “we say ‘lā shukr ‘alā wāgib’, is that 
not so?” “Exactly,” he responded, 
…we say ‘No thanks [are necessary] for [performing one’s] duty. Saying ‘Thank you” is 
not necessary (mū lāzim). We also often say, ‘you’ve done well’ (aḥsant) instead of 
‘thank you’, in Oman. Or ‘[‘you are’ or perhaps ‘that is’) ‘praiseworthy’ (mashkūr/a). 
Now why do we say that? Because you’ve done well, you’ve done the correct thing. I 
don’t thank my father for giving me food, a home. That’s his role. ‘Thank you’ is not 
expected. I will say, aḥsant, ‘you’ve done well’… if I say anything. 
 
The difference between a duty or an obligation and the kinds of activities for which 
thanks are necessary is delineated here clearly. Graeber, reflecting on the super-abundance of 
“pleases” and “thank-yous” in American sociality, refers to it as the “quintessence of middle-
class morality” (2014, 123). Such a morality asserts a kind of false equality that is, in his view, 
based on the imputation of norms regarding exchange (the tit-for-tat trade of goods among 
equals) to those that properly involve what he terms “baseline communism” (the free movement 
of goods as people need them) (123-4). He notes that in contexts where it is assumed that people 
will take care of one another, people “often find it insulting to constantly be told, in effect, that 
there is some chance that they might not do their job as a waiter or taxi driver correctly, or 
provide house guests with tea” (124).87 Anthropologist Jacques Godbout reads the French 
                                                          
87 Anecdotally, I was told on several separate occasions to stop saying “thank you” in English and 
“shukran” in Arabic so very much. Ḥamad in Manaḥ had to tell me privately to stop thanking everyone 
when meeting folks or drinking tea or coffee with them. I also made a habit of thanking the invariably 
South Asian waitstaff that were subjected to endless torment from the performance troupes when we ate 
together. This too was taken to be incorrect. My wife and I were also corrected by a couple from Kerala 
that hosted us for a period in Muscat. The implication in each occasion was that my effusive thanks for 
the most basic hospitality was at the least annoying, perhaps showing weakness, and at the worst 
insulting. 
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“merci” (thank you) against the literature of the gift. Gifts, he thinks, are dangerous. “For 
instance,” he writes, “the word ‘thank you’—in French merci—may be seen as an indirect way 
of saying that the very fact of receiving a gift can make one in some sense dependent, can put 
one at the “mercy” (merci in French) of the giver” (1998, 8). Such a perspective on attributing 
generosity is presented by Wilson in her work on Chinese traders in Papua: 
I asked a young PNG-Chinese boy what he thought of his mother. “She knows how to 
survive,” he said. He smiled. “I’m like that too.” He offered me half of the cocoa pod he 
had stolen off a tree. “You’re lucky to have me with you, huh? Otherwise you’d get lost. 
And I can climb the trees and get you all (the cocoa pods) you want.” I thanked him. 
“You’re very generous.” He looked at me with scorn. “Of course.” What else did I 
expect? As his mother later explained to me, PNG-Chinese are, by definition, generous to 
each other, otherwise they never would have survived their history. (Wilson 1989, 77) 
 
Certainly the same can be said for Omanis. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has posited the first of two linked mechanisms that help show how praise 
and political authority are linked: the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism. In this chapter, I 
outlined a “macro” process: that is, the linkage between two broad social behaviors and beliefs: 
the generosity of leaders and their perceived legitimacy. This was complicated by the reciprocal 
mutuality of the “gift,” analyzed in several places and on several scales. While many other 
factors and practices also play into this process, generosity is an important one for our purposes 
because, as I have shown, Omanis recognize that praise is an appropriate response to such 
generosity. For some Omanis, their praise involves performing razḥa and ‘āzī, linked 
performance practices that have a long history of mediating political relationships in Oman. In 
the next chapter, I show how the form and practice of razḥa, as a collective dance and song 
practice, has particular implications in performers’ understandings of praise and their role in 
praising.   
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Chapter 4: A Moral Economy of Praise: How Razḥa Integrates Power into Community 
لاجرلاب ئنبت راد لك 
 لاجرلاب دضاعتت امل  
لاجم هلام لسكلا امأ 
 بيرق لاو ديعب نم لا  
Every homeland is built by men,  
when those men work hand in hand. 
As for laziness, it has no place  
neither near nor far. 
Rabī‘al-Millāḥ bin al-Murr al-Hidayfī, 
 ‘āzī for the Firqat Ḥārat al-Bilād li-l-funūn al-sha‘abiyya 
 
In this chapter, I investigate collective performance responses to the 
Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism described in chapter 2. There are many kinds of responses to 
the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism, but the one we will focus on here is collective praise 
performance in the sung-poetry and dance complex called razḥa. This chapter presents razḥa 
performance as another potential mechanism, what I call the Razḥa Integration mechanism. 
Integration in this context refers to two processes: 1) the pulling together and mutual expression 
of both dependency and power on the part of performers; and 2) the socially and culturally 
realized public reception and recognition of generosity. Thinking abstractly, we can conceive of 
this mechanism as working during or within the overall process of the Generosity/Legitimacy 
mechanism. During this overall mechanism, the specific ways that razḥa are performed is 
understood to signal not only dependency, but also power, cultural authority, strength, Omani 
identity, dignity, masculinity, communal bonds, and other positively evaluated qualities. My data 
suggest that razḥa is a social mechanism that mediates a central social uncertainty that emerges 
in the context of leaders’ gifts—generosity’s potential for both equality and inequality. 
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This hypothesis relies on the ambiguity of the social processes involved in the 
Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism. If the general mechanism of “generosity produces 
legitimacy” holds in Oman, we can see that it has taken a variety of courses throughout history. 
Direct disbursal of cash and goods to tribal leaders is qualitatively and quantitatively different 
from disbursements to patronize poets, which differs yet again from the expansion of 
infrastructure and other social welfare benefits and the ensuing collective praise response. Each 
of these can be conceived to be operating according to its own cultural logic, although some 
elements are shared.  
a. Experimenting with the “Alchemy” of Generosity: A Theoretical Détente  
Before showing how this proposed mechanism functions, we should draw the focus to an 
argument latent in the last chapter. In it, I briefly pointed out that the mutual valuation of 
generosity amongst elites and non-elites means that “generosity” as a concept and practice might 
be a potential source of hegemony construction. Similarly, I intimated that the obligation of elites 
to be generous was both a specific strategy of rule as well as an emblem of their commitment to 
a reciprocal moral economy. While I explored community- and state-based generosity as 
interacting with the vicissitudes of gift exchange, it bears repeating that anthropologists have 
largely confined their analyses of gift exchange to small-scale societies. While this is thankfully 
changing, Katherine Bowie’s concern that “the significance of gift giving in the political 
economy of complex societies deserves more attention” remains salient (1998, 476; but see Yeh 
2013). In her study of the “alchemy” of charitable giving as a way of tham bun (making merit) in 
Theravada Buddhist Thai villages, Bowie shows that a variety of interpretations undergird 
different acts of giving and receiving. Even though monks and temples are considered the 
worthiest recipients of gifts, the practices of beggars are understood to be “making merit by 
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allowing those who are better off to part with material possessions and thus practice non-
attachment” (471-72). By focusing on class in this way, Bowie is able to point out how “the role 
of the poor in shaping the behavior of the wealthier has been ignored” in scholarship on the gift. 
“Morality,” she writes, “is responsive to social context” and givers and receivers are mutually 
constituted along moral valences as well as political economic ones (474). While merit-making 
“masked inequality with a veil of legitimacy,” it was nevertheless a “weapon of the weak,” 
wherein apparently voluntarist giving was subtly coerced from the wealthy by ever-present 
threats of theft, violence, and looting (474-76). Bowie argues that charity qua merit-making 
developed as a kind of class détente: it eased class tensions by generating charity from the 
wealthy to provide for the needy while never calamitously upsetting the status quo. Bowie seems 
to conclude that non-elites regard violence as the unspoken potential response to failures of 
continued charity. 
While we often imagine the wealthy patron giving out goods, we rarely imagine how 
such giving is interpretively shaped, meaningfully intervened on, and constrained by the actions 
of the receiver. Further, as Bowie points out, there may be negative consequences to not 
giving—basically, Thai non-elites compel elites to give at least in part by threatening violence if 
it does not continue. Hegemony, in the Gramscian sense, might be best conceived of not as a 
temporary alliance, or coincidence of interests, but instead as a détente, as Bowie claims. 
“Hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups 
over which hegemony is to be exercised,” wrote Gramsci, so “that a certain compromise 
equilibrium should be formed” (1971:161). It is this compromise, this class standoff, that I think 
is enacted in performed responses of praise. As I noted in the last chapter, while there has been 
some attention given to elites’ practices of directed generosity, there has been little effective 
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attention to the responses that non-elites return. In that vein, this chapter not only analyzes those 
responses, but attempts to show that those responses are not merely the expression of gratitude, 
but are attempts to speak back, to intervene, to provoke. Omani praisers, when they razḥa, do not 
simply “receive” gifts.  
It is here where I think we can usefully extend Bowie’s work. Focusing closely on the 
responses of non-elites shows how non-elites can compel giving through negative means—“give 
generously or we’ll kill you”—and through positive means.88 Praise might be an example of a 
positive means. Rather than the implied threat of violence, praise is a concrete action that ties 
acts of giving with a particular set of ideals of authority, moral action, and a community. As we 
saw in out discussion of ethnomusicologists’ study of praise, praise has an explicit normative 
component. While hegemony might be a détente rather than an alliance, praise is a way of 
ensuring the continuation of that détente in a way that benefits non-elites at the same time as it 
benefits elites by insisting on and disseminating norms that achieve that goal. In short, praise as 
manifest in razḥa and ‘āzī is a way of turning acts of giving into relations of obligation—it turns 
acts of giving into a moral economy.  
I argue that this Razḥa Integration mechanism operates through praise performance in 
such a way that it circumvents and modifies the relationship between performers and elites from 
one of dependency and encompassment to one of obligation and reciprocity. Generosity is not 
just a good deed, it is a good deed because it helps specific communities. Rather than producing 
one-way relations of patronage dependency like those of the Islamic Middle East surveyed by 
Sharlet (2014), razḥa performance instantiates renewed and reaffirmed relations of mutuality 
                                                          
88 I do not mean to imply moral valences here, equating “positive” with “good”, just that one is a 
concrete action and the other is the lack of action. 
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between performers and elites, changing the way that the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism 
operates. This sustains the integrity and solidarity of the community in the face of a sometimes 
overwhelmingly powerful state apparatus of development and giving. What I mean by this is that 
the form, presentation, and texts of razḥa and ‘āzī and what these forms, presentations, and texts 
mean to performers prevent or diminish the social effects of dependency that can arise in unequal 
gift exchange. They do not obliterate unequal power relations, but they might transform them, 
tame them, reduce them to mutual obligations cycling throughout a community built of locals 
and the ruling classes. Performers assert that their communities and elites are part of a network 
of trust and mutual obligation—a moral economy. In razḥa, community members display their 
reception of gifts and represent the community as morally deserving of the gifts along several 
axes: because they are dignified, because they are part of an egalitarian society, because they are 
Omani, and importantly, because praise is a form of civic labor that deserves recognition. I do 
not think it obscures the deeply unequal social and material relations between these vastly 
different class positions. It does not “produce” egalitarianism. Performance does, however, 
demonstrate and display graciousness, dignity, communality, sociality, and Omani heritage while 
also enacting the reception of generosity that ultimately cannot be returned.  
b. The Razḥa Integration mechanism 
In chapter 2 I proposed five principles of praise that would be investigated. In this chapter 
I analyze principles 3—5: 
3) that praise is addressed to power and aimed at integrating power into community;  
4) that praise manages power relationships by manipulating fame, name, and reputation; 
5) that praise is civic labor, an obligatory response to generosity and an inducement to 
further giving. 
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When we think about praise and generosity as being mutual obligations, as being linked in a 
moral economy, we can see how principles 3—5 are not only responses to praiseworthy 
behavior, but responses that intervene in those relationships. For performers and communities, 
praise is not a straightforward exchange, but a way of doing something to achieve certain ends. 
Such ends can be material—indeed they often are—but can also point to the production or 
maintenance of certain kinds of social relationships and identities. These are not opposed ends. 
Rather, these principles show how praisers manipulate context, social status differentials, shared 
mythopoetic histories, imagery, reputation, and notions of equality in order to draw elites into a 
shared moral economy, and to fix them there. 
This drawing in is achieved in several ways, and I think that it must be continuously re-
performed. Surely, elites would prefer not to give and enjoy the same benefits of hegemonic 
control. Preventing the moral economy’s dissolution into a market economy requires continual 
intervention. The reason I argue that praise intervenes in social relationships of praise is that 
performers often explain that razḥa is a response (CLA. radd) to praiseworthy deeds (variously 
referred to as O. Ar. makrūma/makrūmāt, mafkhara/mafākhir, or CLA. khayrāt, ḥasānāt) or 
noble virtues (O. Ar. faḍīla/faḍā’il, maziyya/mazāyā). Praise in the Omani context is a claim on 
ruling classes: that they are caught in mutual obligation relations with local communities—that 
they constitute a shared moral economy. Giving and praising, while not transactions, are 
reciprocally arranged and produce certain social relationships. I trace this mechanism though 
analyses of performance and the way that performers motivate four discourses: 
1. Communities are necessary to complete circuits of praise. Performers frame 
themselves as necessary to the completion of exchange circuits of praise and goods by 
being a crucial source of praise and representation, initiated through invitations and 
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consultation. Further, they present themselves as a community that is a worthy and 
correct recipient of gifts from leaders by mythopoetically presenting a shared history 
between their community and leaders, that is, as Omani Arabs. Since it is also an 
obligation on givers to receive praise, the context of receiving collective praise is used by 
performers to represent their communality. Leaders, in turn, regard engaging razḥa 
groups as a way to produce interest in their activities. Performance is then a way of 
“encompassing” the praised, just as the generous giver “encompasses” the recipient. They 
are obliged to listen, to pay attention, and to remunerate. 
2. Performers present themselves as dignified and proud. Performers graciously receive 
gifts in a way that does not demean them and also asserts their autonomy, pride, and 
dignity through bodily comportment, adornment, and dignified communal movement. 
Dignity and pride are embodied through bodily states like ḥamās, 
(enthusiasm/excitement, fervor, élan); shugā‘a, (bravery, courage, also encouragement); 
and rigūla, (masculinity, manliness). By “accepting” or “integrating” gifts into a 
community by acting as representatives of the community, they obscure direct 
relationships of dependence that might obtain in dyadic gift relations. 
3. Performers see praise as labor that is necessary to building community. Since 
performers generally conceive of praise in moral and sociable terms as outlined in 
Chapter 2 and are obligated to respond to generous giving, they frame their praise, 
communal charity, and male sociability as Omanis as a kind of labor in service of the 
nation and community. This framing signals that they do not receive gifts for “nothing.” 
Both the performance practices and the labor involved in maintaining a community are 
often compared to work and operates as a kind of maintenance of sociality. 
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4. Performers understand praise performance and gifts to be necessarily communally 
oriented. Omani razḥa and ‘āzī differ from other forms of the Generosity/Legitimacy 
mechanism because they are necessarily communal and collective, recognizing 
obligations not between patrons and clients, but between rulers and communities. Since 
gifts of development and infrastructure are given not to individuals but for communal 
use, the praise response must also be communal. The forms of performance themselves 
are necessarily communal and are taken as evidence of the ways in which performance 
necessarily implicates the entire community. 
c. Outline 
Much of this chapter follows one performance over the course of an afternoon and the 
days of planning before it and shows how different discourses animate the ways in which form, 
presentation, and text confront and subvert the dangers of dependency. The framing event of this 
chapter was a festival arranged in the wilāya of Manaḥ in the Interior which was organized by 
the wālī on October 6th, 2017. The festival, entitled “fī ḥubb Qābūs” (“For the love of [Sultan] 
Qābūs”), was planned for the evening of the Friday at the end of a week that witnessed new 
photos and videos of the Sultan being released on Omani state media after no such pictures or 
videos had been seen of him for several months. The Sultan was in fact in residence at his palace 
in Manaḥ, the Ḥuṣn al-Shamūkh mentioned previously. Ḥamad, the manager of the Firqat al-
‘Arabī in al-Ma’arā, informed me that the appearance of the Sultan was very reassuring to the 
people of Oman, who did not know whether he was alive or dead. His appearance caused many 
groups and governmental bodies to plan celebrations for the weekend. In the days leading up to 
Friday night, the group was busy consulting with the office of the wālī to hammer out the details 
of their performance. As I discuss certain features of this performance and the events leading up 
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to it, I will show how these four discourses come into play when performance is addressed to 
power. 
Over the course of this chapter, I document two related threads: how performers use 
razḥa to skirt the potential that generosity would render them as weak or dependent, and how 
performers actively draw elites into relations of mutual dependence in a moral economy. 
“Transforming power into community”: Praise as a Necessity 
The organization and the planning of the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival was mostly undertaken in 
the few days between the appearance of the Sultan in various media and the next available day 
off, Friday. I asked the performance groups and later the wālī whether they could have a festival 
without the performance groups. “Never,” replied the wālī, “they are a necessary part of our 
community and they present our unity and our pride (humā giza’ ḍurūrī min mugtam‘anā wa-
yubayyinū waḥdatunā wa-‘izzunā).”89 When I relayed this to some of the groups, one member 
memorably replied: “that’s true, we’ve heard that before, but I tell you no one would come if it 
wasn’t for us.” 
“How do you mean?” I asked. 
“If it was just speeches and odes? No, that won’t work (mā yaṣlaḥ), no one would come. 
He [the wālī) knows what brings crowds, and he wants crowds. The wālī is good, brings 
beneficial things to us from his virtuous nature (yigīb al-ashiyā’ al-mufīda min faḍā’iluh), and 
we do razḥa. If we are invited, there will be crowds. Simple.” 
                                                          
89 Some of his enthusiasm must be attributed to his speaking to me and his knowledge of my 
project. Performance groups in Manaḥ have noted that former wālī-s have not taken really any 
personal interest in the groups at all, simply delegating lower officials to make sure they are 
present. Certainly some celebrations and events from the past did not involve one or more of the 
groups, to their chagrin. 
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“I see. And are those things equal? Is that an equal exchange (tabādul90 mustāwī) 
between the good things and the razḥa?” 
“No,” he replied, “there is no exchange. We do razḥa today for Qābūs, and the wālī is 
recognized because he brought us together. He hosts the event—each contributes to the event in 
[their own] way (yasāham fī al-mushārika kulli ḥad bi-ṭarīqu).” 
 This is an example of the first discourse I present here: that of the way that performers 
and hosts see their praise as essential or necessary to the completion of the circuit of exchange 
and praise. If performers are keen on seeing the razḥa as a kind of necessary part of a circuit of 
mutual obligation, it is because the danger of dependency is at least tacitly understood. 
Performers are not merely paying a debt or thanking a patron. From the perspective of razḥa 
performers, generosity and praise in the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism form a circuit 
between equals of different capacities. It is not a squaring of accounts because there is no way to 
“account” for the things which are exchanged. The fact of their exchange, and the different and 
incommensurable “value” that is attributed to the exchanged praise and goods, are enough to 
make the claim that this circuit is one of mutual concern and commitment. If it was just an 
equitable exchange, a contract, a debt to be repaid, then the logic of thanks and accounting would 
operate. But it is not. Rather, this circuit of goods and praise is a sort of expectation based on the 
mutual fulfillment of different but linked obligations. It is the fulfillment of an obligation 
pursuant to previously fulfilled obligations. Just as performers and the communities they 
represent cannot fund the building of palaces and hospitals, leaders cannot praise themselves. 
                                                          
90 It should be noted here that tabādul is a word that does not in itself imply any equality in 
quantity, just participation in some kind of transfer, as “exchange” does in English. In Arabic, 
the word does not necessarily imply an economic focus, though see chapter 6 in Lancasters 
(2011) for their take on concepts of exchange in the Oman Peninsula. 
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Good deeds require the praise of a moral community that matters to the doer of the deed. For 
Omani celebrations of development, good rule, and infrastructure, praise poetry operates as it 
does in South Africa: “the recitation of praise poetry is a constitutive element of the event 
itself”—it forms the basis of the entire affair (Kresse 1998, 188). That praise is central to these 
gatherings is important because it fulfills the need for deeds to be recognized unambiguously in 
appropriate praise. 
 Classicist Leslie Kurke (2013) explains the necessity of praise in Ancient Greece when 
she quotes one of Pindar’s lines, “For praise from home is mixed with blame” (2001, 76). In her 
interpretation,  
the same house that produces achievements cannot also manufacture their glorification. 
Praise must come from outside in order that the surrounding community not be alienated, 
or put positively, the value of the achievement is the prestige it has in the eyes of the 
community, so the praise must come from the larger group. (Kurke 2013, 76) 
 
Kurke’s argument throughout her monograph The Traffic in Praise is that Ancient Greek praise 
poetry, epinikia, was part of an “economy” of praise and good deeds that constantly circulated 
amongst houses, patrons, poets, and communities. Aristocrats, participating in the earliest 
Olympic games, were praised for their victories in order “to match the deed in words” (2013, 
86). In a sense, victory and good deeds set individuals apart from society, and praise poetry 
reincorporated them by reminding them why the deeds performed were good and praiseworthy: 
because they served the community. Indeed, in the 5th century BCE context of shifting political 
power from influential independent aristocratic households to the mixed urban city-state polis, 
drawing aristocrats into the moral community of the polis was “the condition of its survival” 
(2013, 225). Elites’ contributions to mutual defense, festivals, taxes, and other social goods were 
necessary to the continuing viability of the city-state social structure. The fear that aristocrats 
might “absent themselves from the polis” could be avoided by mollifying them with praise 
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(2013, 225). Rather than allowing aristocrats to distance themselves from the everyday life of the 
community, community members sought ways to link aristocrats to the life and future of the 
polis itself. Von Hallberg summarizes Kurke’s argument as showing how “[Pindar’s] poems 
produce power by giving an athlete, a household, and a city recognition from outside the city’s 
borders” (2014, 46). In such a condition, praise poetry “sets out to produce general value for a 
wide audience to share” and is therefore part of a system that “transforms power into 
community” (2014, 47). Power—in this case, power that inheres in fame, name, and reputation—
brings a person, family, or deed into direct mythopoetic contact with a real, discrete community.  
Power in the ancient Greek polis was held by independent noble houses (at least at first), 
who were drawn into the civic life of the city to ensure their collective survival. Being “drawn 
in” means that the noble houses were convinced in one way or another to use their economic 
capital for the general benefit of the polis rather than merely for themselves. In the contemporary 
Middle East, the state-form and those that control its institutions hold similar constitutive power. 
Since praise is “addressed to power” (per the 3rd principle of praise I outlined above), we find 
that Omani praise practices often deal with relationships between rulers and ruled.  
Older extant razḥa-s were directed at shaykh-s and qāḍī-s. For example: 
 هيراجم ذخات لكاشملا يلخ فورلاب يضاقلاي فورلاب فورلاب 
نيو دح لك هموكحلا يسركو روربم جحلاو هيراجم ذخاتهيض   
Bi-l-rūf, bi-l-rūf yā qāḍī, bi-l-rūf  
khulī al-mushākil, ta’khudh migāriyya; 
Ta’khudh migāriyya wa al-ḥagg al-mabrūr  
wa kursī al-ḥikūma kulli ḥadd yanḍīu. 
 
Take it easy, O qāḍī, take it easy,  
leave your problems and take a trip. 
Take a trip—the ḥajj pilgrimage:  
the seat of government is all of us and life goes on. 
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Another refers to the shaykh and his role within the community as a kind of shepherd (see Music 
Example 5). 
 
Music example 5. Razḥa melody from a performance in al-Ma‘arā and al-‘Izz in wilayāt 
Manaḥ. 
The shaykh mentioned here quickly comes to be understood as the Sultan in conversation. Newer 
razḥa-s, of course, are almost always directed at Sultan Qābūs, like this example from the fī ḥubb 
Qābūs festival: 
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Music example  6. Razḥa melody from the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival, written by Khalfān of al-
Ma‘amad. 
 
Matā yarga‘ linā ha-al-qā’id al-baṭal, 
 Min dīrat al-’Ālmān matā yarga‘ ‘alaynā; 
Kull ‘Umān al-yawm mishtāqa li-shūftak 
 Yā sayyid sulṭān ’inta linā dukhr 
 
When he returns to us, this heroic leader 
 from the land of Germany, when he returns to us 
All of Oman today misses seeing you 
 O lord Sultan, you are a treasure to us. 
 
a. Praise, Power, and Relationality 
Insofar as praise is addressed to power, it is relational. Because it often moves from lower 
to higher status individuals, it can index relations of weakness as well as strength. Shryock and 
Howell’s (2001) investigations of karam (CLA. generosity, hospitality) in the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan confirm this fact. Their discussion of the ways in which the ‘Adwani tribe 
has positioned themselves vis-à-vis the ruling Hashemites reveal, to them, the strength and the 
weakness of their position. When they were told the names of the “who’s who” of ‘Adwani 
notables over the course of their research, they found that the lists were often given to Shryock in 
confidence. Not only could these lists provoke envy in other families, but: 
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a mood of insecurity accompanies the construction of these lists, because they show 
beyond all doubt that the power to make (or break) an ‘Adwani notable now lies securely 
in government hands. Rhetorically, the lists create a double bind: they stand as proof of 
the “good relations” between the ‘Adwan, a shaykhly house, and the Hashemites, 
Jordan’s ruling house, but they simultaneously betray a spirit of calculated self-promotion 
that should never trouble the heads of the truly powerful, who bestow favors on others 
and rely on status inferiors to praise them for it. As the proverb says, “He who praises 
himself is a liar” (man ḥamad nafs-u fa-howa kādhib). (Shryock 2001:253-4) 
 
Shryock and Howell’s report shows two important facets of the relationships between praise and 
power: first, praise marks unequal relations. Since “real power” in some sense cannot be 
dependent, showing unambiguous dependency signals weakness. The ‘Adwani can only claim 
power through their dependence on the Hashemite state, and so can make only a limited and 
circumscribed claim on power. More importantly for our case here, however, is the fact that 
power can secure praise, but cannot praise itself. Self-praise makes one “a liar”; it is a praise that 
cannot be trusted. Proper praise, believable praise, requires “status inferiors” to produce and 
disseminate. This situation is partly what prompts the distribution of goods—economic power 
cannot be directly transformed into hegemonic power without human performance. Praise is 
necessary, but it cannot be produced by those who are praised—therefore, praisers are necessary 
as well. If praisers depend on giving, givers depend on praise. 
b. Offering Invitations, Acknowledging Mutuality 
The more time I spent with Omani performers of praise poetry, the more I realized that 
they knew that they were necessary and were proud of it. This does not mean that they were 
haughty. Instead, they had a sense of purpose as valued members of the community, even though 
this perception could be shaken in various ways. Performers think that their praise is not only an 
obligation but is necessary to the function of the overall Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism. 
However, the way that performers’ participation is realized changes the way in which 
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participants in the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism perceive their relationship. One practice 
that performers point to as evidence of their necessity is the formal invitation. My research 
concurs with Christensen and Castelo-Branco’s survey of Ṣuḥār insofar as performers expect to 
be invited to perform, and not commanded (2009, 218-9).  
As a contrast, in medieval examples of poetic patronage we see that poets took advantage 
of the presence of the king, shah, or caliph in his court to attempt to solicit patronage. This is 
similarly a way for praisers to affirm their necessary role in the “economy of praise” (Kurke 
2013). However, poets were not necessarily invited to give praise poetry in the courts of caliphs, 
they simply showed up and expected an informed audience. For example, in Kumiko 
Yamamoto’s The Oral Background of Persian Epics: Storytelling and Poetry (2003), she 
presents Persian courts as having been relatively open to poets, with rulers distributing largesse 
in anticipation of the arrival of praisers at festivals. The poets, reciting praise and epics, were a 
kind of entertainment. She cites a courtly text on such an exchange: 
[Mas'ūd I] sat down to the feast of nowruz. He had brought many presents and taken a lot 
of trouble [in preparing the feast]. He heard poems (še'r) recited by poets (šo'arā'), to 
enjoy himself in this time of winter, and unwind and relax. [When the poets finished 
reciting,] he gave them presents. (2003, 54) 
 
Present-day Omanis, on the other hand, do not perceive their razḥa poetry in praise contexts as 
being for entertainment and would not imagine performing without explicit permission. One 
important way that performance groups demonstrate their necessity to the praised is by only 
performing for an invitation (da‘wa, Christensen and Castelo-Branco (2009) also report 
barwah91).While many performances involve the direct transfer of cash, groups leaders made 
                                                          
91 When I asked the troupe about the term barwah, several respondents were surprised that it was 
in use in Ṣuḥār in between the 1980s and 2005. One described barwah this way: “barwah means 
a letter from the wālī, a letter with a seal from the wālī that says something, I don’t know what. I 
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sure to tell me that they would not perform for leaders without express invitation from some 
involved representative.  
 The invitation for performance at these kinds of events always moves from the powerful 
to the less powerful. Making a request makes one vulnerable. Thus, when local leaders (like the 
wālī of Manaḥ in the case of the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival) call a meeting to solicit the performance 
groups and invite them to participate, groups perceive this as a proper way in which the leader 
subtly lowers himself in order to secure their involvement. The invitation is a potential signal of 
dependency because it shows how the festival requires the participation of status inferiors. This 
is a major way in which groups point to their necessity in this circuit of exchange—they could 
not be ordered, but only invited by leaders, just as one would approach an equal—even if this 
equality is temporary. 
 Aḥmad, the ‘āzī and Vice President of the group in al-Ma‘arā, related that he was 
summoned (along with the leaders of the other performance groups in Manaḥ) to the office of the 
wālī in order to discuss setting up the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival to celebrate. He emphasized that this 
was a formal invitation, not a command. “It was consultation (shūrā),” he pointed out,  
it was not a command (’amr). In fact, this was a very good meeting and the first in a long 
time. We have been invited to come to the office of the wālī before to discuss 
performances. This was different. All the groups came, and the wālī said he wanted a big 
performance. Māshāllah, you saw the crowd (al-gumhūr), it was a big event. I have never 
seen this in my time in the group, it was the largest in Manaḥ that I can remember. 
 
The fact that Aḥmad considers this consultation reflects how important the notions of an 
invitation and collaboration are for the praise groups. The notion of consultation is a crucial one 
for Omani political and social life (Ghubash 2001). In this case, the wālī’s invitation brought 
                                                          
have never seen a real barwah but that’s how things were done in the old days. If he [the wālī] 
announced something, if he made a ruling, then there would be barwah.” 
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together the four different neighborhood groups in Manaḥ, which impressed many Manḥī-s. In a 
conversation after the conclusion of the event, I asked a few members about the cooperation they 
saw: 
BJG: Have the four groups ever worked together before this? This was a very large number of 
performers today, I think. 
Ḥamad: This is the biggest number I have seen. This is why al-Waḥshī [the wālī of Manaḥ] is 
respected, because he does consultation with all the groups. 
BJG: And not all the groups get along, you might say. They don’t all agree. 
Salām: “We say ‘bull’, and they say milk it.”92 [laughter] 
Ḥ: That’s true. But this is what al-Waḥshī does, this is why he is loved. He brings us together, 
brings everyone [together] and brings a big participation. His invitation is heard. 
The wālī’s ability to draw together the disparate groups—to persuade, to arbitrate—is a 
critical ability of “the shaykh” in Arabian political culture. Part of this comes from knowing 
when to issue invitations and to whom. For Ṣuḥāris, such an invitation is crucial to the 
organization and proper reception of performance, especially when the performance is addressed 
to power in front of the wālī’s office (Christensen and Castelo-Branco 2009, 218-9).  It is no less 
so for Manḥī-s, who take the invitation as a kind of solicitation and the beginning of an 
obligation. “Without an invitation, how could we razḥa?” another performer remarked when I 
                                                          
92 Naqūl thūr, yiqūlū ḥilbuh. This is an old saying, perhaps not so commonly used anymore. 
Salām and I enjoyed talking about old sayings and idioms and he had brought this one up in a 
group conversation earlier that day. The phrase refers to disagreement or two people who do not 
see something the same way. Usually it is applied to people who ignore advice or incorrectly 
assess a situation. In this case, it can refer to obstinate disagreement or contradiction stemming 
from dislike. 
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asked. “[Would] we just go and take their space, be annoying, sing and dance for money just like 
that? No, never, doctor, that would be no good.” 
Though invitations always move from the powerful to the less powerful, this “power” can 
be situational. For example, oftentimes members of the performance troupes will expect direct 
invitations to perform, rather than general requests from troupe leadership. The “administration” 
(O. Ar. ’idāra or mudīriya) of the troupe often announces group events by sending a written 
invitation that stipulates location, uniform, event type, and whether or not group members should 
bring antique rifles. Here is the invitation to the festival sent to members of the Firqat al-‘Arabī: 
“For the Love of Qābūs” festival: 
Delighting in the high station and radiating benevolence of His Highness and 
being aware of his generous favors (makrūmāt) and the gifts (‘aṭā’āt) of the renaissance 
and its continuing progress over 47 years, the sons of Manaḥ are honored to hold the “For 
the Love of Qābūs” festival at 4:00 pm next Friday afternoon 06/10/2017 at the racetrack 
of the Dressage Club near the Manaḥ Health Center. The festival will include: 1) Men’s 
Arts; 2) Women’s Arts; 3) Horse and Camel shows; 4) Drone aviation; 5) Unfurling of 
the colors of the flag of the Sultanate and pictures of His Majesty; 6) Closing ceremony 
(al-‘āzī). The invitation is open to all. 
In the name of [local shaykh] and by his request I present to you an invitation to 
participate in the festival in the Governate of Manaḥ and in the neighborhood of al-
Ma‘amad near the Manaḥ Health Center. We ask of you that you participate alongside 
your brothers in the 4 performance troupes of Manaḥ in the mid-afternoon and into the 
evening and we would be honored by your attendance and presence. You are welcome as 
honored guests or as participants and may God grant you a thousand blessings in bond 
and wealth to raise the level of the arts in our Governate by your presence and 
attendance. 
The date is Friday 06/10/2017 and we will begin in the mid-afternoon, from the 
‘Aṣr prayer until the ‘Ashā’ prayer and afterwards God willing we will eat dinner (we 
will tell you if it’s cancelled). Your attendance in any number will be most welcome, an 
honor and a pleasure from you all, but as always the largest number of participants is the 
best. We ask especially for the participation of the youth; please listen and respond to this 
message. Your participation is most welcome. 
In regard to uniforms, please wear a white dishdāsha and a maṣar and khanjar of 
your own. If you do not have a khanjar with you, they will be provided and available for 
you from the common supply. Guns are not permitted at the event.  
Please accept my sincerest regards and most beautiful greetings, and may your 
days pass in health and good fortune. 
261 
 
 
 
c. How Invitations Avoid “Praise from Home” 
 Invitations are also crucial because they make praise a voluntary engagement, at least 
nominally. Two other proverbs make this clear: a pan-Arab caution that “Only the Devil praises 
himself” (lā yashukkar nafsu illā ’Iblīs) and the delightfully Omani colloquial “He who praises 
himself deserves a kick” (Bū maddāḥ nafsu yibālu rafsa). Praisers are necessary to the proper 
functioning of the circuit of exchange that animates the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism, but 
“praise from home is mixed with blame” and self-praisers are “liars.” This means that forced 
praise is just as tainted as self-praise. This puts pressure on leaders to make praise look as 
voluntary as possible. Hence the importance of the invitation, even if this invitation cannot really 
be ignored. Elites must seek out praisers. That said, leaders do maintain a distance between 
themselves and performers during the event. For example, at the fī ḥubb Qābūs event, despite the 
large number of participants and the successful round of invitations, all the invited guests sat in a 
long row in front of the dancing and parade ground. None of these important guests, including 
members of the Bū Sa‘īd family, performed praise for the Sultan. In an interview about why 
leaders do not perform the razḥa in Oman the way Saudi royalty perform al-‘arḍa al-najdiyya, 
one respondent replied that:  
Respondent: It’s really rare that a shaykh might do razḥa; but in Saudi it could be that 
they do it because they need to make more confidence in the leaders, you know? Here we 
have confidence in our leader and in our society (‘andnā thiqqa baynunā wa-as-sulṭān 
wa-al-mugtama‘) so why would he come and razḥa? He knows that we will do razḥa 
even if he was not there among us, but I don’t know about in Saudi. I wonder if they 
would do it without him, because you know you will be rewarded for doing [it]. Us, no, 
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there’s no reward, there’s no money. We do it because we are proud, and there is a 
request. How could we refuse an invitation to show our pride?  
BJG: There is a line from the group in Bahlā, “sayyidnā fī al-‘amr wa-ṭā‘a” (Our leader 
[we’re with you] whether ordered or voluntarily obedient). 
R: Yeeeeesssss, exactly. We would do razḥa if there was an order [to do so] and 
voluntarily, as well. Exactly. 
This respondent muses that the political situation in Saudi Arabia may make the façade of 
equality more important, which leads to shared performance with leaders. While Omanis of high 
social rank might write praise poetry, they rarely perform it. I myself have never seen a “leader” 
or host of any description participate in the razḥa, much less an ‘āzī, but this does not mean that 
this never occurred. When we look at the written history of razḥa-s in chapter 5, in fact, we will 
see that leaders are at least recorded to have participated. The changes in the social rank and role 
of participants reveal some important changes in Omani society over the last 50 years that will be 
investigated in chapter 6. 
Praise from a Second “Home”: Locating the Moral Economy 
After an invitation, groups start to plan their performances, write poetry, and choose their 
uniforms. This is the point at which praisers begin to (re)construct their moral economy, to insist 
once again on the reciprocal relations that tie giving and praising. Once the groups in Manaḥ 
were invited to perform for the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival, many began to write razḥa-s for the event. 
Once again, the poet who gave the ‘āzī at the soccer pitch, Rabī‘, volunteered himself for the 
performance of this ‘āzī, and the expectation of the other groups was that he would write a new 
qaṣīda for the event. The types of poems that the groups wrote will occupy us here insofar as 
they represent themselves as a proper community to offer praise, and reciprocally, to accept 
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generosity from leaders. One crucial social function that performance groups accomplish in 
performance is to help identify the community that they represent as morally and culturally 
correct recipients of generosity. This means that performers recognize the circuit of generosity 
not as a general pattern of exchange that obtains between givers and receivers or leaders and 
followers, but specifically within their communities. Praise is discursively realized as a necessity 
chiefly because of what it does within the specific moral, political, and cultural community in 
which it is sung.  
In Oman, the Sultan, various local or national patrons, and families are praised for their 
traits or actions, but always from a certain person from a certain location. Omanis see this as a 
necessary way in which specific deeds are recognized by specific communities, be they regional, 
ethnic, or religious. Omani praise practices are always tied in one way or another to a discrete 
location. This is partially accomplished by the way the performance groups are named after a 
particular town, region or even neighborhood. All groups are officially connected by way of 
name and by formal governmental registration with a particular locale. For example, the four 
groups that were invited to the festival represented four large neighborhoods in Manaḥ. They 
were: 1) The Firqat Ḥārat al-Bilād li-l-funūn al-sha‘biyya; 2) The Firqat al-‘Arabī li-l-funūn al-
sha‘biyya; 3) The Firqat al-Ma‘amad li-l-funūn al-sha‘biyya; and 4) the new Firqat al-Fīqīn li-l-
funūn al-sha‘biyya, representing, respectively, the Ḥārat al-Bilād neighborhood, the al-Ma‘arā 
neighborhood, the Ma‘amad neighborhood, and the Fīqīn neighborhood. Praise rarely occurs 
without also mentioning the nation, a state, or even a village, though this is more common in ‘āzī 
than it is in razḥa. Due to the shorter form of razḥa poems, they often require tacit knowledge of 
the present event and its surroundings to be fully understood. A good example of the way that 
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poetry frames the relationship between generous givers and praisers is a razḥa written and then 
sung by Khalfān, an older and founding member of the Firqat al-Ma‘amad, at the festival.  
‘Awal salām allah li-Qābūs al-mu‘aẓẓam 
Yalī ‘alaynā fāḍ bigūd wa makrūmāt, 
Ṣabaḥt ‘umān al-yawm fī khabr al-nu‘am 
Wa yā allah ‘amru madīd sanīn (fī) ṭā’ilāt 
 
First, God’s greeting to Qābūs the great, 
 He rules over us, overflowing with generous gifts and benefits, 
Oman awoke today to blessed news, 
O God, his age great, years of glory. 
 
 
Figure 21. Khalfān and another performer holding a copy of the razḥa-s Khalfān had 
written for the Fī ḥubb Qābūs festival. The first is discussed above—in conversation, 
everyone agreed that he had forgotten a “fī” in his writing in the last line. “It rides better 
that way,” a younger poet remarked. 
 
Part of this poem is clear, but the “blessed news” refers to the appearance of Qābūs on 
television—the reason for the festival. This kind of poem marks the distribution of goods 
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because the “generous gifts and benefits” (gūd wa makrūmāt) specifically refers to goods and 
services delivered by a patron to various clients (also from the root of the word used here for 
“generosity” or “hospitality,” karam) as a deed to be recognized by the “first greeting.”93 It is 
also important to note that while no location is verbally encoded in the text, Khalfān is so famous 
in Manaḥ that the poem is automatically associated with Ma‘amad and its community. The 
community recognizes the good deed of the Sultan, the “blessed news” of his continued health, 
and wishes for yet more. It is a recognition of a particular social relationship as well as a plea for 
it to continue, from a certain poet, in a certain place, and at a certain time. The wish for his long 
life is implicitly a wish for these same kinds of social relations to continue, where a powerful 
figure is morally obligated to help his own community. 
While much of this locational marking is accomplished pragmatically and deictically in 
razḥa, that is, through the people, group, grammar, and location of performance, in ‘āzī these 
markers are often verbalized. Recall the ‘āzī presented for the soccer pitch in al-Ma‘arā: 
These are our benefits in Manaḥ / We salute the designs that are in good order, 
[Those] that Qābūs taught us and acts in good faith / Qābūs is a physician to the 'umma. 
O my homeland al-Ma'arā, peace! / You gave me pride, you gave me respect. 
First the poet mentions the town and governate of Manaḥ, followed by the larger (potentially 
transnational) notion of the ‘umma, the religious community of Muslims. After this, he mentions 
the small neighborhood of al-Ma‘arā, the location of the performance and the home of most of 
the participants.   
                                                          
93 See Caton 1986 for a discussion of the importance of greeting. In Oman as well there exists an 
elaborate culture of greeting with various registers and requirements stemming from cultural and 
religious sources. 
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 The ‘āzī written for the festival mentions the Sultan alongside various cities and 
landmarks associated with state power: 
                                                                  … / And with one tongue94 they all spoke 
With one tongue, all of them [spoke] / and the results and blessings came, 
Witnessed by the Qaṣr al-‘Alam95 / In Muscat, the fine, the unshakeable. 
In Muscat and the rest of the cities / and in every inch of the nation, 
We thank [Qābūs] happily and publicly / God loves those who are grateful. 
Ziyād al-Shukaylī also incorporates location-specific lines into his 2016 ‘āzī, in direct speech to 
the Sultan. 
BJG: Often, bā, you say “You have Sumay’il, you have Ḥazim, your glory stretched from the 
lands of the Persians to Zanzibar, you have Buraymī and Ṣuḥār.” I’m not quoting the lines, the 
poetic lines exactly but that is the construction, with “you have” (‘indak). Why is that so, why do 
you say the cities as a list like that? 
Ziyād: Yes. Well, I do that to, to list the glories of Oman (amgād ‘Umān). I do that so that all 
know the breadth of Oman (misāfat ‘Umān), and the great cities that it is composed of. I also do 
this for Bahlā’, you didn’t mention Bahlā’, but I also do this for Bahlā’. So it is known, we are 
also a part of Oman and we are Omanis.  
BJG: But you use the “you/your” pronoun (-ak). Why do you do this? 
Z: That’s because I am speaking to His Highness. I am speaking to him. If I am speaking with 
you, I say “you” is that not so? He knows me, and I know him. He needs to know who I am and I 
am from Bahlā’ and I am of the Shukayl and like this. I’m not just someone from nowhere, or 
                                                          
94 Referring here to Sultan Qābūs acting on behalf of all Omanis. 
95 The royal palace built by Qābūs in Muscat, after demolishing his father’s. 
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asking for money or help or aid with no right or basis (min ghayr haqq wala ‘asās). In the old 
days, as I told you before, the ‘āzī informed people about news and it was also a form of 
requesting aid. If you request aid, there must be a relationship, it’s on the basis of something [or 
“it’s because of something,” (lāzim hunāk ‘alāqa fa-huwa ‘alā ‘asās shay). And what is the 
basis? It’s because of help from you, you supported them, you stood by them, and they 
reciprocate (Wa-al-‘asās mū? Al-‘asās huwa al-rifid mink. Tarfidhū, tugīrhū96, wa-b‘ad yiraddū 
lak).  
 In this case, Ziyād makes clear the ways in which support relies on mutual relations and 
reputation. He is not just any poet, but rather an Omani Arab Muslim poet from Bahlā’, with a 
historical relationship with Muscat, the Sultan, and the various cities of Oman. The cities belong 
to the Sultan, and insofar as they do, he is beholden to consult with them. Whether he does so is 
a different matter. What Ziyād is saying here, with the tact of a “status inferior” and praiser, is 
that there is a certain relationship between good, moral, Omani people and a good, moral leader. 
He is drawing a socially realized circle around a particular moral economy. The praiser is using 
the elite’s reputation for providing help to secure help in the present.  
 Marshall Sahlins has pointed out that kinship distance often recapitulates the moral stakes 
of exchange relationships: kin are given things freely, community members are given gifts (to be 
returned), and strangers are only engaged with in impersonal market exchange (1972, 190ff.). 
While this can be complicated, praise from non-elites to elites might be conceived as a way of 
mediating the enormous social distance between praisers and the praised by ensuring that the 
praised are kept as intimates in exchange, if not in kinship distance. Praise calls on powerful 
                                                          
96 From the form IV verb ’ajār from the root j-ā/ū-r, “to stand by or aid.” Other verbs from this 
root include “to be neighbors with” and “to support, shelter, or protect.” 
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social elites and attempts to embed them within such a fictive kinship proximity just as it seeks 
to embed them within a moral economy—the two are linked. 
Praisers mythopoetically create a morally valenced relationship. This not only draws 
some of the power of the poetry back to the poet (the praiser reminds the praised where he is 
from or where he is) but he also in some way binds the praised to the place or community. Von 
Hallberg writes, “the casual modern view is that praise is a gift to a deserving or undeserving 
recipient. The ancient one was rather that praise circulates through a culture, justly binding 
people in a network of obligations” (2014, 48). The praiser draws the praised into a “network of 
obligations” that involves forming social relationships with the praiser and his community, 
however brief. The crucial resource that is manipulated by poets here is fame, name, or 
reputation. Poets use the potency of having a good reputation in both positive and negative sense. 
In a positive sense, they praise good deeds to add to the reputation and fame of the praised. In the 
negative sense, they provide models for kinds of good behavior that would be praised. It is this 
kind of negative praise that helps to manipulate leaders. Interpreting what Khalfān sang to the 
wālī and to the Sultan: “God lengthens the life of those who give generously… you do give 
generously, don’t you?” 
a. In and Out of the Moral Economy: Proper and Improper Praisers 
 While it is the case that praise comes from proper sources, it is also true that Arab 
Omanis praise the Sultan and local leaders for things that all manner of people use. For example, 
praisers often mention the generosity of the Sultan with regard to rebuilding and restoring “Old 
Towns” (referring to the sections of abandoned houses and living spaces adjacent to modern 
housing built by the state in one way or another), highways, hospitals, modern amenities, power 
transformers, and water resources. All of these “good deeds” are of general social benefit. South 
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Asian and European guest workers, as well as tourists, benefit just as much if not more from 
these infrastructural investments, and yet they (and I) are not expected to praise the Sultan for 
them, certainly not in Omani poetic idioms. So why should Omani Arabs continue to praise these 
general benefits? 
Asking about why only Omanis praise things that everyone uses, I recorded several 
different answers. 
Respondent 1: How could anyone else praise the Sultan for these things? You say 
everyone uses the highway, yes, this is the reality. But how could you Englishmen praise the 
sultan for this? No, it’s not your place, you cannot. You use it, yes, but it is for development, part 
of the renaissance. 
Another: 
R2: We praise, as I told you, on the basis of our duty, it’s upon us (‘alā asās al-wājib 
‘alaynā). It is not upon you, or the Indians, or anyone else.  
A third replied: 
BJG: So, just imagine that you never performed for the opening of the soccer pitch or 
anything like that. Could you use the soccer pitch? For example, the players didn’t do razḥa but 
they use it the most of course.  
R3: Of course they didn’t need to razḥa in order to use the pitch. But I tell you, if no one 
came to recognize and honor the shaykh-s that helped build the pitch, that would be a great 
shame.  
BJG: You mean that you couldn’t use it? 
R3:  … No, no, I don’t think so, I mean, it would be a great shame.  
BJG: But it is for you, I mean, it is built for your sake. 
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R3: Yes, also [Bank Muscat, who funded the construction] and the state, I mean, the 
health ministry. They [all have] plans. It is for our sake but we have… to accept it in an 
appropriate way (al-mafrūḍ annu nataqabiluh bi-ṭarīqa munāsiba). 
And finally: 
R4: I tell you, now we rely on foreigners. But they will not be here forever, we don’t 
need them. We are strong and we don’t need them, soon they will all be gone.  
BJG: They will be gone? I’m a foreigner. 
R4: Yes, that is true. I mean the Indians will be gone. We have given them enough 
already.  
BJG: And we foreigners are not able to praise the Sultan for these benefits, as you say. 
R4: They cannot even speak Arabic, or English, God knows. They wouldn’t know who 
to praise, who to respect.  
An appropriate response, it is clear, is a praise response. In addition, it is not just a praise 
response, but praise coming from certain sources and bodies. In our case, it is from Omani Arab 
Muslim men from the rural Interior region of Oman. Indian guest workers, foreigners, and 
ethnographers are not fully able to participate in the shared moral economy that performers call 
into being as they praise. 
However, as we’ve seen, their praise is not a kind of reflex, an automatic recognition of 
good deeds, but rather an orchestrated and mutual realization of a social relationship with known 
parties. Foreigners are both shamed and symbolically excised from the social fabric by their 
inability to praise and “know” who to respect. Omani praisers not only have the ability to praise 
in socially acceptable ways, but also know what relationships are important and what 
personalities and activities require praising. Even for appropriately positioned praisers, however, 
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simply showing up to opening day festivities with praise poems comes from a place a weakness. 
Likewise, buying praise outright is questionable. Being invited to accept and recognize the good 
leadership of the Sultan’s development programs through poetry and performance is quite a 
different relationship than showing up uninvited with sycophantic verse in hand, certainly to 
Omanis. Further, this kind of location- and community-specific praise reveals the ways in which 
power has circulated in Oman, that is, in a relatively small-scale but modular rulership. Most 
importantly, however, this kind of praise poetry seeks to draw the praised into a moral 
community with the praisers. Rabī‘’s ‘āzī for the event concludes by recognizing this: 
This is our way and our path / O God, we ask, all of us 
Preserve for us our Sultan / And extend his life for years. 
b. Grabbed by Praise: Encompassing the Giver 
Earlier in this section, I indicated that praisers know that they are necessary, and that the 
praised are partly dependent on them for praise. One way that they identify this, I showed, was 
by accepting invitations, and another was identifying themselves as part of a specific community 
with the praised. Another way that praisers see themselves as having some power over the 
praised is the fact that the praised must pay attention to the praiser. 97 This is especially obvious 
when praisers speculate on the emotional states of the praised, whether they induce tears or an 
assortment of other emotional states that are more specific to Omani emotional registers.  
I want to cite here an explanation of this viewpoint put forward in a group interview in 
Manaḥ. Late in my fieldwork, I had started to focus on why razḥa was a group performance 
activity, and why it was necessary in addition to the qaṣīda. I spoke with the young ‘āzī of the 
                                                          
97 Earlier I referred to this as “encompassing” the praised, following Meneley 1996. 
272 
 
 
 
Firqa al-‘Arabī troupe in his new home (fīllā, “villa”) on the outskirts of al-Ma‘arā. As I drove 
up with Ḥamad, he noted the new garden. “I haven’t been to his new house yet.” He playfully 
grabbed my arm as he turned the car off. “I’m sorry, villa!” He laughed at the term used for these 
kinds of homes, separated off from one another and surrounded by a 2.5m high wall. Ḥamad 
lived in an older home, tucked tightly together with others on the main road, a secondary stage in 
the move out of the old walled quarters of Omani towns filled with ḥayyān, mud-brick and date-
palm trunk houses that accommodated large families.   
Aḥmad began to slide the metal gate open to greet us after Ḥamad honked the car horn. 
Ḥamad elbowed me as I was opening the car door and smiled again, pointing with his nose to the 
gate. I knew he wanted me to shout, “hawd, hawd!,” a type of greeting and warning to home-
owners, which announced guests, that meant something like “knock-knock!” This was not 
considered very refined behavior and Omani were delighted whenever I could be cajoled enough 
to do it. I was saved by Aḥmad simply waving us in. We walked into the courtyard and Aḥmad 
showed us some new gardens, low against the cement wall. I was encouraged to take a seat and 
prepare my recorder in the majlis, a separated room to host guests. Aḥmad’s was air conditioned, 
I immediately noticed, to a bone-chilling 16C. When the friends re-entered, I rose to greet them 
and we exchanged pleasantries again. Aḥmad, who had rather infamously (within the group, 
anyway) ignored my WhatsApp messages for a few days, pointed to a deep cut on his palm as an 
explanation. “I’m telling you, the phone beeped, and I reached to grab it and pow! I wounded my 
hand on the fence I was working on, there was blood everywhere. I went right to the hospital and 
I forgot about it, doctor, wallahi.” 
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“It’s no matter,” I said, waving it off, “as long as you’re well.” We settled into the 
interview session after sharing coffee, dates, and fruit. As the interview continued, I asked about 
qaṣīda and ‘āzī: 
BJG: I’ve heard that you can ask for things in poetry, for example, you can ask for money, or 
help, or what have you. 
A: Yes, I’ve heard that. That is so. 
BJG: Can you do the same in ‘āzī? Can you ask for… 
A: Oh, no no… 
Ḥ: No, I’ve never heard of that…  
A:  I’ve never heard of, yeah, right, I’ve never heard of that. No I don’t think so. 
BJG: Why is that? 
A: [scratches his beard and looks up to the ceiling and over to Ḥ] Eh… 
Ḥ: Eh, well I think… 
A: It’s not done, it’s not done. 
Ḥ: [shakes his head vigorously] It’s not done. 
A: That is the qaṣīda in which you request things. It’s a great shame to not fulfill a request when 
it’s asked from a shaykh in a qaṣīda, a great shame (wāgid ‘ayb). You don’t ask in ‘āzī; in ‘āzī, 
you need to show strength, manliness (al-rigūla), I mean, your pride and heritage. You represent 
your community, so you need to bring enthusiasm/vigor (al-ḥamās). 
BJG: Is there no enthusiasm/vigor in qaṣīda? 
A: In razḥa there is more, much more, no doubt, māshāllah. As you know, doctor, razḥa is 
unique to Oman, and so it touches the heart of all Omanis. 
BJG: Even leaders and others who have authority? 
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A: Everyone in the same way. Do you remember, yā ’akhī [turning to Ḥ] the al-Marzūqī ‘āzī 
when the Sultan shed one tear? You can see it, doctor, go on YouTube or the internet. We could 
see it now. He was just a boy, he was so young, but he had, māshāllah, he had a voice. [the 
conversation continues as he searches for it.] … Ah, here, here, look… there, there’s the tear. 
Look at him, [sitting] steadfast on the throne, and even then see how the arts grab him (wa b‘ad 
shūf kayf al-funūn tamsikuh)!98 
BJG: Yes, I see that. Have you ever seen anyone cry at one of your events? 
Ḥ: No, no, but I have spoken to people afterwards and they know us because we always bring 
masculinity and enthusiasm/vigor. You can see the ṭarab overtake them (tirūm tushāhid kayf 
yista‘iz al-ṭarab ‘alayhum). 
BJG: Ṭarab? The way other Arabs talk about ṭarab, that’s what you mean?  
Ḥ: Yeah, you know about ṭarab I think. It’s very important… 
BJG: Wait, what’s ṭarab, how do you see… 
A: …ṭarab is, I mean, a strong emotion, it’s a strong feeling from someone who listens to the 
arts. They are grabbed, they are grabbed [by the arts].  
BJG: How do you see that?  
A: How do you see ṭarab? Well, maybe they move in their chair, they move their arms, they 
can’t look away. This is ṭarab. Then they are with you. 
 A few days later, I brought up the conversation with another group of performers: 
                                                          
98 Safeer Oman. “Nizūl dam‘a al-sulṭān Qābūs ’ithnā’ tā’thīruhu bi-l-‘āzī” [Sultan Qābūs 
shedding a tear while he is affected by the ‘āzī]. Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, 19 July 
2015. Web. 13 July 2017.   
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7NkgcabviCs&t=0s&index=13&list=PLtxUcpgmZ5So0KE
9u3lfkoGutVDSO0Ofq  
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BJG: So, do you think it is good when you grab the shaykh-s and guests? Emotionally, I mean, 
when they are caught up in ṭarab? 
R: Is it good? Yes, it is good that they listen, and if they listen they will feel the emotions of the 
arts. All this ṭarab talk you are telling us about, I don’t know. If they invite a group, they must 
listen, it’s a great shame if they don’t listen or look at their phone or any of this. If they are a 
romantic type, I suppose they might be grabbed, but at the least they must listen. 
BJG: Why must they listen? 
R: They must listen to them (lāzim yistami‘ūn’ilayhum) because they invited the group. If you 
invite the group and treat them poorly, they will know and not listen to your invitation a second 
time. Listening to them is respect, even if it is boring, [laughter].99 
These conversations show how performers consider the ability of the arts to “grab” the 
praised an important display of their power. They do not have many examples of the ways in 
which specific political goals or aims are achieved by the arts (though such stories are common 
in the genre of qaṣīda). Rather, they point out the important way in which leaders are brought 
into the moral and emotional community of the performers through the emotional displays of the 
praised. The praised are “with” the praisers when they are emotionally “grabbed.” Those who are 
praised are obligated to listen to the praise and may be strongly affected by it. Though this effect 
may be unpredictable, it does indicate how histories of performance and language can mark the 
boundaries of communities.  
                                                          
99 This position recalls Wellstead’s comment on Omani performers: “I found no surer way of 
exciting a kindly feeling towards myself, when among this rude people, than by listening with 
apparent interest to these performances [songs and dances]” (Wellstead 1837, 75). 
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Order and Chaos, Pride and Disgrace: Embodying Power as Emotional Display 
If praisers from a certain place and group are necessary to this circulation, they are not 
neutral mediators of praise and generosity. Instead, they actively shape their own roles within 
this circuit by managing their comportment and presenting themselves in a certain way. They do 
so by embodying power through manifesting dignity (al-kirāma), honor (al-sharaf100), and pride 
(al-fakhr) along with a number of other potent emotional and physical states. In this section, I 
want to highlight the ways in which Omani performers of razḥa and ‘āzī present themselves in 
such a way that displays power as dignity, honor, and pride rather than dependency. It is very 
important that performers of razḥa and ‘āzī do not project weakness, fear, or helplessness, which 
is disgraceful. Much like the Manobo in the Philippines with whom Buenconsejo studied find 
stinginess to be disgraceful, Omani praisers find a wide array of emotional and physical states 
disgraceful in performance—undress, uncleanliness, unkempt hair, dirty clothing—and exhibit a 
constant concern with grooming and scent. Loss of emotional control, uncoordination, femininity 
or squeamishness, sycophancy, and a lack of tact or good manners in speech or action are 
similarly considered unbecoming and ruin a performance.  
The most serious flaw of a razḥa, though, is one that communicates weakness and 
dependency. A razḥa that “begs” (tas’āl) is reprehensible—powerful men do not beg. As we 
noted earlier, the oral qaṣīda, while an undoubtedly important genre, may in fact signal weakness 
when compared to the oral ‘āzī or razḥa precisely because it might make an appeal or request. 
                                                          
100 ‘irḍ (CLA, “honor”), as a legal constituent of a person inhabiting an honor system, as for 
example discussed by Frank Stewart (1994), is not discussed in this section. The term al-nāmūs, 
referring to a kind of personal honor and code in Oman (and heard often in ‘āzī poetry because it 
rhymes with Qābūs), is also not discussed here (though see Meneley 1996, 103 for more 
literature on this specific word). 
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Performers perceive of razḥa as an extremely dignified practice, one in which “all Omanis are 
equal,” including the Sultan and other leaders. Performers and elites are tentatively equal—that 
is, not in a magister and minister relationship. They are equal insofar as they are members of a 
moral economy, necessary to one another if not materially similar. Razḥa-s should project power, 
confidence, poise, masculinity, and dignity. The three Arabic terms listed above do not exhaust 
the terms used to describe the feelings of dignity, honor, and pride that are developed in the 
course of razḥa, but they are the most common. Finer-grained distinctions can undoubtedly be 
made, but for our purposes here these terms and translations shall suffice. 
Most Omani men I worked with perceived participation in the funūn as an honorable 
practice, one that displays both their heritage and the strength of their traditions. Since each 
performance is not only evidence of their pride and dignity but also an expansion of it, 
performers interpret razḥa not as an expression of weakness and dependency, but of strength and 
autonomy. Some performers point to the fact that the government patronizes these events as 
evidence of their acceptance, while others say that they are more accepted nowadays because the 
government sponsors them. In any case, as opposed to other nearby regions, performance of 
razḥa or ‘āzī does not denigrate Omanis. In nearby Yemen and in the Mashriq, dancers and 
drummers (especially women) are considered to occupy low social strata and are accorded very 
little social prestige (van Nieuwkerk 1995; Adra 2001). While Omani performers are not social 
elites (as very few if any of the praised perform) they are also not specifically disparaged. They 
are, in Shryock’s terms, “status inferiors” who are nevertheless necessary to elite reproduction. I 
sometimes heard light criticism and playful joking about music or singing, especially mocking 
certain types of voices, but discourses on Omani nationalism appear to have replaced older 
assumptions about performers.  
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Christine Eickelman reports some of these older perspectives when she writes that 
shaykh-ly women in al-Ḥamrā’ do not sing at weddings or for religious festivals, and neither do 
their male kin. Rather, it is “the descendants of slaves” who make music for the festivals (1984, 
73-5). This seems to fail to distinguish between non-shaykh-ly Arabs and African-descended 
enslaved populations. During my research, Arabs of the ‘Abriyīn tribe in al-Ḥamrā’, descendants 
of those who Eickelman described, noted that many of their ancestors participated in the arts and 
they were not necessarily descendants of enslaved populations. This is perhaps a question of 
perspective: as many anthropologists have pointed out, those at the bottom of the social structure 
often have a much better grasp of its nuances than those at the top. The same claim—that music-
makers were exclusively drawn from enslaved peoples—was reported by European travel writers 
who noted that drummers were enslaved Arabic-speakers of African descent (Wellstead 1838, 
70-1, 345-8).  This is not the case today, where only 35% of participants I interviewed consider 
themselves or are considered by others to be partial descendants of enslaved people and form the 
majority of drummers. I draw this distinction not to diminish the role of enslaved Africans in the 
development of these genres, but to show how at least today, it is not the case that only 
descendants of enslaved populations perform. 
The importance of expressing and embodying dignity in the razḥa is made especially 
clear when it is compared with behaviors and practices that are not considered dignified. As I 
was sitting in the old souq of Manaḥ one day, an older performer named ’Ismā‘īl approached me, 
asking about my weekend. After obligatory pleasantries, I realized he wanted to share something 
with me. He began: 
“This weekend, I was out with the Sultan,” he boasted. 
“Really!” I responded, suspicious. I’d heard this kind of story many times.  
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“Yeah, he drove by in the area back by the Genāba [the nearby Bedouin], and I was out 
there getting money, look, I was like this all weekend,” he smiled and threw himself on the 
ground, scuffling his feet and miming grabbing at fluttering riyāl-s in front of him. “And 
somebody elbowed me (drukunī)! Wham! And I went ‘oh!’ and fell like this!” He rolled on the 
ground but still mimed grabbing at money all around him, laughing. The commotion brought 
over his nephew. 
“Uncle, what are you doing? What’s going on here? (Shasālifa?)” 
“I’m showing the Englishman about the weekend, the money throwing.” 
“All right, Uncle, that’s fine, that’s enough now. Ignore him, doctor, he’s just confused.” 
His nephew helped ’Ismā‘īl to his feet. The others looked over briefly and continued in their 
conversations. 
I brought up ’Ismā‘īl’s actions a few days later. Ḥamad tutted. 
“Yes, this is the shame of the Omanis (fiḍīḥat al-‘umāniyīn), I suppose you want to talk 
about it. Yes, it is called nashḥa, this is when the Sultan’s guards drive around in a four-by-four 
and throw out money randomly (bi-gizāf). There’s a crowd that follows them and snatches it up, 
they run after it grabbing at money. It’s a total mess, chaos (rabsha). You can see it on Twitter 
and on YouTube, I’ll show you.101 It’s a real disgrace, no honor, no dignity.” 
“I’ve never heard of this,” I ventured, “why does the Sultan do this?” 
“Why? He has his ways. He’s wise, there must be some reason for it. There are poor folks 
who are afraid to ask for things, maybe, they need money but are ashamed. Maybe, who knows? 
Poor ’Ismā‘īl has no sense, he’s old and forgets. He performs with us because he is our kin, he’s 
                                                          
101 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WfFDODbdLSA  
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known in Manaḥ, but he degrades his dignity when he chases the nashḥa (yarakhkhaṣa nafsu 
gārī b‘ad al-nashḥa).” 
I saw an opportunity for a sensitive question. “So people chase after money thrown from 
the Sultan’s car? Isn’t that a bit like the razḥa-s for the Sultan after he is generous? Is that like 
nashḥa?” 
“Ha, not at all,” Ḥamad scoffed, “razḥa has the greatest pride and honor, it shows it, 
nashḥa is a disgrace. A complete shame; no, razḥa is not at all the same. One is order, the other 
chaos (wāḥid lahu al-niẓām, al-thānī rabsha). It’s completely the opposite, one hundred percent 
(al-‘aks bi-l-tamām, mi’a bi-l-mi’a).” 
The difference between the ways generosity is recognized in razḥa and nashḥa is clearly 
understood, if not articulated. The notion that razḥa and nashḥa might be the same kind of 
activity is plainly absurd. One of the main ways Omanis conceive of this difference is in the way 
that performance frames the former as orderly, managed, and the latter as unordered and 
undignified. Razḥa is a display of dignity, pride, prestige, and honor because of the way 
performers present themselves. Dignity and pride are performed in three ways: in clothing and 
appearance; in bodily comportment; and in the inculcation of proper emotional states. 
a. Annointing the Mirror of the Self: Material Display and Dignity 
Despite any other social hardships they face, all group members in Manaḥ are sure to 
present themselves with dignity (al-kirāma). This manifests visually in the great care and 
attention that is given to personal appearance. No performer considers dancing without a crisp 
dishdāsha, a tightly-wound and fresh maṣar (ideally made in Kashmir, with elaborate hand-
stitched patterns), a leather belt chased with silvered thread holding a new Samsung phone and 
buckled with a decorative khanjar belt dagger, prayer beads, an ‘aṣā camel stick, and an antique 
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sword and buckler. Just as the Zabidi women that Meneley studied with place great value on 
personal appearance (Meneley 1996), which brings honor (al-sharaf) to oneself and others, so do 
Omani performers. Outward appearance is a mirror of inner value. 
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Figure 22. A fully dressed dancer from the Firqat al-‘Arabī at a performance in ’Adam. He 
carries an antique British Lee-Enfield rifle, multiple bullet belts, a khanjar, prayer beads, a 
crisp dishdāsha and expertly wrapped maṣar. 
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Figure 23. Two members of the administration of the Firqat al-‘Arabī shopping in Nizwā 
wearing everyday clothing, the dishdāsha and kumma cap. 
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For performers especially, looking put together is a point of pride that brings honor to the 
viewer as much as the wearer. Before every performance that I saw, performers would take 
twenty minutes to an hour to dress themselves, usually outside their cars using their windows as 
mirrors. This period of “dressing up” was very pointedly related to the notion of al-kirāma. 
“Dressing well and with fine things shows that we feel our dignity, that we show our dignity and 
know that we represent more than ourselves when we razḥa,” claimed one performer from al-
Ḥamrā’. Generally speaking, performers would show up in an everyday dishdāsha and kumma 
(as in Figure 22) and then change into a finer dishdāsha. With the freshly pressed dishdāsha, 
they would then wrap their maṣar around their head, put on their belt and dagger, slide shell 
casings into the belt loops, wrap their prayer beads around their dagger hilt, slide their phone into 
their belt, affix their shoulder straps, and apply perfume to their hands, faces, and headwraps. 
Afterwards, duelers would bring out their swords and bucklers and test them out. This is done, in 
general, in small groups, who comment on each other’s clothing continuously. Prior to this, and 
often occasioned by the upcoming performance, performers would have their hair cut and beards 
trimmed into a variety of shapes102 (a poorly groomed beard is especially bad form, something I 
learned the hard way). Oftentimes, one member would help wrap the maṣar of another, tightly 
tucking in stray lengths of fabric to expose the maximum number of folds, embroidered designs, 
and frills. The belt often requires a second pair of hands, since it is buckled in the back and is 
worn very tight. After the belt is buckled, the khanjar dagger must be positioned just so, since 
                                                          
102 There are dozens of names for beard styles in inner Oman. A beard that is longer around the 
mouth is referred to as a sa‘ūdī “Saudi” or a gifla “lock”; if the beard is squarely cut to form a 
right angle on the cheek, it is a khangar; if the beard tapers to two points on the neck, reaching 
the sternocleidomastoid muscle, it is a sayfiyya “sword-style” or gambiyya “dagger-style”; if the 
area around the lower lip is shaved, it is a hilāl “crescent moon”; etc. 
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some performers like it vertical, others jaunty, others pointed up and away from the abdomen 
(see Figure 21).  
The final touch for most performers is some kind of perfume. Commercial brands of 
perfume are often used on dishdāsha-s and maṣar-s, but the fragrant smoke of freshly burning 
frankincense, myrrh, or oud is preferred. Performances are often concluded with the distribution 
of perfume and local “natural” rosewater (with a distinct smoky smell due to its mode of 
production). Perfume is thought to combat the sweat and unpleasant odor that builds up through 
prolonged performance, while “natural” rosewater is poured onto the hands and over the head to 
“cool and comfort the heart” (yubārid al-fu‘ād), a phrase which has both literal and figurative 
overtones. All of these elements are interesting to us here because they show us just how much 
attention is given to a beautiful personal appearance, and also how much that personal 
appearance is managed socially. 
On the day of the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival, after all the invites had been accepted and plans 
made, I met the Firqat al-‘Arabī at a flat gravel parking area near the Manaḥ Health Centre. 
Ḥamad and I were the first to arrive and we sat awaiting the others. We chatted for a few minutes 
while others began to show up. When more members of the administration for the group showed 
up, they decided to check and see if some more members were out in the farm plots praying. 
Several farm plots in an agricultural exclave belonging to members of the al-Ma‘arā 
neighborhood are clustered near a government-dug well, equipped with a small bathroom and 
prayer room. As we pulled up to it along the narrow service road that connects it to town, Ḥamad 
noticed that the large steel gate that is drawn over the road to prevent people from driving down 
it was open, commenting that “certainly they’re down here, because [so-and-so] always leaves 
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this cursed gate open whenever he’s here.” As we pulled up along the farm plots, Ḥamad called 
out the various owners of the plots and where plots had previously been.  
“Here is Khamīs’s [plot],” Ḥamad said, squinting against the setting sun to our west, “and 
look, his ox is out.” The ox in question was a small, Japanese 4-cycle roto-tiller, sometimes still 
called a “plow” (O. Ar. ḥirth/a, CLA. miḥrāth). Since most plot-farming occurs on a small-scale 
basis, these hand-pushed tillers have totally replaced the former yoked oxen.  
We arrived at the end of the paved road at the small cluster of outbuildings, bathrooms, 
open washbasin, and prayer rooms and spotted a few neighborhood folks out my passenger 
window. Smoke billowed in from across the tiny parking lot, spreading from a number of felled 
date palm trunks, being burned to be re-tilled into the soil. Through the smoke we saw the tall 
figure of a performer named Muḥsin coming out of the prayer room. 
“Look at this,” said someone in the car. “They’re all out here.” Indeed, several more had 
been just behind Muḥsin, coming down the stairs in good spirits. 
“Peace be upon you! How are you all, well I trust? Where have you all been?!” Ḥamad 
called out from the driver’s seat, leaning over me on the passenger side. 
“And peace be upon you as well, I’m well, we’re well. We were praying, what are you up 
to?” 
“What are we up to? You know what we’re doing. We’re getting ready for the event 
today, and we find you out here?” 
“There’s an event today?” Muḥsin feigned a shocked expression. “O, father, I hadn’t 
heard!” 
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“You hadn’t heard!” continued Ḥamad. “You hadn’t heard? I told you, I told everyone, I 
texted, I called, I called your brother, I sent you messages, WhatsApp, I sent you [them]. Have 
you and your phone been sleeping since Monday?” 
“No, I haven’t been sleeping, are you inviting us now? Is there time? I am busy today, I 
have circumstances.” 
“Yes,” Ḥamad replied, dryly, “yes, we all have circumstances. But you know there’s a 
performance today. We need you there.” 
“Well, if there’s a performance, and the doctor is coming,” he smiled at me, “then I’ll be 
there to support you all.” 
The others, lapsing into similar conversations around us, shouting from the car back to 
the stairs of the prayer room, began to assent as a group.  
“We’ll see you there!” several shouted out, walking back to their cars. 
As we turned the car around to head back to the parking spot, one of the performers in the 
car with us tapped my shoulder. 
“Did you see that?” 
“What do you mean?” 
“They didn’t hear about the performance? Ha! No, they heard. They were pretending to 
be on their farms this morning so we would have to come out and ask them. If they were 
farming, they would be in tee-shirts and wizār-s [ankle-length waistwraps], God lengthen your 
life. And they were wearing maṣar-s! Who wears a maṣar to chop down a date palm trunk? They 
hadn’t heard. Huh! Phooey!” 
We all laughed.  
288 
 
 
 
The management and primping that occurs before each performance is an understood part 
of the entire process. The laughter that this anecdote provoked was not mocking their 
appearance, but rather their obvious deception, related to their desire to be formally invited 
(echoing our discussion of invitations in the second section of this chapter). Their clothing, in 
fact, gave them away. One of the first performances I documented was preceded by 45 minutes 
of dressing and grooming prior to the event itself, and this time was planned by the 
administration. Young performers are often called to task for showing up without having any of 
the required items, but these are always provided by the administration of the group in question. 
Old-timers are particularly apt to call out younger performers who take dozens of selfies 
throughout the process of dressing up for Instagram, Snapchat, and WhatsApp. Notwithstanding 
some tensions between the generations, no performer is expected to arrive at a performance 
“dressed up,” and nearly all comment favorably on one another’s appearance. The well-dressed 
performers pretending to be working on their farms sought to present themselves as dignified 
equals with the group leaders I was riding with. Never intending to skip the performance, they 
instead sought to elicit respect by dressing well and ignoring compulsions to perform. By 
dressing in their best, they acknowledged their intention to perform while simultaneously 
asserting their independence and autonomy. 
The uniforms for performers are expensive. While dishdāsha-s and camel sticks are fairly 
cheap, with even the very finest rarely exceeding twenty OMR (~fifty USD), maṣar-s vary 
widely in price and quality, with truly splendid maṣar-s fetching hundreds of riyāl-s. Daggers, 
while usually given as gifts or inherited, can cost thousands of dollars, and respectable pieces are 
at least 2-300 OMR ($500-$750). Swords and rifles can be even more expensive and are often 
decorated with silver wire even after the fact, further increasing their cost. Discussing the cost of 
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items is one of the common topics of conversation in these dressing up periods, even if the item 
in question is not owned by the wearer. Due to the cost of daggers and the requirement that 
uniforms be at least mostly similar, groups often collectively own a few dozen maṣar-s and 
perhaps a dozen presentable daggers for participants to wear in case they forget (or in rare cases) 
do not own their own dagger. Collectively owned materials establish baseline equality in dress 
for all members and are freely given out to the needy or forgetful. 
Days after the festival I received a call from one of the managers of the Firqat al-‘Arabī, 
asking me to accompany them on a trip to the souq to inquire after belts.  
“Belts?” I asked, “how can I help?” I was confused as to why they might ask me along. 
Anything I inquired after in the souq, they assured me, was three times more expensive than it 
was for them. 
“It’s part of the uniform, so you should see where they are made and what not,” he 
offered, “come pick me up and we’ll go look in Manaḥ and if we have to we’ll go to Sināw or 
Nizwā, ok? We want to buy enough belts for the group, so say 50 or so.” 
I assented and we picked up a few more members before heading to a men’s clothing 
rental shop across from the Sultan Qābūs mosque near the administrative center of Manaḥ. As 
we hopped out of the car and climbed up to the second story (the first story was a women’s 
clothing store), Ṭalāl noted that prices would be expensive everywhere since gasoline prices had 
recently been raised. Similar to many such establishments, the clothing rental store was full of 
mirrors and gleaming white marble and lined with expensive and beautiful sets of men’s clothing 
hanging along each wall. After customary greetings, I walked around the walls taking in the 
different patterns and types of dishdāsha.  
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“This is from Ṣūr,” Ṭalāl noted, slipping up beside me. “You can tell because of how the 
collar and karkūsha (a small bundle of loosely tied threads that hangs from the collar and is 
typically perfumed] are sewn in and all wrinkly… and the dagger, here, look, the hilt is gold. 
Yep, that’s Ṣūrī all right.” Indeed, the front collar was not only embroidered with gold thread but 
had the wrinkled appearance typical of Ṣūrī style. For Ṭalāl, as for many Ibāḍīs, wearing gold 
was frowned upon—not a concern for the inhabitants of the majority Sunnī coastal town.  
“200 riyāl!” came a hoarse whisper from the front counter. “Yā būwī, you’ve made a 
mistake. Didn’t I say “salāmu ‘alaykum” when I entered? 200 riyāl, never, no not in my life have 
I heard such a thing.”  
“What’s the matter? You’re looking for belts?” I asked, walking up to the counter. 
“Prices are high,” came the reply from the uninterested Omani shopkeeper. He took down 
an embroidered bullet belt from the wall behind him and laid it down next to the one that another 
group member was fingering. “These here are designer bullets (riṣāṣī dīziyin], you know, from 
China. This is cheaper.” The “designer” bullets were small, hollow metal casts that were painted 
gold or silver. 
“We want the real bullets, antiques. We can’t wear these. Listen, we’re buying bulk, can’t 
you get us a deal?” 
The shopkeeper sighed. “The problem is that each antique bullet is 5 riyāl. You will 
require hundreds of bullets, I don’t even know where we can get that many. Belts I can get, but 
bullets?” 
“I have a friend in the army,” someone from our group piped up from the back. “Maybe 
we can go to the army base and get bullets.” 
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“I don’t think the army will give you bullets,” I laughed. No one seemed to agree, and 
several thought that going to the army base nearby would be a great idea. 
“Okay, thank you,” surrendered Ṭalāl as negotiations staggered to an impasse. “Khalla, 
let’s get out of here. May god grant you plenty.” 
Outside, the group gathered at the bottom of the steps. Each knew a place they could get 
belts for cheap, had a mountain of bullets at home, and was related to someone who owned a 
clothing rental store that could get them 40 belts by the weekend.  
“Why does everyone want a belt anyway? Don’t people bring their own belts?” I asked 
Ṭalal. He slowly tilted his head at me and grinned devilishly.  
“Well, you see, not everyone can afford these belts. As you heard, they’re very 
expensive. And someone was taking all those pictures of belts and putting them on Insta[gram]. 
Now everybody wants a nice belt, with antique bullets, and they’re saying they don’t look 
dignified next to someone with a nice belt with bullets (mā yabdū karīm ganbū ḥadd bi-ḥazm al-
riṣāṣī).” 
By taking pictures of the nicer dressed members of the group, who were often younger, I 
had inadvertently highlighted some internal inequalities in the group. In this case, those who 
lacked belts made a point of demanding them from the group administration in order to retain 
their dignity, rather than to redress a particular social inequality. Expressing their inability to 
maintain a dignified bodily comportment was at least as important, for the group as a whole, than 
economic disparities between members. 
b. Embodying Emotional States, Dangerous and Otherwise 
Another factor that contributes to the way in which performance helps to partially 
overcome the relations of dependency that threaten social relations between rulers and the ruled 
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is bodily comportment—in this case, the bodily comportment of performers. This is, as we have 
seen, deeply tied to dress and appearance for most razḥa performers. Performers not only fashion 
a beautiful appearance but also strive to act in ways that reflect their self-respect and dignity. 
This does not require a “stiff upper lip” or the reserved bodily comportment of guests or patrons 
of the performance, who must sit still and pay attention to the performance. Rather, the 
performer needs to project certain kinds of comportments (that often overlap with emotional 
states, as we will see in a moment) that are appropriate to his situation. Leaders or administrative 
members of groups often shade in and out of full participation in the dancing and singing, 
moving around to encourage participation, take pictures, or greet honored guests. In general, 
however, embodied behavior is thought to be based in and also project certain emotional states. 
These emotional states are linked both to the necessity of praisers (only praisers can 
safely call up these powerful emotional states) and to the ways in which praisers represent 
themselves as powerful members of the moral economy. They are, after all, armed, coordinated, 
virile, energized, and numerous. Razḥa has been a dance for war—and, in the opinion of some 
performers, it could be again. 
c. Rigūla or Masculinity 
One important point, footnoted earlier, is the way in which performers embody 
“masculinity” or rigūla. A masculine comportment is physically open and wide, with the chest 
thrust forward and head up. It is aggressive and confident, manifesting in decisive, unhesitating 
movement in dance steps. The razḥa dance steps allow for a great deal of improvisation from 
dancers. Dance styles that were routinely described as projecting rigūla in feedback interviews 
were those that involved a great deal of bouncing vertical trunk movement, with the spine fairly 
straight, deep knee bends and shoulder hunches, and strong stomps on each footfall. Further, 
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rigūla-style voices are loud, open-mouthed, and clipped as opposed to melismatic. Gentle 
swaying, closed arms, downturned heads, and quiet singing are considered “womanly” and not 
appropriate to the performance of razḥa. Women, when they dance, do not exhibit these features, 
so we can safely assume that this dichotomy is more concerned with the maintenance of a certain 
kind of hegemonic masculinity than it is with distinguishing between social genders as 
experienced and embodied by Omanis. 
One way that rigūla is identified is with the intransitive verb khashuna/yakhshun, “to be 
rough, coarse, raw, unpolished or crude.” Importantly, the verb describes a way of doing things 
in performance, not a part of performance itself. Performers say, roughly, that so-and-so “is 
coarse” in dance or singing or general behavior, as suits the context, meaning that the behavior in 
question is done in a tough, masculine way, unconsidered or unbeautified. For example, after a 
short trip to Kachchh, India some of my friends asked what I had played and sung for my Indian 
hosts. I replied that while I played a lot of Omani music for my Indian friends, I could not really 
perform because one shouldn’t perform the music without dancing as well (as they had insisted 
so many times). My Indian hosts were not at all interested in dancing, since they themselves 
considered this unbefitting the masculine appreciation of music. They only responded positively 
to a particular ‘āzī singer from ‘Izkī, who sang long, unaccompanied and untexted melismatic 
lines before the Arabic couplets of the qaṣīda. When I relayed this to my friends in Oman, they 
laughed, and one responded that while the singer was indeed good, he yatanaghunaghu-ed the 
melody, meaning that he “cuddled” or “acted tenderly toward” or perhaps “cooed” the melody in 
a way that was beautiful but unbecoming of a man, who must yakhshun a melody. Indians, they 
insisted, prefer these effeminate ways of singing that are heavily melismatic and (in their 
opinion) overly adorned. I should point out that the verb tanaghnaghu/yatanaghnagh is often 
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used to describe the way that men and women act towards babies, referring to a collection of 
activities (cooing, holding, stroking, rocking) and a way of enacting them (softly, slowly, 
warmly, tenderly). It is not a verb used only to describe women, nor is yakhshun used only for 
men. My interlocutors were, in effect, comparing the qualities they valued in music to those they 
imagined were valued by my Indian hosts. 
Feelings of masculinity are deeply tied to senses of pride, especially as expressed in the 
terms al-fakhr or, more rarely, al-‘izz, power or might. This sense of rigūla was reported by the 
leader of a group in Nizwā, who recalled that when he first was invited into the razḥa by his 
father, he remembered that “I was proud of my [feeling of] masculinity (kunt aftakhir bi-
rigūlatī), I was amongst the men and doing razḥa as an equal with them.” Crucially, this meant 
that he was dressed completely in the way that other men were, with a real dagger in his belt. 
The giving of a real dagger to a youth is an important life-cycle event for many Omanis, and his 
corresponded with his full inclusion in the men’s dance performance as well. In his case, the 
feeling of rigūla emerges from inhabiting a certain kind of body adorned in certain ways, 
recognized by peers and superiors as being like their own male bodies. 
d. Shugā‘a or Encouraged Bravery 
The classical definition for shugā‘a is bravery, but Omani performers conflate its 
meaning with the Form II and V verbal forms [II (=f‘a‘ala): shajja‘a/yushajja‘a; V (=taf‘a‘ala): 
tashajja‘a/yatashajja‘a), referring to encouraging or heartening some other person or persons. 
Hence, a performance can be “brave,” which in this context might also mean that it is 
“heartening,” “encouraging,” or “emboldening.” Shugā‘a is also often used to refer to the ways 
in which performers urge others into participating more actively. A common behavior for 
performers is to run from one’s own line to the other to sing directly in the face of a group 
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member from the facing line that the first thinks is “slacking” (yaqṣar). For example, during the 
first multi-group performance at the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival, older members of the Firqat al-
‘Arabī ran up and sang loudly into the faces of their own younger members, to encourage them 
to perform more actively. If younger members have taken out their phone or are losing focus in 
some other way, older members approach these “slacking” performers to draw them back into 
performing by grabbing them or lightly striking them with their camel stick. Other techniques 
include grabbing a performers’ shoulders, making him bob, and shouting yallā (let’s go!), halā 
(hey!), ‘āshū (feel it!) or yā shabāb (O youths!). Performances that were rated as exhibiting 
shugā’a or that were described using the verbs shown above were often “marching” or “walking 
razḥa-s” (razḥāt al-māshiyya). These are universally in duple rhythms, to accommodate 
marching steps. Certain joint dance movements are especially associated with shugā‘a, though it 
is important to realize that they do not comprise a particular dance movement that is called 
shugā‘a. Rather, shugā‘a is a way of behaving that increases participation, and, as the next 
section will cover, encourages ḥamās. 
Many of the actions that are encouraging (tashgī‘) are thought to resemble the 
movements of armies. For example, one common move during a walking razḥa is for the back 
half of the parade of dancers to stop marching (but otherwise continue bobbing to the beat of the 
drums) and raise their camel sticks over their heads, poised like swords. After the front half of 
the parade line moves about ten meters away, they spin around as individuals and charge the 
backs of the front half of the parade, yelling and waving their camel sticks as if to hit them. 
Often, the performers who initiate this move will hold back their fellows until they can charge 
“while they have the line,” that is, while they should be singing their half of the razḥa couplet. 
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Figure 24 illustrates this pattern of dancers, but they are charging the drummers, who have 
drifted ahead. 
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Figure 24. In five photos, top to bottom, dancers spin in place and charge the drums, a 
manifestation of shugā‘a. 
e. Ḥamās, or Vigor and Enthusiasm 
Shugā‘a and ḥamās are deeply interrelated emotional states and the suites of behaviors 
that exhibit or develop them are similar. As we will see in the next chapter, ḥamās is the critical 
emotional state for understanding the ways in which razḥa and ‘āzī have been integrated into 
broader Omani political systems and Ibāḍī Islamic rulings. Classical Arabic sources define 
ḥamās as “courage,” “zeal,” or “valor,” derived from the trilateral root ḥ-m-s. Among 
orientalists, the word is often used to refer to themed collections of poetry (for example, Abū 
Tammām’s Ḥamāsa of c. 845/230, which spawned several other such collections). These literary 
collections often included militaristic or self-praise poetry that would be similar in topic and 
theme to poetry written today by razḥa poets. Shi‘r ḥamāsī, “poetry of courage,” however, often 
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refers to something akin to “epic” in the Arabic literary canon, though the included poems are 
better referred to as “heroic.” In many ways, it is because razḥa and ‘āzī produce ḥamās that they 
have been accorded some level of respect in elite Omani society.  
In contemporary Oman, ḥamās refers to a heightened emotional state of vigor, excitation, 
or enthusiasm. A range of behaviors are associated with ḥamās, but they are not all positive. It 
can arise in sports, driving quickly, fighting and angry speech, and performance, among other 
things. When Omani performers or audiences talk about ḥamās in performance, they talk about it 
in two main ways. First, they talk about ways to produce it, or, in their terms, “giving” or 
“bringing” it (ya‘ṭī or yigīb al-ḥamās). Second, they talk about performances that have it or 
exhibit it by saying, shay ḥamās fīh (there’s ḥamās in it), ish‘ur al-ḥamās (feel103 the ḥamās) al-
ḥamās mawgūd (ḥamās is present/here), or shūf al-ḥamās (look at the ḥamās). All these kinds of 
statements might also be put into the past tense to refer to past performances. For Omanis, ḥamās 
is best experienced as a collective emotional state—some group should exhibit or feel ḥamās. As 
we shall see, ḥamās is more problematic if it is felt individually, especially when it is not shared 
or spread to other members of the group. Ḥamās is most acceptable when it is a product of a 
group experience.  
When I presented videos of performances and tried to have participants show me “when” 
ḥamās started or who brought it, my interlocutors were hesitant to do so. One performer, Fahd, 
responded this way:  
Fahd: In reality it is not that I feel ḥamās and you feel it, and he feels it… No, it is that there is 
ḥamās among us… you need others to feel it as a group, maybe you need more than one person 
to feel ḥamās together (ma‘ b‘aḍ). Usually ḥamās is brought by the drums (yu‘ṭī bi-l-ṭubūl) and 
                                                          
103 “Feel” here in the sense of “emotionally experience” like one “feels” anger or sadness. 
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then we feel it, but sometimes you will see it in the duelists and this is rousing for the others (wa 
hadhā tashgī‘104 al-b‘aḍ). 
BJG: Can you imagine a performance where one person feels ḥamās and no one else does? 
F: Perhaps, perhaps. This is not a good thing though, sometimes there’s someone who feels 
ḥamās strongly and the others do not and that is not good because there is no balance (mā shay 
mayzān). 
BJG: Balance? 
F: Yes… I have seen old-timers feel ḥamās alone, and people think they act foolish. You see, in 
the old days, the drums didn’t play that much, so they were powerful, razḥa was a very strong 
thing, I mean. Here, one day I was in Bānī Bū Ḥaṣan… 
BJG: That is in the Sharqiyya governate, no? 
F: Yes, far from here but they have strong razḥa there, different, but every Friday evening they 
are there. The town participates, not groups, they don’t need groups to organize things like we do 
here. Anyway, I was there on the weekend, and I heard the drums so I came out to see them, they 
were hundreds, really. But there were many, and I joined the line and there was no ḥamās among 
us. I saw the duelists, some old greybeards, they had their swords out, I mean, bang bang bang. 
Then I realized, they were really fighting! I mean, really making war, so I said to one standing 
with me in the line, I said, “who are these duelists? Are they feuding, do they have a deep-rooted 
hatred for one another (tashāḥin b‘aḍu al-b‘aḍ)?” “No,” he said, “they are just fighting, old-
timers cannot control their emotions (mā yisayṭirū ‘alā mashā‘ir), he thinks it’s a real war.” I tell 
you, they fought like devils. Here, when we duel, you try and hit his buckler, some the thumb. 
They were really trying to kill one another. I ask you, is this good? No.  
                                                          
104 The gerund of sh-j-‘ examined as shugā‘a above. 
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BJG: Might ḥamās be dangerous (iḥtimāl al-ḥamās khaṭīr)? 
F: I don’t know about dangerous. Anyway, one man fell, and the other took his dagger out and 
tried to slit his throat, take his head as they say. That’s how it was in the old days, things were 
brutal. He tried to take this man’s head in the duel! 
BJG: No! 
F: Yes, I am telling you the truth, praise be to God, lord of the two worlds. He did not kill him of 
course, but the one on the ground stayed there like a corpse for ten minutes. 
BJG: And this is ḥamās? 
F: Yes, but it’s no good. It’s no good. 
 This expression of ḥamās, enthusiasm and vigor, is wrong because it is not shared or does 
not rouse others. The performers do not feel ḥamās to the same extent that the duelists do, and 
this effects the collective emotional state of the group. The duelists take things too far, even 
though (or perhaps because) they feel ḥamās. When I related this story to others, they showed me 
several videos of this kind of ḥamās state in razḥa duels. Several were worried that this would be 
too much for an “Englishman” (myself) to bear. Other such individual displays of ḥamās are 
similarly regarded with a mixture of interest and disdain. For example, videos are often shared 
on WhatsApp groups that show individual dancers falling or rolling on the ground, pulling their 
daggers out to threaten one another, or vigorously swinging their heads back and forth in front of 
the beating drums. These kinds of behaviors were very uncommon in Dakhiliya, but one Bahlāwī 
performer related a story about one of Qābūs’s early trips to Dakhiliya in which a dancer felt 
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such ḥamās that he fired his gun in the air and destroyed several power lines that had just been 
installed.105  
Socially acceptable ḥamās is exhibited as a group or by an individual who is then 
matched by his group. The feeling of ḥamās is often reported when there is a high level of 
excitement and participation from amongst the group. When ḥamās is appropriate, it is a 
powerfully transformative and engaging collective emotion. When it is felt as part of a group, it 
reinforces that group’s sense of themselves as a strong and masculine whole, one that demands 
attention and respect. The collectively felt attainment of ḥamās affirms the unified front that 
collective performance in Oman seeks to present.106 
At an event organized by the Women’s Association of Manaḥ, I was invited to dance 
with the Firqat al-‘Arabī to welcome about a dozen guests from Great Britain. The event was 
held at the newly renovated old quarter in al-Bilād, a neighborhood of Manaḥ, and we were set 
up in two lines along either side of the long central avenue leading from the northern gate. After 
the welcoming razḥa-s, we sat in the central avenue for almost two hours while the Women’s 
Association ran their meeting. Tempers were growing short. 
                                                          
105 This story type is common in Dakhiliya and is often pitched to the problem being discussed: a 
tribe is too rural and backward, and holds a razḥa under a newly installed power transformer and 
destroys it by firing off rounds into the air; a notorious drunk shows up to a razḥa and shoots 
several new power lines in his celebration; an Indian once tried to razḥa and seized a gun from 
an Omani dancer and accidentally discharged it into a power line, ruining the party. The moral of 
this story type is fairly straightforward. 
106 The importance of presenting a “unified front” in Arabian peninsular societies has been 
commented upon by several scholars of the region. Meneley (1996) writes that the houses of 
Zabīd go to great lengths to obscure and tamp down any public perception of infighting within 
them. Similarly, Dresch and Piscatori note that a “politics of closeness” (qarāba) manages means 
of access between the political elite and ordinary Gulf citizens (2013, 24-5). Qarāba refers 
specifically to the ways in which persons and social units manage who may speak and interact 
with them, when, and under what circumstances—the management of the public face of a 
corporate group. 
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“Ḥamad, we’ve got things to do, it’s a working day,” one exasperated youth whined. “We 
can’t sit here all day waiting for these ladies.” Several others agreed, but an older performer, 
Layth, scolded them into performing a razḥa qaṣṣāfiyya (“fast” razḥa) in order to “encourage the 
return of the group’s ḥamās” (li-tashgī‘ ‘awdat al-ḥamās). Layth pulled me off the low bench 
just inside the main gate and pushed me toward the middle of one dancing line.  
“Come on, doctor, let’s razḥa!” he shouted, pulling others up as well. He started giving a 
rousing, fast qaṣṣāfiya, and the drummers moved to the center of the circle. Layth moved around 
the circle, making sure every member understood his lines and heard the melody, insuring full 
participation. As the drums thundered into the rhythm and we took turns singing the melody back 
and forth, the drummers paced over to Layth’s line, stopping in front of him. Along with the 
main beats, Layth slowly bobbed his shoulders and neck and bent his waist down toward the 
drums. He jauntily swung his camel stick backwards and forwards, and the dancers to his left and 
right began to do the same. Layth’s entire line began to “bow” to the drums, which invigorated 
my line. As the opposing line raised themselves back up, they lifted their camel sticks above 
their heads and began to march with the drums toward our own line. When they reached us, the 
entire group was packed together within perhaps a meter, shoulder to shoulder with the 
drummers. My own line began to shout “ho ho! Ha ha!” on the off-beats of the drum rhythm and 
hunching and bobbing just as the first line had. The drummers followed us and we danced 
backwards along with the drums, hunched almost completely over, bobbing and throwing our 
shoulders into every other beat. As the first line backed away, a young member of the group 
administration spread his arms out across our line next to me and said, “one more!” On the last 
repetition of the melody, we shouted out on the off-beats and stomped our feet as hard as we 
could. Watching the drummers and the far line, which had their camel sticks all raised above 
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their heads to signal the last line of singing, we all jumped and stamped hard on the last beat. In 
the silence, we all broke out laughing, panting for air. Layth beamed, sweat dripping to the end 
of his nose.  
“That’s ḥamās, boys, that’s ḥamās!”  
“There’s no Money in this Art”: Praise as Dignified Work 
The third discourse that transforms the ways that performers perceive their own praise 
performance is in framing it as work or labor. Praise and performance are framed as a kind of 
work on the behalf of a community. This framing draws an implicit analogy with giving—just as 
giving helps a community, so does labor for it. Community work like this does not gain the 
worker money, like a wage—and neither does praise. Giving, praise, and labor are at least 
partially compared, but not in terms of their ability to produce money. Money is secondary to 
obligation. In brief, I learned that Omanis praise performers think of razḥa the same way they 
think of cleaning falaj-s, painting anti-smoking signs, and taking care of the communal 
underground oven in town: it is a form of civic labor. It keeps community going. And insofar as 
it keeps community going, it keeps ties with elites going. 
To understand why framing praise performance as a kind of labor reframes it as a 
dignified practice, we need to understand how certain kinds of labor are differently valued.107 
Amongst rural Omani Arab men, “work” (shugl or ‘aml) is highly valued, especially certain 
kinds of community service and farm labor. While the menial and unglamorous labor on the farm 
is performed by South Asian contract laborers, most members of the groups in Manaḥ also 
                                                          
107 This differential in valuation is highly racialized—devalued labor is performed by South 
Asians, who are simultaneously denigrated for doing it and prevented from joining in valued 
labor. See Jain and Oommen (2017) for further discussion.  
306 
 
 
 
tended to their family farms in some capacity. Plant maintenance, monitoring irrigation flows, 
digging galbāt, and transporting farming equipment and materials are often undertaken by 
Omani Arabs, while harvesting, planting, maintaining date palms, managing irrigation canals, 
weeding, cleaning equipment, and tilling are often not. The former types of labor are valorized 
insofar as they are topics of conversations that speakers use to praise themselves. This is 
especially the case if this farm labor cuts into time otherwise spent in wage work (dawwām). For 
example, a common story trope involves the speaker listing their responsibilities on the farm, 
with their family, and at their wage-paying job, but ultimately prioritizing family and productive 
farm labor, which is accompanied by a wave of compliments. Even though these farms are often 
small-scale, merely supplementing household pantries, they are often central to rural identities.  
Similarly, community service is also considered a kind of dignified work. One way this 
manifests is in the roles of performance groups within a broader network of civil organizations in 
Manaḥ. This is a pattern that also obtains, to greater and lesser degrees, in the other large towns 
in Dakhiliyya. In Manaḥ, the Firqat al-‘Arabī li-l-funūn al-sh‘abiyya fi wilāyat Manaḥ is part of 
(tāb‘a, lit. “follows”) the older football club in Manaḥ, the Farīq al-‘Arabī. This organization, 
one of the oldest civil organizations in Manaḥ, also arranges collective clean-up efforts for the 
local falaj-s, Qu’rān readings and memorization competitions, wedding feasts for members and 
other locals, festival celebrations, and the maintenance of the collective tanūr (underground 
oven) just outside the town community center (sabla).  
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Figure 25. A bundle of cooked meat (khiṣfa) is pulled out of the still-hot tanūr oven. 
The oven is approximately 3.5 m wide and 5 m deep and is used to cook huge quantities 
of meat during religious holidays. Wood fuel and maintenance are paid for by members, who 
each contribute a few riyāl-s before and after each use. Group members compete to do the most 
“work” during the brief period while the tanūr is in use.  They volunteer to carry wrapped 
parcels of meat (khiṣfāt) from each house to the oven, and deliver them a day later, after cooking. 
Some members carry the wrapped raw or cooked mutton in wheelbarrows, but houses further 
into the neighborhood usually require a pick-up truck. A younger relative of the driver stands 
over the cab in the bed of the truck, shouting out to neighbors that they are collecting freshly 
wrapped parcels or dropping them off. Others work on chopping wood and building a massive 
fire inside the oven, reached by lowering ladders down into it. At the events I participated in, 
after the fire was of a suitable size, villagers quickly hurled in over a hundred khisfāt at once. 
Once they were inside, they dragged a huge metal cover over the mouth of the oven and sealed it 
308 
 
 
 
with mud standing by, kneaded by foot by a half-dozen younger group members. After a day of 
sealed cooking, ladders are lowered down into the still smoldering oven and those “not afraid of 
work” head down into the oven. Once down, they attach ropes to the various meat parcels, which 
are hauled up by groups circling the smoking opening. Afterwards, they distribute the meat to its 
owners, clean the oven, and cover it until the next barbecue. 
I arrived in Manaḥ for the first time a week after a collective clean-up of a falaj. 
‘Abdullah, a performer I had met before in Muscat, joked that I had shown up “just in time to 
help celebrate” but not help in the hard work, just like his brothers reportedly always do. He 
continued:  
We’ve done this many times, the razḥa troupe. We don’t just razḥa, we help in many 
ways. We do this because it helps the Sultan, as well. We need to start taking care of 
ourselves, our own houses and the falaj is part of that. Many people complain to the 
government, ‘give us this or that’, no, no, no. Here, we are not like that, we are humble. 
We don’t want problems and we’re not afraid of hard work.  
 
Others concurred, giving examples of nearby towns and their reputed fear of hard work. “We’ll 
become like the Sa‘ūdīs,” said one, “tired only from counting our money!” 
These kinds of work are either public (like working with the tanūr) or made public 
(telling stories about one’s valued work). More precisely, work like this is only made public 
insofar as it is dignified, masculine, honorable, and signals the worker’s economic power, bodily 
strength, wisdom, responsibilities, and skills. We can briefly contrast this kind of talk with talk 
about wage work, in offices and government ministries, which is almost always negative. Often 
this work is not challenging or interesting, or alternatively extremely stressful. For example, one 
Omani ‘āzī singer worked as a guard at a water pumping station. When asked about his work 
(dawwām), he replied, “I don’t do anything. I just sit. It’s not work but it’s for the government so 
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it’s ok.” Guard work is not valued work insofar as it does not improve the social standing 
(broadly construed) of the worker in the way that valued work can.    
Due to this, when the topic of work comes up in many razḥa and ‘āzī poems, we should 
interpret it as a kind of work that is a “good deed,” that is dignified, and that reaffirms masculine 
identities.  In this way, performers frame performance as work, good manners, pride, and 
heritage, an endeavor that is industrious and rebuilds the community. Praise is different from and 
in some ways opposed to labor that is undignified or servile. Rather than being handed 
everything that they have, performers categorize razḥa as a kind of productive and useful labor 
that is necessary to reproduce community. In this same vein, when performers talk about 
composing poetry for razḥāt and ‘āzī, they refer to it as “work.” Those who avoid performance 
unreasonably are referred to as “shirking” or “slacking,” qaṣaru/yaqṣar. Further, if they have to 
excuse themselves from an invitation to perform with a good reason (say, due to dawwām or 
wage work), they often reply to the invitation saying, “I apologize, I have work” to which the 
administration replies, “thank you, that’s fine, you’ve not shirked/slacked (mā taqṣaru).”  
When the manager of the Firqat al-‘Arabī, Ḥamad, first drove me around the ring road 
that encircles Manaḥ, he brought me to a short, graded hill to the north side of the town. When he 
climbed out of his Subaru to take in the view, he waved his hand across the brown landscape. 
“When I was younger, this was all green,” he said softly. “Now look, this is dead lot after dead 
lot. My land is back further south, and it grows a little, water is available. Water is available. But 
here…” I commented on the lack of date palms, which I had also seen in ‘Ibrī, where a drought 
of over five years was just breaking.  
Ḥamad: Look, there are some. But that’s not what these fields were, these were oats, barley, 
wheat, grass for animals. In the town we have more dates, but here is grain. Grain doesn’t need 
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too much water and look, there’s not enough. We have date palms in the south, but there's little 
water and people are now burning them, you'll see the smoke later in the year. 
BJG: Where does the water come from? 
Ḥ: It comes from ‘Izkī, from the falaj al-Malikī. 
BJG: No! That’s so far [~twenty-three km]. 
Ḥ: Wallahi, it’s a long falaj. Our ancestors were strong, they came with Malik bin Fahm [the 
ancient Arab leader and “founder” of Oman] and they made the falaj-s. And now we preserve 
them, when our fathers were poor and had nothing, they preserved them. Now, with the 
renaissance, we preserve them still. They are life, seriously, they are life. 
BJG: Can’t you use mechanical pumps? 
Ḥ: Of course, but the water is low in the earth, the earth is thirsty. Ask others, when they built 
their houses I saw that they dug down a meter, two meters and found water. Now, you have to 
dig and dig. The government made a dam, you know, there’s one near Firq [a small town 
between Manaḥ and Nizwā] and one in ’Imṭī [a town north of ’Izkī], we will see them. But in 
Manaḥ we have to be careful with regard to water. For fifteen years there has been drought, 
water is not available. 
Ḥamad was making clear that some obligations are shared by the community as 
necessities of its survival. Mechanical pumps were an option but have depleted water levels for 
the entire community. Government intervention can be imagined, but the onus of responsibility 
falls, for Ḥamad and for many other Manḥīs, onto the people of Manaḥ themselves. 
a. Praise as labor for the community 
It may seem strange to think of valued labor emerging as a way in which performers 
frame their praise as signaling their dignity, especially when the major exchange cycle is 
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predicated on mutual obligations of unequal gifting. This discourse seems to motivate an 
alternative moral universe, one in which good workers reap their just rewards, when the 
Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism presents a moral universe where webs of interlocking and 
unequal mutual obligations knit together stratified social classes. For most rentier theorists, the 
labor of Gulf citizens is hardly a consideration, because the state provides benefits regardless of 
their labor. If in Kuwait Sulayman Khalaf could claim that the state presented an “image of 
unlimited good,” an indefinitely long future of wealth and plenty for all, for example, Limbert 
has shown that no such idea can be claimed for Oman, emanating either from the state or the 
people (2010). Rather, she writes that people conceive of Oman’s economic renaissance as a 
kind of “dream-time” between the “realities of poverty” in the past and the imagined future 
(2010, 11). As Limbert shows, this perception has deeply altered Omanis’ relationship with their 
own past and with notions of “communal responsibility,” neighborhood relations, and women’s 
sociality (2010, 11-16, 132, 80-1).  
Such uncertainties were likewise present in Manaḥ, but Manḥīs were quick to point out 
the ways that they were working hard to improve Manaḥ by themselves and along with the state. 
When I pointed out that only a minority of Manḥīs performed in the razḥa, one participant 
rejoined that “more came out” during the religious and national holidays, but it was true that 
“others stay in their houses nowadays and forget who they are.” Another performer, on a 
different occasion, responded to the same point by pointing out that these days, people feel “they 
deserve more from the government and forget their manners.” A different Manḥī pointed out that 
everyone knew razḥa, but some were embarrassed, or were “too lazy, afraid of work,” or “were 
conceited (mutakabbirīn, anfhū kidha (pushing his nose up with his finger)),” because it is 
associated with rural life. But when National Day comes, he said, “you’ll see, everyone 
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participates.” Despite this speaker’s confidence, the participation of “everyone,” even during 
festivals and state holidays, is not guaranteed. As we saw in the last section, invitations and even 
pestering is sometimes necessary for the group to be brought together. When Ḥamad and the rest 
of the administration brought me along to gather the missing members out at the prayer room in 
the agricultural exclave before the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival, they made this clear. Each had stories 
of the amounts of phone calls, texts, emails, and visits that they made in order to secure the 
highest possible turnout for events.  
“Being a manager is constant work, and mind you, there’s no money in this art,” Ḥamad 
began: 
You have to love the arts in your heart, have them in your heart, in order to do this. To 
get the youths to come to meetings, I have to call them, send messages, emails, I go to 
where they are, I go to their work (dawwām) and find them and ask them. ‘Why didn’t 
you reply, why haven’t we heard from you?’ If they have circumstances (ẓurūf) then we 
say okay, peace be upon you. If there’s work, ok. But if they’re just slacking (yaqṣarū 
bass) then I will keep going after them (fa-adawwur ‘alayhum ‘alā ṭūl). You have to do 
this. I take time to do it this way, because it’s easy to slack and be lazy but we must work 
and work or we might lose ourselves or we will forget our culture (lāzim nashtaghal wa-
nashtaghal walā iḥnā ma‘adūmīn walā rāḥ nansī turāthnā). 
 
Others agreed with this assessment and volunteered similar stories regarding their work to keep 
the group together.  
This everyday maintenance of male social ties across households is a similar kind of civic 
labor. In this case, much of this community work is performed amongst and between men as kin 
and quasi-kin. Letters, text messages, and home visits to cajole, convince, and persuade group 
members to perform with them is a constant endeavor. The extent and intensity of this 
community-sustaining labor amongst Omani performance groups may seem surprising given the 
fact that so many simultaneously report that praise is a kind a mutual response that is “necessary” 
to functioning of the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism. These discourses may compete less 
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than they at first appear, however. As we saw with the farmers dressed to the nines, denying the 
compulsion to perform is a way to index autonomy. Often, messages that solicit performers 
reference the necessity of performance, dignity, and representation and stress communal 
obligations. In a way, this civic labor of men soliciting one another is one method by which these 
discourses of communality circulate amongst performers. This circulation serves to guarantee 
continued participation in the exchange cycle. Praise requires considerable mental, physical, and 
emotional exertion, but that burden is lightened with many hands.  
b. “As for laziness, it has no place”: Generosity accrues to those that work 
 It is in performances that the results of this community work are most clearly seen. 
Returning to the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival, when the group was finally together and dressed, they 
circled up around the drummers in the parking lot and started to sing short melodies individually, 
trying to encourage someone to throw the first shilla. After a moment, an older performer sang a 
razḥa qaṣṣāfiyya including a few already composed poetic half-lines: 
ةلحلاو رادلا ىلع يملاس رثنأ 
ردغلا كليسي ليسلا لثمةنا   
هلشي دح ام يكبي برط 
ةنلاسك سانلاو ربعب يكبي  
Inthar salāmī ‘alā al-dār wa-l-ḥilla, 
 mithl al-sayl yisaylik ghadrāna 
ṭarab yabkī mā ḥadd yishīluh, 
 yabkī bi-‘ibr wa nās kaslāna 
 
Spread my greetings to the homeland and the encampments, 
 Like the soft rain drizzling down to you [and settling in] small, clear pools. 
Ṭarab weeps [because] no one sings the poetic line, 
 It weeps to its heart and the people are lazy. 
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As the poetic line circulated a few times, the ‘āzī singer that worked in the water pumping station 
shouted over the group, “or they are thieves! (walā ḥarāmī!) instead of wa nās kaslāna. This 
replacement (kaslāna/ḥarāmī) was a joke, but further reveals the relationship between praise, 
work, and generosity. Those who fail to sing the lines are lazy, or worse, are thieves. They take 
the generosity of rulers for granted and give nothing back, do not work. Another element of this 
relationship is how it frames work and labor as a moral good to be desired, especially work for 
the community. Recall the ‘āzī given for the opening of the soccer pitch in Manaḥ: 
Every homeland is built by men / When those men work hand in hand. 
As for laziness, it has no place / neither near nor far. 
This is the mission of every youth / Wading into challenge and difficulty. 
And for those that walk the path of rightness / It's impossible for their actions to fade. 
 Work to “build” the homeland is valorized and mythopoetically made into a “mission” 
for every youth. Youths, at least for many of my interlocutors, are the most in need of direction. 
 Importantly, praise not only responds to certain kinds of labor, but also mythopoetically 
presents certain kinds of labor as valued. It both constructs and presents certain kinds of activity 
as praiseworthy, thereby ideally promoting them. Citizens themselves are rhetorically produced 
as actors who can work to benefit their homelands in various ways (though many of the more 
workaday and unflattering aspects of this sociable labor are not at all recognized). Those who are 
lazy are complacent and take advantage of the mutualistic relationships between rulers and the 
ruled. Those who work, in contrast, present themselves as part of the same moral economy in 
which the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism operates. Framing praise as a kind of labor, and a 
specialized one at that, makes maintenance of the social order and maintenance of the relations 
between rulers and ruled a valued and responsible activity.  
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  For some, learning the arts is also “work,” work that is valued since it reproduces 
community and passes on traditions. When I asked why more people do not feel obligated to 
praise, one interlocutor, Muḥammad from Nizwā, replied that: 
Muḥammad: Praise and the arts are not difficult, but people are busy. People now live alone, 
they do not come down to the market to razḥa with us. When my father was young, they would 
play the drums in town and everyone heard. Nowadays, how do you play the drum so everyone 
hears (kayf taṭabl ‘alshān sim‘ayū al-jamī‘)? But you will see, the old-timers always bring their 
grandchildren to do razḥa if we are doing it and they see us. The youths know that this is a 
hobby, yes, but an important one. People have work, they have duties, there is pressure on them, 
but still the arts are here. This is authentically Omani, and it takes effort to maintain and spread 
these things. Our fathers and ancestors worked to pass these down to us, and we must struggle to 
maintain them. 
BJG: Does the government not help in maintaining the arts? Patronizing them? 
M: What does the government do? They sit in their offices and they drink coffee. They are 
experts in drinking coffee, they don’t know the arts. They just like to film [the arts] for 
television, but they don’t know [the arts]. It takes real work (yaḥtāg ‘alā al-shughl) to learn 
them, years I mean. What you’ve seen is a drop from an ocean, one drop from an ocean.  
 He then shared with me a beautiful little video that he had in his phone, which slowly 
scrolled through a variety of black and white pictures while a solo singer gave a mulālā’ and 
versed a razḥa: 
يهاز برطلا نامز لوأ 
   هنيهزم اوحار مويلاو  
  يهلاو يهاس برعلا اوراص 
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هنيه برطلا حيصي بلقلاو 
   
’Āwal zaman al-ṭarab zāhī, 
 Wa-l-yawm rāḥū mazahaynuh, 
Ṣārū al-‘arab sāhī wa lāhī, 
 Wa-l-qalb yiṣiḥ al-ṭarab haynuh. 
 
In the past, ṭarab was bright and lively, 
 And today those that brightened it have gone; 
The people have become neglectful and forgetful, 
 And the heart cries out, “ṭarab, where is it?” 
 
 The term ṭarab here refers to a feeling that is deeply linked to musical performance, that 
A.J. Racy defined as a kind of “ecstasy” (2004). Here, it is a stand in for attention and caring for 
the funūn.  The text has the tone of a lament, that the funūn might be lost due to neglect and 
effects an urge to the listener to join the singer in searching for that feeling of ṭarab, set deep in a 
past but not yet, perhaps, gone. This will take work, Muḥammad emphasized, teaching and 
learning and commitment. The work of praise is part of the work of community, undertaken by a 
community and what makes a community. When it is successful, it helps to link communities to 
the ruling classes and integrate their plays of power in ways that do not threaten the solidarity of 
the community while not risking the social ills of rebuffing such gifts. 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter has presented the Razḥa Integration mechanism as manifested through 
several discourses. This mechanism works within razḥa performances to shape the way they are 
interpreted by performers and elites alike. By presenting themselves as dignified, morally-correct 
local recipients of elite generosity, they at least partially skirt the potentials for dependency and 
weakness potential in the broader Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism. Additionally, they frame 
their contributions and obligations (as necessary praisers, with praise as labor) as linking them to 
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elites in a web of mutual obligations that I have called a moral economy. Moral economies are 
those in which transactions are not neutral and anonymous, but reciprocal and affirming of social 
relationships. 
 What I think is important here is that the praise response is not just acknowledging 
generosity and recognizing dependency. As we have learned from scholars like Buenconsejo 
(2002), the norm of reciprocity does not exhaust the effects of gift exchange. Rather, the 
atmosphere, the embedded and interpreted meanings of exchange, can be altered or influenced 
by thoughtful action. By attending closely to performance, or rather to the ideas that inform 
performance and make it meaningful, we see that razḥa does more than account for generosity, 
or even just impel it. Instead, the actual performance of razḥa is understood as asserting pride, 
dignity, masculinity, autonomy, civic care, and other strong, positively valanced states. 
Potentially, conceptually anyway, razḥa receives generosity without conceding dependency just 
as it draws elites into the continued giving that sustains a moral economy and a shared 
community. Nevertheless, I do not think that razḥa somehow distances itself from the flows and 
constraints of global capital. Rather, it asserts a different logic of circulation: reciprocity. And 
yet, the reciprocity remains necessarily addressed to the only institution that can sustain such 
dramatic and transformative acts of generosity: the state form.  
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Chapter 5: Warfare and Welcome: Historical Sources on the Role of Omani Performance 
Practices and State Power 
And the instruments of entertainment that have no use 
Outside of themselves are to be broken whenever they are found, 
In all of their types that exist, 
Because in this there is no benefit. 
-‘Abdullah bin Ḥumayd “Nūr al-Dīn” al-Sālimī (1286-1332/1869-
1914) in the Jawhār al-Niẓām. 
 
Some readers may wonder how it could be possible that a musical practice could possibly 
have been a stable, public social mechanism of legitimation and the construction of a moral 
economy in a region of the world that is most well known for its peoples’ intense condemnation 
of “music.” I don’t want to hand-wave this issue away. I think it’s a good question. In fact, when 
we dig into this confusion, we find that it is far more interesting than just a legalistic valuation or 
condemnation of music. What I show in the chapter is that razḥa and ‘āzī have been 
provisionally tolerated in Omani Arab Muslim society not because it is orthodox to do so, pace 
Talal Asad, nor because they are particularly meaningful practices for constructions of a moral 
self, contra Shahab Ahmed (2015). Rather, they are tolerated merely because they are practical: 
they serve some explicit purpose. In fact, many “musical” genres are tolerated for precisely this 
purpose. This seems to be an underrecognized issue in the interminable debates on whether 
“Islam” condemns or tolerates or valorizes music.  Historically, razḥa and ‘āzī seem to have 
been tolerated because they were technologies of warfare—and insofar as they supported war, 
they were deeply connected to statecraft, elites, and leadership. 
In order to show this, I analyze both historical records and Ibāḍī Islamic rulings on the 
status of music and musical instruments. I review some of the literature in ethnomusicology on 
these topics, as well as some major attempts at theorizing Islam and Islamic legal practice. I 
conclude the chapter by examining the close relationship between razḥa, ‘āzī, and state power. 
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An Untended Flower: Music in Omani Histories 
Writing a musical history of Oman based on primary sources is extremely difficult. In a 
conversation with another student of Omani music, she remarked that it was an “untended 
flower” (warid mā yughtadhī)—it had the potential for great beauty and meaning, but was 
mostly left alone. As Walīd al-Nabhānī notes in From the History of Music in Oman: Problems 
and Texts (Min tārīkh al-mūsīqā fī ‘Umān ’ishkālīyāt wa nuṣūṣ) (2016): 
The number of historical musical studies in Oman is small and this is not surprising given 
that we know that Omanis did not write on this topic or on the arts in general, despite 
their contributions in other sciences, such as astronomy and medicine. The first attempts 
at paying attention to Omani music—collecting, classifying, and analyzing—date back to 
the early eighties of the last century. This is when His Majesty Sultan Qābūs ordered the 
collection of Omani musical heritage in a national plan adopted by the Ministry of 
Information, and this launched the first efforts in this field. Features of interest [then] 
rolled out continuously in the study of Omani musical arts, their instruments, and their 
different aspects. (al-Nabhānī 2016, 11) 
 
As al-Nabhānī and other authors (al-Kathīrī 2005; al-Shaydī 2008; Christensen and Castelo 
Branco 2009; El Mallah 1998) note, no primary documents thus far uncovered in Oman or about 
Oman specifically cover music. Not only are primary histories relatively few, but those that we 
possess were written by Ibāḍī intellectuals who were, in general, strongly opposed to music in 
theory and in practice. Musallim al-Kathīrī adds that these sources “have focused most of their 
attention on political and military actions, and mention of some musical instruments and their 
uses comes [only] sparsely in their pages” (2005, 47). Those that do come, however, are 
undoubtedly about razḥa, further cementing the genre as the one most closely associated with 
political power in Oman. In a conversation with al-Kathīrī himself, he told me that the “razḥa is 
the history of Oman.” While this is true, the actual stitching together of this history is perhaps 
impossible due to the occasional nature of the poetry. At the ends of events, I would often ask 
poets what they sang that day, and more often than not, they had already forgotten the text. 
320 
 
 
 
While razḥa-s are clearly commentaries on the day, they are not purposefully memorized like the 
qaṣīda, the famed “register of the Arabs.” Razḥa-s were rarely written down before literacy 
achieved its current levels. More important in terms of written sources is that literate Ibāḍī 
scholars108 were asked to make statements on the Islamic legality of music on several occasions 
and these opinions were collected. While we will see that much of the information offered by 
these scholars is outdated (especially regarding instrument types), it is the perspective they 
provide on the limited permissibility accorded to music that interests us here. 
Warfare and Welcome: Omani Orientations to the Charge of Music 
A few days before Ramadan began in 2016, I was sitting in Ḥamad’s majlis enjoying a 
ḥilba, a milky fenugreek-flavored drink. As I was setting out my notebook and recorder, Ḥamad 
noticed a book on the status of music in Islam in my bag.  
“Oh, father,” he moaned. “What is this?”  
“This?” I picked up the book. “This is a book about Islamic jurisprudence…” 
“Well, I can see that, doctor, what do you want with it (shtibā bih)?” 
“I just wanted to know the opinions of Ibāḍī scholars on music…” 
“That’s fine,” Ḥamad said, leaning back and pulling his dishdāsha over his feet, “but 
you’re not studying music. If you want to know about that, it’s not in razḥa. There’s no melody, 
there’s no singing, there’s no instruments (mā shay al-naghmāt, mā shay al-ghinā’, mā shay al-
ma‘āzif). But I’m no scholar, don’t ask me. I don’t know. Listen, I don’t want to enter into that 
                                                          
108 Eickelman (1983) estimates the literate population in al-Ḥamrā’ in the 1940s at eight percent, 
“of whom most possessed little more than basic literacy,” and offers this as a reasonable guess 
for the rest of Inner Oman (166).  
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issue, I don’t even want to enter it (mū bāghī adakhkhalu). The razḥa is for warfare and 
welcome, that’s what I say to any Imam.” 
“That reminds me, why isn’t the razḥa ever performed if a new mosque is opened?” I 
asked facetiously, trying to corner him. I knew that this was a total impossibility, even then. 
“Oh, lord spread blessings and mercy like rain. That is a good question for the Islamic 
scholars, I do not know.” 
Months earlier, I was discussing some of the local arts that were less well-known than the 
razḥa and the ‘āzī with Khamīs, the leader of a new troupe in ’Izkī. We were meeting in his 
‘azba, a kind of semi-permanent camp and corral for grazing stock, eating dates by the goat pen 
that he affectionately referred to as the “UN” (“I’ve got every type of goat in there,” he boasted, 
“Indian, Pakistani, Sindhi, Afghan, Somali, Kenyan, Nubian, Egyptian, Georgian, Bosnian, Iraqi, 
Persian, Balochi, Roman, and Chinese—it’s the UN of goats (al-’umum al-mutaḥḥida māl al-
hūsh)”). After a half-hour of chatting, a pickup full of Khamīs’s male kin pulled up. We 
exchanged pleasantries and they joined us in eating dates. 
“We’re talking about music,” Khamīs said casually, flicking his eyes over to his younger 
brother. 
“The arts?” His brother replied. 
“No, music, this Englishman wants to study music here.” 
“Well, not music, God lengthen your lives,” I jumped in, “I want to study the arts. But we 
were chatting a bit about music around here. Khamīs said that you all perform al-rūgh in the 
early dusk?” Al-rūgh is a genre of instrumental reed-pipe music accompanied by drumming and 
some sung poetry. The word rūgh refers to both the genre and the reed-pipe, which is shaped and 
played like the more common mijwiz. I have never encountered any source that discusses al-rūgh 
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and so it may be a genre that is mostly performed by shawāwī (semi-nomadic herders) 
performers, whose music is largely undocumented in Western scholarship. The area around ’Izkī 
is, however, home to many rare and undocumented instruments, including a kind of gourd 
resonator monochord, a large family of African-derived idiophones, and so on. 
“Al-rūgh,” his brother chuckled, “that’s the horn-pipe of Satan (mizmār al-shayṭān)109, 
that al-rūgh. The only thing worse is the zār, did you hear about the zār?” The zār is a common 
name for a genre of healing music mostly performed by and for women: as it deals with jinn, 
supernatural beings, it is roundly condemned by Islamic scholars.110 
“Zār? You want to see a zār, doctor?” Khamīs perked up. “Mizmār al-shayṭān, ha! I hold 
a zār here every night. Zār and mizmār, all night.” Of course Khamīs did not hold a performance 
of zār or rūgh every night, but he was voicing an opinion contrary to his brother’s take on music. 
Rather than acquiescing to the putative illicit nature of music, as Ḥamad would later do, Khamīs 
pushed back against that discourse, claiming to embrace a profoundly controversial genre of 
music.   
As these anecdotes show, Omanis express a wide range of perspectives on music, from 
those like Khamīs’s—that embrace music—to those that condemn it. Before we discuss 
particular Ibāḍī perspectives on the issue of music, however, we should outline the general stakes 
of the debate over the status of music in Islamic discourse. Such a foray bears a long pedigree: 
                                                          
109 The famous rebuke uttered by the Prophet’s father-in-law and longtime follower Abū Bakr in 
an equally-famous hadith. Abū Bakr admonished two women of the ‘Anṣār singing in the 
presence of the Prophet on a festival day by saying, “The horn-pipes of Satan [mizāmir al-
shayṭān] in the house of God’s Prophet!” The Prophet’s reply: “Let them sing, O Abū Bakr, 
verily to every nation there is a festival, and this is our festival.” 
110 See Janice Boddy’s 1990 ethnography Wombs and Alien Spirits for a deeper discussion of 
zār. 
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Amnon Shiloah introduces it as an “interminable debate” in his Music in the World of Islam 
(1995, 31). “The debate elicited views that varied from complete negation to full admittance of 
all musical forms and means, even dance,” he continues, “between these two extremes we can 
find all possible nuances” (1995, 31). Oman is no exception. Early in my research, when I was 
not pursuing Omanis’ perceptions of the Islamic status of music, I nevertheless recorded a wide 
range of beliefs. These often correlated with the social and economic position of the actor: an 
official in the Omani Center for Traditional Music told me that “that debate is over, from the 
Middle Ages the scholars agree that music is permitted”; a performer of the Sufi-inflected111 
mālid genre told me that “rhythm (al-‘īqā‘) is a powerful tool for religion, and must be used with 
care”; a performer of razḥa at the Muscat Festival brought me a fatwā declaring attendance at the 
Muscat Festival to be avoided if possible because it included music (mūsīqā, “especially from 
Bahrain,” he added).  
Understanding how differently positioned Muslims regard music requires both historical 
and ethnographic engagement. To do this, we should begin, in Talal Asad’s terms, “as Muslims 
do, from the context of a discursive tradition that includes and relates itself to the founding texts 
of the Qur’an and the Hadith” (1986, 14). This is precisely Lois Al-Faruqi’s initial point in her 
1985 article on “Music, Musicians, and Muslim Law,” worth quoting here in full: 
The first question that must be asked if we are to avoid misunderstanding the attitude of 
Islam toward music and musicians is: Who or what shall be regarded as speaking for 
Islam? We are all well aware of the multitudinous collections of often contradictory 
statements, both oral and written, on music that have come from various regions and 
periods of Islamic history. Are all of these sources to be regarded as equally qualified to 
speak for Islam? Or are we to content ourselves with examining only one person's or one 
group's opinion on the matter? In order to be true to the data and to Islamic civilization, it 
                                                          
111 Valerie J. Hoffman points out that a major difference between Ibāḍī and Wahhābī doctrine is 
the importance of mysticism to Ibāḍī scholars (2015). While few Ibāḍīs might refer to 
themselves as Sufis, a similar concept of sulūk, or “pathways” in religion, is present in many of 
the writings of scholars during the 19th century Ibāḍī “renaissance.” 
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would seem that the researcher should investigate as many as possible of the materials 
that a consensus of the Muslims themselves consider to be authoritative in these matters. 
Coverage of the sources of wide acceptance within the culture is demanded by logic as 
well as cultural and intellectual honesty. (1985, 3-4) 
 
The irony of course, is that starting “as Muslims do” reveals precisely the core complexity of 
discussing music and Islam: that there is no obvious universal position. The only sūra, or verse, 
in the entire Qur’ān that scholars have argued refers directly the music is Luqmān 6: “And of 
those people who buy idle talk to lead [others] astray from the path of God without knowledge, 
and take it as mockery, they will [face] a humiliating punishment.” The central term in this sūra, 
“idle talk,” is a translation of al-lahū al-ḥadīth, whose exact translation has been subject to many 
opinions.112 Indeed, this is why Asad promotes studying Islam and Islamic practices as 
“discursive traditions” (1986, 14). For Asad, “a tradition consists essentially of discourses that 
seek to instruct practitioners regarding the correct forms and purpose of a given practice” (14). 
Such practices are constituted within discourses that relate to past, present, and future, and are 
Islamic insofar as they are practices “into which Muslims are inducted as Muslims” (15). An 
Islamic practice so constituted is authorized as orthodoxy by those with power—“wherever 
Muslims have power to regulate, uphold, require or adjust correct practices,” Asad claims, “and 
to condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect ones, there is the domain of orthodoxy,” 
which is “crucial to all Islamic traditions” (15). For our discussion here, we should recognize that 
the “interminable debate” over the legal status of music is precisely the kind of discursive 
tradition to which Asad is drawing attention. However, despite Asad’s claim of the constant push 
for orthodoxy (and orthopraxy), the status of certain kinds of music remains doggedly murky. 
                                                          
112 See al-Awtaneh 2012 for a fuller discussion. 
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This situation is noted by historian Shahab Ahmed when he criticizes Asad’s notion of 
Islam as a tradition in What is Islam? (2016):  
The subtle yet crucial problem with Asad’s conceptualization of Islam as a “discursive 
tradition” is precisely his locating the definitive quality of the discursive tradition in the 
dynamic of authoritative prescription of the correct: that is, in orthodoxy, which emerges 
irresistibly in his conceptualization as the “crucial” component in Islam. (2016, 272-3) 
 
For Ahmed, it is incorrect “to put forward a schema where the definitive purpose of the 
discursive tradition/Islam is the production of orthodoxy” (273). “The effect of Asad’s 
conceptualization of Islam as a discursive tradition,” he continues, “is to present Islam as a 
tradition which, for all its variety, is constituted by an overriding concern to institute orthodoxy” 
(273). Ahmed instead argues that, at least within what he terms the “Balkans-to-Bengal 
complex,” a “temporal-geographical entity” stretching from Sarajevo to Dhaka, a huge range of 
discursive practices have flourished—"Avicennan philosophy, Akbarian Sufism, Suhrawardīan 
Illuminationism, Ḥāfiẓian poetics, figural painting and wine-drinking”—never striving for 
orthodoxy, embracing complexity, and that are nevertheless “at the very center of the discursive 
tradition” and hence Islam (277). One of Ahmed’s strongest statements of this fact comes from 
analyzing the musical life of Amīr Khusraw, the famed inventor of qawwālī, (650-725/1253-
1325). Noting that music is rarely considered “Islamic,” he shows that despite this, “in the self-
statement of Muslims, we find that music is made meaningful precisely in… Islamic terms” 
(427). Ahmed claims that Khusraw’s heterodox and anti-authoritarian “couplets on music 
constitute and make normative statements that are at once philosophy, Sufism, theology, 
Qur’ānic exegesis and law” and hence take part in the “discursive tradition” as much as any 
scholars seeking orthodoxy.113 
                                                          
113 Ahmed concludes that positions like Asad’s and those that have built on his ideas have 
generally failed to thoroughly investigate the notion of “authority” in Islam. One scholar who has 
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What we learn from Ahmed’s criticism of Asad is that to use Asad’s definition is to focus 
squarely on the hegemonic play of power in Islamic societies. Productively, Ahmed frames 
Asad’s position as one that allows us to draw a succinct link between Islamic discursive practices 
and the politics of the state, in its many forms.  
In Oman and amongst Ibāḍīs, what is interesting about the outcome of this debate over 
the status of music is not that it does not seek orthodoxy and orthopraxy, since it decidedly does. 
Rather, the avowedly Islamic conclusions of it admit the performance of a controversial 
practice—the razḥa—for controversial reasons. Ibāḍī rulings on music are neither simply a 
matter of applying or constructing an orthodoxy, as Asad would have it, nor do they merely 
privilege the capacity of practices to “have meaning” for Muslims, as would Ahmed. Instead, we 
can see a strong pragmatic thread, attending closely to context and wary of the ramifications of 
overzealous condemnation. Rather than trying to establish an Ibāḍī “doctrine” on music, we can 
use these writings and fatwas to trace the shifting role of music in Oman. Historically, the razḥa 
is deeply associated with the state and with political (and tribal) power due to its connections 
with warfare, social communication, and communal organization. The ability to host a razḥa and 
act as its patron is a demonstration of one’s political position and resources. However, the razḥa 
is not a straightforwardly admitted practice since it does not sit easily with most Islamic scholars 
in Oman. The reason why is explored next. 
                                                          
taken this quite seriously (and before Ahmed’s critique) is anthropologist Hussein Ali Agrama 
(see for example 2010) who casts the fatwa as a form of ethical practice. Far from modeling 
fatwa as an authoritarian tool in the “overriding concern to institute orthodoxy,” Agrama argues 
that the authority of the fatwa lies in its ability to offer guidance and wisdom, not a capacity to 
enforce compliance (2010, 14). 
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 Music and Muslim Law, Redux 
Al-Faruqi’s classic investigation of the status of music in Islam presents a hierarchy of 
“sound art expressions” (handasah al-ṣawt) that are arranged in relation to two poles whose 
statuses are clear (1985, 7). At the top of the hierarchy lies the most legitimate form of handasah 
al-ṣawt: Qur’ānic recitation (qirā’a), and at the bottom is “sensuous music associated with 
unacceptable contexts” (8). Virtually all Islamic scholars are in agreement on the position of 
these two forms. Down the hierarchy (which al-Faruqi operationalizes as representing fewer 
people assenting that that genre is straightforwardly legitimate [14]) are, in order: 
A. Religious chants: (adhān, tahlīl/ṭalbiyyah, takbirāt, madīḥ, tasbīh, and taḥmīd) that are a 
duty to believers; 
B. Chanted poetry with noble themes;  
C. Family/Celebration music (lullabies, women’s songs, wedding songs, etc.) 
D. “Occupational” music (caravan chants, shepherd’s tunes, work songs, etc.) 
E. Military Music (ṭabl khānah) (8). 
Everything “below” this threshold is commonly considered “music”—mūsīqā—and is therefore 
at least controversial if not fully illegitimate. Al-Faruqi valuably concludes that the intention of 
the hierarchy was not to “destroy all sound-art” (27), but rather to submit musical pleasure to 
higher ethical standards. She argues that “a number of interrelated aspects seem to have been 
involved in determining the implicit hierarchy of sound art that is described here” (13). However, 
the four aspects she picks out (conformity with Qur’ānic chant; conformity with the “aesthetic 
demands of the culture” (13); community acceptance or esteem; and “conformance in sound-art 
to the moral demands of Islam”) do not account for either the reasons why this hierarchy 
developed or the role of hegemonic power in the attempts to establish it as orthodoxy. These are 
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not the questions she was seeking to answer with her article, but we can usefully extend her work 
by introducing these concerns. 
Al-Faruqi presents a picture of Islamic proscriptions on music that hints at two further 
aspects of the implicit hierarchy of Islamic sound-art. The first aspect is the dual nature of 
condemnation and promotion. As Asad has argued, the tendency to orthodoxy is not only 
negative, that is, excluding certain practices, but also positive, that is promoting certain practices. 
Al-Faruqi rightly notes this when she writes that the hierarchy was meant as much to promote 
certain genres as it was to delegitimize others. We also see that the construction of certain genres 
as music preserves other genres from the charge of being music. This discursive tradition of 
judging music not only marks some genres as legitimate, but also marks some as other. These 
other genres include music for frivolous entertainment, music that promotes sensual eroticism, 
music that is non-functional: genres that are not serious or functional. Hence, the people who 
engage in them are not to be taken seriously. Those who do not engage in them, conversely, are 
serious and should be taken seriously or taken to be doing something useful. Islamic 
proscriptions on music and non-music serve to distinguish types of behavior from one another 
and associate those behaviors with different bodies, minds, classes, and the like. As Shiloah 
writes, “the total prohibition involves only art music, which displays man’s vanity and primarily 
furthers interest in mundane, worldly matters” (Shiloah 1995, 37). These he contrasts with 
Islamically permitted genres, whose acceptance is due to the “predominance of the text in 
religious or folk music, wherein the combination of sounds is relegated to a secondary role, or is 
a device mainly designed to support the words and enhance their meaning” (37). In fact, the main 
social punishment that those who play and make a living by unlawful music receive is that their 
testimony in Islamic courts is invalidated (see al-Sulaymānī 2011). 
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The second aspect that these authors bring out but do not directly express is the role of 
function in the determination of what is Islamically permitted. The four aspects that Al-Faruqi 
puts forward for explaining the organization of the hierarchy clearly focus on the higher end of 
the chart. Al-Faruqi seems to justify the chart in terms of how the other legitimate forms of art 
relate to the chanted Qur’ān. While this is clearly operant in the case of the religious chants that 
sit just below the chanted Qur’ān in Islamic permissibility, there seems to be little that connects 
the rest of the legitimate genres to the Qur’ān. Rather, what connects these other legitimate 
genres is that they fulfill a certain specific role, that is, they have a defined and unobjectionable 
social function.  Women’s wedding music, lullabies, “occupational” music, and military music 
have relatively clear functions but little relationship to the recitation of the Qur’ān. The final 
division of legitimate music is chanted poetry with “noble themes.” In the context of this 
dissertation, we can see how and why it might be more parsimonious to think of this as a 
functional genre as well: this poetry is often praise or the kinds of serious political poetry from 
rulers that has long been a part of Arabian political discourse (Sowayan 2003).  
As we will see, Omani (and other) Ibāḍīs have attended quite sensitively and 
pragmatically to the question of the status of music, just as they have maintained a clear 
orthodox stance and attention to the meaningful aspects of musical practices. As Agrama (2010) 
has noted, the power of the fatwa lies not on what basis it can compel action, but the way that it 
offers avenues of action. In this case, it compels actions by attempting to mark the boundaries of 
ethical engagement with performance practices by picking some out as moral, some as immoral, 
and others as simply practical. The question is then whether or not this emphasis on function and 
usefulness is a part of the Islamic discursive tradition on music.  
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“Devotion is a Wide Door”: Islam, Ibāḍī Pragmatism, and the “Problem” of Useful Music 
When we look at Ibāḍī scholars’ judgments pertaining to music, one recent text stands 
out: Khālid bin ‘Īsā bin Ṣāliḥ al-Sulaymānī's Al-ghinā’ wa al-ma’āzif fī al-mayzān: qirā’a fī al-
aḥkām al-fiqhiyya al-mut’aliqa bi al-ghinā’ wa al-ma’āzif wa ḥukmhumā fī al-islām (Singing 
and Musical Instruments in the Balance: A Study on Jurisprudential Judgments Pertaining to 
Singing and Musical Instruments and their Judgment in Islām, 2001). Al-Sulaymānī gives an 
overview of the debate surrounding music first by looking at the Qur'ān and the “pure sunna” 
(Ibāḍīs regard only a small selection of ḥadīth-s as “pure”), then by taking up a philological 
approach to the definition of the key terms “singing” (al-ghinā') and “the playing of musical 
instruments” (al-ma‘āzif). Finally, he reviews the more recent perspectives espoused by Ibāḍīs 
and the other Islamic legal schools (Shī‘ī, Ḥanāfī, Shafa‘ī, Mālikī, and Hanbālī). Interestingly, al-
Sulaymānī begins his text with a section called “A Necessary Word,” in which he writes that 
some might think that writing a book about music is already problematic, no matter its 
conclusions. He imagines them saying:  
Does he not realize (the poor fool) that he who is addicted to trivialities of mind is 
himself trivial?!! That he invites the people to walk the dark path in which he himself 
lives?!! That he has set himself as a demeaner of this great religion?!! That he attacks 
God and His Prophet by analyzing what God and His Prophet have made 
impermissible?!! (2011, 17). 
 
This passage shows us that the default position of the informed layperson is that music is already 
impermissible. Further, even an investigation of it is problematic because it may lead some 
people astray. Al-Sulaymānī answers this charge by writing that compiling such a book could be 
of some benefit to others in clarifying their religion. He quotes the Sūra-s al-Dhariyāt 55: “And 
remind, for reminding benefits the believers” and the famous Āl-‘Umrān 110: “You are the finest 
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nation raised up to [benefit] the people, enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong, and you 
believe in God” to set himself as one who reminds the Muslim of what is forbidden. 
Al-Sulaymānī then discusses the key terms of al-ghinā’ and al-ma‘azif and reviews how 
many scholars before him have used the terms. These two terms are often used in conjunction 
with one another in the Islamic jurisprudence on music, referring at least in general to “singing” 
and “musical instruments and the playing of musical instruments.” 
a.  Al-ghinā’ and al-ma‘āzif 
 Al-Sulaymānī writes that “singing” (al-ghinā’ ) is a “polluted word” (kalima 
mulawwitha) due to its association with “those that draw from singing a craft and profession; and 
those that bring to it musical instruments that move/agitate the spirit, that arouse passionate love 
and obscenity” (20). It is for this reason that “those with common sense are on their guard 
against using the word ‘singing’ (al-ghinā’) and avoid it, and they replace it with other words 
such as the word inshād” (20).  Such a shift in vocabulary does not change the status of music 
that is already “polluted.” “If we come to the general meaning of the word al-ghinā' amongst the 
Arabs,” Al-Sulaymānī continues,  
we find it comes amongst them by the meaning of [1] beautifying the voice and uplifting 
[raising] it, and by the meaning of [2] the ḥudā’ [cameleers’ songs], and [3] songs of 
poetry on occasions of happiness and joy and otherwise, [though subsequently] this word 
was stuck after that with al-ghinā' al-mājin (“immoral singing”] as the most common 
usage. (21) 
 
 Al-Sulaymānī concludes by firmly distinguishing between al-ghinā’ al-mubāḥ and al-ghinā’ al-
muḥarram. Mubāḥ (CLA,  permissible) in Islamic jurisprudence means something that is 
permitted but for which there is neither reward nor punishment, something towards which one 
ought to cultivate indifference. Al-ghinā’ al-mubāḥ for al-Sulaymānī “is chaste, modest, 
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respectable, authentic singing, free from the traces of indecency and which is not accompanied 
by musical instruments and the forbidden ṭarab. This type is now classified under the name 
inshād” (23). As for al-ghinā’ al-muḥarram, al-Sulaymānī quotes Māliki scholar Abū ‘Abdullah 
al-Qurṭabī (610-671/1214-1273):  
It is immoral singing…[as al-Qurṭabī said] it is ‘singing which agitates the spirits and that 
arouses them to passionate love, amorous poetry and obscenity… which moves the still 
and reveals the hidden… this is that type of singing if it has poetry that celebrates 
[women in verse] by mentioning women and descriptions of their beauties, and 
mentioning wine and other forbidden things upon which there is no difference [in opinion 
amongst scholars] in their being forbidden… As for what the Sufis have created these 
days it is from an addiction to listening to the sung (samā‘ al-mughannī) and the 
instruments of ṭarab.” (24)   
   
As we saw above, at some point the last definition, that is, music being associated with 
immorality, became the most commonly used definition of al-ghinā’. Other types of singing used 
to be referred to as ghinā’, including the Islamically licit genres of wedding/life cycle and 
occupational music. However, the word itself has come to represent all that is negative and illicit 
in vocal music for many Islamic scholars. 
Al-ma‘azif, likewise, has come to refer to all musical instruments and the playing of 
them. Early definitions, such as those compiled by Ibn Manẓūr (d. 711/1312), indicate that al-
ma‘āzif referred only to the playing of instruments, not the instruments themselves, equating it 
with malāhī, or “entertainment.” Later scholars amended the meaning of al-ma‘āzif to include 
musical instruments themselves (al-Sulaymānī 2011, 24-6). A point worth lingering on here is 
that the instruments and their functions as reported by al-Sulaymānī are of considerable 
antiquity. There is, for example, no reporting on new instruments or on a wide range of 
commonly used instruments and considerable attention is paid to instruments that haven't been 
used in hundreds of years. For example, his list of instruments includes the kinārā (“about which 
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there is some disagreement” as to whether it is an ‘ūd or a duff), the kūba (an hourglass drum), 
and the ṣanj (the Persian cheng or harp).  
Walīd al-Nabhānī notes the same confusions in his chapter on musical instruments 
discussed in the Omani Ibāḍī fiqh literature. In a chapter devoted to the case of the dāhir, he 
notes that Ibāḍīs have often defined al-ma‘azif only as chordophones, using the word al-mizāmir 
for aerophones and al-mizāhir for idio- and membranophones (2016, 44). Similar to the 
misunderstanding over the kināra, al-Nabhānī cites other scholars who have reported on the 
kibārāt, some saying that “it is an ‘ūd as well, and some folks say it is a duff” (44). Al-Nabhānī 
concludes that, due to this confusion and the surrounding context, the instrument “was not 
present at the time of the author,” Muḥammad bin ’Ibrāhīm al-Kindī (d. c. 508/1115).   
b.  Ibāḍī Pragmatism: Condemnation and Conciliation  
When al-Sulaymānī shifts his focus to presenting the perspectives of Ibāḍī perspectives 
on music, he is unequivocal:  
The reader of the books of Ibāḍi scholars that treat the question of singing and musical 
instruments and what is related to them (in the judgment of jurisprudential scholars) finds 
that Ibāḍism is amongst the harshest of all the Islamic schools in condemning singing and 
its instruments. There is no difference amongst Ibāḍī scholars and their rulings, neither in 
the past nor in the present, on the question of forbidding singing and musical instruments. 
Rather, their statements on the two are the most ruthless of all statements, and they 
consider the two amongst the greatest of sins and most reprehensible actions. (2011, 95) 
 
Such is the position espoused by Muḥammad bin ’Ibrāhīm al-Kindī, cited above: “listening to 
entertainment is disobedient, sitting amongst it is sinfulness, and working in it is apostasy (of 
ungratefulness towards God’s blessings, CLA. kufr al-nu‘ama)” (96). Many Ibāḍī scholars have 
interpreted this kind of harsh judgment as permitting the destruction of instruments as a means of 
defense against them. The breaking of instruments is a common behavior cultivated in “enjoining 
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the right and forbidding the wrong” (see Cook 2000). Such a statement is recorded by the 
11th/17th century Ibāḍī scholar Shaykh Muḥammad bin ‘Abdullah bin Jum‘a bin ‘Abīdān al-
Nizwī: 
As for the dahra/daïre and the mizmār-s and all the instruments of entertainment, it is 
permitted for you to break them if you are able, if they are used or not. As for the 
dahra/daïre, the āṣnāj (cymbals] and zamārāt, they are to be broken wherever found, used 
or not. As for the reed instrument (qaṣba), as it has been said: ‘when it is used and there 
is singing with it’… as for the duff-s, if they are used outside of the month of marriage, 
then they are to be broken. (cited in al-Sulaymānī 2011, 98) 
 
Another instrument mentioned by the Ibāḍīs, more familiar in Central Asia, is the ṭunbūr. 
Interestingly, Mūsā bin Ābī Jābir al-Manḥī (of Manaḥ, d. 181/797) writes that one has 
“permission to leave it unbroken “if it was without adornment (’idha kān l-ghayr zayna), 
[though] if the value of the ṭunbūr seemed high, then most scholars permitted breaking it ‘even if 
it was of great value’” (al-Nabhānī 2016, 45). As opposed to discussions of instruments that 
perhaps were not used in Oman or were no longer used there, these details seem to indicate that 
not only was the tunbūr present at some time, but that it was differentiated in construction. 
Lieutenant Wellstead reports but does not name an instrument that may be related to this ṭunbūr: 
“seated cross-legged under the scanty shade of the date-palm, I have often listened to [a 
Bedouin] thus amusing himself for hours. The only accompaniment is a rude guitar with two 
strings” (1837, 74-5). 
 Al-Kindī reportedly asked another scholar, ’Abī al-Ḥuwārī, about  
the dahra/daïre, is it to be broken if it is not played? And he replied: yes, it is broken… so 
I said to him: And if I see a duff in a house is it for/upon me to break it? He said: Yes, 
that is for/upon you. Another speaker said to him: Is it permitted to sell duff-s at a Muslim 
souq [or marketplace]? He said: No, that is not permissible. (al-Sulaymānī 2011, 99)  
On this last point, the selling of music instruments in a Muslim souq, another scholar compares 
this to the “foolishness of the relaxation of the [obligation] to covering of the men of the world” 
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“the letting down of hair onto backs,” men dressing like women and the converse, or allowing 
youths and idiots to carry weapons (al-Sulaymānī 2011, 103).  
Ibāḍīs were careful not just to condemn their own music, but that of Africans, British 
subjects, and Indians as well (Cook 2001, 409-10). British Imperial officers stationed in Muscat 
noted in 1869 that the influence of Sa‘īd bin Khalfān al-Khalīlī, an Ibāḍī scholar, had reached 
such a level that he outlawed the weekly music sessions of the Siddi-s (a population derived from 
enslaved Africans) in the capital (Johny 2010, 70). Similarly, the British Political Agent in 
Muscat had to intervene when Ibāḍī leaders requested that he prevent his Indian subjects from  
beating drums or playing musical instruments. Disbrowe [the Political Agent in Muscat] 
refused to heed the request. Instead, he replied that if these activities were restricted only 
during hours when it is unreasonable or caused disturbance then an understanding could 
be reached between the two sides. [Imām] ‘Azzān in his reply stated that music was to be 
banned at all time [sic] and no concession would be made to British subjects. (Johny 
2010, 71) 
 
However, recall that ‘Azzān’s time as Imām was predicated on his opposition to imperial 
ingresses in Oman and his call to reassert the religious basis of the Imamate. 
The essential statement on music for our purposes, however, is a qaṣīda written by the 
famed Imām ‘Abdullah bin Ḥumayd “Nūr al-Dīn” al-Sālimī (1286-1332/1869-1914) in the 
Jawhār al-Niẓām fī ‘ilmī al-’adyān wa-l-aḥkām (The Jewel of Order in the Science of Religions 
and Judgments), a collection of poems and prose sections that gather and expound on Ibāḍī 
Islamic themes. In the section entitled “Book of the Order of the World,” in the subsection on 
“Enjoining the Right and Forbidding the Wrong,” he writes the following lines: 
And the instruments of entertainment that have no use 
Outside of themselves are to be broken whenever they are found, 
In all of their types that exist, 
Because in this there is no benefit. 
 
Bin Maḥbūb told us about his compatriot; 
That he played a drum with no mind to it. 
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And in their telling, he [Bin Maḥbūb] rent the leather [of the drumheads] 
And that is incumbent upon any of the proper [Muslims]. 
 
And they are not permitted to play the drum, 
For entertainment — but for two 'just meanings': 
And that is the terrorization of enemies, 
And as a response to the distant cries [of communication], 
 
And as a call to the prayers of the festival (al-‘īd) 
Or to a serious and purposeful meeting between them [Muslims].  
(cited in al-Sulaymānī 2011, 96-7) 
Nūr al-Dīn demonstrates the harsh Ibāḍī take on music as requiring the destruction of musical 
instruments. However, what this passage shows most clearly is the pragmatic Ibāḍi interest in 
function and uselessness. The poet’s main criticism of music and musical instruments in this 
passage is that the instruments of entertainment are to be broken “because in [them] there is no 
benefit” and they “have no use outside of themselves.” Al-Sulaymānī adds that musical 
instruments are “not [the kind of things] that are benefitted from” (97). When the “two ‘just 
meanings’” for using instruments are provided, they are clearly phrased in terms of function: 
insofar as drums are useful in times of war (to terrorize enemies and coordinate soldiers) and in 
peace (to gather the Muslims to festival and consultation) they are permitted. This is a clear 
expression of what Al-Faruqi presented as the hierarchy of handasa al-ṣawt, but the justification 
of it is not presented in terms of the sound-art’s similarity to the recitation of the Qur’ān, but of 
its benefit to believers in other ways. 
 The current Grand Muftī of the Sultanate of Oman, Aḥmad bin Ḥamad al-Khalīlī, has 
issued several fatwas about music and echoes his predecessors very closely. Condemnation 
should be the general stance, but bets are hedged. The general Ibāḍī interpretation of music 
contends that the “al-lahū al-ḥadīth” mentioned in Luqmān 6 refers to music, musical 
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instruments, the purchase or renting of music, and nearly everything else related to it. In an 
undated fatwa issued by the Muftī, he summarizes an Ibāḍī position: 
Al-lahū is impermissible (yaḥram al-lahū) when it pulls to it corruption and emits 
iniquity. Its impermissibility is evidenced by the true speech of the Most High: “And of 
those people who buy idle talk to lead [others] astray from the path of God without 
knowledge” [Luqmān 6]. Al-lahū al-ḥadīth in this verse is “singing,” as narrated by the 
learned interpreter and translator of the Qur’ān Ibn ‘Abbās—God’s mercy upon him. 
Thus it was told about the Prophet—May God send prayers and peace—through the 
telling of 12 of his followers, of [his] prohibition of singing and playing and instruments 
(al-ghinā’ wa-l-‘azif wa-l-zamr). Despite this, scholars have permitted, in the case of war, 
what inspires ḥamās (vigor, enthusiasm) in the believers and strengthens their resolves. 
However, war songs (inshād-s) that carry ḥamās are conditional provided that they do not 
come at the expense of religious duties, such as impeding the duty to remember God and 
the duty of prayer; surely, God knows best. (cited in al-Sulaymānī 2011, 106) 
 
Once again, function outweighs the doctrinal slash-and-burn prohibition of music. Music is, in 
fact, too useful to ban completely. In my discussions of this with another religious scholar, he 
explained to me that non-Muslims often think that Muslims ban alcohol and music without 
exception: “In fact,” he pointed out, “alcohol and music are common. Why? Because you need 
alcohol for cleaning, chemistry, for useful things (ashiyā’ mufīda) like perfume. It is the same 
with music. It is not ḥarām without exception—if it is useful and beneficial to the Muslim, he 
must use and benefit from it.”  
 The definition of permitted sonic art for Ibāḍīs is also quite wide—as Al-Faruqi notes, it 
is only that music which is most strongly associated with immoral settings that is uniformly 
denounced. In a 2005 fatwa, the Muftī also commented on a variety of inshād-s that were sent to 
him. The letter and response read:114 
July 2005 / Jumādā al-thānī 1426 Fatwa 
In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. 
His Eminence the Shaykh / ’Āḥmad bin Ḥamad al-Khalīlī the Venerable Grand Muftī of 
the Sultanate: 
                                                          
114 I have not yet found the sound examples that accompanied the letter. 
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Peace be upon you, and God’s blessings and mercy, 
The included attachment with the letter is a group of inshād-s that include various 
vocal expressions. Since the controversy amongst people has increased around [music’s] 
judgment according to the Sharia, we submit it to your Eminence, seeking from you the 
blessing of notifying us as to its status. 
  
The attachment is ordered as follows: 
1 - Al-duff? 
2 - Western music/rhythm? (al-‘īqā’ al-gharbī) 
3 - Sea music with or without interlocking clapping? 
4 - Invigorating military music? 
5 - Melismata (Āhāt) - by a natural human voice? 
6 - Melismata by sampler (a human voice entered into a computer then used in 
performance)? 
7 - Autotune (a human voice entered into a computer and purified to become sharp, free 
from melodic impurities)? 
8 - Vocal alternatives (a human voice entered into a computer which then undergoes 
editing until it becomes like another voice)? 
9 - Bass (al-bayz) (a rough voice accompanying music/rhythm either human or non-
human)? 
  
The answer: It is well-known that devotion is a wide door. So he who is prudent 
leaves [unmolested] the non-prohibited—that is most safe and forthright. As for the 
judgment, I do not find in what has been presented in these expressions something that is 
forbidden except for the Western music, insofar as it is in imitation of non-believers, and 
the Sea Music with interlocking clapping due to the clapping. Surely God knows best. 
(cited in al-Sulaymānī 2011, 109-110) 
 
 Is Music Useful or Useless? 
What emerges from the discussion of music most clearly is (1) that proscriptions on 
music made by Ibāḍīs are very fine-grained, and (2) that a crucial deciding factor is whether or 
not the music or instrument serves a discrete and necessary social function. Hence, while musical 
instruments are broadly impermissible, commonly held exceptions exist to preserve what is 
useful and beneficial—similarly, music that is considered to have no use or benefit is prohibited. 
Discussing Ibāḍīs’ take on musical instruments in general, Cook reports that  
[Omani Ibāḍī] jurists will consider—though not necessarily adopt—a kinder view of an 
instrument if it meets one or more of the following criteria: if it is not actually being 
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played; it is being played without the accompaniment of singing, revelry or partying; it 
could in principle be used for some legitimate purpose; it is being used by children rather 
than adults. (2001, 411, italics mine)  
 
One example of this kind of thinking is given by al-Nabahānī when he writes that the large qaṣba 
(CLA, “reed,” flute) was “beneficial in remembering the hereafter (or death in another reading). 
It was reported about Al-Wuḍāḥ bin ‘Aqaba (f. 237/851) that his son Ziyād saw him listening to 
the sound of the large qaṣba while crying” (2015, 45-6). 
 This practical mode of thinking in religious matters was reported by Limbert (2010) in 
her ethnographic research on sociality in Bahlā’ as well. However, Limbert notes the reverse: 
While older Bahlawis [people from the town of Bahlā’] considered neighborly sociality a 
condition of being a proper and pious person, I quickly learned that some younger 
Bahlawis considered this visiting to be an impediment to human responsibilities to God. 
Being social, younger Bahlawis argued, was a distraction from the constant remembering 
of God that was incumbent upon pious individuals. Thus, rather than considering this 
sociality to be “proper” (that is, religiously sanctioned), younger Bahlawis argued that it 
was useless (ghayr nafa’a), a waste of time, and thus a sin. (2010, 14)   
 
Rather than the usefulness of a practice determining its acceptability, it is the uselessness of an 
action (within a certain discourse) that condemns it. Despite protestations that visiting might, in 
fact, be a kind of work (shughl] (like praise), its frivolity is enough to make it sinful. Limbert 
notes that Oliver Leaman (1980) traces this tendency of equating “uselessness” with sin back to 
the 3rd/10th-11th century Islamic jurist ‘Abd al-Jabbar, who first presented the uselessness of an 
action as “sufficient condition of its evilness,” whatever the consequences (129). If, as ‘Abd al-
Jabbar claims,  
everything has value because there is a purpose behind its existence, anything which is 
not in accordance with this purpose must be evil. The performance of a useless action 
must be objectionable on such a view, since it involves acting as though there were no 
all-encompassing purpose at work in creation. (Leaman 1980, 129) 
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Despite the high-mindedness of this claim, for Omanis the concept of uselessness is a very 
practical one. A common saying amongst Omanis when evaluating something is to say “mā 
yaṣlaḥ,” which means both “it’s not proper” and “it’s not useable, not practicable,” or the 
opposite, “yaṣlaḥ,” meaning that it is fitting, serviceable, or useful. An Omani proverb runs, gald 
al-fi’r mā yaṣlaḥ l-al-raḥmānī (lit., “a mouse’s hide isn’t useful/enough to skin a raḥmānī 
drum”), used to refer to meager attempts to solve a big problem. Encouragements to drink more 
water, juice, or coffee, to eat more, or to use incense are accompanied by the phrase, “it will 
benefit you” (yistafīdak). After many interviews and performances, I was asked “did you benefit 
from it?” (tistafīd minnu?) Discussing the moral dangers of coffee and coffee consumption in 
Bahlā’, Limbert cites a jurisprudential qaṣīda by the scholar Mājid bin Khamīs al-‘Abrī (1252-
1340/1836/7-1921/2) who “simply notes that there is nothing wrong with coffee and that its 
effects are not harmful, but rather useful” (66). 
a. Legitimating the Drums of War 
However, the most important exception for a discussion of the razḥa and the drumming 
in it is the Ibāḍī exceptions for military music. “It is noteworthy that the attitudes of the [Ibāḍī] 
jurists are not uniformly hardline in all these matters,” writes Cook, and that “the single most 
prominent motive behind the softer views is military” (2001, 410). His paragraph on this 
exception is worth citing at length: 
One jurist who considers playing chess a grave sin allows it when the object is instruction 
in military strategy. Another describes male shrieking as a wrong and a residue of the 
Jāhiliyya, but relents when asked to consider it as a war-cry intended to rally the troops 
and strike fear into the enemy; he expresses the hope that it may then be permitted, 
though his preference would be for the use of the Islamic war-cry ‘God is greatest!’ … 
One jurist recollects that in the coastal city of Ṣuḥār, Maṭṭār and his men had not been 
prevented from use of this drum [the duhra], and he wonders what the doctrine of the 
scholars concerned can have been; we know from elsewhere that Maṭṭār and his men 
were Indians [possibly Baloch], a military force which the Imām maintained in Ṣuḥār. 
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Another jurist states that a certain Abū ’l-Ḥuwārī al-Ma‘nī used to object to the Indian 
who beat the drum in the camp (sc. at Nizwā in the Omani interior), and distanced 
himself from the Oman in consequence. More striking than any of this is the discussion 
of the question whether the imam may overlook the misdeeds of his own followers in 
wartime; one view accepts this concession, the other rejects it. The emphasis on military 
efficacy is doubtless linked to the resilience of the imamate in Oman. (Cook 2001, 410-
411) 
 
Al-Nabhānī notes the same process regarding drums in the Interior. “It seems that drums 
acquired their legitimacy from some Islamic scholars due to their effect they had during war and 
in meeting the enemy” (2016, 46). He writes, “Shaykh Khamīs bin Sa‘īd al-Shaqṣī (c. 1030s-
1090s/1620s-1680s) confirms that when he said:… ‘In our days, the drum is not considered 
shameful (lā yistaqbaḥ al-ṭabl) especially if it was a time of war, in a parade at the (military?) 
camps, and perhaps as a sign or notice of that” (46). Al-Shaqṣī concludes that “each time period 
and people has its own legal judgment,” and al-Nabhānī astutely notes that this is perhaps written 
with a sense of resignation. Al-Shaqṣī was, after all, “one of [Imām Nāṣir bin Murshid’s] central 
supporters” and “this period was a time of the wars to unify the nation and throw out the 
occupying Portuguese” (46). This echoes the stances cited in earlier sections from the current 
Grand Muftī, Nūr al-Dīn al-Sālimī, and others. In the next section, we will examine more closely 
the context and social ramifications of this doctrinal position over the last few centuries, and the 
controversial role it has had in aiding state power. 
“The Right has come”: Music in Omani statecraft 
In the previous section, we have seen how, despite early and continued condemnation of 
music and musical instruments, Omani Ibāḍī intellectuals have made special exceptions for the 
drum in times of war or for the inspiration of fighters. In this section, I collect and review much 
of the extant textual evidence for the role of music in non-jurisprudential contexts. I focus on two 
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contexts: that of Oman proper, and the Omani colonization of East Africa and Zanzibar. As we 
shall see, reports of music in these contexts are often associated with the violent display of state 
power. Insofar as music is played in the context of such state displays, it is tolerated as useful. 
Outside of this context, it is often condemned. This trend is especially well-documented since the 
early 11th/17th century, which corresponds with the rapid expansion of Omani state power, 
internal development, and imperial ambitions. It is perhaps unsurprising that the bulk of 
anecdotes including drums and performance come from this period.   
a. Oman Proper 
Omani musicologist Musallim al-Kathīrī has gathered some of the few mentions of music 
and instruments that exist in the native Omani historical texts, especially from Nūr al-Dīn al-
Sālimī’s history Tuḥfa al-’a‘yān bi-sīra ahl ‘Umān (Masterpiece of the Notables in the Story of 
the People of Oman, 1998]. In al-Sālimī’s retelling of the origin myth of the Omani Arabs, it is 
the Persians who used “trumpets and drums” in their fight against them, while the Arabs did not 
(al-Kathīrī 2005, 48). However, somewhere in the intervening millennia Arabs began to use 
drums for a variety of purposes, often communal, military, and political. Due to the paucity of 
evidence over this period, we will confine ourselves to the last two or three centuries. 
Historical examples of music and drumming largely begin with the end of the Ya‘āriba 
and beginnings of the Āl Bū Sa‘īdī dynasty, in the mid-18th century. Nūr al-Dīn and bin Razīq 
both retell the story of the founder of the Āl Bū Sa‘īd dynasty Aḥmad bin Sa‘īd’s Trojan Horse-
like hoodwinking of the Persian invaders at Barka using drums (al-Kathīrī 2005, 48). Aḥmad had 
apparently invited all the remaining Persian leaders in Oman to a grand feast in the fort at Barka, 
during which he fed them lavishly (including perhaps alcohol). In their overfed stupor, Aḥmad 
commanded a drummer to play from the ramparts and call out, “anyone who has a complaint 
343 
 
 
 
against the Persians, come take your revenge!”115 Upon hearing the call, Omanis fell on the 
trapped Persians and murdered them, save for a number who were expelled back to Bandar 
Abbas. Later in bin Razīq’s telling, two descendants of Aḥmad cemented peace between them 
“by beat of drum” (Badger 1871, 202), while another anecdote notes the presence of horn 
trumpets amongst the army of the Imam ‘Azzān (r. 1284-6/1868-1870) (Al-Kathīrī 2005, 48). 
More than just the presence of drums, the razḥa complex has long been associated with 
warfare. Al-Kathīrī notes that comparable to other Islamic contexts, music had a “specific 
military function in Omani armies” (2005, 48-9).  An anonymous text recorded in the late 1980s 
can serve as an example: 
Sayyidī lan ’amr ‘alaynā    
 Nasabbiq al-bārūt wa-l-nār    
Fī al-ma‘arak lan talāqaynā    
 Nartamī law damnā gārī   
  
Our Lord [need] not order us; 
 We race to the gunpowder and spark. 
In battle you will not find us 
Falling, though runs our blood! 
 
Wellsted is likely the first to describe the dance in English and does regard it as a “war dance.” 
Men dance with weapons and display their courage and skill-at-arms (1837, 69, 319-22): 
Upon my return to the tent [in Ga‘alān Bānī Bū ‘Alī, a town in the southwestern 
Sharqiyya region] I found there the whole of the tribe, at Beni-Abu-'Ali, consisting of 
about two hundred and fifty men, assembled for the purpose of exhibiting their war 
dance. They had formed a circle, within which five or six of their number now entered. 
After walking leisurely round for some time, each challenged one of the spectators by 
                                                          
115 This is likely the ṣāyiḥ, a town crier who played instruments (a drum also called ṣāyiḥ or horn 
trumpets, barāghīm) and made announcements, typically employed in many forts and castles as 
described by al-Shaydī (2008, 119 n.266). Al-Kathīrī adds that “one Omani citizen” recalled that 
drums were very common in signaling certain kinds of activities: one knew the sound of the 
neighborhood’s drum, and different drums announced the arrival of important guests, others that 
enemies were at the gates. Al-Hashimy writes that Sultan Fayṣal sounded a drum to warn the 
citizens of Muscat that “it was unsafe to stay outside the walls at night” due to the Imam Sālim’s 
raids (1994, 108). 
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striking him gently with the flat of his sword. His adversary immediately leaped forth, 
and a feigned combat ensued. They have but two cuts, one directly downwards at the 
head, and the other horizontally across the legs. They parry neither with the sword nor 
shield, but avoid the blows by leaping or bounding backwards. The blade of their sword 
is three feet in length, straight, thin, double-edged, and as sharp as a razor. As they carry 
it upright before them, by a peculiar motion of their wrist they cause it to vibrate in a very 
remarkable manner, which has a singularly striking effect when they are assembled in 
any considerable number. The shield is attached to the sword by a leathern thong; it 
measures about fourteen inches in diameter, and is generally used to parry the thrust of 
the spear, or jambeer [likely the khanjar]. It was part of the entertainment to fire off their 
matchlocks under the legs of some one of the spectators, who appeared too intent on 
watching the game to observe their approach, and any signs of alarm which incautiously 
escaped the individual, added greatly to their mirth. Their only music consisted of a small 
drum, beaten by a slave. (Wellsted 1837, 69-70) 
 
The context, dueling, and regalia he describes are strikingly similar to current practice in the 
Interior, with the exception of the playing of a single drum as opposed to a matched pair. Rather 
than just dodging the sword, the aim nowadays is often the satisfying clack of hitting your 
opponent’s shield. The circle dance style of the razḥa might have been developed in the 
southwestern Sharqiyya—this is certainly the opinion of many of my interlocutors—and this text 
provides some more evidence. Yusuf al-Shawqi, the Director of the Omani Centre for 
Traditional Music prior to Musallim al-Kathīrī, notes that a variety of the razḥa which involves 
the two encircling lines is named razḥa al-ḥuwāmah (the “gliding razḥa”) and is “common in the 
provinces of the Sharqīyah, especially in Ṣūr, Ja‘alān Bānī Bū ‘Alī and Ja‘alān Bānī Bū Ḥasan” 
(1994, 155). In the interior, however, this style coexists with many others, which are likely just 
as antique.  
Later, in Muscat, Wellsted describes another razḥa form, involving meeting lines: 
The men amused themselves [during the ‘īd celebration] with horse and camel races, and 
with the same description of war-dance as I have described in my account of the Beni-
Abu-'Ali Arabs. They also practised another, which I have never seen elsewhere: two 
lines form at the distance of ten or fifteen yards, and approach each other to the sound of 
a drum, beaten by two slaves stationed midway between them. They proceed at a slow 
and measured pace, until within about two yards from each other, and then either party, 
after simultaneously bowing their heads, retreated to the same distance as before; in this 
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manner they continued to approach, bow, and retreat as long as I remained. (1837, 319-
22) 
This style of razḥa is another unnamed but common form in the Interior, and the blending of the 
two might be evidence of the development of the line form outside of the southwestern 
Sharqiyya, and the circle form within it. In any case, both are closely associated with warfare and 
the movements of soldiers and battle lines.  
 Direct evidence of the razḥa being used in warfare is presented by bin Razīq in his 
history of the Āl Bū Sa‘īdī-s (bin Razīq 2001). Sulṭān, the son of the Imam Aḥmad Āl Bū Sa‘īdī, 
the governor of Ṣuḥār who repelled the Persians from Oman, was living in Gwadar on the 
Makrān coast after a failed coup against his father. The Baloch ruler there granted the town and 
its environs to Sulṭān as a gift, which the Omanis retained until the late 1950s. After the death of 
his father and nephew, who had been appointed the wālī of Muscat by his own father (at that 
time the Imam Sa‘īd bin Aḥmad), Sulṭān returned to Oman in c. 1206/1792 and marched on 
Muscat. He sent a letter before him proclaiming that he was only interested in attacking the forts 
of the city and would leave the inhabitants and merchants in peace. The merchants, one in fact 
the author’s father, devised a clever way to gauge the strength and will of the defenders. The 
merchant families fired muskets into the valley through which Sulṭān’s army would have to 
march and cried that they had met the enemy. When the defensive forts in Muscat merely fired 
their muskets into the air in a bid to pretend that they were willing to fight rather than emerging, 
the merchants of Muscat knew they would be defeated by Sulṭān’s army. 
About an hour afterwards Sultan and his force approached through the Wadi, with their 
swords drawn and singing as their war-song this noble sentiment, “The right has come 
and has overthrown the wrong; the wrong is overthrown!” (wa siyūfihim maslūla wa 
Sulṭān yamshī ’imāmihim. Wa sha‘ārihim hadhihi al-āyā al-sharīfa, ‘jā’ al-ḥaqq wa 
zahiq al-bāṭil, ’inna al-bāṭil kān zuhūqan’ [bin Razīq  2001, 370]) When they reached my 
father's house, my father went out to Sultan, took his hand, congratulated him, and 
informed him that he had read his letter to the notables and merchants of Maskat, and that 
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they had expressed themselves much gratified at his consideration for them [Sulṭān soon 
successfully took the forts.] (Badger 1871, 217) 
 
The original text in question here gives a more literal translation as “and their war-song 
was this noble verse of the Qu’rān,” since the quoted war-cry is found in Sūra al-’Isrā’ 81. With 
the description of marching, naked swords in hand, a leading patron, and a collective war-cry, I 
think it is not unreasonable to read this as an example of a razḥa or very conservatively as some 
kind of proto-razḥa. Here, an army marches and gives a war-cry together, clearly fulfilling the 
practical premise of Ibāḍī Islamic tolerations for razḥa—prosecuting military action against a foe 
of the state. The text of the presumptive razḥa is also Qur’ānic, therefore waylaying concern that 
the text might be objectionable on other grounds.  
Several of the “cousin” forms of the razḥa in the Ẓāhira and Buraymī region are also 
clearly linked to warfare. One, al-ḥarbiyya, is simply named “the one for war (CLA, ḥarb).” Al-
Shaydī notes that al-‘ayyāla, “one of the arts of war and the sword,” is named for “attackers” or 
“those that come against” (O. Ar, ‘āl, pl. ‘ayyāl) (2008, 211, 211 n.610). “It was named thus al-
‘ayyāla because it was performed for warfare when one tribe came against (ta‘āl) another” 
(2008, 211 n.610). An example from 1986: 
Yā dār al-falak, yā dār wa nayyāl al-ghumām   
 Winn shira‘ al-maṣgūl ḥinnā fī hawwāh  
Wilā’ wilaynā al-dār wa al-‘izz istigām  
 Wilā’ namawt wa nistirīḥ min al-ḥayāh.  
 
O Heavens, O home of the dispeller of clouds. 
The swords come buzzing and we’re in love. 
If we fled the homeland and upright honor, 
Then we die and take a rest from life. 
 
Al-Kathīrī claims that the razḥa al-wahābiyya form is named after the Saudi Wahhābī 
movement, as the dance groups performed to prepare for battle against them during their 
incursion in the early 1800s. “Nowadays, the wahābiyya / ‘ayyāla is known in the areas that were 
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the stage to this conflict,” in the Ẓāhira, northern Bāṭina, and in the United Arab Emirates (50). 
Al-Kathīrī continues: “arms (swords, daggers, rifles, and camel-sticks) are considered a common 
symbol in dance within many of the traditional Omani musical forms, as in [the arts that 
exemplify] ḥamās, self-praise, and praise” (2008, 50). 
Razḥa-s were clearly closely tied to fighters and fighting. Following our investigation in 
the first section, this should imply that this kind of music was permitted insofar as it fulfilled a 
function. Interestingly, historian Sa‘īd bin Muḥammad bin Sa‘īd al-Hashimy, in his dissertation 
on the rule of the revivalist Imam Sālim bin Rāshid (r.1331-8/1913-20), records that  
According to one story [Imam Sālim] was walking one day near the fort of Nazwa (the 
old traditional capital of the Ibāḍ) and he heard some soldiers singing and dancing. He 
shouted at them: behave yourselves in this place! When the soldiers heard his 
commanding voice they became full of fear and became quiet.  (1994, 56) 
 
Clearly Imam Sālim was admonishing these soldiers for performing what was likely a razḥa. 
This story helps to show that razḥa were necessary at certain times but were not necessarily 
warmly embraced by elites at all times. Razḥa is useful and dangerous. While it is valued for 
instilling virtue and encouraging the faithful, it can also inspire religious rebuke and celebrate 
vice. Some of my interlocutors, for example, were especially fond of razḥa-s that were called 
ghazaliyya, love razḥa. One such razḥa was taught to me after a raucous meal of ṣalūna, a kind 
of watery curry, whose gingery spice was said to excite the eater to sing this: 
Kharagat min al-ḥuṣn al-muṣūfa     
 ‘ūdihā116 yaḥanni al-ṣufūf.     
ṣadrihā sab‘a niṣūf      
 tabarī al-‘ila wa al-sigām    . 
‘aynihā nugm al-thirayya’     
 khudhihā badr al-tamām     
mazūrihā mā dām ḥayya      
                                                          
116 As mentioned in the first chapter, this literally means “her wood,” in this region of Oman read 
as “her tree trunk,” referring to her figure. 
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 bukra wa ta‘ad al-khiṣām  
   
She went out from the fair castle, 
Her slim waist swaying. 
Her chest is half a seven,117 
That cures all sickness and ills 
Her eye is the North Star, 
Her cheek the full moon. 
Her visits are what sustains life; 
     Bah, tomorrow consider the consequences! 
 
This is precisely the kind of poem that would in any other case be considered forbidden as 
immoral singing, ghinā’ al-mājin. However, this razḥa is now sung at weddings (“just late in the 
evening, you know, when the kids are off to bed,” one man sheepishly offered). 
Recall that since the Imam was not allowed to have a standing army, tribes had to be 
petitioned to join his military excursions. Often Imams did this with letters (see al-Hashimy 
1994), but from what we’ve seen it seems likely that much of this work amongst common people 
was accomplished through sung poetry. In the entry on razḥa in his 1994 Dictionary of 
Traditional Music in Oman, Shawqi writes that it “was a way of announcing war, victory, peace, 
or the mediation of peace between warring parties” (1994, 152). This recalls the peace 
announcement made between Imam Aḥmad’s descendants cited above, but also highlights the 
razḥa’s role in the context of military action. Razḥa not only encouraged and invigorated those 
doing battle, but also mediated information about warfare, broadcasting it amongst both 
belligerents and those uninvolved in the actual prosecution of armed conflict. Al-Shaydī gives an 
example of a razḥa sung in the context of a meeting between different parties: 
ḥinnā birūg al-mikhāyil   
 wa-l-ri‘ūd al-gawiyya    
tashad linā al-gabāyil    
 yawm ḥall al-ligiyya   
                                                          
117 A seven written in Indian numerals, used in Oman, is ٧, and so “half a seven” cut horizontally 
is thought to resemble cleavage.  
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We are the lightning of the incessant downpour, 
The peals of strong thunder. 
Witness the tribes mustered to us, 
On this day of meeting! (2008, 122) 
 
A razḥa like this one probably played an important role in not only invigorating soldiers but 
informing them of the stakes and encouraging them and their leaders to join.  
Another intriguing anecdote shows us further how the arts were both folded into the state 
apparatus and functioned in disseminating information. In ‘Ābī Bashīr Muḥammad “Shayba” bin 
Nūr al-Dīn ‘Abdullah bin Ḥumayd al-Sālimī’s (d. 1314-1406/1893-1985) history of the 20th 
century Imamate Kitāb nahḍa al-’ā‘yān bi-ḥurriyya ‘Umān (The Book of the Notables’ 
Renaissance in the Liberation of Oman], he chronicles the election of the Imam Muḥammad bin 
‘Abdullah al-Khalīlī in 1920. “Just after sunrise on Friday the 13th day of Dhī al-Qa‘ada of the 
year 1338/1920] the religious scholars, notables, and ‘those that bind and loose’ (’ārbāb al-ḥall 
wa-l-‘aqd) gathered in the Nizwā mosque” to finalize the contract and pledge of allegiance to the 
Imam Muḥammad bin ‘Abdullah al-Khalīlī (324). They apparently had to nearly force the title 
on him, and even “did not take from him a pledge nor condition, as was taken from weak 
Imams,” something that would limit his activities and purview as Imam (324). After listing the 
personages that then pledged allegiance to the new Imam (concluding with “the common folk”),  
His Eminence ’Abū Mālik gave the people a speech about contract, then after him ’Abū 
Zayd gave a speech to the army. After the conclusion of the two speeches, the majlis 
participants dispersed and the Imam took power—the doors were opened for him, 
cannons rang out the good news, and fine singers and criers began spreading (the news 
around Oman, wa qām al-ṣādiḥ wa al-bāghim bi-l-nashr).  
 
Happiness effaces this honor presented,  
 So the sad do not frown when you are smiling. (al-Sālimi 1998, 324-5) 
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The terms al-ṣādiḥ and al-bāghim require explanation here. Al-ṣādiḥ118 refers to a fine, powerful 
male singer, a kind of falsetto which is also used to describe the singing of birds. The verb it is 
derived from means “to sing, to chant” (Wehr 1994, ṣ-d-ḥ). Al-bāghim is slightly less 
straightforward. A historian put it to me this way:  
Historian: What al-Sālimi means here is not the literal meaning, this word means a cow 
or gazelle or camel that is lowing/bellowing. Baghama means to cry out, or to call out but 
it is for pastoral animals. Often this is said between the mother and the young, the young 
lows after the mother. It wants milk, it sees a lion, like this. Here, it is a combination of 
terms that shows that all were singing the name of the Imam, in high voices, the ṣādiḥ, 
and the low voices, the bāghim. Like we say, I searched East and West—did you go all 
the way to China and then to America? No, it is an expression of magnitude, do you 
understand me? 
BJG: Yes, it is clear now. And what do you think he means by this, in terms of the arts? 
H: This is unmistakable; he means by this the ‘āzī and the razḥa (kiānat al-‘āzī wa-l-
razḥa), this is the ṣādiḥ and bāghim respectively. The high voice and the low voice, this 
also carries the meaning of the high classes (al-khāṣa) and the low (al-‘āma) in society. 
In this he means the news spread far and wide. 
It is important to mention here that the historian in question knew the topic of my dissertation 
and so his attribution of the meaning of ṣādiḥ and bāghim as ‘āzī and razḥa may be more 
friendly than factual. 
                                                          
118 The ’ism fā‘il of the verb ṣadaḥa/yaṣdaḥ, ṣ-d-ḥ; though see Wehr 1994 who defines it as a 
“note raised a semitone, a sharp.” 
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However, there is some evidence that ‘āzī-s and razḥa-s were performed for the Imam 
Sālim’s election ceremony in 1913. During my research, an ‘āzī began to circulate on social 
media that was claimed to be one sung at this election. “A qaṣīda from an ‘āzī dating to around 
1913, to the election of the Imam Sālim bin Rāshid al-Kharūṣī,” the text read, “the same spirit of 
ḥamās and national pride that was in that day is in this ‘āzī.” I could not corroborate the 
historical accuracy of the poem myself, though many readers claimed that the antiquated 
language was enough proof—many words challenged even accomplished poets. Al-Hāshimy 
claims that many of the poems that were read that day “were later published in a book called 
Tahānī al-Imām Sālim b. Rāshid al-Kharūṣī (Congratulations to the Imam Sālim bin Rāshid al-
Kharūṣī] by [Shaykh] Nāṣir b. Sulaymān al-Lamkī in Zanzibar in 1332/1914” (1994, 88). Note 
that this election proceeded with the same formal order of genres of oral performance as we have 
seen in celebrations involving the wālī of Manaḥ, during the opening of the soccer pitch, and 
others. First, there are formal speeches given by relevant persons, followed by recited poems 
written for the occasion, followed by “singing and chanting.”119 In any case, the translation of 
this purported ‘āzī is incomplete and tentative. Nevertheless, the ‘āzī demonstrates much of what 
has been claimed regarding generosity and giving, communal representation, and mutual 
obligations between rulers and ruled: 
I invoke the name of the Originator,  
 My heart sharpened by my important task. 
 
The news has spread about the Ghāfirī (meaning the Shaykh Ḥimyar bin Nāṣir al-Nabhānī al-
Riyāmī [d. 1920], who was counted as the leader of the Ghāfiri faction in the Sultanate)120 
                                                          
119 In Jan Morris’s description of the Sultan Sa‘īd’s 1955-6 royal progress through the Interior,  
Sultan in Oman, she describes the reception of the Sultan in Nizwā in terms similar to those 
expressed by other authors; typically, no specific mention is made of music. 
120 A staunch ally of Imam Sālim’s Imamate, he led the Bānī Riyām tribe on several campaigns 
against Bahlā’, Gabrīn, and Rustāq on behalf of the Imamate. 
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 That he is extraordinary, and the Imam comes forth. 
 
He is extraordinary, and the faithful come forth. 
 ‘Ibrī and Tanūf have escaped.121 
 
Ḥimyar is insatiable, no man exceeds him, 
 Other than widowers and orphans.122 
 
Other than widowers; Father of the right, 
 Who makes things affordable by his own wealth! 
 
From Sharjah and the northern country, 
 Beyond wasting from hunger, he devours foods. 
 
Beyond wasting from hunger, he is to them a seller of his life (shirāh], 
 And to them he dispenses the zakāh tax. 
 
They have called the Maghrib prayer for years, 
 And he loves the Muslims’ victory. 
 
They said, “yea, we are ready!” 
 The people are at the ready. 
 
Obediently, the people are ready, 
 And they are proud of Nizwa, the westernmost. 
 
In the fort123 blows a strong wind, 
 Undertaking the destruction of the ugly. 
 
Undertaking the destruction from the wall. 
 O bin Ḥamad, there is no victory for you.124  
 
Confronted, he despaired from life, 
 He drank from the fated cup of death by his own hand. 
 
He drank the cup of death from his own hand, 
                                                          
121 This refers to the two towns joining the Imamate, presumably. Tanūf was the place where the 
Imam Sālim was elected; ‘Ibrī was the “turbulent frontier province” of the Imamate, bordering 
Saudi Arabia and constantly threatening independence (Wilkinson 1987, 254). 
122 This was said to refer to Ḥimyar’s humility; others claimed it referred to his “hunger for war, 
which was like a widower’s or orphan’s hunger for food.” 
123 Likely Nizwā fort, where Imam Sālim held power. 
124 Referring to Sayyid Sayf ibn Ḥamad Āl Bū Sa‘īdī, the ruler of Nizwā fort, who committed suicide during 
the Imam’s siege of it. 
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 The sugar-cane presses did not speak of it.125 
 
Follower of the writings of the [high officials]126, 
 A horse [i.e., bin Ḥamad] they led by the halter and bit. 
 
A horse they led goes onward, 
 [While] the army is in the mosque safely, 
 
Not one fatigued, unbroken; 
 By God the victory is everlasting. 
 
The WhatsApp message concluded, “it is said that the owner of this ‘āzī is Barīk bin Ḥamūd bin 
Khaṣīb bin Salīm bin Mubarak bin Khanjar bin ‘Umrān al-Raḥbī (of the house of the ’Awlād 
Salīm).” The same poem can be found online with similar attributions.  
 A final anecdote brings us to the next section of this chapter. W. H. Ingrams, the well-
known British historian of Zanzibar, recalled that one day, while he rested at Chake in Pemba, a 
crew of Omani sailors had arrived, forced to seek shelter there rather in Zanzibar due to bad 
weather. Being British, he writes that  
I asked them all to tea. They were Suris [from Ṣūr in Oman] and it was my first contact 
with them. What struck me most was the fact that they were all black. They had, 
however, finer features than our Bantus and were bearded…they rather alarmed me by 
coming to tea armed to the teeth with sticks, swords and round shields of rhinoceros hide, 
as well as the usual jambiya [curved dagger] round their waists. Some also carried small 
war drums. After the gentle manners of my Zanzibar and Pemba friends the uncouth 
habits of the seafarers at first surprised me, but they were friendly and appreciated the 
party even if they were not entirely at home with cups and saucers and cakes. However 
they were quite happy with the sherbet and black coffee in Arab cups, and afterwards 
proposed to dance a Razha for me. 
 The reason of the armament now became clear. Their intentions were peaceful but 
the display they gave was extremely warlike. The orchestra of drums struck up and the 
rest, pairing themselves off, indulged in mimic contests on the lawn, which I thought 
might end fatally at any moment, for they made great sweeping lashes at each other with 
their swords, which were apparently only avoided by dexterous countering with shields 
                                                          
125 Nizwā and this region in general was known for growing a large amount of sugar-cane, which 
was pressed into a sweet drink; perhaps what carried the poison that the wālī drank? 
126 Probably referring to the Sultan’s administration, for whom the wālī held the city. 
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or by leaps in the air over the passing sword which would have made any skipping 
enthusiast envious. Some performed with jambiyas, making circular downward strokes 
parried by shield. When one overcame his opponent he would sit astride him and make as 
though to gouge out his eyes with horrifying realism. (Ingrams 1966, 38-9) 
 
Once again, the razḥa is associated with warfare and welcome. In this case, it is performed by 
sailors coming down the East African coast. In the next section, we will see how this movement 
of people is further evidence of the central role of the razḥa in the politics of the state. 
b.  Omani colonization of East Africa 
 The final source of evidence on the role of music in Omani statecraft comes from the 
Omani expansion into East Africa. In the period from about 1650 to 1898, two successive waves 
of colonization and imperial ambition animated Omani leaders and merchants to take more 
sustained interest in controlling East African trade. This expansion was begun by the Ya‘āriba 
dynasty, though as Wilkinson comments “the power of the Ya‘arubī merely increased without 
being consolidated” (1987, 50). It took the economic base and connections of the Āl Bū Sa‘īdī-s 
to achieve that consolidation. “From the 19th century on,” historian Beatrice Nicolini writes, 
examining the second wave (1750-1898), “it was the blood-red flag of Oman that formed a tie, 
and not merely in the figurative sense, between the Omani enclave of the port of Gwadar in 
Makran-Baluchistan, the principal ports of Oman and the island of Zanzibar through the 
movement of peoples, precious goods and slaves” (2004, 4). Zanzibar was first considered as a 
capital city of the Omani empire in 1829, under the reign of Sa‘īd bin Sulṭān, who expanded 
Omani influence up and down the East African littoral some 960 miles in total (Ingrams 1931, 
160-3). Though much has been made of the move,127 for our purposes what is interesting is that 
                                                          
127 See Nicolini (2004, 136-8) for an overview. 
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at some point in this period, Omani (or at least Arab) dances began to be performed by the 
Swahili-speaking populations in Zanzibar and its environs.  
East African coastal peoples had, over the period in question, adopted and integrated 
many foreign influences within ngoma dance practices. As ethnomusicologist Kelly Askew 
notes, Swahili communities “developed aesthetic preferences for cultural borrowing and the 
appropriation of foreign elements” due to their historical role as intermediaries in Indian Ocean 
trade (2003, 611). These borrowings reveal how often music and dance have been associated 
with and constitutive of political power in East Africa (Askew 2003, 628). She examines dansi 
and ngoma (glossed as “modern” and “traditional” genres respectively) to show how such 
aesthetics “have clear economic utility” in the context of highly dynamic and multicultural trade 
networks (2003, 632). These dances in turn were linked with competing dance associations, 
themselves folded into the well-known East African urban moiety system, which acted as a 
“basic integrative device for urban settlements” (Ranger 1975, 20).  In light of these social 
structures, Askew writes that  
music and politics thus combine to create a powerful mix of political action and agents in 
Swahili history and present-day practice. Through music, Swahili individuals have 
appropriated European [and Arab] symbolic and cultural capital for themselves, voiced 
their political agendas in song, debated political action, and used musical events as 
opportunities for education and organization. (2003, 630) 
 
These factors lead Askew to conclude that “politicking itself constitutes a Swahili aesthetic 
principle. ‘To sing about’ (kumwimbia) someone, something, some event, some process and by 
so doing effect social change is no small matter” (2003, 631).  
Tracing these shifting influences, Ranger writes in Dance and Society in Eastern Africa, 
1890-1970 (1975) that “in the early 1890s, the dominant influence [on East African dances] was 
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still Arab” (20). A British imperial officer, R. Skene, provides a valuable overview of Swahili 
dances from that period, published in 1917. Skene’s first entry is on “The Razha Dance”: 
The Razha was originally a war dance practised by the Arabs in Arabia prior to starting 
out on a raid. It originated at Manga in Muscat, and is danced with naked swords, the 
object being to get the muscles of the sword arm into training. The Hatharmut or 
Hadramaut Arabs also dance it, but use daggers instead of swords. The dancers, who of 
course are all men, stand in two rows facing each other, or in one row. They advance 
slowly a few inches at each step, keeping time to the drumming. The sword is held 
perpendicularly in the right hand, the fore-arm being at a right angle with the body. While 
holding the hilt of the sword in a perfect balance between the thumb and the first and 
second fingers, the base of the hilt is given a smart blow with the wrist so as to make the 
blade of the sword quiver. Being highly polished and made of fine supple steel, the 
quivering blade reflects the light in a most effective manner. This can only be done with 
the long straight double-edged sword of Southern Arabia and not with the scimitar-like 
blade used further north, owing to the thickness of the latter weapon. The music for the 
Razha dance is supplied by a drum called a chapuo, cylindrical in shape, covered with 
goat skin on both ends. It is about eighteen inches long by eight in diameter, and is 
played on both ends with the hands, while hung across the waist of the drummer by a 
cord round the neck. A bass drum is also used, called a vumi of the same shape as the 
chapuo, but larger, being two to three feet long and fifteen inches in diameter. It is beaten 
in the same manner as the chapuo. Anyone who knows how to dance can join in. No 
refreshments are served. (Skene 1917, 413) 
 
Ranger adds that in Zanzibar “it was performed by ‘the men standing in a row and jerking their 
swords in the same manner as Arabs jerk their swords, one of which may sometimes be seen in 
the hand of a Swahili dancer of the Chama’[another dance form]” (Ranger 1975, 20). Several 
features of this are worth commenting on. First, the name of the dance as reported by Skene is 
precisely that of the Omani razḥa, though he claims it “originated” in Muscat. This attribution is 
likely using Muscat as a symbol of Oman in general. Secondarily, the description of rows of 
dancers is very much in line with Wellstead’s 1837 description of a dance in Muscat, while the 
“shaking” of the sword blade is good evidence of a direct link with other descriptions of Omani 
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dance. Similarly, the pair of drums here resemble in both size and differentiation the kāsir and 
raḥmānī of Oman.128  
An expert on taarab music in Tanzania, musicologist Janet Topp Fargion, adds that 
“before their introduction to taarab, Shaib Abeid [a member of the first taarab club] writes, 
[dance associations] played music known as kinanda cha marwas and tari la diriji, but their 
favorite was to sing nyimbo za raz-ha (raz-ha songs) and other Arabic songs at weddings and 
other celebrations” (Fargion 2016, 208). These dance clubs were “comprised of people of 
Hadrami descent” and she cites this fact, Skene’s description of kinanda (another dance), and R. 
B. Serjeant’s (1955) reports of a similar name, razīḥ, being used for a different dance in 
Ḥaḍramawt in Yemen, to conclude that the dance arrived from that region. While she also cites 
the entry on razḥa from Shawqi’s Dictionary, the evidence presented in this chapter seems to 
point to Oman as the origin point of at least the razha described by Skene.  
Arabs were not the only groups to have their dances adopted and transformed in East 
Africa. Ranger documents that British, French, and German dances, marches, costumes, 
instruments, and musical ideas were all brought into the beni ngoma in various ways. What is 
clear is that each successive empire’s display of pomp and circumstance were, sometimes 
flatteringly, sometimes sarcastically, emulated in East African’s own dances. What makes this 
interesting is that razḥa was not only performed in entertainment, but also as a serious 
demonstration and recognition of state power by Arab colonialists. Some films of these dances 
                                                          
128 Note that Wellsted described the dance in Ga‘alān as involving just one drum and in Muscat 
involving two. There is some evidence that this style of drum pair was adopted in Oman from 
Swahili drummers, much like the adoption of the shape, construction, and name of the misundū 
drum from Zanzibar in the Afro-Omani līwa, a popular African-derived musical practice in the 
Gulf. 
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are available, but they are difficult to accurately provenance.129 This is a major reason why East 
Africans seized on the razḥa to emulate: just like the European military marches they adapted 
later, the razḥa was a display of power. It functioned to display the authority, military might, and 
unity of the Arab colonizers. Razḥa carried out a specific function, not only in battle, but in 
peace as well (what relative peace can be had in a government based on trading slaves and 
colonization).  
Conclusions 
This chapter presented an interpretation of razḥa as a central expression of state power in 
Oman, uneasily validated by Ibāḍī Islamic jurisprudential opinion. The relation of state power 
and music is evidenced by the deep connections between religious interpretations of music 
within the theocracy and later Sultanate and in the central presence of razḥa in the expansion of 
Omani state power down the East African littoral. Practicality and purposefulness seem to be an 
under-recognized heuristic that motivated the legal determinations of several ’Ibāḍī legal 
scholars discussed here. Organized sound, drumming, dancing, and the emotional products of 
those activities are too socially useful to condemn wholesale. This usefulness of this dancing and 
drumming to the state was made clear by its spread along the state’s lines of colonial conquest. 
So let’s turn to that now. 
  
                                                          
129 Dramsi Nizwa. “ ‘Umāniyūn yū’idūn fann al-razḥa fī Zinjibār ‘ām 1949” [Omanis perform 
the razḥa in Zanzibar, 1949]. Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, 15 Aug. 2017. Web. 15 
Aug. 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-1t9GTc0ltE  
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Chapter 6: The Gift of Rule: Legitimating the Authoritarian State with Razḥa and ‘Āzī  
Music is more than a decorative art… it is a powerful medium of social order.  
(DeNora 2000, 156)  
States have a peculiar dual character. They are at the same time forms of institutionalized 
raiding or extortion, and utopian projects. The first certainly reflects the way states are 
actually experienced, by any communities that retain some degree of autonomy; the 
second however is how they tend to appear in the written record.    
 (Graeber 2004, 65) 
 
How does the modern authoritarian Omani state assert itself as real, effective, and 
legitimate? And on what grounds can we interpret the performance of razḥa and ‘āzī as helping 
to constitute the state as such? How, in short, do state performances of razḥa and ‘āzī help 
constitute state hegemony? I’ve claimed that certain performance practices, the razḥa and the 
‘āzī, have had variable but functional roles in legitimizing the political order of Omanis in the 
past and in the present. As I have shown in previous chapters, this legitimation is predicated on 
the function of the Generosity/Legitimacy mechanism: the perception that mutual obligations 
prevail between Omani Arab performers who direct praise and generous leaders who do good 
deeds by directing goods, services, and infrastructure to local communities. There is a 
recognition of mutuality between rulers and ruled, predicated on the adequate performance of the 
duties and obligations placed upon them. We have explored this relationship from several 
perspectives and with some problems in mind: from the perspective of performers, as engaging 
in the Omani/Arab ethos of generosity, how it both displays and undermines relations of 
dependency, and how it has articulated with Ibāḍī Islamic rulings on music. In chapter 3, our 
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focus was on individual leaders, logical targets for praise. Here, we trace the shift in this system 
from individuals to the abstraction of the state. Over the course of the 20th century, as many 
Omani and non-Omani ethnographers have shown, the social contexts of these performance 
practices have drastically shifted. These shifts have situated the razḥa and the ‘āzī as the two 
indigenous performance practices that have become most publicly associated with the modern 
state, its myth-making, and its project of legitimation. I propose that razḥa and ‘āzī have become 
so central to state ritual and the formation of the Omani state as a cultural entity because they can 
model the class relations that legitimate state domination. 
 Throughout this chapter, I offer a Gramscian, that is, a critical political economic 
approach to praise in order to show how this sense of mutual obligation takes on the character of 
an exchange relationship between rulers and ruled, and what this relation entails in the context of 
an Arab authoritarian state. “The State,” however, is a complex concept and requires 
considerable unpacking. In doing so, I propose a theoretical orientation to the state that sees its 
material and economic basis and the various ideological projects that reify it as an object to be 
related to as joined at the hip. “The historical production of the state” is, as anthropologist 
Fernando Coronil puts it, “a mystifying complex of practices and beliefs” (1997, 116). By taking 
on the useful ideas in the “nonrealist” approach embraced by recent ethnographers of the state 
(Krupa and Nugent 2015, 8-14) and addressing its weaknesses through a strict reading of  
Gramsci’s political economy, we can come to a richer understanding of the form, history, and 
development of the state as historically conditioned sets of relations and the practices and beliefs 
that sustain them. “States” are fully dual-natured: they are at once social and class relations 
between rulers and ruled, whose particular forms are historically and culturally mediated, and the 
complex of practices and beliefs that help frame and legitimate these relations, which are in turn 
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realized in institutions, apparatuses, and cultural forms. The state is a material and an immaterial 
existence at once, faces that reinforce and mask each other to produce an illusion of unity.  
In Oman, the modern Sultanate took the character it did due to the mapping of particular 
historical class configurations onto political institutions in such a way that power was 
concentrated within a small group of elites, along with their ‘ulamā’ and merchant allies. These 
elites asserted a level of independence from their allies and constituents by placing themselves as 
virtually the sole beneficiaries of integration into global capital flows, the development of the 
extractive oil economy, and colonial support (Ayubi 1995, ch. 7; Al-Naqeeb 1990). In order to 
sustain this dominance, Gulf leaders now had the dual task of maintaining the pretense of valuing 
“traditional” social relations while developing a modern state apparatus that was wholly 
authoritarian and oligarchic. Anthropologist Maurice Godelier has hypothesized that class 
relations of state domination are often sustained through the development of an ideology of debt, 
specifically of obligation and exchange, and I offer some new perspective on his argument by 
tracing some modern applications of it (Godelier 1986, 13-15, 166-7; Graeber 2012; Yeh 2013). 
I argue that this framing of elite giving as generosity is ultimately a form of governance as gift: 
the gift of rule. Just as gifts of gold require a reception and a response, so does the gift of rule, 
the gift of order, the gift of safety and plenty.  
Based on my argument that this sense of mutual obligation is modeled in the performance 
of razḥa and ‘āzī, I show that relations of dependency are realized between the state/Qābūs and 
performers in state-sponsored events that are, in turn, taken as a model of state-society relations 
as a whole. I trace how these relations of obligation and exchange have shifted from local to 
national levels and from regional to state rulers in order to argue that this shift has had an 
important role in legitimizing the state through praising the Sultan, who has positioned himself 
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as a human proxy of the state writ large. In so doing, I focus on the role of the state and its 
structural and ideological formation in the 20th century in changing the sociopolitical context of 
these practices, effectively controlling and directing their potential legitimizing power. This is 
the critical bridge between performance practice and projects of legitimation undertaken by 
states. Performance of razḥa and ‘āzī serve, in part, to mask the dependency relations that obtain 
in authoritarian contexts by framing them as exchange or mutual obligation, which both draws 
on historical ideals of authority and reasserts them. 
Considering this proposal will prompt us to ask how we ought to understand these praise 
practices as a political activity in an authoritarian state without political parties, formal 
representation, a legislative body or any of the other trappings of modern state politics. 
Throughout, I show how some historically salient features of performance (such as praise, 
celebration, and legitimation) have continued to function in more or less similar ways within the 
modern state, while others (such as communication, martial excitation, and communal 
representation) have been downplayed, become superfluous, or have been quietly suppressed. 
Further, the rise of the significance of razḥa and ‘āzī in public discourse and their inclusion in 
public state ceremonies is not coincidental, but part of a larger campaign of asserting the 
essential “Arabness” and “uniqueness” of Omani culture, the display of solidarity between rulers 
and ruled, and an attempt to form a kind of Omani nationalism that is deeply wedded to the state 
and its image of Oman. To frame this discussion within broader strands of political 
ethnomusicology and anthropology, I first synthesize some of the recent literature in the 
ethnomusicological and anthropological approaches to the state as an analytical category and 
interrogate some assumptions regarding the content and conduct of “politics” as a kind of 
activity. Next, I give an account of Omani state formation that focuses on the ways that these 
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approaches to the state help explain shifting social relations between rulers and the ruled and the 
ways that elites have shaped the context of praise performance. Finally, I elaborate the way in 
which the Omani state has implicated organizations of civil society in its strategic manipulation 
of generosity, praise, and dependency and the cultural ideals that have linked those practices and 
beliefs in the past.  
To begin this final chapter, however, I want to present two situations. The first is the 
image that opened this dissertation: the monumentally successful ‘āzī that was presented to the 
Sultan during the 40th anniversary celebrations just outside of Muscat. The second is the 
controversy over the cultural “ownership” of the ‘āzī as negotiated between Oman and the 
United Arab Emirates. Looking at these two situations exemplifies the stakes of some of the 
questions this final chapter seeks to address.  
a.  The 40th Omani National Day celebration, 2010 
The international success of the 2010 ‘āzī performance by Muḥammad bin ‘Alī al-
Marzūqī for the 40th National Day was perhaps unexpected. Not only had every National Day 
celebration since the 1970s been celebrated with one or more ‘āzī-s performed by talented 
singers, but al-Marzūqī himself had been singing in a similar style (and in front of Sultan Qābūs) 
since his breakthrough performance in 1994 at the Eid celebrations in Ṣaḥam as a boy. However, 
the combination of a dramatic, strongly worded poem, the performance of a lifetime, a 
choreography of striking bravado and audacity, and an almost solemn intensity cultivated by the 
bare-bones presentation (especially when compared to the spectacularly over-the-top “operettas” 
that often accompany these celebrations in the Gulf) made this performance a genre-shaping one. 
In the words of an aspiring ‘āzī performer in Manaḥ, “now everyone sings like al-Marzūqī; 
everyone is just copying him rather than learning the right way.” The various videos of this 
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performance on YouTube have garnered hundreds of thousands of views and comments from all 
over the Arab world and beyond. Perhaps the most telling examples of its success come from the 
way in which ‘āzī-s all over Oman for a variety of occasions are now performed the way this 40th 
anniversary performance was choreographed, rather than in the older choreography. Rather than 
marching in a circle, for example, many groups now choose to remain still or march straight in 
one direction. For the 40th anniversary celebration, the ‘āzī al-Marzūqī led a few important poets 
and performers, all of whom contributed to planning and arranging the performance, and a huge 
square formation of choral singers behind him in a straight line towards the seated Qābūs, 
through a stage-set castle built to mimic traditional fort architecture. The square of choral singers 
behind al-Marzūqī were all members of different performance troupes from throughout the 
country who were interested in or experts in the ‘āzī. With each line, al-Marzūqī and the group 
behind him waved their swords and guns and marched a few steps toward the Sultan. They 
moved into an open space framed by thousands of armed guards, soldiers, police, wrestlers, and 
armed dancers. Between each hemistich, this larger group raised their guns and swords into the 
air, beat drums, and cried responses: wa-slimt! (Truly!) or Hāāā! Aḥmad al-Riyāmī, an ‘āzī from 
Manaḥ, remembered it this way.  
Aḥmad al-Riyāmī: Of course, we were called and invited to join in the National Day celebration 
[in 2010], and we were eager to go (mutaḥamasīn). They called us from the Ministry of Heritage, 
I think it was… 
Ḥamad al-Tawbī: Yes, it was. 
AR: Right, so they said ‘we’re gathering all these groups together to put on the biggest ‘āzī, al-
Marzūqī will give it (rāḥ yilqā‘u), and it is a qaṣīda by al-Masrūrī, who also wrote the ‘āzī for 
the,…’ what was it… 
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BJG: The Year of Heritage in 1994? 
HT and AR: Yes, yes. 
AR: So, when we got there, by God, there were hundreds, there were thousands. It was an ocean, 
and they all loved the arts. They had tents set up for us, food, bathrooms, prayer rooms, it was all 
there. All provided, all available (mutawāffir kulluh). They had tents, big tents, and we stayed 
there for several days, and we did rehearsals for a few days. 
BJG: Did you get some money for going? 
AR: Yes, there was some money. The arts cost money, you know. 
BJG: Do you remember… 
AR: Ah, well, a few hundred riyāl I think… I’m not really sure. They were generous gifts (kānat 
āndiyya), as we say. 
BJG: So, you got some generous gifts, did you have other reasons to go? Was it an obligation 
(lit. “upon you,” ‘alayk) like with the soccer pitch? Because of the generous gifts, I mean? 
AR: No, no, no, the money was for participation, that was not the reason for participation… I 
mean, the money is not important. 
HT: Yes, like this. 
AR: So … [AR asks BJG to repeat question about whether the obligation was similar to the 
obligation felt at the opening of the soccer pitch in Manaḥ, BJG does so] Yes, yes it was similar 
(yitishabah al-’amr). We have to represent ourselves; we recognize Oman and we are proud of it 
(naftakhir bih). That’s love of country, you know, love of Qābūs. This is not an invitation one 
ignores/forgets (al-da‘wa mā yunsī). 
BJG: Of course. So, let’s watch the video… then I can ask… 
AR: Yes, let’s go… 
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[We watch the video on a laptop.130 As we do, AR sings the lines and hums the melody for 
words he does not remember.] 
HT: Did you see our brother in there, duktūr? He was in the group following. 
BJG: No! Where were you, brother? 
AR: [scrubs backwards through video, then points to screen] Here, look. I was thinner then, 
[laughs] (wazinnī kān khafīf). I think that’s me, it’s hard [to tell]. 
BJG: Were you there, O Ḥamad? 
HT: Yes, but we were on the sides. He [Qābūs] gave us all rifles, real ones. F-A-L [pronounced 
as English letters].131 
BJG: Why were you not in the group following? 
HT: Well, that group was for people who knew the ‘āzī, experts in the ‘āzī I mean. Aḥmad, he’s 
an expert. They all learned from each other, and we were on the sides, responding, I mean. 
BJG: Wow, Aḥmad, that must have been really wonderful. Did you enjoy it? 
AR: Yes, it was very beautiful. It inspired me to memorize the ‘āzī, to want to perform the ‘āzī 
as well. Everyone, I tell you, everyone who followed the ‘āzī that day remembers it. It was all 
legends, like the legends team (firqat al-Āsāṭīr, a soccer team that only fielded players who had 
“retired” from the official soccer club roster. The team had been the discussion of conversation 
beforehand.] there at the head, the ‘āzī [al-Marzūqī] the poet [al-Masrūrī] and that al-Tawbī who 
was too busy to be interviewed by you, [laughs]. They were all there. It was wonderful. 
                                                          
130 Badr al-Rabī‘ī. “Fann al’āzī min mahrajān al-sha‘abī li-l-‘īd al-waṭanī al-arba‘īn 2010”  [The 
‘āzī art from the 40th National Day popular festival.]. Online Video Clip. YouTube. YouTube, 29 
November 2010. Web. 13 July 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yh5p8Qxp9Nc 
131 HT is here referring to a standard British Commonwealth rifle, the Fusil Automatique Legér 
(FAL). 
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BJG: And he memorized the poem and gave a beautiful performance… 
AR: Yes, that is very important. It was his performance, but he did not sing live, it was a 
recording; it’s necessary because mistakes are not welcome in this kind of thing, [these things] 
require very precise timing.  
 The staging of this event is telling and can be fruitfully contrasted with other similar 
events. Generally speaking, one kind of state-sponsored event is composed of a selection of 
“traditional tableaus,” usually referred to in Oman as lawḥāt (“tableau” or “scene”). These 
typically include a variety of local dancers and singers performing lightly choreographed 
regional performance genres, such as women dancing al-bar‘a in Ẓufār or men dancing the al-
rawwāḥ in Musandam, in a stadium setting. Such performances might also include equestrian 
displays, camel-riding, pounding wheat, a local giving a qaṣīda, or other elements of local 
folklore and material culture being presented to various governmental authorities. For example, 
the relatively uncelebrated National Day celebration filmed for TV in Nizwā in 1987 contained 
both razḥa and ‘āzī, but both were presented more or less in historically accurate ways and were 
not previously recorded and played over a speaker system.132 This led to a relatively quiet and 
human performance, as opposed to the almost overwhelming volume associated with similar 
celebrations throughout the Gulf. In 1987, the ‘āzī was conducted in the typical manner 
associated with the Dakhiliyya and Sharqiyya provinces, with the ‘āzī himself moving around the 
inside of a half-circle of responders, not facing a particular addressee. On the other extreme of 
civic celebrations, there are the highly choreographed ’awbirayt (“operetta”) spectaculars so 
popular with Gulf autocrats. These typically involve elaborate fireworks, lightshows, tremendous 
                                                          
132 It should be noted that this was perhaps the first planned National Day celebration after the 
completion of the nationwide folklore documentation project launched in the early 1980s. 
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screens, and through-composed, semi-narrative songs in the Mashreqi ’ughniyya mold that 
dutifully display well-mannered children, beautiful women, and chivalrous men delivering 
obsequious monologues in Classical Arabic. Such performances often present a highly edited 
version of the national myth, with flawless choreography and tremendous spectacle, but hold 
apparently little interest to any of the Omani viewers with whom I watched them. Exceptions, 
especially amongst men, were performances of ‘āzī, razḥa, or genres like murabba‘, a kind of 
rhymed verse delivered at a blistering speed. These were, they noted, undoubtedly performed by 
actual Omanis and not Iraqi, Palestinian, Jordanian, or Egyptian performers brought in as 
“ringers,” as Rasmussen (2012) puts it.133  
It was a thoughtful and powerful combination of these two types of staging that have 
been seen at national events before that lent such potency to the 40th anniversary ‘āzī. It was a 
blending of spectacular choreography and commitment to presenting actual Omanis engaging in 
performances that were meaningful to them. In terms of spectacle and choreography, the array of 
armed men in service of Qābūs were all aligned and facing him or marching by and saluting him, 
referencing the poetic line “we all are a razor-sharp sword in your hand” (we will address the full 
text later in the chapter). He had symbolically armed them, and they in turn recognized this and 
saluted him with those admittedly unloaded weapons. The invincibility of the Sultan was on 
display, unworried by the thousands of guns before him. Similarly, the performers were all given 
new uniforms, swords and weapons so that they would have an almost anonymous, non-localized 
or specific, presence: the Arab Omani everyman. Finally, the actual audio of the ‘āzī was pre-
                                                          
133 See Rasmussen 2012 and Rasmussen and Al-Harthy 2012 for a more detailed discussion of 
these events. Rasmussen downplays the importance of “traditional” art forms presented therein 
in favor of music composed outside of Oman for Omani celebrations. In my experience, Omanis 
have little interest in these composed songs. 
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recorded and edited to be of very high quality in terms of sound and performance. However, 
these adapted elements do not completely overshadow the historical inspirations of the razḥa and 
‘āzī. The streams of dancers were not, it should be noted, foreign dancers flown in for the event, 
but were a broad spectrum of experienced Omani Arab men drawn from all over the sultanate to 
perform the most masculine, belligerent, and ḥamās-inducing war-dance, the razḥa, in local 
dialect and with local drummers, costumes, and drums. Duelers danced and leapt in between the 
huge groups of marchers, interacted with the drummers and flashed and buzzed their Omani 
swords as they passed the Sultan. With respect to the ‘āzī, al-Marzūqī presented a typical melody 
and vocal timbre for an ‘āzī, which also retained the most common refrain type of the coast, 
ṣubiyān yā kibār al-shiyyim (O, youths of the highest moral character). The combination of these 
styles of choreography lended the performance both the air of traditionality and authenticity and 
the direct, even overwhelming presence of the choreographed spectacle. In unison they were 
profoundly arresting. 
b. Who can throw the best ‘āzī? Contested ownership of performance practices in 
Oman and the UAE 
Certainly, the best evidence for the potency of the ‘āzī in representing the Omani state 
and praising its leader is the fact that the performance was adopted by the arrangers of the 42nd 
celebration of the foundation of the UAE in Abu Dhabi in 2013. Called “The Spirit of Union” 
(which has been the brand of the Emirati National Day celebrations since the 40th anniversary 
celebration in 2011), the 2013 ‘āzī performance in Abu Dhabi was based on similar 
performances held in the UAE in the past. This year’s, however, included a round of razfa-s (a 
dance similar to razḥa, but without drumming and usually performed in static facing lines) led, in 
fact, by Muḥammad bin Zāyid al-Nahyān, the recognized crown prince of Abu Dhabi. The 
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performance134 was given by ‘Ayḍa al-Manhālī, an Emirati popular singer who began his career 
singing shallāt, a kind of sung poetry that includes drumming but no “music,” and who later 
transitioned to the world of Gulf pop. Al-Manhālī’s ‘āzī was only partial—he deleted the initial 
ṣayḥāt, or calls to the listeners; only sang two lines per cycle; the “wa-slimt!” response from the 
chorus only occured after the first full line; and, finally, he did not use the typical beginning and 
ending line, “wa-muslimīn tikabbir!” with the response, “allahu akbār!” Al-Manhālī has gone on 
to give several more ‘āzī-s since then, often at National Day performances throughout the UAE, 
as have performers like Ḥamad al-‘Āmirī and Ḥussayn al-Jassimī. In each instance, the 
performances have evolved slightly—take for example Ḥamad al-‘Āmirī’s 2017 performance135 
at the “March of the Tribes” during the Zayid Traditional festival in Abu Dhabi, whose 
choreography was modeled more closely on the 2010 Omani ‘āzī. This example was a 
processional ‘āzī, but instead of taking a few steps and stopping for each verse, the groups never 
stopped walking forward, through the large faux fort architecture. 
 Omanis I spoke with about these performances were divided. Some took the fairly 
extreme position that the Emirates was “stealing” or “buying” the culture of Oman in a bid to 
give itself a history or a civilization that it “did not have.” Others were more pointedly 
disappointed at the failures of the Emiratis to accurately portray the ‘āzī, citing certain faults in 
performance that were, to them, unacceptable. Many criticized the vocal quality of the 
                                                          
134 ’ārā’ al-’akhbāriyya. “‘Ayḍa al-Manhālī – Al-‘āzī – al-yawm al-waṭanī” [‘Ayḍa al-Manhālī – 
Al-‘āzī – National Day] Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, 2 December 2013. Web. 12 July 
2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6YtFyJT84iw&t=68s 
135 Helal Alkaabi. “Fann al-‘āzī / li-l-shā‘ir Sayf Muḥammad al-Ka‘abī / ’idā’: Ḥamad al-‘Āmarī 
/ masīra al-qabā’il / mahrajān Zayid al-turāthī” [Al-‘āzī art / by the poet Sayf Muḥammad al-
Ka‘abī / Performance by: Ḥamad al-‘Āmarī / March of the Tribes / Zayid Traditional Festival.” 
Online video clip. YouTube. YouTube, 3 Dec 2017. Web. 5 Dec 2017.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6jkD-jzUg4I 
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performances, the failure of ‘Ayḍa to memorize the poem (he instead read off of a piece of 
paper), the inclusion of female participants, and the fact that he was behind a lectern like a 
“businessman” [English word used]. 
Late in 2017, I sat down with several members of the ’idāra (administration) of the Firqat 
al-‘Arabī in the guardhouse of a water pump station in ‘Izz to discuss some of these 
controversies. As my host sat down with a steaming pitcher of strong, clove-scented tea, the 
group around me had broken into a small chat about the new group being formed in Birkat al-
Mawz. Having lived there for some time, I was asked if I knew about it. I hadn’t heard anything; 
I knew that the leader of the effort was related to the leader of a performance group in Nizwā, but 
I did not think that the group had been formed in any official way. The youngest member of the 
group held forth that they would undoubtedly play with their hands on “Bengali” drums, not in 
the appropriate Omani Arab way using a striker and a switch; others concurred. On that note of 
Omani authenticity, I asked the group if the razḥa or ‘āzī was present in the UAE. They actively 
denied this, though one pointed out that the UAE and Oman were once one land (balad) and one 
people (sha‘b) and therefore had to share one group of inherited practices (mawrūthāt). 
Anticipating this little burst of nationalism, I had brought with me a YouTube clip of a news 
report from the Emirati news channel Dubai One on an art called al-taḥūrība or al-taḥūrayba 
performed by the Naqbī tribe from Ras al-Khaimah. The report clearly presented al-taḥūrība as a 
legitimate Emirati source of the ‘āzī-like performance at Emirati National Day festivities in the 
years prior. Other such reports have claimed the Ẓanjālī tribe from Fujairah as a basis, who 
perform an art called al-‘azwah. In any case, it is at least clear that the practice is or was present 
throughout the region in the recent past. Here is an excerpt of that conversation: 
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[After watching the video, in which an elder Naqbī is interviewed on the practice and several 
examples are shown. Some of the coverage is from a conference organized by the Ras Al-
Khaimah government.] 
BJG: So, how about that? What’s up with that? Have you ever heard of al-taḥūrayba? 
Member 1: Never. 
Member 2:  By God, this is a bunch of fakers, I think (muqallidīn, ‘ataqad). 
Member 1 and 3: [laughter] 
Member 2: Believe me, brother. Believe me, these Emiratis will make it all up (byakhtalaq kill 
shay al-’imārātiyyīn). The ‘āzī is Omani, 100%. It is only Omani and uniquely Omani. They 
don’t have a civilization (ḥiḍāra), so they perform the ‘āzī erroneously like this (fa-ya‘āzū bi-l-
ghalaṭ kidhā). 
Member 1: You’re right, I think it’s made up. It’s not true. I sympathize with this Naqbī fellow, 
listen to him talk about it— 
Member 2: Don’t feel bad for him, brother, he’s just grubbing for cash (mā t‘aṭaf ‘alayuh yā 
’akhī, bass yatamaṣlaḥ!)! 
All: [laughter] 
BJG: Really, I don’t know what to think. Perhaps it’s just very very old. 
Member 1: Like I told you, I’ve never heard the word “taḥūrība.” What does that even mean? 
BJG: … I thought it was like when you say a “little bird” (‘aṣfuwayyir) from “bird” (‘aṣfūr)136… 
taḥūrayyyyyyba, like that… 
All: [chuckle] 
Member 1: Then what’s a taḥūrba? 
                                                          
136 That is, producing the diminutive by placing a long ī before the final root letter. 
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BJG: … By God, I do not know. 
All: [laughter] 
Member 2: [hitting Member 1] If the doctor doesn’t know, forget the issue.  
Member 3: Seriously though, look what they are doing. They are much more famous than 
Oman, they can spread this celebration (qādarīn ‘alā nashar h-al-iḥtifāl), and if we don’t 
preserve these things… 
All: [grunting agreement) 
Later that evening, another group member joined us and I was urged to summarize the video of 
the Naqbī performance practice. I did so, and he concluded, “This Naqbī fellow got a lot richer 
after saying that!”  
BJG: Do you think so? Did they give him a bribe or something (’āṭūhū rashwa walā shay)? 
New arrival: Bribe? Well, of course, I mean, they pay off all their citizens… (yaksabū kull al-
muwaṭanīn)… 
BJG: Pay off? 
NA: Yes, from what I’ve seen (mā shāshaytlī). Really, they pay them off, or else why would 
they stay? Why would he steal our culture?  
BJG: I understand you, but is that not similar to when the Sultan gives at the National Day 
festivals (mūb hadhā mutashāba yawm al-sulṭān ya‘aṭī fī ḥaflāt al-waṭanīya)?  Money, I mean? 
That’s the same, he pays, you perform. He pays you off for a performance. 
NA: [waving his hand] No, no, you’re mistaken. Listen, Oman is an old country (balad ‘arīq) 
and the Sultan is wise. He knows how to be a leader (qā’id). There, it’s a young country, they 
need to buy off the citizens for them to participate (lāzim yaksabū al-muwaṭanīn ‘alā shān 
mushārika). They have no history, nothing else but money…  
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BJG: True, being a good leader means you have to give… 
NA: Believe me, brother, this is a different thing. I’ll give you an example—you know that big 
palm tree-shaped island out there in Dubai… what’s it called? [someone chimes in 
“Gumayrah!”] Yeah, Gumayrah, Yumayrah, whatever. So, when they made that, Shaykh 
Muḥammad, the money ran out, the investment. They could not complete it. So what happened? 
BJG: I have no idea! 
NA: Brother, Qābūs came and funded the whole thing. He funded it, and then gave it right back 
to Shaykh Muḥammad. He didn’t sell it, he gave it (mā yibī‘uh, ya‘aṭīuh).  
BJG: Ah, so he was generous! He was showing…  
NA: No, that wasn’t generosity. He was sending a message. He said, “We’re powerful. We have 
money and we know how to use it.” [The Emirati government] know[s] that Oman is much 
stronger than they are, even though they are richer. Everything in the Emirates is bigger, 
stronger, taller, true. But there’s no planning, no love of country (ḥubb al-waṭan) or anything like 
that, so they buy them off. My point is, if they take our culture and traditions, then we will step 
in (binadkhal al-’amr). 
The continued use and evolution of the ‘āzī and ‘āzī-adjacent forms in the UAE, 
sometimes rising to outright claims to ownership of the practice on the part of UAE authorities 
and researchers, has continued to intensify the rivalry between Omani and Emirati performers 
and citizens. These kinds of performances and claims offended many Omani performers I 
worked with, who remembered the 2013 Emirati performance with a certain ire and were happy 
to point out all of its flaws, according to their understanding of ‘āzī. This contestation of the 
ownership and “rights” to perform the ‘āzī was certainly exacerbated by the 2017 move on the 
part of the UAE to claim the ‘āzī via the UNESCO Intangible Heritage program, placing it on the 
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list of “Intangible Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding” under the sponsorship of UAE. This 
was in spite of the fact that the same practice was inducted into UNESCO’s “Representative 
List” of Intangible Cultural Heritage for the Sultanate of Oman in 2012. Further, Oman and the 
UAE have jointly filed to preserve several other performance practices, including al-razfa, al-
‘ayyāla, al-taghrūda, and even Arabic coffee, the majlis, and falconry in the intervening period. 
Why would they not do so for the ‘āzī, or why would Oman not admit the UAE to the same 
practice at the later date? Why these states would compete over the authenticity of this particular 
practice seems clearer in the light of its use as a choreographed symbol of the power of the state 
and the display of popular legitimation couched in apparently traditional terms.137 Part of why 
Omani state authorities and Omani citizens value the ‘āzī is precisely that it is perceived as a 
uniquely Omani art, one that mythopoetically speaks to Omanis and their history even while it 
creates it. Note also who is making this argument: not politicians and state agents, but state 
citizens. As has been demonstrated in many other contexts, ordinary people take it upon 
themselves to replicate or innovate state ideological discourse. In the Omani case, performers 
situate themselves as uniquely able to performatively legitimate their state through the 
recognition of actual mutuality. Others simply play at the same game. 
c. Praising the Omani State 
These two examples help to illustrate the importance of indigenous and historical 
performance practices to the modern state’s development and the stakes involved in performing 
                                                          
137 In searching the lists of Intangible Heritage, I have seen only two similar examples of this 
kind of “competitive” inscription: between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over the status of rice pilaf 
(Palav or Oshi Palov) in 2015-6 and an upcoming situation in which Malaysia and Indonesia 
appear to be claiming similar martial arts called silat which are to be reviewed in the course of 
2018-9.  
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them to legitimize the state. Both are examples of people talking about the state and its 
characteristics, a practice that Akhil Gupta and others have identified as crucial to the ideological 
functioning of the state (Gupta 1995; Gupta and Sharma 2006; Nuijten 2003). The first lends 
credence to the idea that even within national performances, performers are deeply moved and 
continue to feel compelled to perform over and above proffered material gains. As we will see, 
state officials take advantage of these emotional and personal connections to draw people into 
particular configurations of relations of dependency with the “state” writ large. As the first 
example helps illustrate, the sense of obligation to the state on the part of performers is real, even 
if the concrete benefits received by them are difficult to articulate. This arrangement is no 
accident. The second example serves to demonstrate the intensity of the competition between 
state officials and institutions to lay claim to certain performance practices. It also exemplifies 
some ideas about the “rightness” of the behavior of leaders, with Qābūs acting in the right and 
Emirati leaders in the wrong. The practices in question are neither random nor the most 
representative of local history. Rather, they are specifically chosen and modified for their 
potential in modeling and disseminating state elites’ ideology of state-society relations and 
displaying Arabness and hegemonic masculinity (in Connell’s 2005 sense; Connell and 
Messerschmidt 2005). Further, it shows that some performers recognize that it is state agents 
who try to manipulate culture and history for their own benefit. 
As is always the case, these practices are variously interpreted and meaningful to 
differently situated actors. However, to really understand how and why these arts have come to 
serve state power so closely, it is important to contextualize them in the recent political history of 
Oman. Importantly, we must do this without sacrificing an understanding of the cultural ideals 
and practices that have animated relations between rulers and ruled in the past. If these genres 
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have had some legitimizing power for various authorities in the past, they remain potent in the 
present within a strictly circumscribed ambit: legitimizing the authoritarian state. In the rest of 
this chapter, I examine the ways in which these performance practices help to model certain 
kinds of relations between rulers and the ruled, those which I have referred to as “ideals of 
authority” earlier. 
To show how this shift from praising particular local leaders to the abstract and totalizing 
figure of the modern state has occurred, we need to understand the drastic social effects of state 
formation in Oman. As I have argued in previous chapters, part of the legitimacy of the modern 
state is derived from ideals of authority that were shaped historically and are reasserted and 
reinterpreted within modern praise performance. Here, I add an analysis of the development of 
the state that shows how its unique development has worked to support the continued relevance 
of praise while also sharply constraining its application. Such a situation retains the effects of 
praise while denying them to any institution save for the state/Qābūs or its proxies.  
To evidence this, the main historical trajectory I follow in this chapter is the 
centralization of the authoritarian state under the rulership of Sultan Qābūs (r. 1970-present) and 
his father, Sultan Sa‘īd (r. 1932-70). In Oman, this process of state formation and centralization 
has had a negative aspect—that is, closing off some alternatives, such as competing structures of 
authority, and sharply circumscribing certain types of  performance—and a positive aspect, by 
supporting other alternatives, promoting certain forms of performance, social welfare, and 
development programs. It is important to realize that these are not separate or separable 
processes or projects, but rather results or effects of other policies and projects of Omani state 
formation. As such, this chapter is not a retelling of this history with a focus on “cultural” themes 
or cultural policy when such data is available. Rather, it is an examination of the ways in which 
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elite-led state formation has shaped the context in which razḥa, ‘āzī, and other formerly political 
performance practices have changed and adapted to the contexts and consequences of state 
formation, and how these practices in turn have come to legitimate the Omani state. 
Seeing Something Like a State: Perspectives on State Theory  
States are complex phenomena. They are difficult to study, especially for ethnographers, 
because they are diffuse, historically conditioned, and exist in densely interwoven material and 
ideological linkages. This, in ethnographic disciplines, has tended to produce what Jonathan 
Spencer calls anthropology “within the state” rather than “of the state” (Spencer 2007). Rather 
than interrogating the phenomenon of the state as a form or concept, such ethnographies simply 
assume the state is what appears and documents life within it. Countering this is the research 
agenda that has been termed “the ethnography of the state” (Gupta 1995; Sharma and Gupta 
2006). Why, however, should we focus on “the state” when we study music and politics? 
First, this is a study of music as political behavior, and “the state” is often assumed to be 
the primary shaper of what constitutes politics in the contemporary world. This was not always 
the case, so showing this makes valuable room for critique of the state form and its politics 
(Amborn 2019).. Second, as we shall see, the state is a profoundly cultural phenomenon. Not 
only is it a developed political technology (cf. Robinson 1980) but it is also staffed and hence 
shaped by particular individuals. As such, it is affected by a variety of cultural norms, ideals, and 
habits that pre-exist it. As several scholars have also shown, this is manifested in the ways that 
elites often draw upon musical ideas, behaviors, or metaphors to characterize the state, its 
relations to its people, and its cosmic correctness (Brindley 2012; Guy 1999, 2005; Pasler 2009). 
Such mixed hermeneutics should be taken neither as coincidence nor as idiosyncratic. We have 
seen the deep and compelling interaction between notions of generosity, legitimacy, and praise. 
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Music and performance have long been social tools of elites, though each context of their 
deployment may bear unique insights into how states operate. Focusing on “the state” and its 
particularities—the class composition of its officials, the system of state apparatuses, its putative 
capacities, its cultural basis—in such contexts foregrounds the ways in which music and 
performance articulate with the display of power, authority, political legitimacy, and state 
violence. Studying music and the state with these two reasons in mind can help the study of 
music and politics in general to move beyond studying music as a means of asserting rights. 
building identities, or protest. Instead, a critical perspective on the contemporary state helps to 
contextualize such musical behavior squarely in terms of the relations between rulers and ruled, 
cooptation and coercion, and in a way that does not presume that the form of the state and its 
imposition of political leadership is natural. 
 A number of recent musicological monographs have engaged with the notion of the state 
and its agents as central to the production of music and performance.138 Studies by Askew 
(2002), Castro (2011), Foster and Gilman (2015), Guy (1999, 2005), Meeker (2013), Schauert 
(2015), and Stirr (2017) all focus on the role of the state and elites in attempting to legitimate 
state power by way of specific policies on music and its performance. State elites pursue various 
agendas and target performance practices with certain strategies in mind. While Guy’s research 
shows how minority elites have patronized a music associated with their own ethnic group to 
support the claims of the state they virtually control, Anna Stirr (2017) and Lauren Meeker 
(2013) have documented other cultural policy strategies in Nepal and Vietnam.  
                                                          
138 Askew 2002; Brindley 2012; Buch, Zubillaga, and Silva 2016; Buchanan 2007; Castro 2011; 
Counsel 2009; Guy 1999, 2005; Laumuno 2011; Meeker 2013; Pasler 2009; Schauert 2015; Stirr 
2017; Tochka 2016. 
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The scholar whose approach is best able to explain the interconnection between state and 
non-state agents, the delicate interlinking of coercion and cooptation, and the mutual 
reinforcement of ideological constructions and material social relations is Antonio Gramsci. 
While Gramsci’s approach to the state shifted over his career, his basic insight was that the 
“state” is not the thin veneer of political institutions (or simply an idea), but that it is rather 
“integral,” meaning that it “includes elements which need to be referred back to the notion of 
civil society (in the sense that one might say that the State = political society + civil society, in 
other words hegemony armored with coercion)” (Gramsci 1971, 263). Here we also see 
Gramsci’s second key insight: hegemony. As anthropologist Kate Crehan notes, hegemony is a 
much-contested term (2002, 99). “Hegemony for Gramsci simply names the problem,” Crehan 
concludes, “that of how power relations underpinning various forms of inequality are produced 
and reproduced” (2002, 104).  It is the fitful and tenuous integration of the elements of civil and 
political society that helps define the development of certain capitalist states: religious scholars 
and their interpretations, musicians and their music, bankers and their logics are brought into 
temporary alliances with the army and the maintenance of borders, the delimitation of proper 
forms of political speech, police and the cries for law and order. This shifting alliance of interests 
is what Gramsci calls “hegemony”—the “‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the 
population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant influential group” 
(1971, 12). The Gramscian approach is dynamic and historical, offering an explanation as to how 
non-elites are drawn into the political, martial, and economic schemes of elites, but it also gives 
us a way of explaining why and how legitimacy and ideals of authority can develop in such a 
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way as to make claims on those same elites.139 Basic to Gramsci’s approach is the recognition 
that the “imposition” of the “general direction” of social life is “‘historically’ caused by the 
prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position 
and function in the world of production” (12). Class position is the basis of the ability to impose 
such a direction, but the successful imposition of the “general direction” subsequently increases 
the prestige and social power of the dominant.  
What needs to be emphasized here is that focusing on social relations—in this case the 
political subjection of the ruled by the rulers—and how they play out—in the selective 
distribution of state-controlled goods, resources, and infrastructure—helps to give a material 
basis to our study of the state. Social and material relations interact with the development of the 
cultural and ideological practices and beliefs that characterize the relationship between state 
elites and those they govern, which in turn legitimize and normalize those relations. Rather than 
only looking to the effects of practices, new formal organization, culturally mediated conjurings 
of the state, or simple class cleavages, we need to triangulate and integrate these approaches. 
Concentrating on the suppression of alternative political projects (Bodirsky 2016) and the sheer, 
technical scale of state power to fund and administer expansive infrastructural development 
(Harris 2012) focuses our attention to ways that the coherence of the state is not merely a product 
of ideological projection or imagination. Nevertheless, the state is not just a fixing of social 
relations, but it also a rich site of ideological and semiotic potential. The structuring of this talk 
and the delimitation of the imaginable is crucial.  
                                                          
139 This is especially the case if we consider Gramsci’s understanding of culture (cf. Crehan 
2002). 
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The construction of state hegemony is a good way to investigate this complex character. 
State hegemony is reciprocally material and ideological—these are not different categories, but 
tactical resources. In the Omani case, material constraints such as state directed giving and the 
deliberate management of non-state giving help us to frame the selective representation of 
historical models of ideal authority and the solicitiation of praise and understand their role in the 
overall production of state hegemony. Practices that bridge the apparent gap between material 
and ideological constructions of the state are crucial for understanding a fuller picture of the state 
as form. The position as sketched out above is clearly Gramscian, but not the “hegemony lite” 
version of Gramsci criticized by Crehan (2002). Rather, as Bodirsky points out, it is the 
“’political economic’ Gramsci, who understood the making of hegemony as a process whereby a 
dominant group sought support from subordinate ones through both ideological and material 
means” (2016, 124). This approach allows us to recognize the structural uniqueness of the Omani 
state, whose wealth is extremely concentrated and whose “development” is substantially state 
directed, and how these material constraints interact to produce ideological opportunities, which 
in turn impose their own constraints on material relations.  
In Oman, sung praise is the crucial bridge between the material and ideological, the rulers 
and the ruled, coercion and consent.   
The Gift of Rule: Political Economy, Reciprocity, and Hegemony 
 How does this bear on our study of the Omani state, praise, generosity, dependency, and 
the gift? Returning to Godelier with the insights from Gramsci and the critics of the 
“ethnography of the state,” we can analyze how material social relations and state ideology are 
mutually constructed and mediated by performance. Godelier hypothesized that forms of social 
inequality like the state required a legitimating ideology, specifically, that rulers and ruled were 
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linked by mutual obligations inherent in shared conceptions of exchange (1986, 13-15). “The 
exercise of power must appear as a service rendered by the dominant to the dominated that 
creates a debt of the latter to the former” that is then repaid (14). Godelier proposes that the most 
important and telling part of this exchange is that material goods (food, money, labor, and so on) 
are rendered to the dominant, while immaterial, ideological “goods” (religious and magical 
ritual, for example) are rendered to the dominated (14, 77). This relationship is precisely 
reversed in Oman, as I have described it. Here, it is the expressive potential of sung poetry and 
dance that is controlled by status inferiors that is rendered as a service to status superiors as a 
response to their material generosity and fulfillment of their obligations to them. While 
“immaterial” goods are of course rendered by the state, such as feelings of safety and security, 
promises of development, safeguarding heritage, and so on, the reversal is compelling enough to 
warrant comment.  
What Godelier has in mind here is a standard definition of taxes. Taxes are paid by the 
ruled to their rulers, who in turn propitiate deities, for example. Wilson has shown, however, that 
in the case of the SADR, the state-movement in Western Sahara has promulgated the notion that 
distribution is a form of reverse taxation wherein “the poor tax the rich” (2016, ch. 4). In the 
recent past, SADR agents had control over the array of rations given out by the UN and 
international relief agencies, but individual Sahrawis could make demands on those stores for 
their use. She documents how distribution functions as a mode of governance and makes the case 
that it was borrowed from practices that leaders of tribal structures developed. This is, for 
Wilson, an example of how supposedly wholly different political structures can make use of 
similar strategies in governance. In the case of the SADR and Oman, I would argue that it is not 
the particularities of exchange that should interest us, but the quality of the relationship 
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established. The institution of a structured relationship of dependence may be more important, 
ideologically speaking, than the actual direction and quantity of transfer, as Florence Weber 
noted with reference to the gift.  
One of the values of adopting a Gramscian approach to the state and its legitimating 
strategies is that it does not arbitrarily separate “economic,” “political,” “ideological.” and 
“cultural” or “symbolic” factors. Rather, for Gramsci, there is no prying apart the “practical” 
from the “theoretical” activities with which the state “not only justifies and maintains its 
dominance but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules” (Gramsci 1971, 
244). As Crehan puts it, the value of Gramsci lies in his simultaneous insistence on the “reality 
of fundamental, systematic inequalities” and the “complexity and specificity of the cultural 
worlds different people inhabit” without reducing it either to economic determinism or some 
irreconcilability of human experience (Crehan 2002, 7). With this expansive ambit, the 
Gramscian approach urges us to critically appraise other similar accounts of the legitimation of 
the Omani state, which may include analyses that focus on the “rentier state” hypothesis, 
international relations, political culture, or policy-oriented accounts. While Gramsci allows us a 
way to remain critical of these approaches, especially in their approach to the state, we can still 
appreciate the contributions they make. 
This is perhaps especially important to studying the “state” in the Arabian Peninsula, as 
there seems to be a veritable cottage industry of developing new compound terms to precisely 
describe the state or political-economic system of this region. The terms quickly blossom out of 
control: Do rulers practice “patrimonial”140 or “‘aṣabiyyah capitalism”141 in the 
                                                          
140 Schlumberger 2007, 2008. 
141 Niblock and Malik 2007. 
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“theopetrocracies”142 of the Gulf? Is the “eudaimonic legitimacy”143 enjoyed by “neo-
traditional”144 or “post-traditional”145 “petro-Islamic”146 “rentier states”147 predicated on their 
“tribal ideology”148 or on “Islamic state capitalism”149? This tendency to analytically isolate 
Arabian Peninsular states is particularly vexing when it clearly belies a bias that posits Arabs as 
so “different” from the rest of the world that they require new technical jargon to even 
understand their situation. Oman is unfortunately doubly cursed since it is at once a shining 
example of “non-democratic legitimacy” and touted as an example of “good Arabs,” neither too 
religious nor too belligerent. The notion that the character of these states is something 
unprecedented that requires new categories to explain implies that they have broken from some 
standard mold, rather than having their own specific history. Even their contemporary relation to 
their own history requires explanation, mired as it is in the same conservatism and backwardness 
that plagues their economy. The question, a classic “denial of coevalness” in Fabian’s (1983) 
terms, lingers in these works: how can they be “traditional” and yet so “modern”?  
We can and should retain a measure of skepticism in the study of the “state” so described 
while still integrating their insights, instead of deliberately ignoring them as the “ethnographers 
of the state” so often do (as freeing as that might be). Ideally, the results of these studies help to 
                                                          
142 Khalil 1984. 
143 Niblock 2006. 
144 Rabi 2011. 
145 Peterson 2004. 
146 Ayubi 1995. 
147 Beblawi 1987. 
148 Davis and Gavrielides 1991. 
149 Long 1976. 
386 
 
 
 
flesh out my performative approach. This is because, as Donald Kurtz notes in a study of Aztec 
Imperial legitimacy, “legitimating strategies do not follow one another,” meaning that they are 
not separately or sequentially implemented and then evaluated by elites (1991, 163). Rather, state 
projects of legitimation are an “everything and the kitchen sink” approach, taking place on many 
social and time scales, within many groups, and by various actors involving multiple techniques. 
It is important to not overestimate the importance of performance (or any one element) in the 
development of state hegemony, but to see these various projects as intertwined. Take, for 
example, the notion of qarāba150 that Paul Dresch and James Piscatori mention but do not 
elaborate on as a core component of the developing distinction between citizens and rulers in the 
introduction to their edited volume Monarchies and Nations (2011). Maintaining qarāba, 
meaning “closeness,” means limiting the sheer number of claimants on an elite’s time and social 
and economic capital, which, as Shryock showed in Jordan, is an expression of both power and 
dependency. The ability of social elites to access state power is crucial to their status, which is, 
obviously, wholly dependent on that access. The clear way to manage this simultaneous 
weakness and strength is to avoid using that access. Limiting the number of claimants on the 
material benefits of your access to state networks requires limiting public activity, because norms 
of governance and respectability put a high value on generosity. When Peter Lienhardt first 
arrived in Kuwait to pursue his research in the 1950s, he noticed that “shaikhs no longer walked 
along the streets being greeted by people as they pass,” but instead were only glimpsed moving 
between air-conditioned cars and buildings, moving with “hurried dignity” (1993, 38). Managing 
                                                          
150 A similar notion was put forward by Enver Koury in 1978, analyzing social power in Saudi 
Arabia as taking the form of “circles” and “networks.” Power flowed from the inside to the 
outside, and so positioning oneself as close as possible to the source was a generator of prestige 
and access. 
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publicity and access is a performance of distinction, but also a practical adaptation to state 
dependence. Analyzing qarāba as a cultural ideal that manages and models relations between 
elites and non-elites fits well with my account in Oman, and adds more evidence to explaining 
why elites do not dance and are separated from performers to the extent that they are only 
addressed within explicit performative parameters. These “smaller,” more micro-level 
explanations should ideally be illuminated by those on a larger scale. Taking a Gramscian 
approach gives us an example of how they might be.  
As I see it, performance is clearly an important part of legitimizing the state because it 
models state-society relations, it has immense mythopoetic and affective power, and it displays 
what is taken as a uniquely Omani heritage. It is therefore useful for shaping the boundaries, 
shared history, emotional bonds, mutual obligations of rulers and ruled, and social relations of 
material inequality of the contemporary authoritarian Omani state. “Perhaps the only necessary 
first step” to the production and projection of state legitimacy, Kurtz continues, “is increased 
state control over the nation’s economy” (1991, 163). State control of the economy in Oman was 
firmly secured over the last hundred years with the help of the British and the discovery and 
monopolization of oil resources, but projects of legitimacy have been manifold. In the Omani 
case, razḥa and ‘āzī are one way in which relations are modeled and mythopoetically rendered as 
essential to the state and status quo. State spectacle does not therefore display spontaneous 
celebrations of the state. In many ways it simply cannot: the vacations days and the actual day of 
celebration are not announced by the state until the last minute.151 Invitations for groups to 
perform are likewise loaded: they are, as in the words of my friends in the interview in the first 
                                                          
151 This is likely an attempt to control who can plan huge festivities; if the day is unknown then 
there will be few celebrations that compete directly with the state’s. There are also important 
economic and workforce management reasons, which are not particularly interesting to us here. 
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part of this chapter, “not something to be ignored.” This is because they are both beneficial and 
carry a potential penalty in refusal, twinned notions that rely on material inequality. Spectacles 
do, however, motivate understandings of obligation and mutual dependence. Just as one is 
socially conditioned to stand at the national anthem, so some Omanis are conditioned to see 
praise and good deeds as reciprocally engaging one another, as properly existing in a moral 
economy. What I want to explore in the next section is that the image of the state as “giving” and 
“providing” may not actually require giving and providing equally or even consistently. Rather, 
the perception that the state can and does give may be enough to develop and sustain unequal 
relations. 
If praise and generosity are reciprocal, they operate analogously to the logic of gifts. 
They produce relationships. The gift of the praiser is—broadly—legitimacy. The gift of the 
Sultan is—broadly—rule. 
a.  Personalizing politics…  
In Oman, the form, idea, and practices of the authoritarian state have been directly linked 
to the personage of Sultan Qābūs. This has had direct effects on the organization and 
continuation of praise practices in the Sultanate. Outside scholars nevertheless debate the 
intensity of his authoritarian control, with some characterizing his rule as a kind of “hands-off 
paternalism,” while others describe it as a “personality cult” (notably Valeri 2009). Whatever its 
character, this theme is of interest to us insofar as we can show that this “personalization” of 
Omani authoritarianism has caused praise to become increasingly centralized and unidirectional 
–that is, directed not toward local or regional leaders but only to Sultan Qābūs, and therefore the 
human stand-in for the state itself. This has had the effect of symbolically collapsing the image 
of the modern state into the figure of the Sultan, so that praise of a person became praise of an 
389 
 
 
 
institution. Given the importance of address in praise poetry, such a symbolic shift bears 
importantly on the notion of legitimacy, both of the Sultan and the state form. This 
personalization has had the added effect of inculcating the sense of a personal relationship and 
mutual obligation that obtains between the Sultan and the ruled, which, in turn, leads to effusive, 
enthusiastic state praise performances. What state officials perhaps saw as an authentic 
expression of the popular will was, in fact, the performance of praise directed at the only praise 
target that remained: the Sultan himself.  
The drastic monopolization of praise has come largely at the expense of the potential 
political authority of other competing forms of social authority: the Imamate, the revolutionary 
Marxist state, and the sociopolitical structuring role of tribal authorities. This is especially 
important when we consider that the re-formation of the Imamate in the early 20th-century 
directed at least some performers to produce an ‘āzī for it, analyzed in the last chapter. These 
alternative structures, in the terms of Eric Gordy’s 1999 study of Milošević’s Serbia, were 
“destroyed,” leaving the authoritarian state as the only alternative. The structural shifts from a 
patchwork of quasi-independent tribal chiefdoms to a highly decentralized but structured 
imamate government to a massively centralized modern bureaucratic state entailed many 
changes in many performance practices. Such changes and shifts have likely spurred performers 
to make similar changes throughout Omani history, as the fortunes of governing structures have 
waxed and waned. For example, the formation of the modern state within an international state-
system prompted performers and other governmental agents to adapt certain performance 
practices to align with state narratives of equality, progress, and development, part of a broader 
campaign to legitimize the state by reference to development and history (Phillips and Hunt 
2017). While huge, spectacular displays on state holidays (planned, orchestrated, and 
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choreographed by non-Omanis, as Rasmussen and Al-Harthy 2012 document) have received 
some attention, these studies have largely ignored or downplayed the history and significance of 
the “traditional” genres displayed, why they have been chosen, and what they mean to certain 
Omanis. As the brief examples at the beginning of this chapter illustrate, razḥa and ‘āzī are 
important sites for the demonstration and celebration of the reigning state’s relationship to its 
people.  
Rather than giving an overview of Omani state centralization efforts, I want to focus here 
on the way that these efforts have worked to personalize politics and monopolize praise. There 
have been many such efforts, and the pattern I pick out here is one of many. One, however, bears 
specific mention: while I focus on co-optation of alternative authority structures by the state, it is 
necessary not to overlook that each of the cases discussed here involved organized state violence 
in many forms. The Imamate was invaded and occupied in 1955; tribally organized opposition 
was besieged, bombed, and exiled through 1959; and the Marxist revolutionaries in Dhofar were 
hunted, exterminated, and jailed from 1962-1976.  
b.  … and monopolizing praise 
The most important process to monopolizing praise in the Interior was the “decline in 
importance of the tribe after 1957… and the corresponding decline in the role of the shaykh” as a 
result of increased state centralization efforts after the absorption of the Imamate (Peterson 1978, 
101). As Uzi Rabi points out, Sultan Sa‘īd’s state-building attempts during and after the Jabal 
Akhḍar war (1957-59) were part coercion and part cooptation, but much effort was focused on 
breaking up tribal power blocs (2011, ch. 3). Sa‘īd’s dwindling control in the interior was due to 
the Imamate’s “system of monetary compensation (with the help of the Saudis)” and the Sultan’s 
own “tightfistedness” which had become “his trademark among the tribes” (108-9). In fact, by 
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1957 Sa‘īd had moved permanently to Salala in the southern region of Dhofar and until 1970 left 
Aḥmad bin Ibrahīm Āl Bū Sa‘īdī as his agent in Muscat “to distribute [the Sultan’s largesse]” 
(meager as it apparently was, Peterson 1978, 74). With the successful conclusion of that 
conflict,152 however, the Sultan took strong measures to curtail the potential political power of 
the tribes, largely by apportioning a larger military force to local wālī-s and by forcing out 
influential tamīma-s (such as those of the Shiḥūḥ in Musandam) (121-2). More effective was 
what Nazih Ayubi has called the “defensive strategy” of “segmental incorporation” whereby  
having defeated, disarticulated or persecuted social forces, political organisations and/or 
ideological orientations that represent a serious challenge to the regime, [state elites] then 
co-opt their members (individually or in divided segments if possible) into the regime’s 
own politico-organisational set-up. (1995, 234). 
 
Sa‘īd accomplished this by not recognizing the authority of powerful tamīma-s like Sulaymān 
bin Himyār al-Nabhānī of the Bānī Riyām and instead directly dealing with the smaller units that 
composed that alliance, such as the leaders of the al-Siyābī, the al-Ruqaysh, or the al-Tawbī. 
Such contacts led to the direct state subsidization of a larger number of “lower-level” shaykh-s, 
granting them a measure of independence that undermined the necessity of inter-group alliances. 
When Omanis returning from the hajj in Saudi Arabia relayed to the Sultan that Sulaymān bin 
Ḥimyar wished to return to Oman with his family, Sa‘īd put such incredibly onerous stipulations 
on him that it made return virtually impossible (142-3). This was a bid to put an end to powerful 
tribal alliances, such as Sulaymān’s Bānī Riyām, because they could potentially oppose the 
hegemony of the state. Instead, the state would deal with much smaller tribal groupings while 
simultaneously curtailing their effective power and limiting their social relevance (Eickelman 
                                                          
152 Originating and concluding with British colonial violence, which, as Halliday put it, “both 
exacerbated the conflict between the interior and the coast and prevented its resolution” by 
refusing to recognize an interior state and imposing coastal rule in order to make the colony “pay 
for itself” (1975, 284). 
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1987, 199). Rather than turning to local authorities for subsidies, guidance, arbitration, and 
defense, smaller political units were all directed towards the central state. Under Qābūs, a similar 
policy of strong wālī-s, modern policing, and direct connections to smaller local units effectively 
prohibited strong tribally organized bodies to emerge. While leading, as Limbert’s interlocutors 
lamented, to a proliferation of shaykh-s, this proliferation ultimately served to make “the tribe” 
politically insignificant. 
 The elimination of alternative authority structures and the decline of the importance of 
shaykh-s helped pave the way for the state to begin to implement widespread, unidirectional 
distribution as a mode of governance. Especially in the reign of Qābūs, state development was 
made into perhaps the main interest of the state and was heavily centralized. As Jeremy Jones 
and Nicholas Ridout claim: 
In order to secure the newly, but perhaps provisionally unified state, [Qābūs] would have 
to replace traditional tribal political structures, in which people looked to tribal leaders 
for all their basic needs—employment, justice, education—with a new administration 
organised around his own power. This would require a new conception of government: 
rather than an ultimate source of authority, to whom quasi-autonomous tribal shaikhs 
might turn at times of crisis or need, the sultan himself would have to become a provider 
of services, offer a responsive and day-to-day involvement in the lives of people scattered 
across extensive territories. (2015, 161) 
 
Insofar as local leaders were able to distribute generously, it was with what the state had allotted 
them. Praise began to be directed not in many directions—to the Imam, to tribal leaders, to the 
Sultan, to generous patrons, local notables, and the like—but exclusively to the Sultan. Shaykh-s 
were no longer crucial members in a network of redistribution but were rather made dependent 
upon those same structures. The poems collected by the 1985 “folklore campaigns” by the 
Ministry of Information are as much a reflection of this efflorescence of praise for the Sultan as 
they are a symbol of its efficacy. An overwhelming proportion of the poems in the collection 
mention Qābūs in some way, recognizing him, for example, as the “patron” of the nahḍa, while 
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few if any mention other figures (1994). While there are new ‘āzī-s sung in the name of political 
candidates, we should not confuse this with opposition to that state or Qābūs—in fact, most of 
these begin by praising him. 
 This constriction in praise targets not only helped to monopolize praise but has helped to 
render praise of the Sultan as praise of the state. Recall that while the soccer pitch in Manaḥ was 
funded by Bank Muscat and only administered by the Ministry of Sports Affairs, Qābūs was 
taken as a symbol of good leadership for Khālid, the ministry patron, to follow. Bank Muscat and 
all the mangers, administrators, and bureaucrats who actually paid for and organized the building 
of the pitch are not mentioned. Instead, they are folded into the figure of the Sultan, and hence 
the state, to whom all legitimate praise is directed. Praise on National Day, at hospital and 
university openings, for local infrastructural projects, joint weddings funded by real estate 
companies, and so on are not celebrated with effusive praise of the actual individuals involved, 
but instead the Sultan. Even local wālī-s are mentioned far less than the Sultan. This is a feature 
of rule and praise in the authoritarian state, not a bug. It is not a misattribution to praise the 
Sultan when ‘Aqār, the real estate firm, funds a joint wedding. The administrative tedium of rule, 
of giving, of development, are masked by the figure of the generous Sultan, from whom all 
things flow and to whom all praise is sung.  
 The ability to frame all development as coming from the state/Sultan and as fulfilling a 
mutual obligation to which the ruled must respond is a primary ideological achievement of the 
Omani state. Ayubi concludes that the first part of this achievement is based, in general terms, on 
an economic independence that allows elites to enjoy their advantages without incurring the 
social burden of taxation (1995, 235). By not demanding taxation, the generous rule of the Sultan 
becomes a gift that can never be repaid. “The ruling stratum,” he continues, “does not therefore 
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have to be “unpleasant” either to the owning classes by taxing their profits or to the working 
classes by extracting parts of their surplus labor,” allowing state elites great latitude in political 
mobility (1995, 235). Waterman’s study of jùjú in Nigeria, “a rentier state” (1990, 222), 
similarly hints that praise for local “big-men” and concomitant generosity served to obscure 
agonized class relations in Lagos (1990, 222-5). That all development is ultimately from the 
Sultan is a commonly held idea, even if it is factually false. It is materially predicated on the 
state’s unprecedented ability to direct funding and development, but a great deal of 
“development” is funded and overseen by private corporations. 
 In his 2018 dissertation, Robin T. Steiner argues that the notion of “corporate social 
responsibility” (CSR) has been introduced into Oman over the last few decades as a neoliberal 
intervention to help “roll back” the state (2018, 27). This CSR model puts part of the burden of 
development, distribution of subsidies, and providing welfare and services onto corporations that 
are seeking access to government contracts and other benefits. Especially in local development, 
corporations not controlled by the state have built schools, clinics, and wells as part of this CSR 
scheme as a form of “rent-seeking,” that is, acting to secure certain benefits from the state (56-7). 
Acting generously “render[s corporations] into worthy recipients of state support” (75). 
However, as Steiner shows, CSR policies have not only eased the burden of the state but have 
also helped to extend the effective reach of its apparatuses and accomplish its agents’ goals (28, 
78). In this case, we can clearly see why Gramsci urged us to see “the state” as composed of both 
the apparatuses of government and “civil society,” both working in tandem to reproduce state 
hegemony. In this case, it is  the state as generous giver and provider (Steiner calls this 
“paternalistic”) and the populace as grateful receiver. 
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 There are two further features of this personalization and monopolization that deserve 
comment. The first is that events like the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival in Manaḥ are held with a dual 
purpose, in terms of directing praise. They simultaneously display the faithfulness and the 
gratitude of praisers to the Sultan and the loyalty and effectiveness of the wālī. When al-Waḥshī 
organized the festivities, it not only displayed his close connections with and effective rule over 
the people of Manaḥ but also his own generosity and loyalty to the state/Sultan. Secondly, as 
noted in chapter 3, while generosity may seem a strange habit to attribute to states, it is easily 
attributed to rulers. Classicist Paul Veyne attributed this to people talking not of abstract qualities 
of leadership, but of the “personal qualities of the reigning prince” (1990, 37). We might also see 
a basis for this in the way Arabs of the Peninsula have often been recorded as distinguishing 
between the good traits of the ruler, al-ḥākim, and the reprehensible obscurantism, laziness, and 
stupidity of the state, al-dawla. Seeking and picking out the individual person as figurehead is a 
way of personalizing relations of domination while maintaining a skeptical view of government 
in general.  
 This skepticism can come in many forms. Christensen and Castelo-Branco noted in 2009 
that many performers in Suḥār took issue with Yūsif bin Khāmis al-Maqbālī, the leader of the 
official state performance group, Firqat al-funūn al-sha‘abiyya li-l-wilāyat Suḥār. Despite the 
fact that he and another shaykh controlled who “may participate in any given state affair” along 
with the budget of fees that they may charge and what arts “represent” Suḥār, locals nevertheless 
“question his artistic competence” (2009, 206). While no such official exists in Manaḥ, similar 
struggles over who controls access to government largesse are constant. Before a particularly 
well-attended event for National Day in 2017, I witnessed the wālī invite all of the groups in 
Manaḥ to perform. The group from al-Ma‘arā was to be at the head of the line of dancers that 
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welcomed guests, and was invited to drum. On the day of the performance, another group leader 
claimed that the wālī had in fact invited his group to be the head of the lines of dancers. The first 
group’s leadership reacted harshly, threatening to ask the wālī himself what he intended. Since 
the second leader would not relent, and insisted that he was, after all, the “mas‘ūl” or “agent” of 
the government on issues of the arts, the first group retreated to go pray. On the walk over, I 
talked with one of the leaders of the first group. 
 “I heard him claim he was the ‘agent of the government’ in Manaḥ, is that right?” 
 “No no no,” he replied, “there’s no role like that, no agent here. I’ve never heard of that; 
he’s just got a big head and wants to think he’s important. Even if he was, he would be bad… in 
reality, he would fit right in with the rest of those in the Ministry of Culture!” 
c. ‘Mastering’ Personalized Relations of Dominance: ‘āzī, razḥa, and power 
Anthropologist Catherine Bell has argued that early work on ritual and performance in 
political contexts maintained that it served to “express beliefs in symbolic ways for the purposes 
of their continual reaffirmation and inculcation” (2009, 182). What she has concluded, however, 
is that “the projection and embodiment of schemes in ritualization is more effectively viewed as 
a ‘mastering’ of relationships of power relations within an arena” that allows for the contestation 
and negotiation of them (182). Performance, especially performance like ‘āzī that is in so many 
ways ritualized, can also be conceived of in this way. I see these hypotheses as mutually 
sustainable: performance not only helps to turn beliefs into public symbols, but it also serves to 
demonstrate and integrate established social relations of power. Performance is a way of 
comprehending and acting out those relations.  
Take for example the fī ḥubb Qābūs festival discussed in chapter 4. The purpose of the 
festival was to celebrate the health of Sultan Qābūs, but the performance itself was in front of 
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local and regional leaders, like the governor of the wilāyat of Manaḥ, seated on padded bleachers 
in the front row. The audience is both the Sultan, in a general way, but also those elites in the 
first row. Those are the elites who have some say over the everyday distribution of state 
resources, time, and attention, who broker contacts between companies and local communities, 
who direct generosity in certain ways. One reason why praisers perceive themselves as necessary 
is that they are seen as circulating praise and as therefore compelling and amplifying the 
generous giving practices of anyone who listens to them. The “farewell” razḥa they chose to 
close this event typified this message (see music example 6).  
At the conclusion to the ceremonies at the fī ḥubb Qābūs, the gathered razḥa groups were 
clustered around the front of the bleachers where the audience and local notables had been 
sitting. The group needed a new razḥa to tactfully end the proceedings, and after some false 
starts, some of the members of the Firqat al-‘Arabī started to sing out a mulālā’—a kind of 
unaccompanied melody set to vocables that outlines the coming razḥa poetry. After his fellow 
group members hushed the crowd, two groups began to form to sing the melody back and forth.  
Fī widā’ allah yā ‘aṣḥāb al-maruwwa’!153 
 Jawdukum wāfī min zād al-’ajawwadī. 
Li-tuwāda‘inā fī widā’ al-makhūwwa! 
‘andukum shāyim wa sayīr al-bilādī 
 
Farewell! Go with God, O you exemplars of manly virtue! 
 Your generosity is ample and increases generosity yet more, 
We take our leave in brotherly farewell; 
 You have amongst you one of great virtue, leaving our lands. 
 
We should understand those whose “generosity is ample” to be those elites seated in the front 
row and state elites from anywhere else in Oman. The razḥa, like much praise, is a kind of wish. 
                                                          
153 Al-maruwwa’ is a term that, like chivalry, rolls many concepts and practices into one term. It 
is a “noble” way of being and includes comportments like high-mindedness, bravery, liberality, 
generosity, courage, and so on but with a distinctly masculine valence. 
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It presents behavioral ideals not by merely describing them, but by giving them an explicit 
positive valence. It’s not just that someone gave, but that giving “increases generosity yet more.” 
It wasn’t just some petty bureaucrats who moved some money around or cut some deal, but 
“exemplars of manly virtue.” Finally, the singers firmly state their familial relation to those state 
elites in a “brotherly farewell.” Familial rhetoric is not only motivated by elites, but also 
subordinated classes. Of course, some poets parrot back the claims of the leader to be a kind of 
“father” to the nation, but Omanis at least when they perform this razḥa, invoke brotherhood. 
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Music example  7. Widā’ allah, as performed by the gathered troupes of Manaḥ at the fī 
ḥubb Qābūs festival in Manaḥ 
Returning to the 40th National Day ‘āzī, we can take a closer look at how social 
relationships with the state are manifested in state spectacle, and how this helps to cement state 
hegemony. Entitled “Wilā’ al-qā’id” (Loyalty of the Leader), the poem was written, edited, and 
recorded long before its display at the national day celebrations in Muscat in 2010.  The 
addressee of the poem switches several times, from a general audience to Qābūs to Oman to the 
gathered performers.  
[Provisional translation.] 
Praise be to God, the Supporter / Unique, with none before him in anything. 
Creator of all his worshippers / Bounty comes from his extended hand. 
  
Pray on the best of mankind, the Prophet / Our mediator on the day of calling. 
He is lucky who prays and fasts, / he is found in a bed of roses. 
  
Time greets the land of the noble/generous / With pride from the first age. 
Those who respect you are not ashamed / And no one is shined upon like [Oman or the Sultan]. 
  
Land of dignity and honor! / There is no equal to [Oman’s] actions; 
Ready with sword and razor / at any prattler or jealousy.  
  
Her sky is enveloped by full moons; /  40 in number completed, 
All of them in delight and joy, / the happiness in them uncounted. 
  
From the rising of the dawn / erupting on the low, illuminating the cowardly,  
Our standard is amongst bright meteors, / the drum beating on it in preparation. 
  
An eye raised [to] the zenith of the sky, / covering [Oman’s] beginning in light. 
From [the Sultan’s] carrying it, animosity is diminished / and every mountain and lowland is 
illuminated. 
  
You lead the deserts by [Oman’s] light, / despite idle chatter and vain delusions; 
One who wished for her unveiling / from what in his eyes was a blight. 
  
Oman, home of the most noble and generous! / To its progeny, the ages are young, 
By the favor of the Lord of the Two Worlds / [Oman is] smiling with a face of happiness. 
  
Oman, your ages [pass] in joy / and happiness drinks from your flower (warid); 
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You lead the deserts with a true light / How many of the thirsty drink from your watering place 
(wirad)? 
  
Oman, my path is firm! / to you all shining faces attend; 
Your glory is as high as the winnowing winds, / it shines [hanging] on the peg-heads. 
  
Yesterday gathered the mighty / and the proud in your land of lion's dens; 
From refined thinking: / a sword flickering from the sheath. 
  
The erroneous opinion does not distract [them] / when they build resolute might; 
In the forenoon, you quenched [the thirst of] their swords / and by blood each raider arrives. 
  
For our land he attended and began it; / the clouds of the greedy have melted away 
When you began to oppose them; / Swords [like thunder] responding to lightning. 
  
Oman, O you might of the lion's den! / the people of magnanimity and generous gifts; 
The suspicions of the unbelievers have failed, / Your people, on high, remain strong. 
  
We are sincere and faithful to your might, / O land of highest qualities! 
Though we be fathers or sons / The bond of our blood to [Oman or the Sultan] is a testament. 
  
We came to you, O issue of the generous, / We came at your invitation to respond and fulfill 
your request. 
We all are a razor-sharp sword in your hand, / And the free154 don’t turn away from a promise.  
  
What we behold has witnessed hard times [lit., spittle]; / When your standard raises, 
We came to you, young and old / Your command compelling one and all. 
  
Our Sultan is of noble lineage: / with pride [he is] the issue of the most noble. 
By you Oman has achieved high stations, / Amongst the highest you stand out alone. 
  
Qābūs, Sultan of the lands / We all are witness to your justice. 
O, you who raised the wall-pegs / you are honored by your name being treasure and pillar and 
bond. 
 
There are several themes in this poem that deserve mention. The first is that the generosity of the 
Sultan is emphasized in several places: comparing his generosity to a watering hole where many 
animals stop to drink, offering invitations to perform, and so on. The second is that the image of 
                                                          
154 Recall the discussion of ḥurr in Chapter 5, referring to generosity, nobility, and freedom of 
action in one nominative.  
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Oman as a kind of transhistorical entity is contrasted with the Sultan and the modern state. For 
example, lines like “Though we be fathers or sons / the bond of our blood to [Oman] is a 
testament” is followed by a direct address to the Sultan, by saying “we came to you, O issue of 
the generous.” The bond of blood is with Oman, but the performers have come to sing praise for 
a particular leader, Qābūs. Another theme is the performers offering themselves as soldiers to 
violently oppose doubters and enemies, a blending of consent and force that speaks directly to 
the establishment of state hegemony. Vanpee (2014) argues that this offer of martial support is 
one of the key features of the obligations that the ruled owe to the ruler: military support. 
Dancers uniformly prefer to carry weapons when they dance, usually swords or rifles. Since 
carrying rifles is now often considered uncouth, some groups have replaced real rifles with 
wooden facsimiles, which both allays fears that they might be discharged and allows for more 
members to have access to them, limiting squabbles over who gets to hold the gun during the 
next dance. The second obligation, of course, is rhetorical support in the form of poetry and 
performance. The following line is a perfect example of the twinning of consent and coercion 
and the absorption of elite ideals by non-elites: 
We came to you, O issue of the generous, / We came at your invitation to respond and fulfill 
your request. 
We are all a razor-sharp sword in your hand, / And the free don’t turn away from a promise. 
 
The promise here, of course, is violence in the name of Qābūs, acting to coerce some unnamed 
other. What makes it particularly powerful is that it was invited and freely given by the 
performers. Here, the poem presents the praisers as free, and, as free men, they would never 
betray a promise made—intimating that the Sultan, as a free man himself, would never do so 
either.  
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At the conclusion of the performance, al-Marzūqī makes it very clear to whom this ‘āzī is 
addressed: Sultan Qābūs. He does this by “improvising” a repetition in the declamation of the 
final line: “Qābūs, Qābūs, Qābūs, sultān al-bilād!” Such an expansion—the repetition is not a 
part of the text—is a powerful artistic decision, though it seems minor. Even though al-Marzūqī 
made and performed it months in advance, it is still a focal point of discussion when this ‘āzī is 
brought up in conversation (see music example 1).  
In fact, after the performance, the poet al-Masrūrī and the ‘āzī al-Marzūqī gave a joint 
interview with Khālid al-Zadjālī, Oman’s answer to Katie Couric.155 After playing this final line, 
al-Zadjālī animatedly asked them, “Qābūs was written just one time in the text… but I don’t 
know, is this amendment an addition or enthusiasm (ḥamās): from Masrūrī or Marzūqī?” To 
which Masrūrī responds, “As I told you, this one is a blessing (rizq),” punning on al-Marzūqī’s 
name. Masrūrī continues by praising his performance, attributing the repetition to “impassioned 
feelings within him,” referring to al-Marzūqī, and that he performed as he felt it, without being 
requested to do it. Al-Marzūqī explains that it was a sincere expression, since al-Masrūrī “lived” 
the poem, believed in “every letter in it,” just as much as he wrote it. “I believed in every 
meaning to be found in it,” al-Marzūqī reflected,  
I spoke it (qultuhā) and I expressed myself in it, I spoke it and expressed in it what was 
behind me, around me [the dancers and the national festivities]… I expressed myself in it 
by, what, I made those behind the screens present (istḥaḍart man khalf al-shāshāt). I 
spoke it and expressed in it to every person sitting in his house, who didn’t attend. I 
spoke it expressively for all Omanis and I made this meaning appear (istḥadart hadhā al-
ma‘anā). 
 
                                                          
155 YuSuF ALAMRI. “Muḥammad al-Marzūqī wa Muḥammad al-Masrūrī fī hinnā ‘Umān” 
[Muḥammad al-Marzūqī and Muḥammad al-Masrūrī on “Here is Oman”]. Online video clip. 
YouTube. YouTube, 5 Dec. 2010. Web. 13 July 2017. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eoZ3DARWT-k  
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Pausing, al-Marzūqī reflected that “amongst the greatest oaths for this nation is that we treat the 
Sultan reverentially, hospitably.” He stressed that even when the benefits of the Sultan’s actions 
are not initially clear, his wisdom would “dissolve the clouds” of doubt and shine through in 
time. He then went on to describe how he was especially pleased so many young people found 
meaning in the ‘āzī, since the Sultan had always strived to embody Omani tradition (ḥaraṣ ‘alā 
an yagassid al-turāth al-‘umānī). Here, al-Marzūqī places the reciprocal relations in a clear light. 
Omanis must treat the Sultan as they do in performance, as he is embodied in Omani tradition: 
hospitably. 
 The ‘āzī in 2015 (“Pride and Taking Strength in the Leader of the National Renaissance”) 
is a useful foil for some of these themes. In terms of imagery and performance, the two are 
similar (al-Marzūqī tried to reach for the same emotional impact by “improvising” a similar tonal 
expansion in the line “O hearer, understand,” for example). However, the closing line to each 
stanza is in the typical style of the Interior, wa al-‘izz bi-Allah yidum, “The might of God is 
everlasting.”156 
Thanks be to God, the One and Only / The Everlasting, the Unique, the Steadfast. 
There is no equal to him, and no son / The Lord is the most high. 
  
Pray on the Lord of mankind (i.e., the Prophet) / He who brought the Laws of peace, 
Who circumambulates the great Ka'aba / In his ultimate ḥajj. 
  
Glory to the land of the Noble! / Its sights are set higher than the high peaks; 
Between the planets and the stars / our flag shines upon its pole. 
  
Oman, since long past times, / Glory has had in it its place; 
He has not conducted her in the wedding procession to the festival / For just anyone who 
professes to him his desire. 
  
The loftiest mountain peaks / Give her high dues! 
This every desert has witnessed / the action of brave and valorous leaders. 
  
                                                          
156 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fh6hGJ58PBM&spfreload=10  
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Past times will not be counted [It is not wanted [that] we count past times] / to the mighty, the 
people of action; 
Outstretched necks witness / [that] we are razor-sharp swords for her [Oman]. 
  
Oman! the refined glory! / Her actions and beneficial deeds are the utmost. 
What comfort follows hearing it, / reason overwhelms the lips. 
  
Oman! O hearer, understand / From before Mālik bin Fahim, 
You won from the high ones a share; / What we hear next is his call. 
  
Oman! You of sound nature, / O land [in which] all the free are noble and generous. 
O sun, undarkened by clouds, / In every land and in all space. 
  
Oman! The rising of the sun attends her; / The brilliance of lightning does not compare.  
The highest of the planets high above; / His generosity is likened to the highest. 
  
[Oman] is raised up by it, the noble, the mannered; / A symbol of dignity and good manners. 
He preserved integrity and the promise of security and safety / Against those who restrain his 
land or its open tracts. 
  
All foes and the covetous, / In their necks [they carry] the indignities of debt. 
They bend to Muscat in request; / the [giving] palm is the invitation of the Creator. 
  
O, you who follow this image / Muscat calls to him, "yes!" 
Even if he was blameworthy in the past, / We forgive the past and its evils. 
  
Our Sultan is lordly origin, / offspring of Aḥmad bin Sa'īd 
He of great wisdom and vision, / Chivalrous, God grant life to his fame. 
  
O my lord, your command is a fortress / in all times. 
The arm is yours, you are the guarantor of safety; / You are the shārī and you have the wisdom 
of al-shirāh. 
  
Qābūs, Sultan of the lands / O, giving generously is a mercy to mankind; 
Every peak and valley / Cheers Qābūs and his devotion. 
 
The most telling two lines in this ‘āzī are “All foes and the covetous / in their necks [they carry] 
the indignities of debt. They bend to Muscat in request; / the [giving] palm is the invitation of the 
Creator” and what follows it, “O, you who follow this image / Muscat calls to him, “yes!” Even 
if he was blameworthy in the past, / we forgive the past and its evils.” This line, in the 
understanding of many of my interlocutors, was directed at the various protestors that took part 
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in the wave of Arab Spring protests in Oman, largely in the industrial port of Suhar.157 Others 
claimed that it was directed at the various governmental figures who were fired by Qabus in 
response to the protests. When I pointed out in later interviews that it could easily be referencing 
both groups, several agreed, but pointed out that indirection was a particular talent of good poets. 
Notice how the line is phrased, however: the foe is specifically demeaned for having “the 
indignities of debt” on his “neck.” Earlier in the poem, “outstretched necks” witnessed the 
violent power of the Omani state. Those who bear that debt “bend to Muscat” to ask for benefits 
and the generosity they receive in turn is likened to an invitation. Then, the poet specifically calls 
to the listener who “follows” this meaning and urges them that repentance is acceptable, and they 
will not be turned away. Muscat here is clearly a stand-in for Qabus, a giver of benefits and 
forgiveness, but also a potential source of violence. This meaning is emphasized by the turn 
directly to a verse that establishes Qābūs as a prestigious part of a long dynasty, and who has the 
“great wisdom and vision” that is required to be a good leader. 
In fact, the entire 2015 ‘āzī is much more concerned with violence and generosity than 
the 2010 poem, which was deeply interested in the mythopoetic creation of Omani history. While 
lines like “the arm is yours, you are the guarantor of safety” make reference to the role of leaders 
in maintaining peace and public order, the next line is very warlike in tone. Recall that the 
idealized elected Imam came with certain contractual obligations, stipulations, or licenses. One 
type of Imam was the shārī, or “seller” Imam, one who “sells” his own life, who was granted full 
license to declare offensive wars against other groups and states. The line “you are the shārī and 
you have the wisdom of al-shirāh” is an explicit reference to Imamate leadership patterns, those 
                                                          
157 For more on this, see Valeri (2013). 
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that were deliberately and violently destroyed by the current Sultan’s father. Here, Qābūs is 
called the “seller” Imam, who has the wisdom of knowing how and when to fight.  
 I read these—similar to many of the other poems I have presented—as framing the 
people, the reciter, and performers as petitioners of the addressee. In this case, however, the 
addressee is the modern, authoritarian state in the guise of Qābūs. This I see as the recognition of 
a relationship of dependency that may not imply disrespect but does reflect deep material 
inequality. The recognition of this dependency is, in effect, a recognition of the ramifications of 
this material inequality. In her study on nabaṭī patriotic poetry, Vanpee notes that the term sinād, 
“pillars,” 
is frequently used for both the ruler and the ruled in the context of their ‘ahd, their rights 
and obligations vis-à-vis each other. The support of the ruler is envisioned as protection 
from threats and enemies (hence sinād al-diyār: “pillar of our abodes”) as well as 
material provision and caretaking. On the other side, the role of the people as sinād is 
understood, as giving moral as well as military support. This moral support takes the 
form of approval of the ḥākim’s rule and recognition of his national leadership. The 
people support the ruler militarily by providing manpower. The use of this same term for 
both parties in the ruler-ruled relationship demonstrates an understanding of the covenant 
as a reciprocal agreement with duties and expectations on both sides. (2014, 112) 
 
Despite her reliance on terms like ‘ahd and bay‘a, which many of my interlocutors considered 
old-fashioned and rather crude to describe present circumstances, her point translates well to the 
Omani case.158 Take, for example, the final line of the famed 40th anniversary ‘āzī: 
،دلابلا ناطلس سوباق 
  نيعمجأ كلدعل دهشن    
 نماي،داتولا تيلعت  
  دنس كمساب تفرشتو    
Qābūs, sulṭān al-bilād,  
                                                          
158 These older terms are still used in many “old” razḥāt, however, which are still sung. For 
example:  “Our line is a line strong of determination, in calamity we are all ready // We did not 
forget those old oaths [al-‘ahūd al-qadīma], from the time of our ancestors, the first ones.” 
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nashad li-‘adilak ’ajma‘īn. 
Yā man ta‘alayt al-witād,  
wa-tasharrafat bi-’ismak sanad. 
 
Qābūs, Sultan of the lands! 
We are all witness to your justice. 
O, you who raised the wall-pegs, 
You are honored by your name being treasure and pillar and bond.  
 
Here, the reciprocal and yet unequal relationship is clearly made with references to pillars and 
pegs of different sorts. The terms are witād and sanad. Witād in Omani Arabic usually refers to 
pegs that were hammered into the interior mud-brick walls of homes, castles, and forts in order 
to hang belts, jars, gowns, and so on. Witād function here as a locally relevant type of firm 
support, upon which other objects hang, here rendered as a metaphor for the state. Sanad is used 
three ways in Oman: it can mean “treasure,” a valued thing, or it can mean a “bond,” as in a 
promise or guarantee, but it is also the singular of the term sinād that Vanpee translates “pillars.” 
This is the crux of the line, the power it has as a lexical and grammatical act (Duranti 1994; 
Webster 2016, 2018). In discussing the line with my Omani friends, no one could say which term 
was best, but all recognized that all were apt. In previous attempts at translating this line, I tried 
to choose one of these terms and explain the others. I now think that choosing one translation of 
the term is not helpful.159  
As Alessandro Duranti has shown in forms of Samoan political speech, lāuga in the fono 
council, such minor acts of lexical and grammatical choice in situations of heightened speech can 
have immense social power (1994). “Information flows” of dense conversation turn quickly to 
“moral flows,” the exchange of moral assessments (174-75). He explains this moral-flow 
                                                          
159 Anthony Webster has given much more thought to the vagaries, goals, and values of 
translation than I have, but I am inspired by his example to not try and choose a single word to 
convey this dense and conventional layering of meanings (2018). 
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hypothesis by claiming that “in addition to cognitive constraints and requirements, (i.e., regulated 
in the information flow [of conversation]), discourse proceeds by building moral worlds, in 
which characters are introduced and assessed as examples of moral types, whose actions and 
attributes are either to be praised or to be condemned” (174). By making, evaluating, and 
assessing action according to these moral types (what I have called ideal models), fono speakers 
“redraw not only a political but a moral map of their community” (174). “Politics,” Duranti 
continues, “is about selecting the people that fit the descriptions of the icons created by the moral 
flow” (175). Duranti’s claim about the moral flow of information is helpful in the Omani case. 
The ‘āzī itself is a mapping of a moral type onto the figure of the Sultan, who in turn is praised 
for his continued fulfillment of obligations. The denseness of praise as a linguistic gift is an 
index of the power of the generosity that prompted it and the moral economy in which they are 
mutually embedded. 
 The Sultan is honored by calling his name a treasure, a bond, and a pillar upon which the 
moral economy rests just as he honors the praisers by keeping up his obligations. The state 
stands as a wall-peg, supporting whatever is hung there above the ground and in easy reach. The 
linkage between the ideas is clear: the bond is a promise, holding to a pledge, protected and 
valued as a treasured object, while the pillar holds something up. In this case, the actions are 
conflated. First, it is the raising of the wall-pegs (witād), which, following Vanpee, refers to the 
social obligations that constrain the ruler at the heart of the ruler-ruled mutual relationship. 
Second, the Sultan is honored by his fulfilling and holding fast to that pledge, making his name a 
“bond” to his people who in turn “bear witness” to his just acts. Finally, we can understand that 
this fulfillment of mutual obligations is a treasure, something to be cherished and from which to 
draw pride. The Sultan is the one who raised Oman to its current level, and it is his continued 
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pledge to do so that engenders such praise. This should be read as a claim to legitimacy based on 
the continued fulfillment of social obligations between rulers and ruled. 
 Despite the linguistic denseness, there is a kind of double masking taking place here. The 
first is that the performance is lip synched, staged, and heavily edited while nevertheless giving 
the impression that it is live, improvised, and spontaneous. The themes of voluntarism 
nevertheless run through these praises, as they do many others. The second is that the poem is 
presented as a genuine public address to the Sultan when it was in fact deliberately produced to 
give that image. While the Sultan personally may have had little to do with the planning, it was a 
small cadre of elites who sought to present these ‘āzī-s as somehow representing the people’s 
opinions and perspectives on the state/Sultan. While the poem may do this, we need to also 
recognize that it may have also formed the basis for ordinary people to form relationships to the 
Sultan/state and Omani cultural distinctiveness more firmly. These genres, charged with 
associations with tradition, armed manliness, and structured class relations, both present the class 
relations desired by elites and offer a way for subordinated classes to internalize, integrate, and 
naturalize these structures of inequality as part and parcel of Omani state society. 
Poems like this offer an opportunity to help define persons in social, historical, and 
cultural space, and certainly help to sharpen the image of the social relations that define inclusion 
in the Omani state. This is not a trivial or unimportant function, especially in the current political 
climate that seeks to claim distinctive cultural heritages for each Gulf state, as we witnessed in 
the second opening anecdote. This is what was meant by the “mythopoetic” function of poetry 
from earlier chapters: the social relations modeled in the choreography and imagery of the poetry 
bring those social relations from material to ideological life. They draw lessons and moral 
implicature from the material relations of inequality and generosity to the social relations of 
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dependency, leadership, and legitimacy. At the same time, they furnish actors with emotionally 
invigorating symbols and connections that serve to solidify identities and affiliations. 
 Not all performances model mutual obligations with the state. Compare the remarks 
about money in the opening ethnographic description with another such episode, involving an 
Egyptian business owner trying to hire the same group for a short performance in Muscat. 
Trading WhatsApp audio messages back and forth, the group leader demanded over 500 OMR 
(1300.39 USD) for the performance, which the Egyptian thought was ridiculous. “The arts are 
not cheap,” my friend chided, winking at me. Here, the group leader was taking advantage of the 
lack of a relationship between himself and the Egyptian—the exchange of money would 
terminate their relationship, and so therefore was the only real reason to perform. Elites of this 
kind hire performance troupes to mark particular occasions and to be seen as patrons of Omanis 
and their culture, even if they themselves have virtually no interest or regard for it. I have 
witnessed many of these events, ranging from the opening of table tennis tournaments to opening 
shopping malls and auto dealerships. Steiner’s (2018) work helps us to understand why these 
kinds of events are similar to state spectacles, and yet why they do not inspire any sense of 
mutual obligation and focus on monetary exchange.  
Similarly, for National Day celebrations, many civic bodies hire performance troupes to 
give an ‘āzī or even to make a film demonstrating their devotion and national pride. These events 
as well demand monetary recompense. One useful example of this is an ‘āzī video160 prepared by 
civic leaders in Ṣuḥār in the summer of 2017 on the occasion of the Sultan’s trip to the coastal 
city. As the ‘āzī declares, “this voice is meant for the public / I verse this ‘āzī to spread it far and 
                                                          
160Almawahib Adam. “Farḥa al-Saba‘īn | Al-‘īd al-waṭanī 47” [The Happiness of the 70s | 
National Day 47]. Online Video Clip. YouTube. YouTube, 19 November 2017. Web. 19 Nov. 
2017.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15g7ypL2jA0#action=share  
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wide.” The video then shows the huge new Sultan Qābūs mosque accompanying the line, “Pride 
dresses her, Ṣuḥār,” using the literal term for dressing oneself with clothing. The Sultan Qābūs 
mosques (jāmi‘) are an obvious example of the generosity of the Sultan and the directedness of 
his developmental projects. Most large cities now boast these huge buildings, similar in 
architecture and in purpose. Next, the ‘āzī continues:  
We monitor your arrival every year / And the viewers, by God, are like a flood  
To joyfully celebrate the coming / to the fertile land, never left to desolation. 
Here, the poet presents Ṣuḥār as a land of plenty that has nevertheless been “dressed” by pride, 
meaning this Sultan or his guided development. Now, the people of Ṣuḥār await his yearly 
arrival and boast that they have not let their land become “desolate,” demonstrating that they do 
not take the Sultan’s gifts for granted. Typically, this ‘āzī lacks the beginning ṣayḥāt and the 
proper praise to God and the Prophet before expounding on the main theme, marking it as an 
example of a performance that is either more mimicked than based on expertise or shortened to 
appeal to modern tastes, as we saw with the Emirati case in the opening ethnographic examples 
in this chapter. 
 Short videos like this are common. I was invited to the filming of one in the Interior town 
of Ādam, in which the Firqat al-‘Arabī was hired to star in a local music video to be called 
“Farḥat al-saba‘īn,” “The Happiness of ’70,”161 referencing the year Qābūs seized power. 
Organized by some of the wealthier inhabitants of Ādam, the film was designed to be a reflection 
of the “spirit” of the town throughout the nahḍa. The razḥa and ‘āzī for the event were written 
and recorded prior to the event, and the Firqa from Manaḥ was largely expected to lip-synch to 
the song and be filmed. The location of the film was in the old town center of Ādam, in the shade 
                                                          
161 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GKagsdYNtRw  
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of the tremendous ghāf tree named Ṣubāra, surrounded by the old abandoned shelters of the 
families who now lived out near the ring road. The film crew, local to Ādam, welcomed the 
Firqa members warmly but quickly set to work getting light levels and setting up cameras. After 
briefly considering putting me in the film, they began playing the song through several 
loudspeakers and coaxing the group to dance. 
Farḥat al-saba‘īn min ’a‘āda, 
 Qādihā al-sulṭān min ṣāna‘, 
Wa-l-’ā‘ādī mā lahā qādar, 
 Fī haymat sulṭānnā wa-‘umānnā  
 
The happiness of ’70 once again! 
The Sultan guided it from its first construction. 
And enemies have no power,  
in [the face of] the overwhelming love our Sultan and our Oman. 
 
Music example  8. A razḥa composed for a praise video for the 47th National Day 
celebrations. 
They began by using their drums, which led to a confusion over dance steps, specifically whether 
they were to dance with the song or the drums. The final cut of the song used hand-played drums 
rather than the striker and switch they filmed for the video. The solution to the dancing problem 
414 
 
 
 
was playing the recorded song even louder, since no audio was being recorded anyway. Soon 
though, the director called for a cut and demanded that something be put over a distracting 
electrical socket in the frame behind the group. A production assistant ran up and put a thermos 
in front of it, which drew a bark from the director: 
“Not that, put something historical there! Put a sword or something!” 
The assistant dutifully ran off to a corner where a number of historical objects lay in a 
pile. He quickly grabbed a broken jahla water jug and leaned it against the socket; this was 
deemed to be pretty good. 
Later, when the actors came to perform the ‘āzī, I sat with a group of locals as they took 
in the whole performance. After a few aborted takes, the group was restless. 
 “Listen, brother, you’ve got to raise your voice,” one complained, turning to another, “tell 
him he’s got to raise his voice.” 
 The performer snapped back between takes, wiping sweat from his brow. “Shouting 
won’t do anything, it’s already recorded!” 
“Anyway,” the peanut gallery continued, “you’ve got to raise the sword and shake it (‘izz 
wa-tihizz)! If you don’t do that, don’t call it an ‘āzī. Do it! You need to look strong, you just look 
hot.” 
I asked him if he knew a lot about the arts: “No, not really,” he replied, “I just know he’s 
not doing it well.” 
This was an interesting conclusion, because this ‘āzī was unlike any other I have seen. It 
was very produced, involving a range of vocal skills that are not historically part of ‘āzī practice 
and that trend more towards ānashīd styling. Second, while this ‘āzī also eliminated the ṣayḥāt, 
two main singers traded lines back and forth, which, for most ‘āzī practitioners, would disqualify 
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it entirely. This was, to me, similar to the attempts of Emirati producers to arrange the ‘āzī in a 
way that was more modern and, perhaps, more amenable to current production standards. The 
poem itself praised the Sultan in typical ways, tracing him back to his ancestors and noting how 
his rule was a continuation of their pattern.  
What these two kinds of productions reveal is the way that “civil” institutions (recording 
companies, singers, local elites) are involved in the creation and solidification of state hegemony 
in this context. Yet they lack the gravitas and sense of deep mutualism that animate 
performances directly patronized by the state. It is clear that few if any of the participants outside 
of the Firqat al-‘Arabī had much knowledge about the actual performance of razḥa and ‘āzī, but 
it had become enough of a symbol of national pride, expressed in “traditional” terms, that it 
could be mimicked with a certain verisimilitude. This leads to an important question. Why go to 
the trouble of making these videos if you don’t know how to perform the genres in them? 
Along with Steiner’s work that shows these attempts to represent the elite patron as 
generous and deserving of state support, we should consider this a kind of ethnic boundary 
marking. Expressing a group’s or town’s patriotism and devotion to the Sultan/state in the form 
of razḥa-s and ‘āzī-s makes a certain claim about the links between the performers and the ethnic 
and social character of the state. In this case, the adoption of razḥa and ‘āzī as not only proper, 
but as “traditional,” paints Oman and the performers as an Arab state and renders public 
declamations of patriotism as masculine. Razḥa is demonstrably a public, male, and Arab 
performance genre that is addressed to worldly power. Razḥa-s, historically, were undoubtedly 
performed by men and by Arabs, and so this link is logical. But not everyone even heard these 
genres, let alone performed them—certainly not even all “Arabs” in interior Oman. The 
boundaries of modern Oman contain many groups who perform in many ways. Ādam, in fact, is 
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a town with a strong Bedouin element, and yet no sign of this is apparent in the video purporting 
to represent it. Afro-Omani practices are not subject to nearly the level of elite interest as razḥa 
but especially ‘āzī, even though they command large audiences when performed. Similarly, 
Balochi performance practices have been virtually removed from the public eye (though this is 
partially at the request of the Pakistani government). The point remains that the political, public 
praise performance of razḥa and ‘āzī make certain claims about the public character of the state, 
and the identity of the people involved in performance. They are, in part, making a case for 
themselves to be included in the privileged ethnic strata of the state. Elites in Ādam are staking a 
claim in the privileges of belonging to the state in its modern form—Arab, masculine, dignified, 
praising. And yet, Uzi Rabi shows that Sultan Sa‘īd, as late as the 1960s, claimed that it was 
simply a quirk of history that Muscat had Arabic as a lingua franca: he certainly considered 
himself to be more aligned with and similar to the Muslim states of India and Pakistan than the 
wider Arab world (2011, 118-9). Miriam Cooke’s (2014) recent work on the ethnic character of 
Qatar shows how social distinction and ethnicity are bound up together, as well: real Qataris are 
citizens and are Arabs, and are therefore claimants on state prosperity, while those of Persian 
descent (no matter how distant) are second-class. 
This is partly on display in the video taken in Ādam. The actual performers, those 
knowledgeable about these practices, are rendered as a physical, human element of the stage 
dressing. The voices, poetry, drumming, and melodies that they are visually tied to are not their 
own. One member not present at the filming said he was worried that “real lovers of the arts” 
would see the group participating in the faulty ‘āzī and think that they did not know how to do 
the real thing. When I asked why no one corrected them, he replied, “that’s not our place to enter 
into their production like that. They will do as they do.” The response I would have liked to have 
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given is that it was not their place to do as they liked with these performance practices. I would 
have liked to point out that those folks who made the video—who I am sure meant absolutely no 
harm, and acted only out of a sense of national pride and a desire to embrace their local 
performance practices—would never have done so if structural, material, and political 
developments had not made it seem beneficial. This highly centralized authoritarian state, 
predicated on distributive development, exhibits a tacit cultural policy that frames it as Arab, 
masculine, and traditional. Razḥa and ‘āzī have emerged quite specifically as national 
performance practices because they display these qualities as well as demonstrate the proper 
social relationship between the state/Sultan as generous giver and the people as loyal receivers. 
Conclusion 
James Ferguson (2015) has recently reflected on the importance of distribution to the 
future of global economies, as wage work becomes less and less stable and more and more 
scarce. He calls these “distributive livelihoods”—lives that are built not from waged labor, but 
from distribution. Citing work on distributive economies, guaranteed basic incomes, and “just 
giving money to the poor,” Ferguson shows how distribution might be a way of securing humane 
futures in inhumane times. Reading his work, however, one wonders what kinds of responses 
this distribution will bring—and if we have learned anything from reciprocity, it’s that giving 
impels a response, no matter the gulf. Ferguson’s hopes for a distributive politics are predicated 
on being open to surprise and induction, so let me make one such surprising induction here. 
In Oman, relations of dominance and inequality are masked as relations of mutual 
obligation obtaining between the state/Sultan and subordinated classes through the selective 
reinterpretation and staging of a particular set of historically Arab and masculine performance 
practices.  Relations of dominance are, in James Scott and Pierre Bourdieu’s terms, 
418 
 
 
 
“euphemized,” that is, framed as emerging not from domination but as from other social bases: 
leadership, protection, dependency (Bourdieu 1977, 190ff,; Scott 1985, 306-8). Razḥa and ‘āzī 
have had a similar role in connecting rulers and ruled in the past, and the historical imaginings of 
those events help to explain their adoption by authoritarian regimes in the present. Razḥa 
conjures notions of warfare and bellicosity, noble and heroic men, and the mutual bonds that the 
defense of the polity create in service of guaranteeing the continuation of a functioning social 
order. Likewise, ‘āzī turns on the formal mythopoetic confirmation of the links of mutuality that 
obtain between a generous ruler and his body of followers. In tandem, these arts are both a 
potential source of hegemony for the state, but a hazardous one. As Tochka and others have 
shown us, relying on performers to deliver the ideological message of the state is a risk. 
Performance forms have histories just as performers do. The proof of this is the way that 
performers use praise as a moment not only to praise, but to represent themselves, their 
community, and their moral universe. 
By framing state projects of development as generosity, praisers play a crucial role in 
developing and propagating a relationship model that posits the state as generous giver and the 
people as a grateful receiver. For elites, state ceremonies display this tendency most accurately 
and with the least amount of pushback. As I documented in chapter 4, however, performers 
nevertheless present themselves as active, dignified, and powerful equals to the Sultan, in some 
communal moral sense. While the ultimate project of state hegemonic legitimation may be 
tentatively secured as a détente, Omani performers are not wholly “flattened” or encompassed or 
made dependent in the process. If chapter 3 showed us the potential of state giving to produce 
dependency, and chapter 4 documented the ways that performance waylays this potential, 
chapter 6 has shown us the ways that the Omani state has sought to assert itself as the one power 
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to which all others swear allegiance. This assertion has come partly by centralizing praise (which 
was a two-way process of state urging/staging and performers’ active solicitation of state agents 
and resources) and partly by the destruction of political alternatives. While the state may provide 
(for some), it does not provide a choice. 
I have called this the gift of rule: the deliberate framing of political domination as a 
benefit. Framing development as generosity is one way this is accomplished. As Godelier 
pointed out, relations of domination are easier to accept when they seem like part of an ongoing 
exchange. While Godelier’s hypothesis is at least skeptical that this is anything other than a 
legitimating ideology (as we all should be), the Omani data presented here should give us just a 
moment of pause. Praise may offer a way of not just accepting this ideology of exchange as a 
given, but making it at least partially true, in the limited sense of being an actual material 
transfer of goods. What’s good about insisting on the actual material movement of goods is that 
it makes what elites think about that transfer unimportant: the giving is enough. Encouraging, 
developing, and urging the cultivation of generosity in the powerful, and the not-so-powerful, 
may be an important model for a future “distributive politics” on a larger scale. Opening palms 
with praise does not allow them to frame their giving as disinterested nor as altruistic, but as a 
responsibility and an obligation. 
Inculcating generosity in elites through praise may be one of the “small arms in the class 
war” that was stored away too early. It’s a small, innocuous, and unassuming way of shaping the 
behavior of the people who have the potential to do the most good and the most ill. I don’t expect 
that all praise does this, but I think some can. When Omanis praise, they do not just receive the 
gift of rule, they animate various responses and returns to it. Of course, sometimes they don’t. 
But by asserting that this Godelierian exchange between elites and non-elites is not just naked 
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exchange but instead a moral economy in which equal participants are bound by networks of 
historically sedimented obligation, praise may constitute a genuine mechanism that operates on 
the potential dangers of dependency. It might offer a way to shape domination, to accommodate 
it while not exposing oneself to threat. 
 Nevertheless, the détente of hegemony is a neverending chain of move and countermove, 
action and reaction. 
 So praise, in the end, may not be much in the face of all that. But it is something. 
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 .A xidneppA
 noitisopmoc fo etad etamixorppa yb degnarra ,noitatressid siht ni detic s-īzā‘ eht fo stxet cibarA
 .ecnamrofrep dna
 
 ,5 retpahc ni dessucsid ,īṣūrahK-la dihsāR nib milāS māmI fo noitcele eht ta nevig īzā‘ 3191 ehT .1
 .txet yrotisopxe gnidulcni
روصي ، وفيها م عند بيعة الإمام سالم بن راشد الخ٣١٩١قصيدة لفن العازي" يعود تاريخها إلى حوالي عام 
 :ما فيها من روح الحماس والعزة الوطنية من هذا العازي
  
  سميت باسم المبتدي
 والقلب من همي بري
لحزب اشاعت علوم الغافري ( المقصود الشيخ حمير بن ناصر النبهاني الريامي ، حيث كان يعد زعيم 
 الغافري في السلطنة )
 انه ندر وانصب امام
  
 انه ندر وانصب الوف
 وتزامطن عبري وتنوف
 حمير نهم ما حد ينوف
 غير الأرامل والايتام
  
 غير الأرامل اب حلال
 وابرخ عليهم بالاموال
  الشارقة وبلد الشمالمن 
 فوق البهط يلهم طعام
  
 فوق البهط اليهم شراه
 224
 
 
 
 واليهم بديد من الزكاة
 والسالمي ما من قداه
 قالوا مغرب من العام
  
 قالوا مغرب من سنين
  ويحب نصر المسلمين
 قالوا نعم متولمين
 ناس على الطاعة ولام
  
 ناس على الطاعة زهوب
 واستفتحوا بنزوى غروب
  فيها الهبوب القلعة زمر
 قامت تهدم من الدمام
  
 قامت تهدم من الجدر
لذي انتحر يا بن حمد مالك نصر ( يشير الى السيد سيف بن حمد البوسعيدي الذي كان يحكم قلعة نزوى وا
 اثناء الحصار)
 وخلاف ايس من العمر
 بيده شرب كاس الحمام
  
 بيده شرب كاس الممات
 ما تحكيبه معصرات
  العالياتتابع رسوم 
 خيل يقودونه بخطام
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 خيل يقودون اسير
 والجيش في الجامع بخير
 ما حد عضيل ولا كسير
 والنصر بالله والدوام
  
ن قيل أن صاحب هذا العازي للشاعر بريك بن حمود بن خصيب بن سليم بن مبارك بن خنجر بن عمرا
 الرحبي (  بيت ولاد سليم )
 yaD lanoitaN ht04 eht rof īrūrsaM-la yb nettirw dna īqūzraM-la yb dereviled īzā‘ 0102 ehT .2
 nettirw siht ni sekatsim fo rebmun llams a era erehT .0102 ni tacsuM fo edistuo noitarbelec
  .ecnamrofrep lautca eht morf txet eht tcelfer ton od taht noitpircsnart
 ولاء القائد
 . ليف الشاعر: محمد بن حمد بن علي المسروريتأ
 أداء: محمد بن علي بن خميس المرزوقي
 
 الحمدلله المعين 
  فرد ولاقبله بدى
 خالق عباده اجمعين 
 والرزق من كفه مدد
  
  ى خير الانام لصلوا ع
 شفيعنا يوم الندا
 محظوظ من صلى وصام 
 يلقاه في حوض الورد
  
 حيا الزمان ارض الكرام 
  من عهد الأول بالعز
 ياللي احتما بك ما يضام 
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 حاشى ولا يسناه ند
  
 ارض الكرامة والشرف 
 أفعالها مضرب مثل
 مصيونة بسيوف وشلف 
 عن كل مهذار وحسد
  
 يغشى سماها م البدور 
 وافي عددهن أربعين
 كلهن على بهجة وحبور 
 والفرح فيهن ما يعد
  
 من مطلع المشرق نشب 
 على الدنا ضح الجبين
  ياتنا بين الشهب را
 تخفق بها الكوس وتعد
  
 عين علت كبد السماء 
 تغشى مطالعها بنور
 من حملها غيض العداء 
 وتنير كل جبل وهد
  
 تهدي الفيافي بنورها 
 من غير هذرات وغرور
 حد تمن سفورها 
 524
 
 
 
 من كان في عينه رمد
  
 عمان دار الأكرمين 
 على ذراها الدهر شب
 من فضل رب العالمين 
 متبسمة بوجه السعد
  
 عمان دهرك في سرور 
 والسعد من وردك شرب
 تهدي الفيافي في صح نور 
 كم حايض حوضك ورد
  
 عمان دمتي في ثبات 
 لك حاضر زاهي الجبين
 مجدك على في الذاريات 
 سساني على روس الوتد
  
 أمس حويتي الطايلات 
 والعز في أرضك عرين
 من فكر عالي الدرجات 
  غمدسيف تجلى من 
  
 ما شاغل الرأي الوهم 
 لما بنوا عز مكين
 تروي ضحى أسالفهم 
 624
 
 
 
 من دم كل غازي وفد
  
 ثنى العدوو يسحب خطاه 
 ذابت غيوم الطامعين
 لما تبادت للجباه 
  أسياف من براق رد
  
 عمان يا عز العرين 
 لأهل الندى والمكرمات
 خابت ظنون الجاحدين 
 شعبك على العلياء وطد
  
 إنا لعزك مخلصين 
 يا أرض عالين الصفات
 آباء كنا أو بنين 
 عهد دمانا له شهد
  
 جيناك يا نسل الكرام 
 جينا نلبي دعوتك
 كلنا فيدك سيف هذام 
 والحر ما يثني الوعد
  
 ما ننظره شهد الرضاب 
 لما تعلى رايتك
 جيناك من شيب وشباب 
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 أمرك على الجمع وفرد
  
 سلطاننا عالي النسب 
  نسل الأكرمين بالعز
 نالت عمان بكم رتب 
 نحو المعالي تنفرد
  
 قابوس سلطان البلاد 
 نشهد لعدلك أجمعين
 يامن تعليت الوتاد 
 وتشرفت باسمك سند
 remialced dna teop emas eht htiw ,5102 ni seitivitsef yaD lanoitaN ht54 eht ta nevig īzā‘ ehT .3
 .evoba ,2 īzā‘ sa
  النهضة فخر واعتزاز بقائد
 .تأليف الشاعر: محمد بن حمد بن علي المسروري
 أداء: محمد بن علي بن خميس المرزوقي
 
 الحمد لله الأحد
 الدائم الفرد الصمد 
 ما له شريك ولا ولد
 رب تعلى في علاه 
 والعز بالله يدوم 
  
 صلوا على سيد الأنام 
 اللي أتى بشرع السلام 
 ما طاف بالبيت الحرام 
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  نتهاه عامر بحجه م 
 والعز بالله يدوم
  
 المجد في أرض الكرم 
 نظراته أعلى من القمم  
 بين الكواكب والنجم
 رفت علمنا والقناة 
 والعز بالله يدوم  
  
 عمان من ماضي الزمان 
 المجد فيها له مكان
 ما زفها للمهرجان 
 كل من يحدث له صباه 
 والعز بالله يدوم  
  
 أعلى الجبال الراسيات
 يلها رسوم عاليات  
 كل الفيافي شاهدات
 فعل الصناديد الكماة  
 والعز بالله يدوم
  
 ما با نعدد ماضيات 
 لأهل الفعل والطايلات 
 يشهد رقاب العاصيات 
 إنا لها سيوفن مضاه 
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 والعز بالله يدوم 
  
 عمان المجد الرفيع
 غاية فعلها والصنيع 
 و لي ما رضى تالي سميع 
  فاهالعقل يغلبها الش 
 والعز بالله يدوم 
  
 عمان يا سامع افهم 
 من قبل مالك بن فهم 
 حازت من العليا سهم 
 التالي ما نسمع نداه 
 والعز بالله يدوم 
  
 عمان يا شأن سليم 
 يا أرض كل حر كريم 
 يا شمس ما يغشاه غيم 
 في كل أرض الله وفضاه 
 والعز بالله يدوم 
  
 عمان حاضرها شروق
  البروقما يماثله لمع  
 أعلى الكواكب فوق فوق 
 شأن إلى العليا نداه 
 والعز بالله يدوم 
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 علا بها الفذ الشهم
 رمز الكرامة والشيم 
 صان الأمانة والذمم  
 للي نصا داره وفضاه
 والعز بالله يدوم 
  
 كل العدا والطامعين 
 في رقابهم ذمات دين 
 ثنوا لمسقط طالبين 
 والكف للخالق دعاه 
  بالله يدوموالعز  
  
 ياللي تبع هذا الرسم 
 مسقط تنادي له نعم 
 لو كان في ماضيه ذم 
 نصفح عن الماضي وأساه 
 والعز بالله يدوم  
  
 سلطاننا من أصل سيد
 من نسل أحمد بن سعيد 
 ذو الحكمة والرأي السديد 
 شهم وحي الله نباه  
 والعز بالله يدوم
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 يا سيدي أمرك مصان  
 في كل حالات الزمان 
 ذراع لك وانت الأمان 
 شاري ولك حكم الشراة
 والعز بالله يدوم 
  
 قابوس سلطان البلاد 
 يا جود رحمة للعباد  
 كل الرواسي والوهاد 
 تهتف لقابوس وفداه 
 والعز بالله يدوم
 .6102 ni āra‘aM-la ni hctip reccos eht ta ḥāllaM-la ‘ībaR yb nevig dna nettirw īzā‘ ehT .4
 
 سميت به رب الجلال
 قيوم حي ولا يزال
 وبنثر سلام كالزلال
 للضيف والجمع الرحيب
 
 حييت يا نسل الكرام
 شرفت أهلك والمقام
 واهديتنا منك وسام
 يا مبدع القول العجيب
 
 يا مبدع قول وفن
 يل هادئ الطبع اشجن
 حن دارنا تعزف لحن
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 متباشرة بك يا لبيب
 
 اما سمعنا بخيتك
  حضور في حضرتك جينا
 يا سيدي ذي طلتك
 نفخر بها وبدون ريب
 
 سيد وبن سيد بجد
 انت يا خالد بن حمد
 لو قمت بأفعالك أعد
 قلمي ما ظنه يستجيب
 
 كل دار تبنى بالرجال
 لما تتعاضد بالرجال
 أما الكسل ماله مجال
 لا من بعيد ولاقريب
 
 هذه همم كل الشباب
 خاضوا التحدي والصعاب
  الصواب واللي مشي درب
 لا يمكن أفعاله تغيب
 
 هذه عوائدنا في منح
 نحيي الرسوم اللي تصح
 قابوس علمنا وتصح
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 قابوس للأمة طبيب
 
 يا ديرتي المعرى سلام
 نلتي فخر نلتي احترام
 حولك رجالات نشام
 هذا ماهو شيء غريب
 
 والخاتمة أرجو العذر
 والوقت بالسرعة يمر
 لو كان لي زايد سطر
  مغيبلعزيت إلى قرب ال
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Appendix B. 
1. Arabic Oral Poetry and Prosody. 
The prosody of the Omani oral performance practices studied in this dissertation can be parsed 
using both qualitative meter (i.e., syllabic weight, stress, and rhythm) and quantitative meter (i.e., 
formal patterns of long and short segmental units). As Liebhaber (2010) points out, the divide in 
counting qualitative and quantitative metrics in Arabian poetics is “unsatisfactorily resolved” 
(163) and therefore requires some comment. 
The relation between text, recitation, and melodic performance is complex and amenable to 
analysis. Rather than take up melody here as well, I focus on text and recitation. Following the 
lead of interlocutors, I analyzed poems either as recited or as sung.  
2. Method.  
The method I employed was a mix of tactics found in Caton (1984, 1990), Sowayan (1982, 
1985), Kurpershoek (1994-2005), Palva (1993), and Liebhaber (2010, 2011), and Peutz (2008).  
In counting quantitative meters, I grouped segments into two categories: long (–) and short (u) by 
noting consonants (C), short vowels (v) and long vowels (V) following Caton (1984, 45-122) and 
others.  
Long segments: CV, CvC, CVC, CvCC [CVCC] 
Short segments: Cv [vC] 
Breaking the poetic line into these segments does not respect word boundaries but instead 
focuses on the sound of the spoken line. As noted by Caton (1984) and Sowayan (1982, 1985) 
some typical features of recitation are the elision of the al- article, linking consonants across 
word boundaries, and vowel addition (anaptyxis) or deletion (catalexis), among others explored 
below. 
In order to analyze qualitative meters, I follow the stress patterns that I elicited and recorded or 
identified myself and verified in discussion.  
Two stress weights occur a “strong” beat (rendered in CAPITALs) and a “weak” beat (rendered 
normally). 
e.g., ṣa-BAḤT ‘u-MĀN al-YAWM … 
According to Bailey (1991), the number of weak stresses between strong stresses may vary 
widely and exhibit no obvious pattern. The focus is only on the strong stresses.  
Liebhaber (2010) concludes that differences between quantitative and qualitative meters may be 
reduced to the difference between recitation and singing, but this conclusion may be premature 
because of the wide variety of changes that sung poetic lines undergo. Poems can sometimes 
differ drastically when they are recited or sung (a feature noted by many other Arabists). Long 
vowels can be elongated (e.g., salāāām) or shortened (fī > f-; ‘alā > ‘a-), consonants may be run 
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together (al-mu‘aẓẓam > l-ma‘ẓam), tanwīn consonants elided in speech may sometimes appear 
(e.g., bi-‘ibir > bi-‘ibirin), and vowels may be systematically inserted (wa-l-ḥilla > awal-ay-ya-
ḥilla-’uh). Not all of these changes cause poetic lines to more closely correspond to quantitative 
meters, but may be attempts to align along different axes (rhythmic feel, dance steps, etc.). 
3. Quantitative Meters. 
As a quantitative example, all ‘āzī-s analyzed in this corpus use a form of the classic quantitative 
meter rajaz, whose basic four-segment foot can be rendered: 
| – – u – | or | u – u – | or | – u u – | (for this final variant see Shibi 2018) 
Rajaz is by far the most commonly used quantitative poetic meter in the corpus I analyze. 
However, it appears in couplets of two feet each rather than the classical three. For example, the 
first line of an ’alifiyya or “alphabetical” ‘āzī: 
نيملسملا لاط ب ءابلا 
نينس نم دياوع مُهلإ   
نيدهاجم امايو اماي 
تانفاصلا لويخلا جوف    
Al-bā’ biṭāl al-muslimīn, 
 ’Ilhum ‘awāyid min sinīn; 
Yāmā wa yāmā mugāhidīn, 
 Fawg al-khayūl al-ṣāfināt! 
 
The [letter] bā’: Bravest of the Muslims, 
 They have had their ways for years. 
Over and over striving [in battle], 
 On their swift-footed horses! 
 
Dividing the lines as above we find: 
| al.     bā’.     bi.     ṭā.    //     lal.     mus.   li.     mīn. | 
| –        –         u       –     //      –        –       u        –    | 
| CvC. CVC   Cv   CVC //   CvC   CvC   Cv   CVC  | 
And so on: 
  | ’il.     hum.  ‘a.     way. //     yid.   min.   si.      nīn.  | 
  |  yā.     mā.    wa.   yā.   //    mām.   gā.    hi.     dīn.  | 
  |  Faw.  gal.     khi.  yā.   //     laṣ.       ṣā.    fi.     nāt.  |    
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Here we have two couplets of two feet of rajaz for a total of eight feet. Some notable analytical 
features are the linking of the final “mīm” of yāmā with the initial “mīm” of mugāhidīn and the 
elision of the short vowel “u” in the final foot of the third line. Final consonants join al- articles 
that follow them (e.g., between the feet of line 1 and 4). It should also be noted this is not CLA 
but Omani dialectical (‘awā’id  > ‘awayid; fawq > fawg written with a jīm; antique terms like 
biṭāl; and colloquialisms like yāmā wa yāmā). Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that 
quantitative meters necessarily moved with retentions of a Classical speech patterns. 
Anaptyxis is also common in quantitative meters. The 40th National Day ‘āzī, for example, is 
fully composed in rajaz when anaptyctic syllables are added: 
،دلابلا ناطلس سوباق 
  نيعمجأ كلدعل دهشن    
،داتولا تيلعت نماي 
  دنس كمساب تفرشتو    
Qābūs, sulṭān al-bilād,  
nashad li-‘adilak ’ajma‘īn. 
Yā man ta‘alayt al-witād,  
wa-tasharrafat bi-’ismak sanad. 
 
Qābūs, Sultan of the lands! 
We are all witness to your justice. 
O, you who raised the wall-pegs, 
You are honored by your name being treasure and pillar and bond.  
 
  | qā.       bū.      s(i).     sul.   //   ṭā.     nal.    bi.    lād.   |   
|  –      –         u          –      //   –        –       u       –     | 
| CV    CV       Cv      CvC   //  CV   CvC    Cv  CVC | 
And so on: 
| nash.   had.      li.       ‘ad.    // lik.      ’aj.    ma.  ‘īn   | 
| yā.      man.     ta.       ‘al.    //  lay.    tal.     wi.   tād.  | 
| wat.    shar.     ra.         fat.  // bis.     mak.   sa.   nad. |    
In this case, a final short vowel “i” is added to the third segment (“s”) of the first line, which in 
written form simply ends the word Qābūs. These anaptyctic vowels are justified in Caton 1982 
and in subsequent studies. This insertion makes the modified rajaz meter perfectly regular. 
Catalexis is also common. For example, take this inherited razḥa, which also exhibits rajaz, but 
concludes with a three-segment foot: 
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ةلحلاو رادلا ىلع يملاس رثنأ 
ةناردغلا كليسي ليسلا لثم  
هلشي دح ام يكبي برط 
 سانلاو ربعب يكبيةنلاسك    
Inthar salāmī ‘alā al-dār wa-l-ḥilla, 
 mithl al-sayl yisaylik al-ghadrāna 
ṭarab yabkī mā ḥadd yishilluh, 
 yabkī bi-‘ibr wa nās kaslāna 
 
Spread my greetings to the homeland and the encampments, 
 Like the soft rain drizzling down to you [and settling in] small, clear pools. 
Ṭarab weeps [because] no one sings the poetic line, 
 It weeps to its heart and the people are lazy. 
 
  | ’In. thār. sa. lā  / mī. ‘al.  ad. dār. / wal. ḥil. la  | 
  |  –      –    u   –   /  –     –    u    –    /    –     –   u  | 
  |  mith. lis. sa. yil / yi. say. li. kal. ghad. rān. na | 
  |      –     –   u    –  / u    –    u    –   /  –       –    u  | 
 
For example, a poem by Khalfān of the Firqat al-Ma‘amad discussed 258ff.: 
مظعملا سوباقل الله ملاس لوأ 
كمو دوجب ضاف انيلع يليتامور   
معنلا اربخ يف مويلا نامع تحبص 
تلائاط يف نينس ديدم هرمع اللهايو  
   
‘Awal salām allah li-Qābūs al-mu‘aẓẓam 
Yalī ‘alaynā fāḍ bigūd wa makrūmāt, 
Ṣabaḥt ‘umān al-yawm fī khabr al-nu‘am 
Wa yā allah ‘amru madīd sanīn (fī) ṭā’ilāt 
 
First, God’s greeting to Qābūs the great, 
 He rules over us, overflowing with generous gifts and benefits, 
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Oman awoke today to blessed news, 
O God, his age great, years of might. 
 
In this case, no perfect repeated quantitative patterns emerge due to repeated breaks and 
modified feet, but rajaz is a good first approximation.  
  | u – u – / u – u – / – – u – / – | 
  | u – u – / – – u – / u – – – | 
  | u – u – / – – – – / u – u – | 
  | u – – – / u – u – / – – u – | 
 
4. Qualitative Meters. 
If grouping segments in this way did not yield a pattern, I elicited recitations or sent recordings 
of my recitations to interlocutors to judge accuracy. This often resulted in an obvious qualitative 
pattern. 
In terms of syllabic weight, a qualitative analysis of the last poem analyzed yields: 
’a-WAL     sa-LĀM  a-LLAH,    li-QĀ-    būs AL-   mu-‘AṬṬ-am  
ya- LĪ        ‘a-LAY-  nā FĀḌ,     bi-GŪD  wa MAK-rū-MĀT   
ṣa- BAḤT ‘u-MAN   al-YAWM, fī KHAB ri  AL-   nu-‘ĀM    
wa YĀ       a-LLAH ‘am-RU       ma-DĪD   sa-NĪN   fī   ṬĀ   -’i- LĀT     
Here, alternating syllabic stresses yield a clear rhythmic pattern of six stressed beats and payoff 
of a final additional stressed beat in the final line. This “additional” beat’s arrival is hinted at in 
the first line’s final unstressed beat, compared to the middle two lines concluding with a strong 
stress. Here, the quantitative meter and the qualitative meter present alternate analyses. 
In cases where quantitative meter is wholly inaccurate, such as this razḥa analyzed in 419ff., 
qualitative metric structures are more parsimonious. 
ةورملا باحصأ اي الله عادو يف 
يداوجلأا داز نم يفاو مكدوج   
ةوخملا عادو يف انعداوتل 
يدلابلا رياسو مياش مكدنع  
Fī widā’ allah yā ’aṣḥāb al-maruwwa’! 
 Jawdukum wāfī min zād al-’ajawwadī. 
Li-tuwāda‘inā fī widā’ al-makhūwwa! 
‘andukum shāyim wa sayīr al-bilādī 
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Farewell! Go with God, O you exemplars of manly virtue! 
 Your generosity is ample and increases generosity yet more, 
We take our leave in brotherly farewell; 
 You have amongst you one of great virtue, leaving our lands. 
 
In this case, the abundance of “long” segments precludes a clear or even implied quantitative 
pattern. Yet, following Bailey (1991) and Liebhaber (2010), a clear qualitative pattern emerges: 
four strong stress lines followed by three strong stress lines. The variable number of unstressed 
beats are typical of qualitative poetic meters. 
 
fī wi-DĀ‘ a    -LLAH yā ’aṣ   -ḤĀB al-a-ma -RU  -wwa 
jaw-du-kum    WĀ     fī   min  ZĀD al-a-ju   -WA  -dī 
li-tu -WA-da‘  NĀ     fī   wi    -DĀ‘ al-a-ma -KHU-wwa 
‘an -du-kum    SHĀ- yim wa   SĀ- yir al-bi  -LĀ  -dī   
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